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encourage good governance, to promote a culture of human rights, and to build state 
institutions to support these policies have also been examined with a view to determining 
the nature of the state that evolved in Namibia. Finally, the study carries out a democratic 
audit of Namibia using Swedish normative tools. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation examines significant events in the process of state fonnation in Namibia 
and provides an insight into the role played by various actors involved in shaping the 
evolution of Namibia as a state, such as the Namibians, their liberation movement 
SWAPO, successive colonizing powers (Gennany and South Africa), OAU, the Frontline 
States, the international community, and particularly the United Nations. It is argued that 
the international actors' role in the process of state fonnation in Namibia was driven by 
their desire to ensure their continued influence in Namibia for their own benefit. Self-
interest of the West in Namibia was driven by the geopolitical imperatives of the cold 
war, and preserving western economic interests. 
In Namibia, which was a settler colony, self-interest also gained a racial dimension as the 
West sought to protect the interests of white settlers. The case is made that impetus to 
resolve the Namibian question had to await a number of streams coming together - the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the complexion of geopolitics; deeper 
involvement of the Cubans in Angola threatened South Africa; Constitutional Principles 
put forward by the Western Five (U.S.A., the United Kingdom, Gennany, Canada, and 
France) ensured continued protection of the economic interests of the West and the 
protection of the interests of the settlers; and success of Namibians' struggle at the 
international fora and on the battlefield catalyzed the coming together of various streams. 
This constellation of events ensured Namibia's independence in 1990. 
The study also examines how Namibians sought to build a reconciled society out of 
ethnically and racially stratified, diverse and often antagonistic groups. This process was 
begun with the drafting of the constitution by the Constituent Assembly. The first 
government's initiatives to promote democracy and a policy of reconciliation, to improve 
the life condition of the previously disadvantaged groups through affinnative action, to 
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encourage good governance, to promote a culture of human rights, and to build state 
institutions to support these policies have also been examined with a view to determining 
the nature of the state that evolved in Namibia. Finally, the study carries out a democratic 
audit of Namibia using Swedish normative tools. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Curiosity and necessity are the primary motives underlying human 
inquiry. Either we seek to understand the world around us for the sake of 
knowledge, or we seek to understand it so that we may protect or better 
our lot in it. Whichever is the case, our knowledge often brings with it, at 
least potentially, a recognition of certain ways to improve upon things as 
they are. 
Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich} 
Background 
I undertook this research more out of necessity than out of curiosity. As Manheim and 
Rich point out, knowledge gained from research helps us unearth problems and at the 
same time helps us "improve upon things as they are" -- in other words knowledge gained 
through research helps us identify problems and find solutions to the problems. My 
objective in undertaking this research was to seek out problems, challenges and 
opportunities for Namibia in the areas of state formation, including strengthening 
democracy and good governance. 
State formation is impacted by history. In Africa, slave trade and colonialism all but 
destroyed traditional social and political institutions. States that began to emerge during 
the colonial era were transplants from Europe, and their structures were designed to 
exploit the continent's resources, both material and human, for the benefit of the 
metropolitan country. In other words, the history of colonialism in Africa has been the 
history of exploitation of the continent by European empires in their own struggle for 
supremacy through expanding their territorial conquests, controlling maritime traffic, 
acquiring new sources of raw materials, and finding new markets for their goods. 
I Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich (1995), Empirical Political Analysis - Research Methods in 
Political Science. 4th ed., White Pains, N.Y., Longman, p.l. 
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A significant thrust for the carving up of Africa came at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference 
"to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which might in future arise from new acts 
of occupation (prises de possession) on the coast of Africa.,,2 In the continent's 
geopolitical history, another major thrust, an anti-colonial thrust, came in the post World 
War II era, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s when indigenous populations of many 
countries began to demand independence. 
In the four decades following World War II, pressures exerted by the people of the 
colonies made it non-viable for the colonizing states to continue to hold on to their 
colonial empires. These pressures were largely peaceful but invariably included threat of 
violence by individuals, political organizations and liberation movements in the colonies. 
Even when independence movements, such as those led by Nkrumah, the founding father 
of Ghana, or Kaunda, the founding father of Zambia, talked about non-violence, their 
support amongst the majority carried an implicit threat of violence. On the other hand, 
independence movements in some colonies, such as Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Mozambique, other Portuguese colonies, South Africa and Namibia, had to go one step 
further and resort to violence and armed struggle for securing the independence of their 
countries. 
One distinguishing feature between the colonies that achieved independence largely 
peacefully and those whose inhabitants had to resort to armed struggle was that the latter 
were settler-colonies with large populations from the colonizing states. One could argue 
that the colonizing states' interests in the non-settler colonies were largely geopolitical 
and economic, and racism was used peripherally to further these interests. However, their 
interests in the settler-colonies were influenced also by their desire to protect the interests 
of settler populations. Racism was used as a policy instrument to further not only the 
2 General Act of the Conference of Berlin of the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, 
Turkey and the United States Dealing with Africa. In Fred L. Israel (ed.) (1967), Major Peace Treaties of 
Modern History, 1648-1967,11, New York, Chelsea House Publishers. The treaty was not ratified by the 
United States. 
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interests of the colonizing states but also those of settler communities. Consequently, in 
settler-colonies racial issues became very significant during their struggle for liberation.3 
Policies of job reservation, and discouraging of social interaction across races and 
cultures pursued during the colonial era stratified various societies. In settler colonies, 
colonial rulers had segregated dwelling areas, such as the Katuturas and Sowetos of this 
world. Social intermixing was not only frowned upon but was unacceptable and illegal. 
Access to jobs, education, health services, and other opportunities was stratified 
according to colour and ethnicity. Such imposed structures could not provide a basis for 
integration after independence. 
Even when it became clear to the colonizing states that it was no longer viable to hold on 
to their colonies, these states and their western allies sought to manage events and 
outcomes that would ensure the protection of their geopolitical, economic and ethnic 
interests after their colonies became independent. Therefore, they not only attempted to 
manage the outcome of transition to independence but also created conditions that 
ensured their continued economic and geopolitical influence in the newly emerged 
independent nations.4 
This interest in creating geopolitical and economic spheres of influence was particularly 
enhanced during the cold war era. As the colonial powers were all European or ethnically 
European, their desire for creating and securing geopolitical and economic spheres of 
influence found expression in the old themes of racial 'supremacy'. In fact, these themes 
were never far from the surface in the colonial powers' calculations in their interaction 
with the newly independent states. Protection of the interests of settler white communities 
was seen by the colonizing states to fit seamlessly into this approach. 
3 See Basil Davidson (1992), The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, New 
York, Random House. 
4 See for instance, Ibbo Mandaza (ed.) (1986), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, 
Dakar, CODESRlA. 
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Efforts to ensure geopolitical and economic dominance and continued protection of the 
interests of the whites took many shapes. First, in their dealings with their erstwhile 
colonies, these states took an anti-socialist, anti-communist stance; then they linked aid to 
anti-nationalization policies. Of late, emphasis of the European states' relations with the 
African states has shifted to issues such as democracy, human rights, particularly 
property rights, and compensation to the settler community if 'their' properties were 
taken over by the state. In their approach towards African states, interests, views and 
cultures of the indigenous populations were of little consequence. Policies of these states, 
for instance, did not take into account the plight of the indigenous landless but focused on 
ensuring that settler whites did not lose land regardless of the way they acquired that 
land. This one-sided relationship created some unique social, political and economic 
problems for the governments of newly independent countries. 
People seeking independence, on the other hand, focused their initiatives on seeking 
support of the international community and sometimes launched armed struggle to 
achieve their objective. Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, 
United Nations General Assembly, and many individual countries supported their effort. 
People who had gained their independence sought also to ensure that their rights as 
citizens of independent states were continually strengthened. Country after country 
therefore sought ways to empower indigenous populations through land reform, 
affirmative action, and socio-economic policies that were often very different from those 
desired by the European states. 
Thus, those who had colonized Africa, and those who were colonized sought to promote 
their own interests. However, it needs to be emphasized that self-interest cannot and 
should not be trashed in itself. As Rabbi Hillel5 had said some two thousand years ago, 
"If I am not for myself, who is for meT' He goes on, however, to put a limit on self-
interest, "But if I am only for myself, what am IT' Interpreting Hillel's questions, Rae6 
suggests, "We need to go beyond the pursuit of self-interest to an understanding of the 
S Quoted in Bob Rae (1998), The Three Questions: Prosperity and Public Good, Toronto, Viking, p. 9. 
6 Ibid., p. 11. 
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responsibilities we have for other people." Hillel's questions haunt us at every stage as 
we deal with the role of individuals, the government, the private sector, the civil society, 
globalisation, capitalism or socialism. 
This process of promoting their interests was and continued to be defined by various 
parties always taking a cold, hard look at where they were coming from, i.e., their 
strengths and weaknesses; seeking to define where they wanted to go, i.e., what 
objectives would perpetuate their geopolitical and economic self-interests; and focusing 
relentlessly on issues that helped them move toward their goal. Zimbabwe's example 
provides an illustration of how various parties sought to promote their interests. The 
constitution imposed on Zimbabwe by the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) 
guaranteed white representation in the parliament for a fixed period, but after the expiry 
of seven years, Zimbabwe scrapped these provisions. In Namibia, on the other hand, 
SWAPO was able to resist the West's efforts to impose a constitution but had to accept 
certain Constitutional Principles that guaranteed property rights and job security for the 
whites. 
Taking specific Namibian examples and concentrating on a few significant events, this 
study examines the pathogenesis of Namibia's social, political and economic problems 
and their linkage with the western nations' desire to protect their interests without regard 
for the wishes of Africans. Equally, this study seeks to gain an insight into how 
representatives of the people seeking independence and statehood pushed for their own 
self-interest of achieving stability and promoting development in their countries. This 
obvious conflict and interaction of opposing interests had consequences for state 
formation. 
For instance, countries, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa with sizeable 
settler populations share a common characteristic of racially skewed land distribution. 
The majority of whites owning land rely on property rights to protect their interests, but 
blacks feel that whites acquired land illegally through coercion and dubious treaties. 
Whites are being supported in their effort to hold on to their properties by European 
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countries with little regard for how the land was acquired and little consideration for the 
desperation of the blacks. The land question therefore continues to be a source of conflict 
between the settlers and the indigenous populations.7 
Of course, peaceful solutions are possible, but European states and the United States have 
maintained a blinkered view. They did little to help Zimbabwe solve the problem ofland 
hunger amongst the blacks, but have now shown deep concern over the Zimbabwe 
government's decision to seize white-owned land to settle landless blacks to reconnect 
Africans with their ancestry. Similar concerns are being raised about Namibia. However, 
so far Namibia remains a peaceful country that seeks to solve problems constitutionally 
and democratically. Causes for the situation developing in Zimbabwe, and the fear of 
such a situation developing in Namibia, need to be addressed by those who created such a 
situation in the first place. 
As for the governments of these two independent countries, realizing that they had 
reasonably big white settler populations, they had been anxious to promote reconciliation 
and address contentious issues through reconciliation. However, western countries' 
belligerence on the land issue has seriously compromised reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
There is not even recognition of the fact that Zimbabwe was the first country in southern 
Africa where the policy of reconciliation was implemented. Who can forget that it was 
President Mugabe who had appointed General Walls as the Army Chief of independent 
Zimbabwe! Who can forget the fact that Ian Smith, who had rebelled against the British 
Crown, instead of being executed as all rebels were dealt with in Europe, is still a free 
man! Europeans and Americans who have been concerned about the turn of events there, 
have been found wanting. They should have displayed the same concern about the plight 
of landless Africans as they have shown about the 'seizure' of white land by the 
Zimbabwe government. 
7 See, Fiona Adams and W. Wemer (1990), The Land Issue in Namibia: An Inquiry, Windhoek. Namibia 
Inst for Social and Economic Research; Sam Moyo (1995), The Land Question in Zimbabwe, Harare, 
SAPES Books; Tessa Marcus, Katby Eales and Adele Wildschut (1996), Down to Earth: Land Demand in 
the New South Africa, Durban, Univ. of Natal. 
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Namibia is following constitutional means to try to address the burning issue of land. 
During 1999, I was designated by the cabinet to tour European cities and the European 
Union to sensitise European leaders on this burning issue. I informed them about our 
policy of willing-seller-willing-buyer that had emerged from a successful land conference 
held in Windhoek during 1991. Using a metaphor from the computer industry, I appealed 
to the representatives of European countries to help us buy the hardware, i.e., the land. 
They opted for the easier option. They wanted to help with software only, i.e., training of 
new persons settled on that land. I had reasoned with them that their decision implied that 
government would need to seize the land on which landless could be settled and trained. I 
also pointed out to them that in adopting this approach Europeans were saving a million 
dollars today, but when the situation got out of hand, they would have to spend one 
billion dollars on efforts to rescue the white people. They were being penny wise and 
pound foolish. 
By focusing on some of the events that proved to be critical in changing the direction of 
political evolution of the state, this study seeks to gain some insight into the method, 
motivation, and intent of various actors that shaped the Namibian state. These actors 
included the South Africans, Europeans, North Americans, the League of Nations, the 
United Nations, Organization of African Unity, the Frontline States, the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and the N amibians. 
An understanding of the historical, political, social and economic context should help 
shape responses to the social and political issues newly independent Namibia needs to 
address. 
Research Questions 
Thus, research questions for this study can be articulated as follows: How did different 
actors' actions through history manipulate events that impacted on the type of state that 
emerged in Namibia? What impact did these actions have on the progression of the 
Namibian question until its final resolution? How did Namibians respond to these actions 
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to achieve their objectives? Since Namibia's independence, what have Namibians done to 
build a modem state? 
In answering these questions, this study aims to enhance our understanding of the 
evolution of the political history of Namibia. However, in order to ensure that the study 
remains focused on the research questions, it concentrates on various issue sub-questions 
in the context ofthe research questions. 
Issue sub-questions, as Stake8 points out, "are not simple and clean, but intricately wired 
political, social, historical, and especially personal contexts .... Issues draw us toward 
observing, even teasing out the problems of the case, the conflictual outpourings, the 
complex backgrounds of human concern." They "address the major concerns and 
perplexities to be resolved.,,9 Principal issue sub-questions related to this study may be 
articulated as follows: 
1. What was Namibia's colonial inheritance (German, South African, and 
International), and how did this inheritance shape the context within which 
Namibia's transition to independence had to be negotiated? What were the key 
interests of different players, and how did these interests impact on the events 
leading to the independence of Namibia? 
2. What were the strategic and tactical agendas of the people of Namibia under the 
leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia 
(SWAPO)? 
3. In the process of transition, how were different players' agendas constituted and 
reconstituted and to what effect? 
4. What has been the experience of the first government of independent Namibia in 
state building with special emphasis on some of its core political projects and 
policies? 
8 R. Stake (1995), The Art of Case Study Research, Thousand Oaks, Sage, p. 17. 
9 John W. Creswell (1998), Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions, 
Thousand Oaks, Sage, p.l 0 l. 
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Based on research questions, and issue sub-questions, the study seeks to examine various 
issues in chronological order. 
Research Methodology 
This study is particularly amenable to a case study approach for investigation as it allows 
the researcher to concentrate on uncovering the interaction of significant factors 
characteristic of the phenomenon. Further, the case study approach within the context of 
qualitative research is considered suitable for this study because the issues whose 
understanding is sought are grounded in the assumption that features of the social 
environment are constructed as interpretations by individuals and that these 
interpretations tend to be transitory and situationa1. lo In addition, the issues to be 
examined fall within the scope of a qualitative research approach with generally accepted 
characteristics as follows: 11 
1. Qualitative research manifests an interest in understanding how people make 
sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world. It strives for a 
depth of understanding as an end in itself, not as an attempt to predict what may 
happen in the future, or to generalize to a universe. 
2. Qualitative research provides an inductive approach to knowledge generation. 
Qualitative researchers build towards theory from observations and intuitive 
understandings gained in the field. 
3. Central to qualitative research is gaining the emic, or insider'S, perspective, that 
is, the perspective of the participants in the research study. 
4. Emphasis on understanding the emic perspective is not incompatible with 
inclusion of the etic, or outsider, perspective. The perspective of the researcher 
helps him or her to make conceptual and theoretical sense of the phenomenon in 
terms of the researcher's professional experience. 
5. Data are mediated primarily through the human instrument as distinct from an 
inventory, questionnaire or computer analysis. 
Because case study, as a methodology, is particularly responsive to research questions of 
why and how, it is particularly suited for this inquiry, which requires a holistic 
examination of social and behavioural phenomena that are by their very nature 
characterized by ambiguity and a necessity to be responsive to changing conditions of 
10 See Karen E. Winegardner, The Case Study Method of Scholarly Research, 
http://www.tgsa.eduJonline/cybrary/case1.html. accessed 15 June 2001. 
11 S.B. Merriam (1988), Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach, San Francisco, 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, quoted in Winegardner, The Case Study Method o/Scholarly Research. 
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infonnation and design. It also allows for an adaptive research structure that can 
accommodate qualitative and quantitative perspectives, techniques and standards. 12 
Significance of the Study 
Bibliographic research finds no study that integrates the role of various actors involved in 
the Namibian question and its resolution with the independence of the country. Such a 
study, analysing efforts by various players to influence events, could provide an insight 
into the constraints and opportunities within which the process of Namibia's 
independence has unfolded. These events shaped the Namibian society, its political 
structures, race relations, the final outcome of the constitution, and the type of democracy 
that evolved. Examination of these events could also shed some light on the historical 
circumstances that impacted on the ability of the government of independent Namibia to 
address some of the pressing problems, such as promotion of democracy, public service 
refonn, economic development, promotion of social equity, and carrying out land refonn. 
To this end, this work will contribute towards a greater understanding of the future 
direction of economic development, social equity, and democracy in Namibia. 
Def"mitions 
In this study some tenns have been used with specific meanings, and it would be 
appropriate to define the parameters within which these tenns have been used as follows: 
West means European, North American, and pre-1994 white South African governments, 
and ethnic whites in Namibia. The words 'European' and 'White' have been used 
interchangeably to represent a racial grouping. Therefore, there is an overlap in the use of 
the words 'West', 'European', and 'White'. 
Researcher's Personal Interest 
Because of my role in the independence struggle, in the drafting of the constitution of 
Namibia as the chainnan of the Constituent Assembly, and subsequently as the first 
prime minister of Namibia, there is an autobiographical element to the thesis. My. 
personal involvement in the process of Namibia's state fonnation ensured that I had a 
12 Winegarciner, The Case Study Method of Scholarly Research. 
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unique perspective of the events. Thus, working on the thesis as a participant in the 
events as well as analyst gave me extraordinary opportunities and imposed significant 
constraints. I, by virtue of being the prime minister was privy to unique information that 
would normally be inaccessible to other researchers. Equally, however, by virtue of my 
commitment to the collective responsibility of confidentiality with regard to the 
discussions within the cabinet and within SWAPO Political Bureau meetings, I was 
constrained in the use of additional information. In fact, collective responsibility 
demanded that the members supported the final decisions even if they did have 
reservations about them. 
It is against this background that I undertook the study. I have not divulged any of the 
information from the proceedings within the cabinet, the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of SWAPO, and the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly that 
were classified or restricted because of collective responsibility. For instance, for 
information pertaining to the decisions of the drafting committee of the Windhoek 
Constituent Assembly, I relied on the minutes of the Assembly meetings - when 
decisions of the drafting committee were reported to the Constituent Assembly'S meeting 
and were recorded in the assembly's meeting, they could be used because those minutes 
are public documents. 
This limitation, however, does not in any way limit the value of the study. After all, 
scholars often bring their own personal experiences and perspectives just as I have done. 
As Kaplan13 cautions, "Often, what passes for analysis is merely an expression of one's 
life experiences applied to a specific issue. From that sin stems another - that of selecting 
facts and insights to defend a particular vision. To this dilemma there may be no 
solution." 
Despite this caveat, I was motivated to undertake this research for many different 
reasons. A clear understanding of what these motivations are can contribute greatly to 
focusing on core aspects of the study, and help bring about objectivity to research 
13 Ibid. 
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methodology and context, particularly if the approach taken is qualitative. According to 
Maxwell: 14 
It is useful to distinguish between three different kinds of purposes for doing a 
study: personal purposes, practical purposes, and research purposes. Personal 
purposes are those that motivate you to do a study; they can include such things 
as a political passion to change some existing situation, a curiosity about a 
specific phenomenon or event, a desire to engage in a particular type of research, 
or simply the need to advance your career. These personal purposes often overlap 
with your practical or research purposes, but they may also include deeply rooted 
individual desires and needs that bear little relationship to the 'official' reasons 
for doing the stupy. 
Manheim and Richl5 point out that "curiosity and necessity are the primary motives 
underlying human inquiry. Either we seek to understand the world around us for the sake 
of knowledge, or we seek to understand it so that we may protect or better our lot in it." 
I was motivated to undertake this study for all the reasons listed by Maxwell except for 
the need to advance my career. Another important reason for my undertaking this study 
was the realization that political literature generated contemporaneously with the period 
of occupation or of liberation does not, because of different priorities, concentrate on 
building an interpretive paradigm. Through this research, I seek to make such an attempt. 
The resulting realignment of evidence with objective and method in the evolution of 
Namibia's political history should help bring together theories, methods and evidence 
within which Namibia's political history needs to be perceived. 
Equally, however, assumptions of this new paradigm need to be vindicated and personal 
bias that can never be far from the surface needs to be exorcised. 16 As a politician, I am 
aware of these implications, and that awareness has motivated me to undertake this study 
as an academic exercise. 
14 Joseph A. Maxwell (1996), Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, London, Sage, p. 15. 
15 Manheim and Rich, Empirical Political Analysis, p.l. 
)6 Robert D. Kaplan (2002), Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands A Pagan Ethos, New York, 
Random House, p. xix. 
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The limitations within which I worked on this thesis did not stop me from bringing to this 
study my personal perspective, and the perspective of many other Namibians who were, 
and continue to be, participants in the political evolution of the country. These 
perspectives have, of course, been subjected to informed analysis. 
'This study also has particular relevance for me as a politician, because it allows me to 
examine how management of events by the West impacted on the country's transition 
from colonialism to democracy. This aspect of the study should be of value to the 
evolving political milieu in the country, as the government moves forward to strengthen 
democracy with social justice. The study should also be of some value to many other 
countries in Africa and elsewhere in identifying challenges thrown up by conflicts 
between the West's agenda and Africans' own agendas. 
Finally, this study has been undertaken at an opportune time as Namibia prepares to elect 
a new president after the first thirteen years under the leadership of the founding 
president. The challenge for Namibians would be to secure an orderly succession. The 
process of management of this succession will truly test the country's democratic 
credentials. The jury is still out on which way Namibia will turn. 
Literature Survey 
Sources of material for this case study are diverse. While emphasis has been on my 
personal recollections, an attempt has been made, wherever possible, to substantiate facts 
by referring to existing literature. Towards this end, collections of Namibia's National 
Archives, the National Library, the University of Namibia Library and regional library 
catalogues that cover most of the major South African libraries have proved valuable. 
A significant body of information on Namibia exists, but the majority of documents are 
not readily available for various reasons. As Hillebrecht points out, "The literature 
concerned with Namibia has reached immense quantities (though much of it is less 
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impressive qualitatively), and the only problem lies in getting to it.,,17 To get to this 
literature, scholars on Namibia need to have access to the archives in Windhoek, Cape 
Town and Pretoria; the records of the German colonial administration in Potsdam, 
Germany; the Rhenish Missionary Society records held by the Vereinigde Evangelishe 
Mission in Wupperthal, and the Finnish mission records in Helsinki. IS Thus, "not only are 
the sources for Namibian history very scattered; very few have been published.,,19 
Namibia's history remains under-researched and under-published not only because of 
difficulties in getting to the available literature but also because primary literature exists 
in diverse languages. As Saunders20 points out, historians of Namibia need to know 
English, Afrikaans, German, Otjiwambo, Otjiherero, Khoi-Khoi Gowab or 
Damara/Nama, and Finnish. This situation has, however, improved somewhat in recent 
years with some new monographs and articles appearing in the English language. 
The rest of this chapter offers a survey of the literature available and outlines the themes 
that form the focus of each chapter of the thesis. 
Thesis Outline and Themes 
Erikson's bibliographjl, focusing on the political economy of Namibia, Strohmeyer's 
Namibia National Bibliograph/2 and some other general and specialized bibliographies23 
help to get an overall perspective of the literature, but for more recent information one 
17 Werner Hillebrecht, "How to Find Out What has Been Written About Namibia," in Brian Wood (ed.) 
(1988), Namibia 1884-1984: Readings on Namibia's History and Society. London and Lusaka, Namibia 
Support Committee in cooperation with United Nations Institute for Namibia, p.74. 
18 Christopher Saunders, "Towards the Decolonisation of Namibian History: Notes on Some Recent Work 
in English," in Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984, p. 81. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Tore Linne Erikson with Richard Moorsom (1985), The Political Economy of Namibia: An Annotated. 
Critical Bibliography, Oslo and Lusaka, Scandinavian Inst. of African Studies in cooperation with United 
Nations Institute for Namibia and Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs. 
22 Eckhard Strohmeyer, Namibische National Bibliographie/Namibia National Bibliography (Basel, Basler 
Afrika Bibliographien, 1978, 1979, and 1981). 
23 Two bibliographies that are somewhat dated but are still useful are Barbara Rogers (1975), American-
South African Relations: Bibliographical Essays, Mohamed A. EI-Khawas and Francis A. Kornegay (eds), 
London. Greenwood Press; Etna Schoeman (1978), South West AfricaINamibia: An International Issue. 
1920-1977, Braamfontein, SA Inst. of International Affairs - This bibliography was updated in 1982 as The 
Namibian Issue. 1920-1980: A Select and Annotated Bibliography Boston, G.K. Hall. 
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has to go to other bibliographic sources, such as library catalogues, specialized indexes, 
and the internet. 
The literature survey shows that little has been published specifically focusing on the 
impact of the West's initiatives on Namibia's evolution as a state. Of course, facts are 
there, but they need to be reinterpreted to examine the interplay of various forces 
involved in the Namibian question. 
In Chapter Two, Namibia's colonial history during German and South African 
occupation has been examined. This part of the history greatly influenced the nature of 
the state. In addition, impact of the involvement of the international community through 
the League of Nations, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice has been 
analysed. At each level, various actors sought to influence short-term outcomes that had 
long-term implications for the Namibian state. The particular focus of the chapter is 
therefore to get a glimpse of how various actors' involvement influenced the formation of 
the Namibian state. 
Historical developments during the period of German occupation, the period of the 
mandate and the period of illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa are 
relatively well documented. The period of German occupation has been chronicled by a 
number of researchers with works of Drechsler and Bley4 remaining fairly significant. 
Drechsler's work, though narrowly focused, provides a scholarly account of the Herero 
resistance to German conquest, and the German policy of extermination. He also seeks to 
explain the economic reasons for this conflict, explaining the German policy of land theft 
and massacre of indigenous populations. Bley's work is broader in scope and is perhaps 
the most detailed account of German colonialism in Namibia. He illustrates in detail the 
24 Horst Drechsler (1980), Let us Die Fighting. The Struggle of the Herero and Nama Against German 
Imperialism (1884-1915), London, Zed Press; Helmuth Bley (1996), Namibia Under German Rule. 
Hamburg, LIT. Bley's other important and relevant works include "Social Discord in South-West Africa," 
in P. Gifford and William R. Louis (eds.) (1967), Britain and Germany in Africa, New Haven, Yale Univ. 
Press, pp. 607-30; and "German South-West Africa after the Conquest 1904-1914," in Ronald Segal and 
Ruth First (eds.) (1967), South-West Africa: A Travesty of Trust, London, Deutsch, pp. 35-53. 
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fonnation of the settler colony, highlighting the brutality of German racism, 
totalitarianism, and military adventures. 
Works of Esterhuyse, and Kienetz25 also provide useful background information on the 
resistance of the Witboois and the Herero against German infiltration and occupation. 
Esterhuyse's Ph.D. thesis is a narrative of the first decade of German colonialism, and 
Kienetz's thesis provides details about German land grab policies, and emigration 
policies during the first decade of German colonial rule. A number of early works 
focusing on Namibians' resistance are also of interest. These include the works of 
Bochert, and Bridgman.26 Bochert deals with the penetration of traders and missionaries, 
and the role of the Witboois in their dealings with Germans and the eventual resistance of 
the Witboois against German intrusion. Bridgeman, on the other hand, provides an 
account of Gennan military campaigns against the Herero and Herero resistance. Two 
reports, one by the British government and the other by the German government, provide 
detailed accounts of the situation prevailing in Namibia during German colonial rule.27 
The British report criticizes German policies in the territory, and the German report is a 
response to this British report. These two reports also show how the beginning of a new 
phase in the struggle for domination of the territory of Namibia began. These works were 
valuable background readings that helped crystallize my thinking. 
The interwar period, starting with the establishment of the League of Nations, its decision 
to make South West Africa a class 'C' Mandate, the exercise of this mandate by South 
Africa, and the consequences of these developments for the Namibians, spawned 
25 I. H. Esterhuyse (1968), South West Africa 1880-1894. The Establishment of German Authority in South 
West Africa, Cape Town, Struik. This document was originally submitted as a Ph.D. thesis at the University 
of Cape Town. Alvin Kienetz (1975), Nineteenth-century South West Africa as a German Settlement 
Colony, Minnesota, Univ. of Minnesota. 
26 Christian Bochert (1980), The Witboois and the Germans in South West Africa. A Study of Their 
Interaction Between 1863 and 1905, Durban, Univ. of Natal; Ion M. Bridgman (1981), The Revolt of the 
Hereros, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press. In addition, Drechsler's Let us Die Fighting is a very useful 
source ofNamibians' struggle against German occupation. 
27 United Kingdom (1918), Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germans. 
Prepared in the Administrator's Office, Windhuk [WindhoekJ, London, HMSO; Deutschland, 
Reichskolonialamt (1919), The Treatment of Native and Other Populations in the Colonial Possessions of 
Germany and England: An Answer to the English Blue Book of August 1918: 'Report on the Natives of 
South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany, 'Berlin, German Colonial Office. 
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considerable primary literature. Significant works include those of Bradford, Braum, 
Hayes, Lewis, Ngavirue, Simons, Barron, and Theodoropoulas.28 Bradford's thesis 
covers South African native administration's actions in the territory. It outlines various 
racist laws implemented by the administration and provides statistics that show the 
impact of these racist policies. Braun's work supplements Bradford's study as it provides 
the hitherto unpublished documents on the nature of South African administration in 
Namibia in 1920s. Louis also deals with South Africa's native policies and provides a 
well-researched analysis of the Bondelswarts 'rebellion'. Ngavirue's thesis details 
economic and political basis of competition and conflict between various Namibian 
groups as well as between them and the Germans. The Nazis in A/rica, edited by Barron 
is a collection of documents showing continued links between German settlers and 
Germany and how Germany sought to maintain influence over the colony even after 
South Africa had occupied it. Theodoropoulas examines the legal aspects of settler 
racism and exploitation of black workers. A recent study by MacMillan29 provides an 
exhaustive narrative of background negotiations between the Europeans and the 
Americans in establishing the League of Nations and devising the mandates system. In 
addition, a number of reports by the Union of South Africa and South African 
propaganda material provide useful insight into the events of the period.3o 
28 Robert Leroy Bradford (1965), The Origin and Concession of the League of Nations , Class 'C'Mandate 
for South West Africa and Fulfilment of the Sacred Trust, 1919-1939 (PhD Thesis), New Haven, Yale 
Univ.; Robert L. Braum (ed.) (1976), Southwest Africa Under Mandate: Documents on the Administration 
of the Former German Protectorate of Southwest Africa by the Union of South Africa under the Mandate of 
the League of Nations, 1919-1929, Salisbury, North Carolina, Documentary Publications; Patricia Hayes 
and others (eds.) (1998), Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915-1946, 
Oxford, James Currey; William Roger Louis (1967), "The South West African Origins of the 'Sacred 
Trust', 1914-1919," African Affairs, 66, 262, pp. 20-39; Zedekia Ngavirue (1972), Political Parties and 
Interest Groups in South West Africa: A Study of Plural Societies (PhD Thesis), Oxford, St Antony's 
College; H.J. Simons, "Techniques of Domination: South Africa's Colonialism," in Segal and First, ed, 
South West Africa: A Travesty of Trust, pp. 103-17; L. Smythe Barron (ed.) (1978), The Nazis in Africa, 
Salisbury, North Carolina, Documentary Publications; and Christos Theodoropoulas (1978), "Racialism 
and International Law: Native Law or the Regulations of Capital-Labour Relations in Namibia," The Indian 
Journal of International Law, 3-4, pp 299-321. 
29 Margaret MacMillan (2002), Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, New York, Random 
House. 
30 South Africa (Union), Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland (pretoria, Govt Printer, 1917 (Vol. 1) -1960 (Vol. 30» (Each report contains a 
section on Namibia); South Africa (Union), Report Presented by the Government of the Union of South 
Africa to the Council of the League of Nations Concerning the Administration of South West Africa for the 
Year (Pretoria, Govt Printer, 1918-1939, 1946). Other reports by the Union of South Africa include Interim 
and Final Reports of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Question of the Future Form of 
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Post-World War II period of the mandate has also received considerable scholarly 
interest. Dugard's31 work, a collection of documents on legal and political history of the 
period is perhaps the most comprehensive work on the Namibian question at the United 
Nations and in the International Court of Justice. Goldblatt,32 who had spent all his life in 
Namibia, details the exploitation of Namibians on the farms and in the mining sector, 
emphasising various repressive actions of the colonialists. Wellington's work33 is perhaps 
most significant for the interwar years as he critically analysed the annual reports of the 
SWA Administrator. South African government's Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into South West Africa Affairs34 aimed at promoting apartheid structures in Namibia 
became a valuable and comprehensive source of information on the condition of blacks in 
the territory in early sixties. A more recent study covering the Namibian question during 
the period of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Court of 
Justice, subsuming earlier works on the topic, was published by the United Nations 
Institute for Namibia as Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility.3s 
Namibians' struggle for independence has been covered by Nujoma, Dobell, du Pisani, 
Moleah, Bauer, and others.36 Nujoma's work is particularly significant as it provides a 
Government in South-West African Protectorate, Cape Town, Govt Printer, 1921; Report of the 
Administrator on the Bondelzwarts Rising, Cape Town, Govt Printer, 1922; Report of the Rehoboth 
Commission, Cape Town, Govt Printer, 1927; Report of the South West Africa Commission, Pretoria, Govt 
Printer, 1936. 
31 John Dugard (ed.) (1973), The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings 
on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations, Berkley, Univ. of California Press. 
32 I. Goldblatt (1961), History of South West Africa from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, Cape 
Town, Juta. 
33 John H. Wellington (1967), South West Africa and its Human Issues, London, Oxford Univ. Press. 
34 South Africa (Republic) (1964), Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 
1962-63, Pretoria, Govt Printer (Also known as the Odendaal Report). 
3S United Nations Institute for Namibia (1987), Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, Lusaka, 
U.N. Inst for Namibia. 
36 Sam Nujoma (2001), Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma , London, Panaf; 
Lauren Dobell (2000), SWAPO's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means, Klosterberg, 
Schlettwein; Andre du Pisani (1982), "Namibia: From Incorporation to Controlled Change," in Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 1 2, pp. 281-305; Andre du Pisani, "State and Society Under South African 
Rule," in C. Keulder (ed.) (2000), State, Society and Democracy: A Reader in Namibian Politics, 
Windhoek, Gamsberg Macmillan; Andre du Pisani (1985), SW AlNamibia, the Politics of Continuity and 
Change, Johannesburg, J. Ball Publishers; Alfred T. Moleah (1983), Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation, 
Wilmington, Disa Press; Gretchen Bauer (1998), Labour and Democracy in Namibia 1971-1996, Oxford, 
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first hand account of the evolution of Namibians' struggle for independence. Dobell's 
analytical and refreshingly comprehensive work, based on interviews with many SWAPO 
and non-SWAPO leaders in the country, provides valuable information at one place on 
the emergence of SWAPO and the role it played in the liberation of the country. 
However, some of Dobell's assumptions, e.g., SWAPO lacked broad-based grassroots 
activism and therefore worked through the international community, cannot go 
unchallenged. To paraphrase what Mao had said, the guerrilla is like a fish. Fish lives in 
the water and cannot survive without it. Similarly, the guerrilla lives with the masses, and 
cannot succeed in his mission without mass support. He is sustained by the masses. 
SWAPO could not have succeeded in gaining Namibia's independence without mass 
support. 
Du Pisani's writings are informative as they deal with attempts at controlled change and 
state formation. Moleah provides an introduction to the history of Namibia with special 
emphasis on the migrant labour system, South African strategy for internal settlement, 
and the liberation struggle. 
Chapter Three examines the evolution of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 and 
analyses how the West sought a settlement of the Namibian question by engineering this 
resolution to shore up its own interests in a changing environment. 
Some very useful publications are available to help gain an insight in to the West's 
actions. Works of Barber, Brown, Crocker, Renwick, Rich, and Stultz37 provide details 
about the geopolitical, political and economic changes being sought by the West, 
James Currey; Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984; United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct 
United Nations Responsibility. 
37 S. Barber (1989), "Creating Realities: Some Final Thoughts from Chester Crocker," Optima, 30, 2; Chris 
Brown (1990), "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Role of Third Party Mediators," 
International Journal, 45, 2; Chester A. Crocker (1992), High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a 
Rough Neighborhood, Johannesburg, J. Ball Publishers; Robin Renwick (1997), Unconventional 
Diplomacy in Southern Africa, New York, St Martin's Press; Paul Rich, "The United States, Its History of 
Mediation and the Chester Crocker Round of Negotiations Over Namibia in 1988," in Stephen Chan and 
Vivienne Jabri (ed.) (1993), Mediation in Southern Africa, London, Macmillan; Newell M. Stultz, "South 
Africa in Angola and Namibia," in G. Weiss and James G. Blight (eds.) (1992), The Suffering Grass: 
Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 
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particularly the United States, in achieving its objectives and how the West proceeded to 
achieve these objectives. Jabri38 explores the same theme emphasizing the part played by 
the Europeans. Namibian and African perspective on the developing situation and their 
responses are elaborated on by Dobell, Khadiagala, Moleah, and Wolfers.39 South 
Africa's strategy as it related to the region is examined by Clough and Herbst.4o On a 
broader front, covering various issues related to Namibia and linking them together, 
works of Brown, Keulder, Kaela, NDI, Namibia Support Committee, Nujoma, and the 
United Nations Institute for Namibia41 are useful. 
However, there are very few publications by Namibians on most of these topics, with the 
exception of the works published by the United Nations Institute for Namibia and the 
Namibia Support Committee.42 This situation makes the examination of Namibia's state 
formation effort somewhat one-sided - largely European. As Davidson points out, 
European writers' view of colonial history ignores the extent of the resistance of the 
African people.43 However, since the late 1960s, there have been some African initiatives 
to correct this imbalance by emphasizing studies on African resistance.44 In Namibia, 
38 Vivienne Jabri, "European Involvement in the Western Contact Group: The Stress and Convenience of 
Coalition Mediation," in Chan and Jabri (eds.), Mediation in Southern Africa. 
39 Dobell, SWAPO's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991; Gilbert M. Khadiagala (1994), Allies in Adversity: 
The Frontline States in Southern African Security 1975-1993, Athens, Ohio, Ohio Univ. Press; Moleah, 
Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation; Michael Wolfers (1976), Politics in the Organisation of African 
Unity, London, Methuen. 
40 Michael Clough and Jeffrey Herbst (1989), South Africa'S Changing Regional Strategy: Beyond 
Destabilization (Critical Issues Series, 1989 No 4), New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
41 Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa; Laurent C.W. Kaela (1996), Question of Namibia, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan; Keulder (ed.), State, Society and Democracy; NDI for International Affairs 
(1990), Nation Building: The u.N. and Namibia, Windhoek, NDI; Wood (ed.), Namibia: 1884-1984; 
Nujoma, Where Others Wavered; United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility . 
42 See, for instance, United Nations Institute for Namibia (1986), Namibia: Perspectives for National 
Reconstruction and Development, Lusaka, U.N. Institute for Namibia; Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984. 
43 Basil Davidson (1964), Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society, 3d ed., London, Penguin, p. 
50. See also Davidson, The Black Man's Burden. 
44 Peter H. Katjavivi's various works as follows: Some Aspects of Namibia 's Political Sociology, Warwick, 
Univ. of Warwick, 1980; The Rise of Nationalism in Namibia and its International Dimensions, Oxford, St 
Antony's College (D. Phil Thesis); "Namibia: Strike and Political Protests," paper presented at the 
Conference on Namibia's Fight for Freedom, Brussels, May 1972, convened by SWAPO of Namibia; 
Hidipo Hamutenya and Hage Gottfried Geingob, "African Nationalism in Namibia," in Christian P. 
potholm and Richard Dale (eds.) (1972), Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays on Regional Politics, New 
York, Free Press, pp 85-94; Rage Gottfried Geingob, "Impediments to the Settlement of the Namibia 
Question," in Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984. See also other articles in Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984; 
Proceedings of the Conference on Namibia's Fight for Freedom, Brussels, May 1972, convened by 
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there is perhaps another good reason for this gap in literature. During the struggle for 
independence and soon after the country became independent, many Namibian 
revolutionaries were involved or consumed in the liberation activities or in managing the 
affairs of the state. Further, many, as good revolutionaries, awaited the revolutionary 
leader to first release his account of the history of the struggle before they could venture 
into this field. Now that the president, the founding father of the Namibian nation, has 
written his autobiography, Namibian scholars will hopefully follow suit -- thus making 
some input into the body of existing literature. 
In Chapter Four, emergent issues and their implications in the drafting of the constitution 
of independent Namibia are examined. As I was involved in this exercise, my own 
recollections form a significant part of the contents of this chapter. My perceptions of the 
unfolding events in the formulation of the constitution hopefully contribute to the primary 
literature on the subject. I have also relied on the minutes of Constituent Assembly 
meetings, and meetings of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and 
Internal Arrangements.45 From a historical perspective, Nujoma's46 autobiography helps 
examine the underpinnings of the issues that shaped the events of that period. At the 
conceptual level, works of a number of authors have been helpful. Elster's47 work has 
been particularly useful in helping compare the work of the Windhoek Constituent 
Assembly with that of the assemblies that drafted the constitutions of the United States of 
America and France. On specific themes of the constitution, a considerable body of 
literature exists on various aspects of the constitution, but only a few documents were 
used for their normative value.48 
SWAPO of Namibia; Ngavirue, Political Parties and Interest Groups in South West Africa; Tunguru 
Huaraka (1982), Namibia by Resolutions: A Legal Analysis of International Organisation's Attempts at 
Decolonisation (PhD Thesis), Geneva, Univ. of Geneva; John Ya-Qtto (1981), Battlefront Namibia: An 
Autobiography, New York, Lawrence Hill; Kenneth Abrahams (ed.) (1981), Seminar on Namibian History, 
Windhoek, Namibian Review Publications. 
45 Windhoek Constituent Assembly (1990), Minutes of Meetings 198911990 , Windhoek, National 
Archives; Windhoek Constituent Assembly (1990), Minutes of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules 
and Orders and Internal A "angements 198911990 (Unpublished -- Personal collection). 
46 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered. 
47 Jan Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 
http://www.law.upenn.edulconlaw/issueslvo12/num2/elster.htm. accessed 19 July 2001. 
48 See for instance Charles Grove Haines (1930, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts: A Study of the 
Establishment and of the Interpretation of Limits on Legislatures with Special Reference to the 
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Since 1990, when the Constitution was drafted, only one work known to me by a 
Namibian scholar, Joseph Diescho, has been produced on the subject so far.49 From the 
perspective of historiography, this study certainly fills a void. By putting various events 
of Namibia's history of the recent past in a chronological order, and by reproducing some 
relevant documents and agreements, Diescho's work opens the way for an understanding 
of events that led to the adoption of the Constitution. so Cliffe51 provides a chronicle of 
political events in Namibia during the period 1989-1990 that influenced the final 
outcome of the constitution and the state. This work also compares the Namibian 
situation with that of Zimbabwe during 1980. 
In Chapter Five, the West's influence on the process of state formation in Africa and 
Namibia has been analysed. The chapter also highlights the challenges the new 
government of independent Namibia faced in setting up new government structures to 
undo some of the wrongs of the past. 
Various aspects of state formation have an extensive body of literature available.52 
However, there is a serious shortage of literature on the related subjects specific to 
Development of Certain Phases of American Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
Univ. Press, http://www.islandnet.coml-arton!constitution.html. accessed 10 August 2000; Thomas Paine, 
Rights of Man, http://www.ushistory.org/paine, accessed 1 December 2002; Ernest Renan (1982), Qu 'est-
ce qu 'une Nation?1 What is a Nation?, Paris, Calmann-Levy; Norbert Elias (1972), "Process of State 
Formation and Nation Building," Transactions of the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, 1970, Sofia, 
ISA, pp 274-84; United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives of National Reconstruction 
and Development; Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of Meetings 1989/1990; M.M. Ncube and 
Collins Parker (1989), Comparative Electoral Systems and Political Consequences: Options for Namibia, 
Windhoek, U.N. Inst for Namibia; Nohlen Dieter (1996), Elections and Electoral Systems, 2d ed., Delhi, 
Macmillan India; David Beetham and Kevin Boyle (1995), Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and 
Answers, Paris, UNESCO Press. 
49 Joseph Diescho (1994), The Namibian Constitution in Perspective, Windhoek, Gamsberg Macmillan. See 
also, Lionel Cliffe and others (1994), The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Boulder, Lynne Reiner. 
so Hage Geingob in his Foreword to Diescho, The Namibian Constitution in Perspective. 
SI Cliffe and others, The Transition to Independence in Namibia .. 
S2 For example, see Pierre Englebert (1997), 'The Contemporary African State: Neither African nor State," 
Third World Quarterly, 18, 4; Renan, Qu 'est-ce qu 'une Nation?; Elias, "Process of State Formation and 
Nation Building," pp 274-84; Thomas Carothers (2002), "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of 
Democracy, 13, 1; Larry Diamond (1999), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, 
John Hopkins Univ. Press; Jarle Simensen (1999), "Democracy and Globalization: Nineteen Eighty-nine 
and the 'Third Wave'," Journal of World History, 10,2; William Tordoff(1997), Government and Politics 
in Africa, 3d ed., Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press; Samuel Huntington (1991), The Third Wave: 
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Namibia.s3 Therefore, in examining the issues related to state consolidation I have relied 
on my and my colleagues' experience in the government, and references to literature have 
been made only to define concepts. In that sense, therefore, this study should become a 
useful source of information on Namibia's experience with state consolidation. 
In Chapter Six, I elaborate on how the first government of independent Namibia sought 
to meet some of the critical challenges it faced in strengthening the democratic state. Of 
course, on the subject of state consolidation, the range of topics that could be covered is 
quite extensive. However, during the first decade of independent Namibia, the significant 
issues were the need to promote reconciliation,54 strengthen democracy,55 strengthen civil 
society,56 and launch anti-corruption5? initiatives. Based on various issues of state 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma, Norman; Amritya Sen (1999), "Democracy as 
a Universal Value," Journal of Democracy, 10,3. 
53 However, see Hage G. Geingob (1995), "From Colonialism to Freedom and Democracy: Role of an 
Effective Public Service in the Political Transition - the Namibian Experience," Public Administration and 
Development, 15; Cliffe and others, The Transition to Independence in Namibia; United Nations Institute 
for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development; United Nations 
Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility; M.D. Bomani and C. 
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fonnation and state consolidation, an attempt also has been made to carry out a 
democratic audit of Namibia. In carrying out the democratic audit, I found the Swedish 
nonnative tools, and the works of Beethem and Micheletti58 particularly useful. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I return to the research question to relate it to the findings of 
this study. 
Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases, Washington D.C., World Bank; Cheryl W. 
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Chapter Two 
Impact of External Political Forces on 
Namibia's Colonial History 
No European nation had the right to assume sovereignty over the 
inhabitants of any part of Africa, and the claims put forward by the 
various governments at the Berlin Conference in 1885 took little account 
of the right of the people who lived in the territories claimed. 
Sir Alan Burns, former Governor, Nigeria, 1945S9 
Introduction 
As a moral argument, Sir Alan's thinking cannot be faulted. However, throughout 
history, international politics has never been a product of noble thoughts, idealism or 
good intentions. Colonization of Africa had little to do with the 'civilizing mission' as 
many twentieth century politicians would have us believe, but had everything to do with 
their economic and geopolitical interests. Colonizing states' policies were greatly 
influenced by the thinking of Malthus and Machiavelli. Malthus gave the politicians an 
argument or justification for seeking additional lebensraum for fast growing 
populations.6o Albeit simplistic, occupation of foreign territories was a convenient 
answer. Other 'benefits' of colonization were soon discovered subsequent to the 
occupation of territories in Africa. Machiavelli helped the politicians' conscience by 
arguing that policy is defined not by its excellence but by its outcome; if it is not 
effective, it cannot be virtuOUS.61 Like Machiavelli, Churchill, Sun-Tzu, and Thucydides 
all believed in a morality of results rather than of good intentions.62 This 'self-evident 
truth' continues to find reaffinnation throughout history.63 Even today, similar arguments 
59 See Wood (ed.), Namibia: 1884-1984. p. 152. 
60 H.L. Wesseling (1996), Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914, Amold J. Pomerans (tr.), 
London, Praeger, p. 105. 
61 Harvey C. Mansfield (1996), Machiavel/i"s Virtue, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, pp. 20,33. See also 
Noccolo Machiavelli (1997), Discourses on Livy, Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella (trs), 
New York, Oxford Vniv. Press. 
62 Kaplan, Warrior Politics, p. 53. 
63 For examples see Kaplan, Warrior Politics, pp. 54- 55. 
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continue to be 'validated' on different issues. For example, globalisation is being cloaked 
in terms of its importance for national development. However, Kaplan points out that 
globalisation is Darwinian. It means economic survival ofthe fittest.64 
There are lessons to be drawn from history as we examine Namibians' struggle for self-
determination and independence. Strains felt by Africa during the colonial period have 
not disappeared. In fact, conflicts between haves and have-nots, and emphasis on 
outcomes based on self-interest with little regard for justice and fairness have only 
become accentuated. In this context, a number of scholars have examined the role of the 
West and international bodies, such as the League of Nations, the International Court of 
Justice, and the United Nations, in addressing the Namibian question.65 However, the 
interplay of various forces and mechanisms used by these forces to sideline the very 
people who were most affected by their decisions has not received the sufficient attention 
of scholars. From the Berlin Conference to the implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 435, decisions about Namibia were taken without regard to 
how Namibians felt about these decisions. 
This chapter briefly revisits Namibia's history to gain an insight into the mechanisms 
utilized by the Europeans directly and through the League of Nations, the International 
Court of Justice, and the United Nations to further their own interests. This chapter also 
examines the possible motives behind the Europeans' various initiatives and their 
repercussions, including Namibians' responses to the Europeans trying to manage 
outcomes. 
64 Kaplan, Wa"ior Politics, p. 119. 
65 See, for instance, Goldblatt, History of South West Africa; Dugard (ed.), The South West A/ricaINamibia 
Dispute; United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility. 
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Namibia Under German Colonial Rule 
Europeans' interest in Namibia began in early 1880s with Imperial Gennany's desire to 
acquire its own colonies in Africa. In order to further its aims, the Imperial Government 
convened the 1884-85 Berlin Conference: 66 
to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and 
civilization in certain regions of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages 
of free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic 
Ocean; [and] to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which might in future 
arise from new acts of occupation (prises de possession) on the coast of Africa. 
In convening this conference, the Gennans had very specific plans: being late on the 
colonization scene, they wanted to acquire colonies without ruffling the feathers of other 
colonizing states. These intentions found manifestation in Article :XXXIV of the General 
Act of the Conference of Berlin: 67 
Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of 
the African Continent outside of its present possessions, or which being hitherto 
without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes 
a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification 
thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to 
enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own. 
These attempts by Gennany started the final push towards the scramble for Africa by the 
signatories to the Act: "This conference did not establish new rules but validated a 
shareout which had the aspects both of competition and partnership.,,68 This treaty also 
sealed Namibia's fate. In 1884, Imperial Gennany declared the territory a protectorate, 
and in 1890 it was declared Germany's Crown Colony. In 1893, Gennany established 
colonial administration in the territory.69 "The period after 1890 saw Gennan ruthlessness 
and brutality upon Namibians in its ugliest form when the entire machinery of 
exploitation - an administrative system, land alienation, white settlement, a labour 
66 General Act of the Conference of Berlin of the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, 
Turkey and the United States dealing with Africa, p. 1081. 
67 Ibid., p. 1097. 
68 Kader Asmal (1984), "Judicial Aspects of the Berlin Conference, 1984-5: Contribution to a New 
Colonial Order," paper presented to the Conference of the German Association of Africanists, Hanover, 13-
16 June 1984. 
69 Henning Melber (1982), "Shadows of the Past: The Consequences of Colonisation and German Colonial 
Rule in Namibia," paper submitted to International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in 
Namibia, Washington, 29 Nov. - 2 Dec. 1982, p. 2. 
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extraction system, mineral exploration, and laws based on obnoxious system of racial 
discrimination - came into being.,,70 
The territory was divided into two sections. Colonial administration was established to 
cover only the southern 80% of the country that came to be known as the 'Police Zone.' 
This area was meant largely for the whites. In order to help the new immigrants from 
Germany to settle, large tracts of land were confiscated from the blacks through devious 
means and repressive measures. Where the indigenous population resisted, they were 
deprived of land by force. In 1894 there were clashes between Germans and Khausas, 
followed by the 'revolt' of Goortontein in 1901, the Swartbooi uprisings of 1904-7, and 
the Herero uprisings of 1904-7.71 Confiscated land was given to the whites, indigenous 
inhabitants' cattle were confiscated for the benefit of the whites, and they were given 
generous financial assistance to help them settle in the colony. 
Blacks were forced to live in the so-called tribal areas in the north and in scattered 
reserves in the Police Zone. This movement of people exaggerated the already existing 
skewed population distribution. As a result of this movement of the blacks to 
unproductive areas, loss of their lands and livestock, and the resulting economic plight 
forced them to work on 'white-owned' farms and in mines for meagre wages. By 1913 
there were over 1300 farms comprising 13.4 million ha of land - all 'owned' by 
Germans.72 Thus, German policy in Namibia ensured that the settlers not only did not 
have any competition from indigenous entrepreneurs but also had access to a large pool 
of cheap labour. In fact, labourers for white farms, mines and railway construction 
became a significant 'prize' for Germany.73 Germany fully exploited this prize: "The 
'native' was almost universally looked upon as a means to an end, never as an end in 
70 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and 
Development. p. 30. 
71 SWAPO (1981), To be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia, London, Zed Press, p. 17. 
See also Moleah, Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation, p. 42. 
72 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and 
Development, p. 31. 
73 See Keulder (ed.), State, Society and Democracy, p. 34. 
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himself, and his welfare and that of the colony were completely subordinated to the 
interests of the German on the spot and of Germany at a distance.,,74 
Namibia's occupation bore ample witness to the sad truth that settler colonialism was the 
worst form of colonialism.75 This form of colonialism entailed not only economic 
exploitation and political oppression but also super-exploitation and brutal political 
repression. All colonialism has a racist predicate, but settler colonialism has a virulent 
racist predicate. As could be expected in such exploitative situations, a constant 
companion of settler colonialists was a fear of the deprived and oppressed natives. 
Germans met this challenge by consistently increasing the oppression. 
The German colonial episode came to an end with the defeat of Germany at the end of 
Word War I. The fate of the colonies of the defeated state was worked out at the Paris 
Peace Conference. However, the administrative and legal infrastructure established in the 
Police Zone, the settlement pattern characterized by racial and ethnic segregation, and the 
labour extraction system established by the Germans in Namibia provided a solid 
foundation on which South Africa later erected its own apartheid state.76 
Thus, the end of the German occupation era changed nothing for Namibians. What the 
people of Namibia wanted continued to be of little consequence. In fact, the practice of 
cooperation by colonial powers and other global players, as characterized at the Berlin 
Conference, continued to thwart Namibians' efforts at self-determination and 
independence. The result was that the Namibian question continued to be a football of 
colonial powers in the League of Nations, in the International Court of Justice, and in the 
United Nations until 1990 when Namibia eventually secured independence. 
74 MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. p. 99. 
75 See for instance, Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition. 1980-1986. 
76 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and 
Development, p. 33. 
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Mandate for South West Africa 
The Berlin Conference had tried to 'validate' the sharing out of Africa, but, largely 
because of the United States' revolutionary zeal during discussions leading to the 
fonnation of the League of Nations, the post-World War I era brought a new thinking:77 
Colonies should not continue to be treated like trophies, transferred by last year's 
champions to this year's winners .... Forced to accept that concept, the Allies took 
a fall-back position, attempting to blur, as far as possible, the differences between 
the mandate and the annexed territory, by assimilating the fonner to the latter. 
In principle, the concept of no more annexation defined the League of Nations' Mandate 
System under which the Mandate for Gennan South West Africa was assigned78 but in 
reality this nascent thinking was not backed by appropriate actions. In fact, at the 
practical level, the application of the concept continued to be governed only by the self-
interest of the colonizing nations. Even the concept of 'self-detennination' was 
confusing. President Wilson, who had articulated this phrase, seemed vague as to what it 
actually meant. Secretary of State Robert Lansing had asked: "What unit has he in mind? 
Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? ... It will raise hopes that can 
never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be 
discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until it 
was too late.,,79 
As Lansing had feared, what happened in the Balkans, in the Middle East, and in the Far 
East (Japan taking the Shantung peninsula in China, for example) and in many parts of 
Africa has its roots in what happened in Paris in 1919. In South Africa, this thinking was 
later on to be translated into a homelands policy based on ethnicity. The intentions of 
South Africa were for these homelands to exercise their right to self-detennination and 
seek independence. However, South Africa's policy on Namibia was different as it 
sought to incorporate Namibia into South Africa against the wishes of the Namibian 
80 people. 
77 See United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: United Nations Responsibility, pp. SO-SI. Further 
details are given in Dugard (ed.), The South West AJrica/Namibia Dispute, pp.2S-29. 
78The Mandates System, Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A. Mandates 1945. 
79 Richard Holbrooke, "Foreword" in MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, p. viii. 
80 South-West Africa Amendment Act No. 23 of 1949, sec. 27.33. 
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Thus, the vagueness of the new phrase (self-detennination) created new problems. The 
principles governing relations between European and non-European people did not 
change much from those prevailing up to the end of the fifteenth century. Up to the end 
of the fifteenth century, "territorial conquests were not only considered meritorious, but 
after occupation, the colonizers could and often did insist that foreign states accorded 
them the benefits of international law. The subjugated populations had no protection 
against colonizer except his humanity and sense of expediency. The sense of humanity 
was narrowly limited by race and religion."sl 
In the case of Namibia, marginalization of Namibians was conveniently 'justified' by 
General Jan C. Smuts, one of the two South African representatives at the Paris Peace 
Conference. He argued that the ex-German colonies in Africa and the Pacific should be 
excluded from the League of Nations' Mandate System: "The Gennan colonies in the 
Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians who not only cannot possibly govern 
themselves but to whom it would be impracticable to apply an idea of political self-
. . . th E ,,82 determmatlOn m e uropean sense. 
As South African forces had occupied Namibia after the defeat of Gennany, General 
Smuts' arguments were designed to acquire the territory for South Africa by annexation. 
He argued that Namibia's annexation by South Africa, rather than placing it under 
mandate, was considered "natural and right." Smuts had suggested to his British 
colleagues that if Americans objected to annexation, Great Britain could graciously 
concede and ask in return for control under general, and minimal, League supervision.83 
81 Quincy Wright (1930), Mandates Under the League of Nations, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 
quoted in Isaak I. Dore (1985), The International Mandate System and Namibia, Boulder, Westview Press, 
E' 1. 
2 Jan C. Smuts (1919), The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, quoted in Dugard (ed.), The South 
West Africa/Namibia Dispute, pp.28-29. 
83 MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, p. 99. 
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General Smuts' influence was clearly discernible in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations as well as in the Mandate for German South West Africa. As per Paragraph 6 of 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations: 
There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific 
Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, their geographical 
contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best 
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous 
population. 
Safeguards were outlined 10 Paragraph 5 and included freedom of conscience and 
religion, prohibition of abuses, such as slave trade, arms traffic and liquor traffic, 
prevention of military training of the natives, and securing equal opportunities for the 
trade and commerce of other members of the league. Continued influence of the Berlin 
Conference could also be discerned in this clause. 
At the time of the formulation and adoption of the mandate, no one had any interest in 
knowing what the Namibians thought about the future of their country. They were not 
consulted about their future because of continuing and pervading belief, first articulated 
in the Treaty ofWestphalia, that global politics was exclusively the function of sovereign 
nation-state actors. 84 Beyond that, the concern was only for white Christians. Another 
reason why Namibians were not consulted was perhaps because the interested parties 
knew that the Namibians sought nothing less than independence and control over their 
resources, such as land, cattle, and minerals, and that position was not convenient for 
Paris Peace Conference participants, their ally, South Africa, and global capitalist 
. t t 85 10 eres s. 
84 Richard W. Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, Donald E. Lampert (1976), The Web of World Politics: Non-
state Actors in the Global System, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, p. 274. 
85 Large part of investment capital and assets in the mining sector belonged to multinational corporations 
domiciled in South Africa, North America, Britain, France and Germany. Consolidated Diamond Mines, 
the South West Africa Company, the Tsumeb Corporation, and the Rossing Uranium Ltd together 
accounted for 90% of output excluding uranium. Further, countries that had negotiated long-term contracts 
for uranium included Britain, France, West Germany and Japan. See United Nations Institute for Namibia, 
Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, pp. 27-28. 
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Nevertheless, with the establishment of the League of Nations, the colonized people had 
very different expectations. They had hoped that the establishment of the League of 
Nations would be a turning point for the many territories that the vanquished of World 
War I were forced to surrender. They had not recognized Machiavelli's warning that 
history does not reward morality per se, and virtue is defined by outcomes and not by any 
moral imperative. Consequently, the new era ushered in with the creation of the League 
of Nations was no different from that prior to its creation. In practice, justice for the 
mandated territories or for colonies was not given importance. What was important was 
how control over the resources in the colonies and the mandated territories was to be 
exercised. 
It was therefore no surprise that the Mandate for German South West Africa was given to 
South Africa. South Africa violated every restrictive provision of the mandate and made 
every effort to extend its sovereignty permanently over Namibia86 by questioning the 
continuation of the mandate beyond the League ofNations.87 South Africa also attempted 
to incorporate Namibia as its fifth province by providing representation of the territory in 
the South African parliament88 and by making all persons born in Namibia automatically 
and involuntarily citizens of South Africa.89 Decisions affecting the lives of the people of 
the territory were once again made much in line with the fifteenth century concept of 
international law, according to which the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of the 
possessions did not matter: they were narrowly limited by race, religion and language. 
Thus, givIng the mandate over German South West Africa to South Africa was an 
example of the western powers' collusion to protect their interests and deny the 
Namibians a voice in shaping their own destiny. 
86 See, Rex v. Christian (1924) A.D. 101. Christian's conviction for treason could only be upheld if South 
Africa had sovereignty over Namibia. The Appellate Division concluded that sovereignty was vested in 
South Africa because neither the League nor the Principal Allied Powers was an entity in which 
sovereignty could be vested. 
87 See, Hansard (19 March 1947) col. 1327, (11 April 1947) col. 2588, (25 February 1948) col. 2407-8; and 
lC.J. Reports (1950). 
88 South-West Africa Amendment Act No. 23 of 1949, sec. 27.33. 
89 South Africa (Union), Citizenship Act No. 44 of 1949, sec. 2-5. 
40 
Mamdani in his work, Citizen and Subject, amplifies this concept by locating colonialism 
in its historical context. He argues that colonial states were organized and reorganized by 
the colonizers to address the overriding dilemma: the native question - the question of 
how a tiny foreign minority could rule over the indigenous majority.90 South Africa 
sought to address this question by giving each of the homelands or 'native' reserves in 
Namibia an alternative choice: either to opt for independence or to join up with any other 
neighbouring independent state of their own choice. Ovambos could either claim 
independence or join with Angola; Kavangos could opt to link up with Botswana; 
Caprivians could join Zambia; and, of course, the white homeland could opt to join South 
Africa.91 South Africa tried to persuade various chiefs to make their choices. Chief 
Eliphas of the Ovambos would have agreed to the independence option had SWAPO not 
intervened by mobilizing the masses against such a break up ofNamibia.92 
Mamdani, elaborating on the strategies for colonial rule argument referred to Lugard's 
I . . 93 apo ogla on raCIsm: 
On the one hand the policy does not impose any restriction on one race which is 
not applicable to the other. A European is as strictly prohibited from living in the 
native reservation as a native is from living in the European quarter. On the other 
hand, since this feeling exists, it should in my opinion be made abundantly clear 
that what is aimed at as segregation of social standards, and not a segregation of 
races. The Indian or the African gentleman who adopts the higher standard of 
civilization and desires to partake in such immunity from infection as segregation 
may convey, should be as free and welcome to live in the civilized reservation as 
the European, provided, of course, that he does not bring with him a concourse of 
followers. 
Reality was, however, very different. Whites did not lose land, they were not persecuted 
and deprived of their livelihood. They were not denied decent education, health services, 
and a say in the governance of their affairs. In fact, the arguments put forward by Lugard 
90 Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, p. 16. 
91 X-Ray (August 1972), quoted in United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility. 
92 My conversations with the role players in the north central region (October 1992). 
93 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa. 
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could easily have come from the South African policy document promoting apartheid,94 
which, translated into English means 'separate development'. Equality or equal 
opportunity was not a part of the policy. 
In the case of Namibia, the League of Nations showed little concern about the fact that 
under South African rule martial law was imposed in Namibia, mass imprisonments were 
commonplace, and forced labour was used to build the railroads and to work in the 
mines. When white settlers were given limited self-government in 1925, there were clear 
signs that the indigenous population was dissatisfied with South African rule, and 
therefore the terms of the mandate were not being met.95 But that changed nothing. 
Even after the demise of the League of Nations and the emergence of the United Nations 
to replace it, South Africa continued to harbour the desire to incorporate Namibia as its 
fifth province. Not only did South Africa refuse to place its mandate under the United 
Nations Trusteeship System that had replaced the League's Mandates System,96 it 
reinforced its efforts to incorporate Namibia, or a good part of Namibia into South Africa. 
However, its efforts were consistently thwarted as a result ofIndia's steadfast opposition 
to incorporation. 
The 1950 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
After South Africa refused to place its mandate under the United Nations trusteeship 
system, the United Nations General Assembly, by Resolution 338(IV) of December 1949, 
adopted by 40 votes in favour to 7 against and 4 abstentions, decided to seek an advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal status of South West Africa. It 
asked:97 
What is the international status of the Territory of South West Africa and what are the 
international obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom, in particular: 
94 See, for instance, South Africa (Republic), Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa 
Af..airs 1962-1963. 
9 M.J. Fox (1998), "Missing the Boat to Self-Determination: Palestine and Namibia in Retrospect," Arab 
Studies Quarterly (22 June 1998). 
<X>United Nations Institute for Namibia. Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility. Chapter 5. 
97 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 338(IV) (1949). 
42 
Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under the 
Mandate for South West Africa and, if so, what are these obligations? 
Are the provisions of Chapter XII [Trusteeship] of the Charter applicable and, if so, in 
what manner, to the Territory of South West Africa? 
Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the international status of 
the Territory of South West Africa, or, in the event of a negative reply, where does 
the competence rest to determine and modify the international status of the Territory? 
The court was unanimously of the opinion that South West Africa continued to be under 
the international mandate. However, the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter, though 
applicable to the territory, do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation 
to place the territory under the Trusteeship System. The Court was also unanimous in its 
opinion that the Union of South Africa does not have the competence to modify the status 
of the territory unless acting with the consent of the United Nations.98 
Five of the judges also gave dissenting opinions. Judges De Visscher and Krylov were of 
the opinion that Namibia remained a mandated territory and the trusteeship provisions of 
the Charter placed an obligation on South Africa to negotiate with the United Nations in 
good faith in order to conclude a trusteeship agreement for Namibia.99 
The General Assembly accepted the Court's opinion. 100 South Africa, on the other hand, 
refused to accept the opinion on the grounds that certain vital information had not been 
placed before the Court. IOI Subsequently, one legal scholar observed that the Union 
Government's refusal to abide by the Court's view did not deprive the Court's opinion of 
its fun legal value, but merely meant that the South African government relied upon the 
fact that there was no machinery for giving effect to that decision. 102 
98 J.c.J. Reports (1950), pp. 143-4. 
99 Ibid. 
100 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 449(V) (1950). 
101 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records; 5th Session, Fourth Committee, 196th meeting, 
paras 46-52. See also United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility, pp. 133-4. 
1021. Goldblatt (1960) The Conflict Between the United Nations and the Union o/South Africa in Regard to 
South West Africa, Windhoek, the Author. 
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South-West Africa Cases 
Emboldened by the 1950 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, South 
Africa refused to accept the United Nations' supervision of its administration of Namibia. 
However, tolerance for this South African prevarication was running thin by the 1960s 
because of the enlargement of the United Nations General Assembly with the admission 
of sixteen newly independent African states. In the General Assembly, attitudes to South 
Africa's intransigence were hardened further following the massacre of innocent 
Namibians by South African forces at Windhoek's Old Location (currently Hochland 
Park) in 1959, and the Sharpeville massacre in the following year. These changed 
circumstances created a new climate at the United Nations, manifesting itself in a new 
militancy in the General Assembly. 
The massacre of innocent Namibians by South African forces at Windhoek's Old 
Location was a result of blacks refusing to abandon their homes to make room for the 
expansion of 'white areas' .103 This incidence was the very first massacre of Namibians by 
the South Africans. It was followed by the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 where 60 blacks 
died. Namibians, thus, led a confrontation against the occupation regime, just as they 
were to be the first in the region to take up arms against racist South Africa. 
Further, in June 1960, at the Second Conference of Independent African States held in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Liberia announced that, as former member states of the 
League of Nations, they intended instituting legal proceedings against South Africa over 
South West Africa. 104 Subsequently, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1565(XV) 
commending "the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia upon their initiative in 
submitting such dispute to the International Court of Justice for adjudication and 
declaration in a contentious proceeding in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate."lOS 
Of course, none of the European states had even considered instituting legal proceedings 
against South Africa over South West Africa. 
103 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 74. 
104 Dugard (ed.), The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute, p. 214. The states participating in the conference 
included Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, The Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab 
Republic. There were also observers from Algeria, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Somalia. 
105 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1565(XV) (1960), paragraph 4. 
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Liberia and Ethiopia's application to the court asked that South Africa be held 
accountable to the United Nations for its administration of Namibia, and that apartheid in 
Namibia violated Article 2 of the Mandate. J06 In response, South Africa raised four 
preliminary objections. First, it argued that since the demise of the League of Nations, the 
mandate was not a treaty in force. Second, Ethiopia and Liberia were not qualified to 
bring proceedings before the court, as they did not have any locus standi. Third, these 
two countries' material interests were not involved. Fourth, the conflict did not meet the 
requirement of Article 7 of the Mandate that "it cannot be settled by negotiations.,,107 
The Court was, thus, forced to consider the objections before it could consider the 
Liberian and Ethiopian application. Two years later, in December 1962, the court 
overruled all the objections by eight votes to seven. 108 The line up of the various judges, 
as to who was with the majority and who with the minority, was significant as it had a 
serious bearing on the outcome of the final decision of the Court in 1966. 
After South Africa's objections were overruled, South Africa was asked to respond to the 
original complaint of Ethiopia and Liberia. Reacting to the outcome, the Prime Minister 
of South Africa, Dr Verwoerd, stated in the House of Assembly that: 109 
In the circumstances, ... particularly the very narrow majority in the matter of the 
Court's jurisdiction, the Government of the Republic would be fully justified in 
not filing counter-memorials in reply to the allegations contained in the 
memorials of the two complainants. The position is, however, that the decision of 
the majority of the Court entitles the complainants to proceed with the merits of 
the case, and unless South Africa files counter-memorials, its case will go by 
default.... The Government's decision [to file counter-memorials] should, 
however, not be construed as implying a change in the attitude which it has 
consistently held in regard to the South West Africa issue, namely that the 
International Court has no jurisdiction -- a matter on which the present members 
of the Court are themselves so sharply divided. 
106 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 140. 
107 ICJ Reports (1962), pp. 326-7. 
108 Ibid., p. 347. 
109 South Africa (Republic), House of Assembly Debates (21 January 1963),5, Cols. 14-15. 
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South Africa submitted ten volumes of counter-memorials that provided an incredible 
amount of infonnation hitherto not available on South West Africa. As a sampling, the 
counter-memorials stated that apartheid was a political necessity to stop the repetition in 
South West Africa of the bloodshed unleashed in Congo and by the Mau Mau in Kenya. 
It stated that African reality demanded that the 'white bearers of civilization' treated the 
natives as their wards, protected them against exploitation by not allowing them to own 
their own land, and gave them the benefits of modern government without the burden, 
which might be abused, of direct political representation. 1 10 
On 18 July 1966, after long and costly litigation the Court, by the President casting the 
deciding vote (the votes being equally divided), rejected the claims of Ethiopia and 
Liberia on the ground that they had not established "any legal right or interest 
appertaining to them in the subject matter of the present claims." In other words, the 
Court refused to decide on the merits of the issues presented to it and went back on its 
earlier decision regarding South Africa's objections. "The judgement surprised all the 
participants and commentators, since the issue was considered by the Court on its own 
motion. The general reaction was that the Court had reopened and reversed its 1962 
judgement on the third preliminary objection, thus undennining the basic principle of res 
judicata, which ensures the parties to a dispute that a judicial decision is final. ,,111 
The line up of judges who held majority and minority views shows that the fonner 
minority had become the new majority because of some changes in the composition of 
the Court. Scholars believe that the new composition of the International Court had 
played a significant role in the outcome. "Change in personnel [judges] was sufficient to 
change the outcome of the case on the merits assuming that a judge's vote on the first 
phase was a reliable indicator of his vote on the second - and the voting of the judges 
who sat on both phases suggests that is was a reasonable assumption."ll2 Dugard1l3 
provides an outline of the changes that took place, emphasizing how various judges were 
110 For details, see Dugard (ed.), The South West AfricalNamibia Dispute, p. 282. 
11 J United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 143. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Dugard (ed.), The South West AfricalNamibia Dispute, pp. 291-2. 
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manipulated to ensure an outcome that was more acceptable to some of the members of 
the Security Council. 
Dugard noted that: 114 
The main purpose of the litigation over South West Africa, as far as the applicants 
were concerned, was to obtain an enforceable judgement against South Africa. In 
tenns of Article 94 of the Charter ofthe United Nations each member State agrees 
to comply with the decision of the International Court 'in any case to which it is a 
party,' and 'if any party to the case fails to perfonn the obligations incumbent 
upon it under a judgement rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgement. ' 
This objective was, however, thwarted by the changed composition of the Court. 
Having exhausted a possible legal remedy, the newly independent countries in Africa and 
Asia decided to resort to a political solution of the Namibian question at the United 
Nations. 
Inclusion of "self-detennination of peoples" in the United Nations Charter was a turning 
point in international relations. This concept was eventually accepted as a right in 
international law. It was a right that was unprecedented because of its new applicability 
to entities other than states or governments. I IS However, Chapter XI, Article 73 of the 
United Nations Charter studiously avoided the use of the tenn 'self-detennination' for 
non-self-governing territories. Instead, terms, such as 'political advancement', 'self-
government', 'political aspirations' and 'progressive development of their free political 
. . ., d 116 
mstItutlOns were use . 
As a consequence of World War 11, and the evolving new thinking about the importance 
of self-detennination, post-war decades saw the sprouting of the seeds of nationalism in 
many of the colonized territories. Demands for decolonisation and self-detennination 
114 Ibid., p. 277. 
liS Fox, "Missing the Boat to Self-Determination." 
116lbid. 
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gained increased momentum with the independence of Ghana in 1957 and Nigeria in 
1960. Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted its 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The 
declaration,117 among others, stipulates, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, and is 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and impedes the promotion of world peace 
and cooperation." 
The Creation of SWAPO 
In the same year, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was 
established as the first national movement with the aim of securing independence for 
Namibia. SWAPO finds its roots in the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) that was 
fonned in 1957 by the Namibian workers in South Africa under the leadership of 
Andimba H. Toivo ya Toivo with the active support ofNamibian students studying there. 
At home, OPC was renamed the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) and 
developed into a powerful workers' organization. Though OPO worked to better the 
condition of workers under the hated contract labour system,1l8 the leaders realized that 
no real change was possible without political emancipation. This realization led the 
workers' struggle to merge into the wider struggle for political independence after the 
fonnation of SWAPO on 19 April 1960 with Mr Nujoma elected President in absentiaY9 
Soon after its establishment, SWAPO began the work of consolidating its support 
amongst Southwest African workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, clergy, and 
community leaders throughout Namibia, regardless of individuals' ethnicity. SWAPO 
had thus become a national movement. 
117 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1960 (Resolution 1514 (XV) 
118 Under the contract labour system, workers were recruited from the 'homelands' for a fixed term and 
were forced to return to their 'homelands' after the completion of the contract. They were not allowed to 
bring their families with them, change jobs, or resign. 
119 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 108. See also United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A 
Direct United Nations Responsibility, pp. 264-5. 
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The leadership also realized that SWAPO's profile needed to be raised outside the 
territory in order to ensure that Namibians had a say in the resolution of the Namibian 
question subsequent to the United Nations General Assembly passing Resolution 1514.120 
Consequently, SWAPO leadership decided to establish its offices in other countries. It 
was also decided to open Provisional Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Nujoma notes, 
"Tanganyika did not become independent until 9 December 1961 (thereafter the United 
Republic of Tanzania), but it achieved internal self-government in May of that year, and 
that made SWAPO's development, and the conduct of our campaign from there, 
somewhat easier." 121 As the profile of a resistance movement is shaped by the nature of 
the oppression it faces, SWAPO's profile was that of black resistance against the culture 
of white oppression. Therefore, initially there were no Whites in the leadership, but over 
time SWAPO membership at all levels became increasingly representative of Namibian 
diversity. 
The 1959 Windhoek massacre and the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa had 
convinced SWAPO that South Africans would go to any extent to retain White 
dominance over Blacks in Namibia as well as South Africa. Therefore, SWAPO 
contemplated launching a war of liberation. By 1962, SWAPO cadres, who were later to 
constitute People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), were being trained in Egypt, 
Algeria, and in several socialist countries. Some debate took place between SW APO 
members in particular and Namibians in general about the wisdom oflaunching an armed 
struggle versus peaceful petitioning to the United Nations. On the one hand, there was a 
feeling that our cause was just, and we could expect that that the so-called civilised world 
would be with us. Advocates of peaceful petitioning also believed that the International 
Court of Justice would not betray the trust Namibians had in it. On the other hand, there 
were those who thought that we should be ready for any eventuality. 
On the very same day that the International Court of Justice had ruled that Ethiopia and 
Liberia had no locus standi under Article 7 of the Mandate, and were therefore not 
120 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), 14 December 1960. 
121 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 113. 
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entitled to a judgement, SWAPO responded from its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam that 
the Court's negative decision "would relieve Namibians, once and for all, from any 
illusions which they may have harboured about the United Nations as some kind of a 
saviour in their plight. ... We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our 
own liberation.,,122 The Secretary of Defence of SWAPO, Mr Peter Nanyemba had stated 
on that occasion, "We have to cross many rivers of blood before we can achieve our 
freedom.,,123 The sense of betrayal was widespread after the International Court of 
Justice's ruling. Consequently, on 26 August 1966, SWAPO launched its armed struggle 
for the liberation of Namibia. 
The first battle between PLAN and South Africans took place at Ongulu-gOmbashe in 
the north.124 Soon thereafter, South Africa started its brutal repression of SWAPO cadres. 
South African forces rounded up most of the top internal SW APO leaders and tried them 
under the Terrorism Act applied retroactively. All but three leaders were imprisoned on 
Robben Island for terms ranging from five years to life. 
Revocation of the Mandate 
As a result of these developments and SWAPO's efforts at keeping the Namibian 
question alive in the international arena, the General Assembly, expanded with many 
African members, proceeded to revoke the Mandate for South West Africa. On 27 
October 1966, it adopted Resolution 2145(XXI) by 114 votes to 2 (South Africa and 
Portugal), with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi, and the United Kingdom), revoking the 
mandate and taking over the administration of Namibia.12s This forward movement on 
the Namibian question as a result of SWAPO having taken up arms against South Africa 
silenced most of those who had earlier questioned the wisdom of launching an armed 
struggle. 
122 SWAPO, To be Born a Nation, p. 17. 
123 As recollected by the author. 
124 For details about the battle and repression that followed, see Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, pp. 163-
170. 
125 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 (1966). 
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A great deal of manoeuvring went on behind the scenes when Resolution 2145(XXI) was 
being drafted. I recall that heated arguments had taken place between the Tanzanian 
representative, Ambassador John Malecela, who later became the Prime Minister of 
Tanzania, and Judge Goldberg, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
when the latter tried to make a last minute amendment. In his last ditch effort, Judge 
Goldberg argued that the mandate with lower case "m" should be terminated and 
Mandate with capital "M" should revert to the United Kingdom. I did not see the 
difference at that time, but Ambassador Malecela objected to the amendment. I recall him 
h · ·d 126 avmg Sal : 
Here we are talking about the suffering of the people of Namibia, people who are 
desirous of securing independence, and my distinguished judge is talking about 
big 'M' and small 'm'. What he is saying in fact is that the mandate with small 
'm' was given to South Africa and must be terminated and the mandate with 
capital 'M' will therefore revert to Great Britain; still Namibia would be under the 
control of someone else, some other colonial power, some other imperial power. 
We therefore reject it. 
Eventually, the original resolution was adopted and members of the Ad Hoc Committee 
for South West Africa were elected. The western countries, however, continued to argue 
that the resolution was unrealistic, because South Africa continued to occupy the territory 
d . f· hd . 127 and showe no SIgn 0 WIt rawmg. 
The Ad Hoc Committee, comprising representatives from fourteen states, viz., Canada, 
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Senegal, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, and the United States, met in 1967 
to consider the "practical means by which South West Africa should be administered.,,128 
Various members put forward three proposals. African representatives on the committee 
proposed that United Nations Council for South West Africa be established to administer 
the territory and lead it to independence by June 1968. The Mexican representative 
126 Based on my recollection. 
127 United Nations Press Release GN3368 (19 May 1967). 
128 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2145 (1966). 
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proposed that the General Assembly should immediately adopt a declaration of 
independence. 129 The United States, Canada, and Italy representatives argued in favour of 
the appointment of a special representative for South West Africa to make a 
comprehensive survey of the territory; ascertain the true representatives of the 
'peoples living in the Territory' [as opposed to exiled SWAPO members]; consult 
with 'all representative elements' in order to establish 'a nucleus of self-
government' as soon as possible; determine the needs of the territory; and report 
back to the General Assembly, which would decide what to do next. This 
proposal also called for a small, preferably three-member, Council for South West 
Africa, whose function was to receive the report from the special representative 
and to cooperate with him. 130 
This proposal for a small three member Council for South West Africa was seen by 
SWAPO as a ploy for heading off more radical alternatives, while at the same time 
placating some Africans and by so doing causing division. Discussions also showed that 
there was an attempt at marginalizing SWAPO. The idea of a fact-finding mission was in 
itself a rejection of those who were already designated as the legitimate representatives of 
the Namibian people, and to solicit other possible opinions contrary to those of SWAPO 
leaders in exile. 
We, as SWAPO representatives, therefore strongly argued against the position of the 
United States, Canada and Italy proposing the sending of a fact-finding mission to 
Namibia. We argued that we knew what the situation was, and that the United Nations' 
archives were full of documentation about how apartheid was being implemented by 
South Africa. 
Support of the OAU, NAM and Socialist Countries 
The International Court of Justice's decision had already accentuated the North/South 
divide on the Namibian issue, and this divide had manifested itself at the General 
Assembly - the Fifth Committee of the Assembly refused to approve an additional 
129 United Nations Document Al6640, para 48. 
130 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 152. See also 
United Nations Documents AlAC.l291L.6 and Al6640, pp. 32-3. 
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.. c. th C urt 131 d h A bl d budgetary appropnatlon lor eo, an t e ssem y ma e sure that no white 
Commonwealth judges were elected. 132 
SWAPO, too, was being consulted regularly by the Afro-Asian block in the General 
Assembly. As Nujoma mentions in his autobiography, "Whenever there was an 
international conference we were there, and at all OAU liberation committee 
. ,,133 
meetmgs. 
As the OAU considered mechanisms for furthering the cause of Namibia, it needed a 
vehicle through which support could be channelled. This vehicle had to be national in 
character with potential to carry out the national struggle. SWAPO fit the bill as it was 
national in its representation and, by launching an armed struggle against South African 
occupation in 1966, showed that it had the capacity to carry the national struggle forward. 
Although SWAPO did not have any legal standing at the United Nations Headquarters 
until it was given observer status in 1976,134 African ambassadors made SWAPO 
members' task easier at the United Nations. I recall that I was given authority by some 
African ambassadors to use their names whenever I came to the United Nations building. 
Previously, as petitioners, we were given only a 'day pass'. These African ambassadors, 
such as Mr Malecela of Tanzania, Mr Abdul Wahab of Egypt and later on Mr V.J. 
Mwaanga of Zambia would treat the SWAPO representative as a comrade and would 
show deference to him even if they were surrounded by western countries' 
representatives in the Delegates' Lounge. These western countries did not formally 
recognise us, but ambassadors like Mr Malece1a who were listened to by the ambassadors 
of the western countries would get up to meet me halfway and introduce me to the others, 
"Do you know the SWAPO Representative? This is SWAPO Representative Mr 
131 United Nations Monthly Chronicle (November 1966), p. 62. 
132 Dugard (ed.), The South West AfricalNamibia Dispute, p. 378. Dugard points out that Sir Kenneth 
Bailey of Australia was a strong contender for Sir Percy Spender's place on the Court, but African 
delegates made it clear that, following the 1966 decision of the Court, he was no longer acceptable. 
133 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, pp. 123. Formal recognition of SWAPO as the sole and authentic 
representative of the Namibian people came after SWAPO had started the armed struggle in 1966. 
134 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 311152 (1976). 
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Geingob." Others would shake hands with me. This is the way solidarity with SWAPO 
was manifested at the United Nations. 
One example of this solidarity was provided by the support of African diplomats when 
Mr Nujoma was to address the Security Council in 1971. Mr Nujoma arrived in New 
York with Professor Katjavivi and Mr Garoeb one day before he was to deliver his 
address. Mr Katjavivi and Mr Garoeb were to have prepared his address. At that time, I 
was still a student in New York. When I returned from my classes, I found to my dismay 
that no work had been done on his address. I therefore sat the whole night to draft his 
address. As it was the first time that a freedom fighter was invited to address the Security 
Council, the address had to be well crafted and well produced. The next morning I took 
the draft to Ambassador Vemon Mwanga, Zambia's representative at the United Nations, 
for his comments. He was happy with the draft and had it retyped on an IBM typewriter. 
Subsequently, I called Ambassador Malecela of Tanzania and asked him to go over the 
draft address. He didn't have any time to spare as he was going to the United Nations but 
agreed to go over the address on his way to the United Nations. I rode with him in his car 
as he went over the draft. He was happy with it. This narrative illustrates the kind of 
challenges SWAPO faced. We had no office, but we had the goodwill of African 
representatives at the United Nations. 
OAU, NAM and socialist countries were focused on addressing the Namibian question 
but often had ideas of their own. At the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, the Soviet-led 
group argued in favour of not entering into another colonial situation. They argued in 
favour of declaring independence forthwith. This caused the SWAPO representatives 
considerable worry. In October 1965, President Nujoma and I met with the Deputy 
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's Deputy Representative at 
the United Nations in the Indonesian Lounge at the United Nations Headquarters. It 
turned out to be a heated debate. Mr Nujoma argued that declaration of independence 
would mean giving South Africa carte blanche to act as it wished. He asked if the Soviets 
would send the Red Army to enforce independence. At the moment, we had the 
international community supporting Namibia's legal status, but if independence were 
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declared unilaterally, we would have to stand alone. At this meeting, Mr Nujoma became 
quite upset and said, "You are wasting my time." He then got up and left. This episode 
illustrates that the nationalist leaders were independent in their action. I was now put on 
the spot, trying to rationalise the behaviour of Mr Nujoma by explaining that he had a 
prior commitment, etc. 
Creation of the United Nations Council for Namibia 
The African position was that we needed the United Nations to have direct responsibility 
to administer the territory by creating a Council for South West Africa as the legal 
administering authority. On 19 May 1967, the General Assembly considered the Report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee and adopted Resolution 2248(S. V) by 85 votes to 2 (Portugal 
and South Africa), with 30 abstentions. This resolution provided for the establishment of 
the United Nations Council for South West Africa 
comprising eleven Member States to be elected during the present session and to 
entrust to it the following powers and functions, to be discharged in the Territory: 
To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible 
participation of the people of the Territory; 
(a) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as 
are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative 
assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage; 
(b) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in 
consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of 
a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which 
elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly 
and a responsible government; 
(c) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and 
order in the Territory; and 
(d) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the 
declaration of independence. 135 
135 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2248 [S-V] (1967). 
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Eleven members elected to the Council at the General Assembly's fifth special session 
held in May 1967 were Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Over the years, membership 
of the Council was increased to thirty-one, and the first substantive full-time 
commissioner for Namibia was appointed in late 1973. 
Initially, the Council was rather toothless. This was due to three reasons. First, it was not 
supported, and was even opposed, by the western countries - only Third World countries 
were represented on the Council. However, there was also a positive side to this because 
the Third World countries were in full harmony with SWAPO's position and this ensured 
SWAPO's position being better understood and appreciated. Second, initially, the council 
had only part-time commissioners for Namibia. It meant that the decisions of the council 
were not followed through at the executive level. Third, the council members were not 
appointed in their personal capacities but as representatives of their countries. They could 
not therefore support any initiative that went against their countries' policies. I recall that 
initially the General Assembly's intention was to appoint the council members in their 
personal capacities, but this idea was given up when the question came up of who would 
pay them. 
SWAPO fought for the appointment of a full-time commissioner in order for the council 
to become more effective. However, initially, even the full-time commissioners were 
rather ineffective because of the lack of support of the West for the work of the council. 
From the perspective of SWAPO, and of Namibia, the first substantive commissioner was 
Mr Sean McBride, former Irish Foreign Minister and former Chairman of Amnesty 
International. Soon after his appointment in December 1973, he shook up the United 
Nations establishment with his unorthodox methods. With his worldwide connections as 
a result of an illustrious career, he mobilized global public opinion in favour of the right 
ofNamibians to independence and self-determination, and against apartheid. Every time I 
brought information to his attention about arrests and detentions in Namibia, he would 
personally contact and mobilize various anti-apartheid groups and Namibia support 
groups. An example of Mr McBride's unorthodox ways is my own recollection of an 
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episode. In 1974, he had seen an article about Namibia in a newspaper and asked me to 
arrange 8000 copies of it. As a United Nations official, I told him that we did not have an 
allocation for making so many copies. He told me "All I want is 8000 copies. How you 
do it is your own business." He got his copies. 
Decree No. 1 
During his period as commissioner, the council "acting in terms of the powers conferred 
on it by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other relevant 
resolutions and decisions regarding Namibia" also adopted Decree No. 1 for the 
Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.136 The objective of the decree was to 
preclude support for the illegal occupation regime by persons whose rights and profits 
depended on the continued existence of the status quo. The decree was subsequently 
approved by General Assembly Resolution 3295 (1974). Copies of this decree were sent 
out to all known investors in the territory and to shipping and insurance companies. 
Private individuals, acting in coordination with the commissioner's office, also raised the 
subject at these companies' annual general meetings. Subsequently, on 3 May 1985, the 
council decided to take legal action against companies and individuals violating Decree 
No. 1. However, this decision could not be followed through as one needed a European or 
American jurisdiction for the application of the provisions of the decree, i.e., the decree 
had to have the power oflaw at the national level. 
However, the decree served its purpose. It was one more weapon in the hands of Namibia 
support groups as well as anti-apartheid groups. It also discouraged further corporate 
investment in Namibia as the corporations saw defying the decree as poor public 
relations. Further, the corporations were unwilling to invest in Namibia in defiance of the 
decree in case SWAPO came to power in an independent Namibia. One corporation that 
increased its investment in Namibia after the United Nations Council for Namibia 
promulgated the decree was Rio Tinto Zinc. This was in clear violation of the decree. 
136 Decree adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia at its 209th meeting on 27 September 1974 
and approved by the United Nations General Assembly at its 29 th Session on 13 December 1974. 
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The western countries soon realized that the Namibian question was beginning to gain 
momentum and that the council was persevering in trying to keep the Namibian question 
on the front burner. They therefore decided to join the council, to dilute it and destroy its 
potency.137 With an expanded council, one could see that the western representatives' 
interests were not in harmony with the interests of Namibia, and all of a sudden phrases, 
such as ''my government's position is ... " became commonplace. Council's position, if 
ever it took one, was overridden by national positions. However, African, Latin American 
and Asian representatives continued to fight for Namibia at council meetings. Mr 
McBride's contribution in making the council effective was outstanding. 
Additional initiatives to support the Namibian cause were also launched, including the 
creation of special United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Fund for 
Namibia,138 the United Nations Institute for Namibia, and the Nationhood Programme.139 
As national programmes, the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the United Nations 
Institute for Namibia were of critical importance for human resource development - they 
helped prepare Namibians to take responsibility of government in independent Namibia. 
They also helped the Namibians penetrate the United Nations system with their 
placement in various United Nations organs. This exposure gave them an opportunity to 
learn about how the United Nations worked, and to make acquaintances with various 
representatives to the United Nations to further Namibia's cause. 
The United Nations Institute for Namibia was established in Lusaka by the United 
Nations Council for Namibia at its 209th meeting held on 27 September 1974 in 
recognition of the fact that any steps that were taken to secure the independence of 
Namibia needed to be taken concurrently with efforts to prepare the Namibians to take 
over the administration of the country.140 I was appointed director of the institute in 1975 
137 There are parallels to be drawn between this development and what Malcolm X had said about the 
march on Washington, D.C. He had said that the march on Washington, D.C. was very potent without the 
involvement of the whites. The march was hot, and angry when it was composed only of blacks. He 
compared it with black coffee that becomes diluted and loses its potency when milk is 'integrated' into it. 
(Said at a public meeting addressed by Malcolm X in Philadelphia in 1964. I was present at this meeting). 
138 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2679(XXV) (1970). 
139 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 311153 (1976). 
140 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Prospectus (1990). 
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and remained in this position until I returned to Namibia on 18 June 1989 to lead 
SWAPO's election campaign. 
fth ·· 141 The purpose 0 e mstltute was: 
1. To enable Namibians to develop and acquire the necessary skills required for 
manning the public service of an independent Namibia; 
2. To undertake research into various political and socio-economic aspects of 
Namibia which would contribute to the struggle for the emancipation of Namibia, 
as well as to assist in the formulation of policies and programmes of an 
independent Namibia; 
3. To serve as an information and documentation centre on Namibia; and 
4. To offer such substantive support in its areas of competence as may be essential to 
the struggle for freedom of Namibians and the establishment of an independent 
state of Namibia. 
Over a period of fifteen years, the Institute trained some 1300 students in the fields of 
law, agriculture, economics, teacher training, political science and history. The institute 
also had arrangements with many universities in Africa, Europe, North America and Asia 
for the institute graduates to pursue higher education. Many institute graduates became 
lawyers, doctors, educators, managers, and academics. In addition, the institute published 
twenty-six sectoral policy research monographs. 142 When Namibia gained independence, 
the institute's graduates formed the nucleus of independent Namibia's civil service. I am 
proud that some of the institute's graduates have risen to high political, legal and 
administrative positions. Attorney General Pendukeni Ithana, Deputy Minister Kawana, 
Adv. Petrus Damaseb, and Namibia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Ambassador Andjamba, personify the achievements of the institute graduates. The 
institute's work was guided by its senate under the wise leadership of Professor Adebayo 
Adedeji, a well-known Nigerian academic and executive secretary of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa. Despite his other responsibilities, he gave his 
undivided attention to the institute and to the Namibian struggle. 
\4\ Ibid. 
\42 Ibid. 
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Thus, on many fronts the council was doing a great deal to further the cause of Namibia, 
and the General Assembly continued to push for freeing the territory from the clutches of 
apartheid South Africa. However, the General Assembly's efforts did not elicit any 
response from the Security Council as will become clear in the following paragraphs. 
Terrorism Trial 
Despite the fact that the General Assembly had revoked South Africa's mandate, South 
Africa continued to be adamant. As already mentioned, in 1966 South Africa arrested a 
number of SWAPO leaders. They were detained without trial for over a year, until the 
passing of the Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967 that was made retroactive to 27 June 
1962.143 Dugard 144 points out that in this act: 
not only is the offence broadly defined but, unlike common law treason and other 
offences, the burden of proof is upon the accused to establish his own innocence, 
once the prosecution has proved the commission of some overt act likely to have 
certain results ... a difficult task, as he [the accused] will have to show, inter alia, 
that his act was not intended to cause or encourage feelings of hostility between 
whites and other inhabitants of South and South West Africa, to hamper any 
person in maintaining law and order, or 'to embarrass the administration of the 
affairs of the State.' 
During the trial, the defence counsel's plea was that the Terrorism Act, as it purported to 
apply to Namibia was invalid and of no effect, in that the Legislature of the Republic of 
South Africa was not competent to enact the said Act by reason of the fact that the 
Mandate for South West Africa was terminated on 27 October 1966, i.e., before the 
Terrorism Act was enacted. This was a test case for South Africa's illegal occupation of 
Namibia. Namibians were arrested in Namibia and transported to a foreign country where 
they had no relatives and were tried in a foreign country for the so-called crime they 
committed in Namibia. In this context, Mr Toivo ya Toivo stated, "We are not South 
Africans. We are Namibians and will never accept your right to try us here in a foreign 
country. We do not accept your jurisdiction over us." 145 
143 Dugard (ed.), South West AfricaINamibia Dispute, p. 414. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Stated during trial in a South African Court. 
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In response, South Africa's Attorney General raised the argument in limine that the court 
had no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the Terrorism Act by virtue of Section 
59(2) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 32 of 1961, which provides 
that, with certain limited exceptions, "no court of law shall be competent to inquire into 
or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed by the Parliament." The Court 
upheld the Attorney General's point in limine. 146 
Subsequently, the trial proceeded and, on 26 January 1968, the court found thirty of the 
accused guilty of offences under the Terrorism Act and three for contravening the 
Suppression of Communism Act. Nineteen of the convicted were sentenced to life 
imprisonment and nine to twenty years of imprisonment. Among those who were 
sentenced to life imprisonment was Mr Herman Toivo Ya Toivo who went on to become 
the Minister of Prisons in independent Namibia at the time of writing. An appeal to the 
full court of the Appellate Division only helped reduce the sentences of five of the 
accused from life imprisonment to twenty years' imprisonment. 147 
Loss of SWAPO leadership inside Namibia was a serious blow to the liberation 
movement. Some analysts148 suggest that this loss decapitated SWAPO internally. 
However, this loss was temporary. South Africa did not ban SW APO for many reasons: 
SWAPO had the support of the international community, and banning SWAPO would 
have resulted in increased support for it; South Africa would have achieved little by 
banning an organization that had a strong presence outside the country, and banning the 
party internally would only have made its internal wing go underground and therefore out 
of reach. SWAPO continued to enjoy popular support within the country. 
However, after the intensification of intimidation and physical as well as psychological 
torture, some comrades at home succumbed. In the early seventies, chairman of the 
internal wing of SWAPO, Mr D. Tjongarero, because of coercion by South African 
146 Paraphrased by Dugard in Dugard (ed.), South West AfricalNamibia Dispute. pp. 415-6. 
147 State v. Tuhadeleni, 1969 South African Law Reports 153 (A.D.) Quoted in Dugard (ed.), South West 
AfricalNamibia Dispute, pp. 415-6. 
148 Dobell, SWAPO's Struggle/or Namibia, 1960-1991, p. 36. 
61 
police, dissolved SWAPO's internal executive committee. This action also resulted in the 
closure of the internal office of SWAPO. However, the emergence on the scene of the 
SW APO Youth League brought dynamism to the situation. These developments also led 
to differences between the views of some internal members of SWAPO and the external 
ones on the armed struggle and subsequent negotiations. 
Challenges to the struggle came in many forms. Following the arrest and trial of 
Namibians, many other repressive measures were applied in the country. The regime 
sought to split SWAPO into two groups, i.e., SW APO members in exile and those within 
Namibia. It did not succeed in its machinations. 
However, with all the top leaders of SWAPO outside Namibia, some problems were 
created. Internal members of SWAPO had to defer to the leadership abroad. After the 
country became independent, this situation eventually led to a distinction being drawn 
between SWAPO cadres who were in exile and those who were within Namibia. They 
came to be known as 'returnees' and 'remainees' respectively. Indeed, such distinctions 
had the potential of creating friction. 149 
Involvement of the United Nations Security Council 
Although the General Assembly had repeatedly called the attention of the Security 
Council to the situation in Namibia during the early 1960s, such calls evoked no official 
response until after the revocation of the mandate. ISO The Security Council became 
involved in the Namibian question for the first time with the condemnation of the illegal 
f 'b' . Pt' ISI trials 0 N amI lans m re ona. 
149 For example, only 'retumees' now have important ministerial portfolios in the government. However, it 
should be stated in all fairness that the leadership in exile was in the executive and the National Committee 
of the party and the internal group duly recognised that fact. Nevertheless, the internal group felt that if the 
retumees had suffered in exile, those who had remained and struggled inside the country had suffered 
equally if not more. They have demanded that their contribution be recognised by allocating important 
ortfolios to them. This issue has to be addressed. 
f50 United Nations Institute for Namibia, United Nations: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 199. 
151 United Nations Security Council Resolution 245 of 1968. 
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Western members of the Security Council also saw this as an opportunity to play a more 
significant role that was in keeping with their self-interest. One of the objectives of the 
western members was to sideline the Council for Namibia. The council was accused of 
wasting money on unnecessary travel. This accusation was partly true. However, 
SWAPO was strongly supportive of the council's activities, including travels. It argued 
that had Namibia not been illegally occupied, there would have been no need for the 
Council for Namibia, and there would have been no need for the expenditure on it or by 
it. If the United Nations wanted to save money, it had to resolve the Namibian question. 
No money would then be wasted. The Council for Namibia was carrying out its duty to 
be the legal administering authority of Namibia, and in so doing was keeping the 
Namibian question alive. 
Finally, in its Resolution 264(1969), the Security Council took note of General Assembly 
Resolution 214S(XXI) of 27 October 1966 terminating the Mandate for South West 
Africa and assuming direct responsibility for the territory until its independence, and 
recognized the termination of the mandate and the assumption of United Nations General 
Assembly's direct responsibility for the territory until its independence. France and Great 
Britain had abstained from voting on this resolution, and South Africa had rejected it. IS2 
The primary reason for France and the United Kingdom abstaining was their economic 
ties with South Africa. These two European states not only had significant investment in 
South Africa but were also supporting it with weapons, such as Mirage fighters and Puma 
helicopters. These were the weapons that South Africa had used time and again against 
SWAPO bases and neighbouring countries. Significantly, France was also involved with 
South Africa in its collaboration in nuclear technology transfer, as was the United 
States. IS3 
On 12 August 1969, the Security Council adopted Resolution 269 condemning South 
Africa for its refusal to comply with Resolution 264 and called upon the Government of 
152 United Nations Monthly Chronicle (June 1969), p. 31. 
153 Jean Sindab, "United States Nuclear and Military Collaboration with South Africa," in Wood (ed.), 
Namibia 1884-1984. pp. 694-701. 
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South Africa to withdraw its administration from the territory immediately and in any 
case before 4 October 1969. South Africa did not withdraw by 4 October 1969, and that 
set the stage for the adoption of Resolution 276 on 30 January 1970. France and the 
United Kingdom again abstained. By this resolution, the Security Council declared that 
all acts taken by South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of 
the mandate were illegal and invalid, and decided to establish an ad hoc sub-committee 
of the Security Council to study, in consultation with the Secretary General, ways and 
means by which relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including Resolution 276, 
could effectively be implemented. 
The sub-committee made various recommendations including the suggestion that an 
advisory opinion be sought from the International Court of Justice. In July 1970, the 
Security Council adopted two resolutions, Resolutions 283 and 284. In Resolution 283, it 
requested all states to refrain from any relations with South Africa implying recognition 
of the authority of South Africa over Namibia. Again, France and the United Kingdom 
abstained from voting on this resolution. In Resolution 284, the Security Council 
requested, for the first time, an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for states of 
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. Poland, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Kingdom abstained. While the United Kingdom had abstained for obvious 
reasons, abstention by Poland and the Soviet Union was also based on self-interest, as the 
Soviet Union did not want this resolution to become a pretext for questioning its own 
presence in Czechoslovakia. 
This resolution sought the court's opinion on the following question: "What are the legal 
consequences for States on the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)?,,154 
1S4 Resolution 276 condemned South Africa's refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions on 
Namibia; declared that all acts taken by South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia since the 
termination of the mandate were illegal and invalid; and called on states to refrain from any dealings with 
the South African government which would conflict with the provision relating to illegal and invalid acts. 
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In response, South Africa raised a series of objections on the participation of certain 
judges of the court in the proceedings for the advisory opinion, and to Security Council 
Resolution 284 on the grounds that two permanent members of the Security Council had 
abstained. It also submitted a proposal to the court that a plebiscite be held, to be 
conducted jointly by the court and South Africa to ascertain whether the people of 
Namibia wished to be administered by South Africa or the United Nations. The court 
rejected all objections and the plebiscite proposal. 
During the hearings, the South African counsel had argued that in adopting Resolution 
2145, revoking the mandate, the General Assembly had acted beyond its powers. In 
considering the issue, the court determined that material breaches of the mandate had 
occurred. 155 The resolution in question was therefore "to be viewed as the exercise of the 
right to terminate a relationship in case of a very deliberate and persistent violation of 
obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship.,,156 But 
merely recognizing a situation as illegal did not, according to the court, put an end to it: 
when a situation has been declared illegal by the Security Council, member states should 
be expected to recognize the declaration and respond to it. IS7 The court's decisions were 
"binding on all States Members of the United Nations, which were thus under obligation 
d th t ,,158 to accept an carry em ou . 
Subsequently, Dugard noted: 159 
The 1971 Opinion was sought mainly to put pressure on the United Kingdom and 
France (which have consistently opposed the legality of the revocation of the 
Mandate) to support Security Council action against South Africa. Despite the 
fact that the International Court has given its fun legal blessing to the action of the 
Security Council, the Council has not succeeded in persuading the United 
Kingdom and France to adopt a more activist policy. On 20 October 1971, these 
two powers abstained from voting on a resolution of the Security Council 
accepting the Court's Opinion and calling upon South Africa to withdraw from 
South West Africa. 
155 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 145. 
156 LC.J. Reports (1971), para. 95. 
157 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p.146. 
158 LC.J. Reports (1971), para. 115. 
159 John Dugard, "The 1971 Opinion and the Future," in John Dugard and E.M. Grosskopf (1973) , South 
West Africa and the International Court, Johannesburg, S.A. Inst. ofIntemational Affairs, p. 24. 
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He further noted: 160 
This will not, however, be the end of the matter. The United Kingdom, France and 
the United States (which had accepted the Court's Opinion) will be under new 
pressure - which can only intensify with Peking seated in the Security Council -
to support coercive measures against South Africa to compel her to leave South 
West Africa. Although these powers have consistently resisted attempts to force 
them to support enforcement action against South Africa in the past, they will find 
it difficult to adopt a purely negative attitude on this matter in the future. In these 
circumstances there is an urgent need for statesmanship on the part of the political 
leaders of South Africa and her trade partners. 
Coup in Portugal 
Where the Court and the Security Council did not succeed, a coup d'etat in Portugal did. 
The coup d'etat in Portugal in 1975 precipitated significant change in the attitude of 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Had there been no coup in Portugal, 
these countries would have continued to stage manage the proceedings in the 
international fora to give a semblance of seeking justice for Namibia through the 
International Court of Justice while in fact undermining the efforts of the Namibian 
people. 
In the sixties, South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique continued to be 
under the control of white regimes. Since 1968, military cooperation between South 
Africa and Portugal had been intensifying. 161 In 1968, South Africa was allowed to 
maintain an air unit in eastern Angola, and a joint Portuguese-South African commando 
centre was established at Cuito Cuanavale. Twenty years later, Cuito Cuanavale was to 
play a crucial role in modifying the regional military balance of power in south-western 
Africa in favour of Angola and against South Africa. 162 By 1971172, South Africa was 
supplying arms, helicopters and pilots to the Portuguese in Angola and was actively 
160 Ibid. 
161 The Namibian (1 July 1988). 
162 Donald Dreyer (1994), Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1945-90, 
London, Kegan Paul, p.66. 
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involved in actions against the liberation movements. At the same time, South Africa had 
started intervening in Angola using Namibia as a springboard. 163 
About the same time, Namibians had started concerted action against the occupation 
regime, with Namibian students and trade unions making 1971172 the years of 
intensification of resistance. According to du Pisani: l64 
October 1971 marked the opening of a new frontier in the war against South 
Africa's presence in Namibia, when PLAN fighters operated for the first time in 
the strategically important Caprivi Strip. Protracted labour action throughout the 
country's mining and commercial sectors in late 1971-early 1972, added a new 
dimension to the politics of resistance. At the time, some 43 000 black contract 
workers (the vast majority from the fonner Owambo) were employed in the more 
developed fonnal economy of southern and central Namibia, some 11 000 in the 
almost exclusively white commercial farming sector, 14 000 in the local 
government service, commerce and industry, 3000 in fishing and approximately 
3000 in domestic service. In Windhoek alone the strike involved some 5000 
contract workers and by 1972 the strike involved some 13 500 workers in 21 
towns and 11 mines. 
Escalation of resistance in Namibia and the developments in Angola, with a white 
colonial regime being helped by a white racist regime, resulted in the militarization of 
Namibia. Later on, South Africa also used Caprivi, where it had built an air force base, 
known as Mbacha Air Force Base, as a springboard for attacking the Frontline States, 
training dissidents, and giving expression to its policy of "hot pursuit." 
The primary reason for South Africa's support of Portugal in Angola was to ensure that 
buffer states, that is, Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia continued to survive under 
white minority control. African states that challenged South Africa by supporting the 
liberation of these buffer states, and seeking change in South Africa, suffered enonnous 
economic, political and social upheavals as a result of their steadfast principles. For 
instance, Zambia's economic woes started around 1975, after Zambia's full compliance 
with sanctions against Rhodesia's VDl. Sanctions worked on Zambia more than on 
Rhodesia. 
163 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
164 Du Pisani, "State and Society under South African Rule." 
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However, the situation changed drastically in 1974 when the liberation movements in 
portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia brought home to the Portuguese that colonial 
adventures were no longer sustainable. Portuguese forces were losing in Guinea Bissau 
and were under pressure in Angola and Mozambique. Timor was in the throes of civil 
war. 
These developments in the colonies precipitated a military-led coup against Portuguese 
dictatorship and installed a new Portuguese regime dominated by the armed forces 
movement, Movimento das Forcas Armadas (MF A). All political parties and particularly 
Partido Comunista Portugues (PCP) and Movimento Democratico Portugues (MDP) 
"strongly emphasized immediate decolonization, which they claimed would strengthen 
d t h ,,165 portuguese emocracy a ome. 
Subsequent to the Lusaka Agreement of 7 August 1974, the process of decolonisation 
started in earnest, with Guinea (Bissau) becoming independent in 1974, and 
Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands, and Sao Tome--Principe Islands becoming 
independent in 1975. Indeed, the beliefs ofMFA, PCP, and MDP proved to be justified, 
because Portugal embraced democracy soon thereafter. One could thus argue that 
pressures from people of African colonies had precipitated the democratisation of 
Portugal. In other words, Africa freed Europe! 
However, in the case of Angola, considerable problems arose as no one party could be 
considered to represent the people of Angola. Eventually, by January 1975, three parties 
were recognized as the 'legitimate' representatives of the Angolan people: Movimento 
popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola 
(FNLA), and Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). A 
transition government with equal partnership between the three liberation movements and 
portuguese presence was sworn in on 31 January 1975. However, soon fighting between 
165 Douglas L. Wheeler, "Portuguese Withdrawal from Africa, 1974-1975: The Angolan Case," in John 
Seiler (ed.) (1980), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, Boulder, Westview, p. 5. 
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the three parties broke out with MPLA occupying Luanda. As a result of this fighting, 
just a few hours before Angola was to become independent, the Portuguese left Angola 
without recognizing any legal government, granting sovereignty to "the people of 
Angola.,,166 With the routing ofFNLA, MPLA came to power in Luanda but the civil war 
continued. 
With the victory of liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the belief 
espoused by the United States and many other western powers that southern African 
liberation movements could not hope to "gain the political rights they seek through 
violence," was put to rest. 167 
From the South African perspective, the independence of Portuguese colonies was a body 
blow. With the emergence of Angola and Mozambique as independent countries, South 
Africa's buffer states had vanished. In the southwest, Namibia was soon to become the 
buffer state. 
Loss of South Africa's Buffer States and the Changing Geopolitical Situation 
Zimbabwe's liberation movement, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), got a 
boost with the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique. It opened up the northern and 
northeastern borders of Rhodesia to the freedom fighters. Further, FRELIMO provided 
valuable support to ZANU in its struggle against the white regime. 
Similarly, the departure of the Portuguese from Angola had left the northern border of 
Namibia unprotected by an ally of South Africa. According to Totemeyer and Seiler: 168 
For the first time, with an independent black nationalist government at its 
northern border, effective military pressure could be brought to bear on the South 
African government. Before 197 4, SWAPO guerrillas depended on Zambian 
sanctuaries (because of Portuguese cooperation with South Africa in denying 
camps or transit routes within Angola to the guerrillas), which meant that they 
could enter and leave SW A only through the narrow and relatively easily 
protected Caprivi Strip area or through Botswana. Now they could move back and 
forth across the Angolan-SWA [Namibia] border (some 800 miles long) .... The 
166 Ibid., p. 13. 
167 C. Munhamu Botsio Utete, "Zimbabwe and Southern African 'Detente'," in Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa 
Since the Portuguese Coup, p. 61. This idea was articulated by Kissinger in National Security Study 
Memorandum 39. 
168 Gerhard Totemeyer and John Seiler, "South West AfricaINamibia: A Study in Polarization and 
Confrontation," in Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, p. 81. 
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Portuguese coup [also] brought about an immediate and massive act of political 
defiance by Namibian blacks. 
As a result of this change in the geopolitical situation, Ovamboland, Kavango, and 
Caprivi became operational areas, and the populations of those areas became even more 
bitterly resentful of the South African administration for its high-handed approach 
towards local populations. Consequently, even the black churchmen who abhorred 
violence became supporters of the SWAPO-led liberation struggle: 
By September 1976 participants in a consultation on 'the responsibility of the 
churches in the changing SW AlNamibian situation' could agree that 'the 
Churches should denounce the legalized violence of the South African regime, 
commend disobedience to unjust laws as a Christian Action, and support genuine 
resistance movements which are working for a freer and more just Namibia.' 169 
Although South Africa remained intransigent, chinks in its armour were beginning to 
appear - its buffer states had vanished, and the liberation struggle was coming closer to 
home. In May 1975, the United Nations Security Council considered a draft resolutionl70 
that would have imposed mandatory sanctions against South Africa, but South Africa was 
saved once again by its allies, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who 
vetoed the resolution. This was the first time they had exercised a veto on the Namibian 
issue; until then the threat had led to much less drastic proposals.1 71 
As the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire had changed the geopolitical equation 
considerably with the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the West recognized 
that the liberation movements could not be wished away. One consequence of these 
events was the West's alarm that the Soviets had gained an upper hand in southern 
Africa, and its concern about being left out of the geopolitical developments in the 
region. This was one of the reasons why the western countries decided to join the Council 
for Namibia. Their concern was no doubt aggravated by the involvement of the Soviets in 
Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Referring to the economic costs of the Soviet 
169 Ibid., p. 83. Totemeyer quotes the Resolution Unanimously Adopted at the End of a Consultation on the 
Responsibility of the Churches in the Changing SW AlNamibian Situation, Swakopmund, 4-6 September 
1976, mimeo. 
170 United Nations Doe. S/11701. 
171 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 208. 
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presence in southern Africa, Julian Amery,172 fonner Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, was quoted to have said the following: 
The second most important source of raw materials in the world is Central and 
Southern Africa, providing gold, diamonds, platinum, uranium, chrome, cobalt, 
nickel, copper as well as many other minerals used in the making of steel and 
other technological processes. The Soviets have established virtually a colonial 
regime in Angola and a protectorate over Mozambique. From these two countries, 
they are poised to extend their influence over Zambia and Zaire's copper-rich 
province of Shaba. Meanwhile they have already begun guerrilla operations to the 
south against South West Africa and Rhodesia. The guerrilla forces involved are 
trained, equipped, indoctrinated and financed by the Soviets with East Gennan 
and Cuban help. 
It was about economics and self-interest. The West therefore began to focus on attempts 
at reasserting itself in the region and saw South Africa as its ally in this effort. South 
Africa, too, exploited the situation in its favour by playing the communist threat card. Of 
course, the United Kingdom and the United States considered these threats real enough to 
justify backing South Africa's adventures in the region. 
This communist 'threat' became the focal point of the western leaders' strategy in the 
region. Various options for managing change were listed in the U.S. State Department's 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39. One of the options in this 
memorandum was for the United States to partially relax American measures against the 
white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, increase aid to black Africa, and initiate 
diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions between the white governments and their 
neighbours. The State Department argued that, once adopted, this policy would prove 
sticky. Hence the label given to this option by its opponents: "tar baby". 
Crocker, reviewing U.S. policy in southern Africa and his involvement in shaping this 
policy, observes in his book, High Noon in Southern Africa: "It was time for the West to 
compete in shaping the destiny of this region. The Soviets and their proxies were moving 
forcefully to assert claims to regional leadership.,,173 He further commented that "Ronald 
172 See WaIter Walker (1978), The Bear at the Back Door: The Soviet Threat to the West's Lifeline in 
Africa, Sandton, Valiant, pp. xiii-xv. 
173 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p.28. 
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Reagan had not been elected to make Africa safer for Marxism, sti111ess to work for yet 
another Marxist takeover in the wake of the 1975-78 Soviet or Cuban gains in Angola, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia and the 1980 Mugabe victory in Zimbabwe." 174 
Of course, in the case of Zimbabwe, in September 1978, the United States and British 
governments together had announced a constitutional and administrative plan for 
transition to majority rule. This plan eventually resulted in the Lancaster House 
Agreement that entrenched twenty-eight seats for white members in the legislative 
assembly for the next seven years. Arrangements were also made for inclusion in the 
constitution of a bill of rights including existing property rights, with resort to the 
judiciary that guaranteed human rights, property rights, public service job security, and 
• 175 pensIOns. 
Zimbabwe's independence was thus negotiated and engineered to protect white interests. 
An attempt was also made to exclude the Patriotic Front, i.e. ZANU and ZAPU, from 
winning the elections. However the outcome of elections gave the Patriotic Front the 
power -- an outcome that was obviously not to the satisfaction of Mr Crocker. 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, with the support of the United States, had succeeded 
in tying the hands of the new government constitutionally at Lancaster House. This 
strategy of managing change to ensure geopolitical advantage for the West, and to protect 
the interests of white settlers, became even more acute in its impact when the United 
States became involved with objectives similar to those of the Europeans and South 
Africans in Namibia and South Africa. 
In the context of Namibia, this attempt at managing change was particularly discernible 
with the West's evolving thinking and the creation of the Western Contact Group,176 
which largely drafted what came to be known as the United Nations Security Council 
174 Ibid., p. 63. 
175 For details see Utete, "Zimbabwe and Southern African 'Detente'," in Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa 
Since the Portuguese Coup. 
176 The Western Contact Group comprising Great Britain, France, the United States, Canada and the 
Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1977. Their proposal was placed before the Security 
Council on 10 April 1978. 
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Resolution 435 (1978).177 The role of Security Council Resolution 435 in bringing about 
change in Namibia will be explored in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Gennan occupation of the territory was characterized by massacres, confiscation of land 
and cattle, and undennining of means of livelihood of indigenous populations. 
Indigenous populations were forced to live in reserves. These actions were designed to 
create a settler colony with plenty of free land and cattle, financial support, and cheap 
labour available to the settlers. Germany also created an administrative structure in the 
territory, particularly in the Police Zone, thus creating a colonial state. This trend 
continued during the period of the mandate exercised by South Africa with Afrikaner and 
English settlers moving in. 
During German and South African eras of occupation, the end result was internal 
colonialism by white settlers and external colonial occupation first by Germany and then 
by South Africa. Furthennore, South Africa institutionalised racism through its policy of 
apartheid. After World War II, South Africa sought to integrate Namibia into South 
Africa and resisted United Nations attempts at supervising the mandate. In this effort, 
South Africa found Britain, France and the United States to be willing supporters. 
At the United Nations, the General Assembly terminated the South African mandate over 
Namibia in October 1966 and declared that the territory came under the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations (Resolution 2145). Two years later the Security 
Council recognized the termination of the mandate and called upon South Africa to 
withdraw its administration from the territory. However, South Africa remained adamant. 
Angola's independence resulted in Namibia's becoming a frontline state, and 
consequently South Africa started the militarization of Namibia. South Africa also played 
177 Soon after Security Council Resolution 435 was adopted, South Africa launched a brutal attack on 
Namibian refugee camps at Kassinga on 4 May 1978 to prevent SWAPO from accepting Resolution 435. 
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the 'communist threat' card that suited the West because of its own geopolitical 
ambitions in the cold war. 
However, because of the involvement of the eastern block countries, changes taking place 
at home as a result of apartheid, South Africa's pariah status, and new militancy at the 
United Nations, the West realized that change in southern Africa was inevitable. It 
therefore sought to manage change. This attempt at managing change started in earnest 
with the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 385 in January 1976 and Resolution 
435 on 29 September 1978. 
~. . 
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Chapter Three 
The Process of Implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 435 
In international affairs, some problems are easier to tackle when they 
have reached the point of crisis than when they are merely heading there. 
Robin Renwice 78 
Introduction 
From the western perspective, the point of crisis that Renwick refers to came in southern 
Africa after Angola and Mozambique became independent in the mid-seventies. The 
crisis became even more acute when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. South 
Africa, a western ally, no longer had any buffer state it could count on to shield the 
apartheid regime from South African and Namibian liberation movements. Cold War 
developments in Angola further challenged the hegemony of South Africa and its western 
allies in the region. For the first time, Namibia shared a border with a militant 
independent country (Angola) that helped SWAPO intensify armed struggle. The 
presence of Russians and Cubans in Angola further crystallized the international 
dimension of the crisis that South Africa and its allies faced. The stage was thus set for 
the interested parties to become pro active in 'tackling' the Namibian question by 
managing Namibia's transition to independence. 
Various players attempting to manage this transition sought to further their own 
geocentric, political and/or economic interests. These players included (1) the Namibians, 
with SWAPO as their "sole and authentic representative,,179; (2) the United Nations; (3) 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Frontline States (FLS); (4) the United 
Kingdom; (5) France, (6) Germany, (7) the United States of America, and (8) South 
178 Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa. p. 129. 
179 In December 1976, the United Nations General Assembly, by its Resolution 311146, had declared 
SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. 
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Africa. Different players had their own agendas. Namibians were trying to secure their 
independence; the United Nations was trying to fulfil its mandate of freeing Namibia 
from the clutches of South Africa; the Organisation of African Unity and the Frontline 
States were trying to counter colonialism and neo-colonialism; European powers were 
trying to protect their economic andlor settler interests; the United States was trying to 
counter the Soviet influence; and South Africa was trying to keep Namibia as a client 
state, and as a buffer against the forces of nationalism and Soviet influence. 
The General Assembly had been involved with the Namibian question ever since the 
creation of the United Nations, first, to transfer the mandate for South West Africa to the 
trusteeship system and then, because of the pressure exerted by African and Asian states 
on the United Nations, to assume the mandate over Namibia. The Security Council, on 
the other hand, did not get involved until January 1968 when it condemned the trial of 
Namibians by South Africans under the Terrorism Act. More significant involvement of 
the Security Council came in March 1969 with the recognition of the termination of the 
mandate by the General Assembly,180 and August 1969 with the declaration that the 
occupation of Namibia constituted an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the 
United Nations.181 Resolution 269 also recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the 
people of Namibia against the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. 
Further, in July 1970, the Security Council asked all states to refrain from any dealings 
with South Africa that might imply recognition of South Africa's authority over Namibia. 
However, various western members continued to support South Africa in order to protect 
their own interests in southern Africa. For example, they made no attempt to isolate 
South Africa by even token actions, such as recall of their ambassadors for consultation 
or closing down their embassies to register their indignation at South Africa's continued 
occupation of Namibia. In their approach, any attempt at helping Namibians to fulfil their 
aspirations for freedom and independence was secondary to the protection of their own 
180 United Nations Security Council Resolution 264 (1969). This resolution called upon South Africa to 
withdraw its administration from Namibia and condemned South African policies designed to destroy the 
national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. 
181 United Nations Security Council Resolution 269 (1969). 
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interests in the region. This chapter explores various players' evolving positions as they 
sought to influence and control the emergence of an independent state of Namibia within 
the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. 
Recognition of SWAPO - A New Militancy at the OAU 
Ever since its inception in 1963, the OAU had been seized with the need to liberate 
Africa from colonialism. In fact, its charter reflected three main aims: anti-colonialism, 
anti-racialism and liberation. The charter stipulated "absolute dedication to the total 
emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent." In 1963, the OAU also 
formed an African Liberation Committee (ALC) and gave all liberation movements 
recognized by the OAU observer status at the meetings of the ALC. 182 
In the same year, SWAPO and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) were 
recognized by the OAU, and the South West Africa Liberation Army (SWALA) 
(renamed first as Namibian People's Liberation Army, NAP LA, in 1966, and then as 
People's Liberation Army of Namibia, PLAN, in early 1970s) was created outside the 
territory. SW ALA was formed after SWAPO had opened an office in Algiers with Mr 
Solomon Mifina as its representative and after Mr Sam Nujoma had urged Algeria's 
President, Mr Ahmed Ben Bella, to deliver the first batch of arms to SWAPO. These 
weapons were later sent to the Caprivi Strip via Cairo and Dar es Salaam.183 
In October 1963, the South West African Liberation Front (SW ANLIF), later renamed 
South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF), was constituted in the first 
organized attempt to unify different Namibian nationalist movements in the territory in 
response to OAU Liberation Committee's declaration that it would support one unified 
political movement in South West Africa. SWANUF, however, never really got off the 
ground. 
182 See Andenkule Ajala (1974), Pan-Africanism: Evolution. Progress and Prospects, London, Andre 
Deutsch; and W olfers, Politics in the Organisation of African Unity. 
183 Klaus Dierks (2002), Chronology of Namibian History: From Pre-historical Times to Independent 
Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia Scientific Society, http://www.klausdierks.comlChronology. accessed 15 
December 2003. 
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In 1964, SWAPO received OAU recognition as the legitimate Namibian liberation 
movement. This recognition came because SWAPO was a broad-based movement that 
had a plan of action including political mobilization (strikes), and intensification of the 
armed struggle. By 1964, SW ALA had soldiers in training in Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, 
and the People's Republic of China.184 Because of these competencies, SWAPO was 
considered a suitable vehicle through which OAU assistance could be channelled to the 
N amibian cause. 
OAU had, however, not withdrawn its recognition ofSWANU until a serious faux pas by 
the SWANU President. In January 1966, during the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's 
Solidarity Conference, also known as the Tri-Continental Conference, in Havana, as well 
as in China, SW ANU President, Mr Kozonguizi criticized all the African states as 
puppets and reactionaries who were receiving aid from imperialist countries. Such 
criticism led ultimately to the OAU's decision to withdraw its recognition of SWANU in 
1968. This decision of the OAU also paved the way for SWAPO to be recognized by the 
United Nations General Assembly as the sole and authentic representative of the 
Namibian people185 in 1976. Further, the United Nations General Assembly gave 
SWAPO full observer status in the General Assembly.186 
Thus, SWAPO had not only played an important role of keeping the Namibian issue alive 
in the international arena but had also put its faith in the international system to deliver 
Namibia from colonialism. As discussed in Chapter Two, guerrilla struggle was started 
only after the International Court of Justice refused to decide on the merits of the case. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 311146) (December 1976). Interestingly, as narrated to me 
by the SWAPO representative at the United Nations, at the OAU meeting in Morocco in 1976, a debate had 
ensued between the Anglophone and Francophone members of OAU. The Anglophone members had 
proposed that SWAPO was the sole representative of the Namibian people, but the Francophone members 
of OAU argued that, in French, the word 'sole' was not adequate and the word 'authentic' should be used. 
Finally, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Mr Malecela, provided the solution by suggesting that both the 
words be used to describe SWAPO. Those who were looking for 'sole' would find it in the resolution and 
those who were looking for 'authentic' would find it in the resolution. 
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However, Central and East African states continued to express their preference for a 
peaceful resolution of the struggle for liberation. The Lusaka Manifesto approved by 
fifteen central and East African states on 16 April 1969 expressed preference for peaceful 
negotiation over confrontation. Over the next two years, this decision came under 
considerable criticism for having failed to recognize that moral persuasions were unlikely 
to succeed in persuading the colonizers to compromise their deeply entrenched economic 
interests in the southern African region. SWAPO leadership, along with the ANC of 
South Africa and the two liberation movements of Rhodesia, played a significant role in 
changing the thinking of DAU away from peaceful negotiations towards armed struggle 
fi .. 187 as a catalyst or negotIatIons. 
The Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the United Nations had 
also pushed for an arms embargo against South Africa, which was blocked by Great 
Britain, France and the United States.188 This new militancy in the international fora 
made the western powers concerned that they were becoming isolated on the N amibian 
issue. As this isolation was seen in western nations' capitals as having the potential of 
serious repercussions on the western powers' future relations with South Africa, Namibia 
and the FLS, the western powers decided to back the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 385.189 
Response of the West 
The Carter administration in the United States undertook a new initiative to address the 
Namibian question. In 1977, Mr Andrew Young, U.S. ambassador to the UN, invited the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Canada to join the United States in a new 
initiative to address the Namibian question. 
Initial motivations of the countries comprising this group that came to be known as the 
Western Contact Group were quite different. The Carter administration was more 
187 There was a gradual move away from the Lusaka Manifesto. OAU's Mogadishu Declaration of 1971 
and the Accra Strategy of 1973 moved towards an armed struggle option. The Dar es Salaam Declaration of 
1975 fully supported armed struggle. 
188 United Nations Document S/11713 (6 June 1975). 
189 Rich, "The United States, Its History of Mediation," p. 79. 
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inclined to take the moral high ground. It also believed that the United States did not have 
to control regimes or independent states directly. Even as independent countries, they 
could sell their resources only to the West, and therefore they had no option but to accept 
neo-colonialism. 
European powers were quick to respond to Mr Young's invitation. They saw it as an 
opportunity to bring about change in the region in a collective way. This reduced their 
accountability individually and still ensured their continued influence with their erstwhile 
colonies and/or post-colonial economic partners.190 This change in strategy aimed to 
protect the economic interests of the West that could be compromised if newly 
independent countries were 'radicalised' by the Soviet block. 
The Western Contact Group, led by Mr Don McHenry (who was later pivotal in the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 435), deputy to Mr Andrew Young, began tough 
bargaining with South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr Vorster and Foreign Minister, Mr Pik 
Botha. SWAPO also made it clear that it would only participate in the constitutional 
process if the Turnhalle principles for internal settlement were abolished, if elections on a 
non-ethnic basis were held under United Nations supervision, and if the South African 
Defence Force left the country prior to elections. l9l In May 1977, Mr Vorster met with 
V.S. Vice-President, Mr WaIter Mondale, in Vienna, where Mr Mondale spoke on three 
issues: majority rule for Namibia, majority rule for Rhodesia, and a progressive 
transformation for South Africa towards the same end.192 
As a result of this effort, South Africa agreed to suspend plans to establish an interim 
government in Namibia, and persuaded Turnhalle delegates to drop their plans. It also 
agreed to allow free elections for a Constituent Assembly. Towards that end, South 
Africa passed the South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No. 95 of 1977, and 
appointed an administrator general to administer the territory and to work with a United 
Nations Representative in the run-up to United Nations supervised elections. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
192 Ibid. 
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However, Pretoria followed a two-track approach -- it worked actively towards reaching 
an internal settlement in Namibia, largely on South Africa's own tenns, and cooperated 
on the diplomatic front to reach a peaceful and internationally recognised settlement on 
Namibia. SWAPO rejected this idea of a Pretoria-appointed administrator-general and 
preferred direct United Nations control over the transitional process. 193 
These efforts were a result of a confluence of developments. Members of the Western 
Contact Group were driven to action because of the pressure being exerted militarily by 
SWAPO and ANC, demands of FLS and NAM for sanctions against South Africa, and 
increasing militancy ofthe United Nations Council for Namibia. 194 As Jabril95 observes: 
Involvement in mediation seemed to be the only means by which western 
European states, along with their North American partners, could find a way out 
of the conundrum .... From the revocation of South Africa's mandate over 
Namibia in General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 1966 to the 
creation of the UN Council for Namibia and subsequent UN decisions on 
Namibia, western interests came directly in conflict with the positions adopted by 
the UN and the emergent Namibian nationalist movement, SWAPO. 
In retrospect, Andrew Young's decision to include the European powers was a shrewd 
move, because ''the European participants [in the Western Contact Group] had a vital role 
in gaining acceptance of the mediation effort and in having an active role in the process 
of mediation.,,196 The Europeans were, in any case, happy to get involved for their own 
reasons. 
193 Ibid. 
194 This militancy and its challenge to Western interests was illustrated by the enactment of Decree 
No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations 
Council for Namibia in 1974 and approved by the United Nations General Assembly at its 29th 
session on 13 December 1974. See United Nations "Violations of Decree No. I for the Protection 
of the Natural Resources of Namibia," paper presented to Regional Symposium on International 
Efforts to Implement Decree No. 1 held by the United Nations Council for Namibia, Geneva, 27-
31 August 1984; Roger Moody (1992), The Gulliver File - Mines, People and Land: A Global 
Battleground, London, Minewatch; and Nicolaas Jan Schrijver (1995), Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties in an Interdependent World (Doctoral Thesis), 
Groningen, Univ. ofGroningen. 
195 Jabri, "European Involvement in the Western Contact Group," p. 61. 
196 Ibid., p. 60. 
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The United Kingdom and Gennany were interested in participating in this initiative 
because of their vital economic interests in southern Africa, 197 their need to protect the 
interests of the considerable white populations in South Africa and Namibia, the need to 
diffuse increasing pressure from FLS and Nigeria, and, in the case of the United 
Kingdom, as a response to increasing pressure from the developing Zimbabwe situation 
and pressure from the Commonwealth. 
The United Kingdom's willingness to participate in the Western Contact Group is 
attributed to Dr David Owen, then Labour government's Foreign Secretary, who wanted 
to enhance economic ties of Great Britain with black Africa and reduce involvement with 
South Africa. He also believed that the solution to the Namibian question and the 
Zimbabwean question could best be obtained with the involvement of the FLS and 
Nigeria. However, "Owen's intention to achieve a lessening of economic relations with 
South Africa while intensifying such links with majority-led states on the continent was 
severely constrained by the potential costs of such readjustment.,,198 
The United States, however, was more interested in maintaining and enhancing its 
geopolitical position in the context of the Cold War. Further, the Democrats in the United 
States, and the Labour government in the United Kingdom, were interested in resolving 
the outstanding issues in southern Africa through a strategy of mediation in order to 
prevent further radicalisation of the liberation movements. 
Initially, however, the United States was behind the Western Contact Group's initiative 
because of its concern about widespread criticism at home and abroad about its stance in 
deferring its initiatives to those of South Africa, particularly on issues related to Namibia 
and Angola. In the case of Angola, the United States was supporting UNITA against the 
Cuban backed MPLA government, with apartheid South Africa and Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) as its allies in that effort. The United States also had to 
197 See, for instance, W.S. Barthold (1977), Namibia's Economic Potential and Existing Economic ties with 
the Republic of South Africa, Berlin, German Development Inst.; A. Roberts (1980), The Rossing File, 
London. CANUC; Richard Moorsom, "In the Grip ofImperialism," in Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984, 
pp. 302-313. 
198 Jabri, "European Involvement in the Western Contact Group," p. 62. 
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worry about black opinion at home and, perhaps, a 'Vietnam syndrome' response to its 
involvement in Angola. SWAPO, too, had successfully lobbied black power movements 
and other groups in the United States to influence policy change. 
West Germany was motivated to participate in the Western Contact Group because of its 
own interests. It wanted to protect the interests of some 18 000 ethnic Germans in 
Namibia and wished to protect its growing trade with South Africa. West Germany also 
had growing military and nuclear links with South Africa, for which it had come under 
increasing criticism by the majority-led African states. 199 
The French had signed military and nuclear contracts with South Africa and had therefore 
come under criticism by the FLS.200 Though the French government was less concerned 
about criticism as "Francophone African states were generally less vociferous in their 
criticism of western links with the apartheid regime than the Anglophone states of 
southern Africa,,,201 it was interested in being a party to negotiations to protect its 
economic interests. 
Canada, the fifth member of the Western Contact Group, was also favourably inclined 
towards the United States' position, though it had few specific interests of its own, and, at 
best, might have brought some 'disinterested' moral authority to the negotiations. 
Thus, each of the participants in the Western Contact Group had its own view and 
strategy, and these defined their approaches to the negotiation process. According to 
Jabri,202 "In the absence of self-defined interest, the Western Contact Group process 
would not have taken place and, therefore, would not have established the diplomatic 
groundwork which ultimately led to Namibian independence." 
199 Sindab, "United States Nuclear and Military Collaboration with South Africa," pp. 302-313. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Jabri, ·'European Involvement in the Western Contact Group," p. 63. 
202 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Jabri203 further identifies the commonality of objectives of the western five that ensured 
the Western Contact Group building a consensus. There was consensus on the following 
issues: 
1. Need for internationally acceptable outcome of the Namibian question and 
support for Security Council Resolution 385; 
2. Opposition to South African sponsored Turnhalle constitutional conference; 
3. Concern to avoid the threat of veto in case South Africa refused to participate in 
the process of negotiation; and 
4. Opposition to limited sanctions (This was essentially the British government's 
position). 
Actions of the Frontline States 
The Frontline States, in line with DAU's Dar es Salaam Declaration of 1975 that gave 
priority to ending colonial rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, committed themselves to 
support SWAPO in its liberation war against South Africa. At that time, the Frontline 
States had considered it easier to tackle the Namibian question than the situation in South 
Africa, because the Namibian problem was that of illegal occupation of the territory. The 
situation in South Africa was, on the other hand, more complex, because South Africa's 
problems could be considered internal (encountering the doctrine of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of other countries). Of course, once the United Nations declared 
apartheid as a crime against humanity, the international community became seized with 
this 'internal affair'. This was the position taken by the FLS. 
Confronted with stark power imbalances and their involvement in the Zimbabwean 
conflict from 1974 to 1981, the FLS' dominant strategy was to mobilize international 
support to realize their regional objectives. Their greatest contribution to the Namibian 
decolonisation process was therefore to be a catalyst for multilateral diplomatic 
intervention in conflict resolution.204 However, the Frontline States and Nigeria had 
individually also ''made substantial direct contributions to the liberation movements, and 
some, like Tanzania, established a special liberation fund to which the workers and 
203 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
204 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, pp.97-98. 
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peasants contributed routinely.,,2os A number of Frontline States also helped SWAPO 
train its cadres for armed struggle. This initiative got additional impetus in December 
1968 when ALC convened a conference at Morogoro in Tanzania to encourage African 
nationalist movements to train their fighting cadres within Africa. 
South Africa's Response 
South Africa's focus was largely on finding strategies that would help it keep Namibia as 
its client state. When calls for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa were 
defeated in the Security Council by a triple veto, South Africa proceeded to seek an 
alternative solution to maintain status quo in Namibia. In September 1975, it convened a 
conference of 'representatives' of eleven ethnic groups at the Turnhalle in Windhoek. 
Various delegations "comprised mostly the same puppets that were earlier set up in 
'bantustans', besides a handful of other black self-seeking politicians.,,206 Their mandate 
was to produce an interim constitution that would form the basis of an 'independent' 
client state in Namibia. The entire scheme was opposed from its inception by the 
nationalist groups, such as SWAPO, SW ANU, the Damara Advisory Council, and the 
Namibia National Front (NNF), as well as major church organizations.207 These 
independent thinking organizations were neither recognized by South Africa nor were 
they part of the Turnhalle conference. 
Meanwhile, in January 1976, the Security Council adopted Resolution 385 that laid down 
the procedure for the transfer of power from South Africa to the Namibians. It provided 
that: 
1. The United Nations shall take over the administration of Namibia. 
2. South Africa shall release all political prisoners, abolish all repressive and 
discriminatory laws, and allow Namibian exiles to return to Namibia. 
205 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 281. See also 
Ronald Dreyer (1994), Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1945-1990, 
London, Kegan Paul International, Chapter 5. 
206 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspective for National Reconstruction and 
Development, p. 50. 
207 Elizabeth S. Landis 1977), "The Tumhalle Constitution: An Analysis," Africa Today (July-Sept, 1977), 
pp.15-16; and Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (1978), South West Africa-Namibia, African American Affairs 
Association, p.20. 
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3. The United Nations shall supervise and control the holding of free elections 
throughout Namibia based on universal adult suffrage.208 
Shortly before the scheduled review by the Security Council of South Africa's 
compliance with Security Council Resolution 385, the South African sponsored 
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference declared that it would draft a constitution for 
Namibia, and it hoped that Namibia would become independent by the end of 1978. 
South Africa had hoped that this effort would not only forestall calls for sanctions209 
resulting from its non-compliance with the scheduled review, but would also help it 
implement 'Odendaal-style independence,21O in Namibia. The plan contained "many 
features of the earlier Odendaal proposals which conferred authority onto tribal chiefs 
and councils unrepresentative of their people and usually handpicked by the South 
African administration. The interim constitution drafted by the Turnhalle Conference in 
March 1977 also provided that "individually and separately, any 'bantustan' could 
. dd" futu ,,211 become 'm epen ent m re. 
The international community rejected the draft produced by the TurnhaIle Constitutional 
Conference. Three permanent members of the Security Council chose not to take a hard 
line but to defer to South Africa's initiative. Nevertheless, the Western Contact Group, 
with its threat of veto in future resolutions, succeeded in persuading South Africa not to 
go ahead with the implementation of the Turnhalle constitution.212 However, in 1977, 
South Africa exacted its pound of flesh by excising Walvis Bay from Namibian 
jurisdiction and placing it under the Cape Province's jurisdiction. South Africa also had 
problems with almost every substantive issue in proposals put forward for an 
internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian question. Further, it continued to 
208 United Nations Security Council Resolution 385. 
209 South Africa did succeed in forestalling sanctions on that occasion. In October, another draft resolution 
for sanctions against South Africa was tabled in the Security Council but was once again vetoed by the 
three Western Permanent Members. 
210 South Africa (Republic), Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 1962-63. 
2Ji United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and 
Development, p. 51. 
212 Financial Times (7 April 1977). 
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threaten the international community that it would hold elections in Namibia in 1978 with 
or without a United Nations presence or participation of SW APO.213 
Western Contact Group Initiatives and Plan for the Independence of Namibia 
The Western Contact Group started the work on its own proposals. There was an 
agreement that their proposals conform to Security Council Resolution 385 and other 
relevant resolutions. The issues involved the withdrawal of South African forces, release 
of political prisoners, presence of United Nations peace-keeping forces, and holding of 
elections. "By coordinating their diplomacy with the Frontline States, the Western 
Contact Group also attempted to exert leverage on SWAPO to make concessions to South 
Africa. The Western Contact Group members even suggested to SWAPO to participate in 
the Turnhalle Conference (1977) as 'one of the interested major parties,.,,214 In response, 
SWAPO put forward its own proposals. These proposals included ceasefire by SWAPO 
and South Africa, immediate withdrawal of South African armed forces and their 
replacement with the United Nations peacekeeping forces, and repeal of all 
discriminatory, restrictive and repressive laws?15 
In January 1978, the Western Contact Group presented its own draft settlement proposals 
to SWAPO, South Africa, the Frontline States, and key United Nations officials.216 
These proposals were discussed by the United Nations officials and representatives of the 
Western Contact Group with SWAPO and South Africa at 'Proximity Talks' held in New 
York. An understanding was for the Frontline States to bring SWAPO on board, the five 
western powers to bring South Africa on board, and for South Africa to bring the internal 
parties on board. SWAPO under pressure from the Frontline States at Luanda (Luanda 
Accord) dropped its preconditions and accepted the proposals despite misgivings?17 
South Africa accepted the proposals on 25 April 1978218 but soon thereafter attacked 
213 Rand Daily Mail (3 December 1977). 
214 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 287. 
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Namibian refugee camps at Kassinga in Angola. It had perhaps hoped that such a 
barbaric act would force SWAPO to reverse its acceptance of the proposals. 
Soon thereafter, the Western Contact Group placed its proposals before the Security 
Councit219 and, on 29 September 1978, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435. 
This resolution provided for the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure 
an early independence of Namibia. The United Nations Plan for the Independence of 
Namibia called for: 
The holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly that would, in turn, draft a 
constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia, with the independence 
process to be overseen by the UN special representative (UNSR) assisted by 
UNTAG. General procedures for the observation of a comprehensive ceasefire 
under UNTAG supervision were to include (1) cease-fire by all parties, with both 
South Africa and SWAPO troops confined to base; (2) subsequent phased 
withdrawal of all but 1500 South African troops within twelve weeks and prior to 
the start of the election campaign, with remaining troops to be withdrawn after 
elections were certified; (3) citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces to be 
demobilized and command structures dismantled; (4) provision for SWAPO 
forces to return via designated entry points to participate in elections; and (5) an 
UNTAG military section to ensure provisions were observed by all parties. The 
implementation plan recommended establishing an UNTAG military component 
of 7500 personnel (5000 personnel in seven battalions, plus 200 observers and a 
2300 person logistics component). The military component's duties would include 
monitoring the cease-fire; confining South Africa and SWAPO forces to their 
bases; assisting in the withdrawal of South African forces; confining the 
remaining South African forces until elections were completed; monitoring the 
borders; preventing infiltration of the borders; and monitoring the disbandment of 
citizen forces, commandos, and relevant command structures. 220 
South Africa accepted the United Nations Plan for the Independence of Namibia but 
again proceeded to register voters for an election for a Constituent Assembly to 'settle' 
the Namibian question internally, outside the framework of the United Nations. In 
response, the Western Contact Group sent a team to South Africa to persuade it to give 
up its insistence on holding the proposed elections. The team failed and the Western 
219 United Nations Doe. S/12636 (10 April 1978). 
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Contact Group announced that the elections organized by South Africa were "regarded as 
the first round of elections,,221 with perhaps the United Nations supervised elections as 
follow up to these elections. Once again the western powers' actions were deferred to 
those of South Africa. SWAPO, on the other hand, rejected this position. In early 
December, South Africa went ahead with the planned elections. After the elections, South 
Africa reiterated its acceptance of the United Nations Plan for the Independence of 
Namibia. 
Even after accepting the United Nations Plan, South Africa's emphasis shifted to creating 
fault lines in its various provisions. It tried once again to scuttle the plan by giving its 
own interpretation to the 'restriction to base' of the South African forces and SWAPO 
freedom fighters. SWAPO's understanding was that restriction to base meant restriction 
of both South African and SWAPO fighters within the country to a base inside the 
country. However, South Africa, by refusing to acknowledge that there were SWAPO 
fighters within the country, argued that there could be no restriction to base of SWAPO 
fighters within the country, but SWAPO fighters should be monitored in Zambia and 
Angola. This South African position later became a contentious issue when the Plan 
began to be implemented. South Africa also questioned the United Nations' capacity to 
perform its duties in an impartial manner. Consequently, there was increasing pressure 
from African states for sanctions against South Africa. 
In an effort to deflect the sanctions pressure, the Western Contact Group decided to 
organize a pre-implementation meeting between the WCG members, SWAPO, and South 
Africa.222 The pre-implementation meeting was held in Geneva from 7-14 January 1981. 
There was increasing recognition in South Africa of the pressure that the western parties 
were bringing to bear upon it to enter into negotiations for a Lancaster House type 
settlement on Namibia. The DTA leader Mr Dirk Mudge tried to avoid such a course223 
with South Africa and 'internal parties' again introducing the issue of 'United Nations 
impartiality'. The breakdown of talks was imminent as DTA presented the United 
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Nations with a list of seven demands relating to the United Nations' alleged bias towards 
SW APO?24 As Kaela225 observes, "Under the Tumhalle dispensation promoted by it, 
South Africa started to demand international recognition of the Tumhalle leadership by 
presenting them as the leaders of the Namibian people who should represent their country 
in the negotiations mediated by the Contact Group." 
This intransigence of South Africa was in part based on its awareness that the new 
Thatcher government in the United Kingdom was supportive of its position. South Africa 
also had reason to believe that the new Reagan policy would be more favourable to it. It 
therefore took a hard line at the pre-implementation talks. That is why, "despite early 
assurances to the contrary, members of the South African delegation reopened the 
question of impartiality, claiming that the United Nations had disqualified itself from 
supervising free and fair elections in Namibia because of its recognition of SW APO.'.226 
Mr Pik Botha, South Africa's Foreign Minister, had also argued that negotiations needed 
to take place between SWAPO and the internal parties. On the impartiality issue, Mr Dirk 
Mudge, who had attended the talks as a member of the South African delegation, 
although he was referred to as leader of the internal parties, threatened to walk out and 
declare UDI in Namibia?27 On 19 January 1981, Administrator-General Mr Hough 
announced that, "the inhabitants of SW AlNamibia will have to find solutions to the 
problems themselves.,,228 The Reagan administration 'accepted' South Africa's argument 
against SWAPO. 
Once the Reagan administration began to lead the Western Contact Group, it chose to 
deal with state actors only. Consequently, SWAPO was often not even consulted, and the 
western powers worked with South Africa primarily "to ensure that the future 
224 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
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government of Namibia would be moderate, pro-West, pro-capital and sympathetic to 
their economic - and to a lesser extent, strategic - interests in the territory.,,229 On the 
other hand, SWAPO's position was that in the end it must be the two parties to the 
conflict, i.e., SWAPO and South Africa, which must resolve the conflict. The other actors 
were only facilitators. 
Reagan Administration's Support of South Africa 
Overall, however, the Reagan administration's policy was less concerned with the 
Namibian question and more with the Cuban presence in Angola. Namibia was only a 
carrot for achieving its geopolitical objectives. According to Rich,23o "United States 
policy at this stage was based upon support for a protracted low-intensity war requiring 
United States military assistance [to South Africa and UNITA] which, it was hoped, 
would increasingly raise the military stake for the Cuban forces in Angola as well as the 
economic costs for the MPLA government." 
In January 1982, Mr George Shultz succeeded Mr Alexander M. Haig as the U.S. 
Secretary of State, and the United States and South Africa began asserting that the 
question of Namibian independence had to be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. At the same time, South Africa carried out further raids into Angola. 
SWAPO rejected this 'linkage' outright. 231 
During the same period, South Africans were pursuing the policy of destabilization 
against the FLS, and were seeking ways to deny both SWAPO and the United Nations 
any role in the final shape of Namibia's future. This belligerency of South Africa was 
never condemned by the Reagan administration. In addition to linking the Namibian 
independence issue with the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola, the Reagan 
administration pushed for the introduction of proposals for drafting a constitution for 
Namibia prior to elections for the Constituent Assembly. Other members of the WCG 
were, however, committed to Resolution 435 as the basis for the settlement of the 
229 Dobell, SWAPO's Strnggle/or Namibia. 1960-1991. p. 69. 
230 Rich, ''The United States, Its History of Mediation," p. 85. 
231 Dierks, Chronology o/Namibian History. 
92 
Namibian question. Thus, the United States' interests were becoming quite divergent 
from those of the European and Canadian members of the WCG to the extent that the 
Europeans began to view the WCG as a liability.232 An earlier consensus at the WCG had 
given way to the demands of the United States that were primarily focused on its 
geopolitical interests: 
The Reagan Administration, for its part, impressed upon the other parties, the 
need to amend UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and to adopt the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for granting 
independence to Namibia. An agreement was secured on these two issues as part 
of a common approach to negotiations for a settlement of the Namibian problem. 
Other points agreed upon were (1) the need, and measures, to counter what was 
perceived to be Soviet influence in southern Africa; (2) creating conditions for 
western-style democracy and the capitalist economic system in an independent 
Namibia; and (3) promoting peaceful change, while undermining the role of 
armed struggle as a means of national liberation. These were interrelated.233 
In keeping with its policy of what it termed 'constructive engagement', Washington had 
also felt that South Africa's concerns with the mechanism for the implementation of the 
United Nations Plan should be addressed to make the plan acceptable to South Africa. 
In the era of the Cold War, both the United States and South Africa saw SWAPO as a 
pro-Moscow organization that, along with the African National Congress (ANC) of South 
Africa and MPLA in Angola, could threaten their geopolitical interests: 
Thus the Reagan administration viewed the problem of Namibia in the context of 
the Cold War at the global and regional levels. Its primary concern, as far as the 
problem of Namibia stood, was to influence the course of change so that what it 
perceived to be the Soviet threat could be dealt with. This necessitated 
collaboration with Pretoria ... to formulate a common approach to negotiations. 
The Reagan administration justified its collaboration with South Africa as 
'constructive engagement.' It is against this background that Washington's 
attempt to have UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) modified should be 
. d 234 vlewe . 
Another major concern of the Reagan administration was to ensure that the future 
government of Namibia, even if headed by SWAPO, would not be a 'communist 
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dictatorship'. Hence the Constitutional Principles that the Western Contact Group, with 
the overbearing influence of Washington, wanted to adopt had all the characteristic 
features of western liberal democracy, such as the doctrine of checks and balances, 
guarantees of individual freedoms, the idea of competing for political office, and right to 
property. The Reagan administration had thus sought to ensure that Namibia retained the 
capitalist economic system open to investment by western multinational corporations. 
The inclusion of guarantees of private property in the Constitutional Principles addressed 
this concern. In promoting liberal democracy and a capitalist economic system, the 
Reagan administration had succeeded in imposing the parameters of a liberal constitution 
on Namibia. 
Kaela235 further noted: 
Behind the Reagan administration's advocacy of formulating an electoral system 
for Namibia before the beginning of the implementation of the UN independence 
plan lay another objective. The democratic constitution for which the principles 
had been formulated would still have to be drafted and adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly on the basis of the two-thirds rule. Therefore, the Reagan 
administration was interested in the choice of an electoral system that would 
prevent SWAPO from coming to power, or, one that would prevent it from 
winning a large majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly. This, it was hoped, 
would guarantee the adoption of a democratic constitution. 
However, the electoral system was not the brainchild of the Reagan administration but 
that of the West Germans, whose intention was to ensure German settler representation in 
the Constituent Assembly by advocating proportional representation system of election. 
The issue of property rights was also of concern to the Germans, the British, the South 
Africans and the United States to protect the interests of the land-owning white settler 
communities and to safeguard investments in South Africa and Namibia. 
The Linkage Issue 
Fear of communism, and the desire of the United States to protect its geopolitical 
interests, resulted in the United States' attempt to link Namibian independence with the 
23S Ibid., pp.216-217. 
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withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This shift in focus gave South Africa new hope 
for delaying the independence of Namibia: 
This linkage ... played well in Pretoria, for it shifted the responsibility for 
achieving Namibian independence from South Africa to Angola and the United 
States. There were also military advantages to this changed posture. Linkage gave 
South Africa reason to continue its military forays into Angola, for, in doing so, it 
would ensure that the Cubans would remain there. As long as the Cubans stayed, 
South Africa could justify retaining its grip on Namibia.236 
Thus, the linkage issue became a major obstacle to Namibia's progress toward 
independence. Namibians saw this interrelationship between Namibian independence and 
the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola as irrelevant. Namibian independence was about 
ending South Africa's illegal occupation in the territory. The presence of Cuban troops in 
Angola was, on the other hand, to help the MPLA government deal with invading South 
African troops and UNIT A rebel guerrillas who continued to fight on. 
SWAPO, the Frontline States, the Organisation of African Unity, France, the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Security Council rejected the linkage issue.237 
However, South Africa remained defiant on the Namibian issue. In response to Security 
Council Resolution 539 that rejected the linkage issue, South Africa's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs issued a statement that South Africa would not succumb to Security 
Council's threats.238 
Chester Crocker himself justified the notion of' linkage' as follows:239 
A narrowly defined Namibia settlement (without reference to Angola) was 
unattractive to Pretoria for a host of reasons. It would entail the loss of a mineral-
rich, strategic buffer zone larger than Texas without any compensating 'quid'; the 
negative political imagery of a U.N.-Ied transition that would favour SWAPO; the 
risk of SWAPO exploiting its U.N., Soviet, Cuban and MPLA support effectively 
to coerce its way into power, drawing encouragement from the nearby presence of 
a highly trained, mobile Cuban force; the desire to avoid abandoning Pretoria's 
black UNIT A allies in Angola; the prospect of a chaotic exodus from Namibia of 
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its white minority, leading to charges at home of a sellout; and the loss of 
Namibian bases for projecting military power into neighbouring states. 
According to Crocker, the South African preferred an 'Angola first' brand of linkage, 
while the Angolans preferred a 'Namibia-first' variety. The United States' interest in the 
'linkage' of the two issues was largely based on geopolitical considerations. 
The fact that neither the European participants nor Canada was involved in the 
negotiations over the linkage issue suggested that they were not interested in linking the 
two issues. However, they continued to influence the thinking on the constitution and 
were successful in achieving a compromise proposal based on the introduction of 
constitutional guarantees for the white minority in Namibia, as opposed to the imposition 
of a full-fledged constitution?40 
West Germans were particularly influential in gaining changes in WCG's proposals with 
the introduction of the idea of a Bill of Rights. They also introduced a proposal for the 
adoption of the German model of proportional representation that would ensure that 
smaller parties would have a significant role in an elected Constituent Assembly. 
Apart from being motivated by a desire to achieve compromise proposals which 
would meet the needs of both the Reagan administration and those of SWAPO 
and its FLS allies, the German proposals were also motivated by an interest in the 
welfare of the German community in Namibia. Unlike the Reagan administration 
and the approach of its chief negotiator, Chester Crocker, which had essentially 
ignored SWAPO as a negotiator, the West German government maintained high-
level contacts with the Namibian nationalist movement and attempted mediation 
between SWAPO and Chester Crocker in 1982.241 
Similarly, the French tried to promote discussions between Angola's Foreign Minister, 
Mr Paulo Jorge, and Mr Chester Crocker to resolve the linkage issue. However, the 
linkage issue was essentially negotiated by the United States, with the British government 
providing some support in the form of facilitating contacts as the British had an embassy 
in Luanda and the Americans did not. 
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With the coming to power of Mr Francois Mitterrand, the French government also began 
to re-evaluate its priorities in southern Africa as it wished to promote relations with the 
FLS and southern African liberation movements. Soon thereafter, in July 1982, the 
French and Angolan governments signed a cooperation agreement. France also supplied 
armed helicopters to the Angolan armed forces for anti-guerrilla operations, despite the 
fact that the Reagan administration had supported UNIT A. This new shift made the 
French reconsider their position in the WCG, and they temporarily withdrew from the 
242 group. 
These policy shifts had serious consequences for resolving the Namibian question. As 
already mentioned, initially, developments in southern Africa were focused on 
decolonisation. Emphasis in the GAU, amongst the Frontline States, within the NAM, 
and at the United Nations General Assembly was focused on the independence of the 
portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe and Namibia and bringing about majority rule in South 
Africa. However, once the issue of Namibia moved to the Security Council, this initiative 
was lost and self-interest of the West became the dominant consideration as 'solutions' 
were sought for negotiated independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The developing role 
of the WCG further undermined the United Nations where the Security Council had 
begun to defer to the WCG on issues related to Namibia. Even the western influence 
began to be lost during the Reagan era because of President Reagan's belief that South 
Africa was a valuable ally against any Marxist tendencies. 243 
United States' Diplomatic Initiatives in the1980s 
The western initiative had lost its momentum and influence over the South Africans 
largely as a result of repeated vetoes by some of the members of the Western Contact 
Group, i.e., the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, in the Security Council. 
The United States, too, had undermined its own influence over South Africa during the 
Reagan era as President Reagan saw South Africa to be a friend and was vocal about it. 
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South Africa saw this as an opportunity to become even more hawkish against the 
majority-ruled black states in the region. One consequence of the United States' 
'friendship' with South Africa was that the United States policy became deferred to that 
of South Africa. As a result, the United States' credibility in Africa suffered.244 
Reflecting on the United States policy in southern Africa, Rich noted:245 
United States policy continued to be burdened by a rather crude Cold War 
strategy rooted in the assumption that there was a monolithic communist interest 
expanding into southern Africa. The original decision by Fidel Castro to send 
troops to assist the MPLA was not a simple consequence of a Soviet grand 
geopolitical design, but related more to Castro's close personal relationship with 
the MPLA leadership, a sense of historical 'mission' to aid third world liberation 
and the desire to play a significant political role on the world stage. 
It is in such a climate that Mr Crocker sought to redefine the State Department's southern 
Africa policy. In the 1981 talks with the Western Contact Group, the FLS, South Africa, 
and SWAPO, Mr Crocker concluded that since the beleaguered position of the Group lay 
at the mercy of South African intransigence and FLS impatience, a new initiative was 
needed to inject life into the stalled process.246 
He considered that while Security Council Resolution 435 addressed the Namibian issue, 
it provided nothing to the South Africans in return. South Africa's primary concern was 
its own security against what it saw as communist expansionism emanating from Angola 
and Mozambique. He therefore sought to link the problem to issues that opened the 
possibility of trade-offs between an expanded list of parties.247 The linkage of Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola with the independence of Namibia provided just such an 
approach. Crocker's approach was in fact a direct result of the Reagan administration's 
support of its ally South Africa. If pressure were maintained on South Africa to accept 
change, there was little South Africa could do. Therefore, Crocker's explanations could 
be seen only as explanations for justifying the U.S. policy - and not a reason for linkage. 
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In pursuing the policy of linkage, Mr Crocker moved to achieve what he called, 'positive 
sum' - something for everyone. As his deputy, Charles Freeman Jr., elaborated, "There 
are at least two basic approaches to an apparently intractable problem if a frontal assault 
seems unlikely to work: one can either disaggregate the problem and attack it piece by 
piece, or one can link the problem to issues that open the possibility of trade-offs between 
an expanded list of parties.,,248 Linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal with the 
independence of Namibia was being sold as a part of this approach, though in the 
geopolitical context, the United States was not a disinterested party. 
Constitutional Principles 
In May 1981 the Western Contact Group endorsed the U.S. initiative comprising three 
phases: (1) addressing the constitutional concerns of South Africa and Namibian internal 
parties; (2) finalizing the agreement on the U.N. role during the transition period; and (3) 
establishing steps for the implementation of the agreement.249 
On the election of Constituent Assembly members, the WCG suggested an electoral 
system with half the seats filled through the proportional representation system and half 
through the constituency-based, first-past-the-post system. SWAPO saw this as a ploy to 
prevent it from getting a majority, and especially control of the Constituent Assembly, as 
most of its candidates were in exile and not within the constituencies. It therefore rejected 
this proposal with full backing of the FLS. The WCG therefore put an alternative 
proposal of one vote counted twice - once to determine the outcome of proportional 
representation with the whole of Namibia as the constituency and once to determine the 
outcome in specific constituencies based on the first-past-the-post system. This, too, was 
unacceptable to SWAPO for the same reasons.250 The WCG therefore decided to put this 
issue aside, to be resolved as a part of the overall settlement. 
In addition to the attempt to influence the outcome of elections, there were efforts to 
force a constitution on the future Constituent Assembly. This imposition, too, was 
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rejected by SWAPO, but it accepted certain Constitutional Principles. These 
Constitutional Principles provided that Namibia would be a unitary state with a written 
constitution, it would have three branches of government, the executive would be elected 
by universal suffrage, human rights would be protected and enforced by the judiciary, 
and the Constituent Assembly would adopt the constitution by two-thirds majority. 
However, the end result of these provisions was almost the same as imposing a 
constitution on Namibia. 
Agreement on a set of Constitutional Principles was Phase I of three phases put forward 
by the Western Contact Group. The other two phases included negotiations on specific 
arrangements on a ceasefire and the composition of UNTAG; and public commitment by 
all parties to the implementation of Resolution 435. Before any discussion could take 
place on phase two of the WCG plan to implement Resolution 435, Mr P.W. Botha 
declared that the three phases could not be completed unless Cubans left Angola. This 
linkage was accepted by the WCG and Angola was willing to discuss it. 
Cuba Raises Stakes 
On February 4, 1982, Angola and Cuba responded to linkage by jointly declaring that 
Cuban troops would pull out of Angola only if four conditions were met: 
1. Unilateral withdrawal of South African troops from the Angolan territory; 
2. Strict implementation of Resolution 435 (1978); 
3. An end to acts of aggression against Angola by South Africa, the United States 
and their allies; and 
4. Cessation of South African aid to UNIT A and all other counter-revolutionary 
bands. 
Meeting these conditions would basically entail the removal of the raison d 'etre of 
Cuban presence in Angola. Angola and Cuba also made it clear that they were not 
prepared to exchange Namibia's independence for the withdrawal of the troops at the 
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South Africa, on the other hand, used the linkage issue only as a delaying tactic and 
continued with its attempt at destabilizing eight neighbouring states with a combination 
of military and economic acts and Machiavellian diplomacy.252 In addition, its incursions 
in southern Angola became bolder. It saw its concern as the communist threat coming 
down to the Orange River. South Africa's Defence Minister stated that if South Africa 
withdrew from the war for South West Africa, it would shift the operational area from the 
Kunene River to the Orange River?53 He also reported to the South African parliament 
that South Africa might make pre-emptive strikes in Angola. One could argue that South 
Africa would have been quite happy to see Cubans stay in Angola as such a situation 
would have ensured continued United States support for South Africa. However, the fact 
is that it was not up to South Africans only. Cuban forces had been reinforced and had the 
potential for going past Namibia. This was not the scenario that South Africa would have 
found attractive. 
Such deep-rooted concerns of South Africa were difficult to address even for seasoned 
negotiators like Mr Crocker. His attempts to create a favourable climate between Angola 
and South Africa, through negotiations in Cape Verde, were later undermined by South 
Africa's alleging infiltration of SWAPO cadres in Namibia. Undermining the Cape Verde 
agreement on mutual withdrawal of forces from Angola only hardened the attitudes on all 
sides and set the stage for further South African cross-border campaigns in Angola. 
Mr Crocker, however, continued to work towards achieving success with his linkage 
.. , . 254 Imtlatlve: 
A mediator has his own agenda and the other parties are the other party. They are 
all on the other side of the table from the mediator and what you want to do is to 
raise the price for the other parties of obstructing the basic direction in which 
you're trying to move. At the same time you are trying to shape intentions in such 
a way that there is that common ground you keep talking about. You also have to 
have the right logical symmetry oftradeoffs so that it is a positive sum game. 
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Of course, Mr Crocker was a mediator, but he was there to protect the interests of the 
United States. His mediation role was subservient to his primary interest of ensuring 
continued U.S. influence in the region. He saw the promise of Namibia's independence in 
return for Cuban withdrawal from Angola as an ideal situation for furthering the United 
States' geopolitical ends in a cold war environment, and providing the necessary 
perception of security for South Africa. The new policy, therefore, had a number of 
components as follows: 
1. First, in the interest of continued United States and South Africa cooperation that 
was considered important for the United States' interests in the region, work 
towards making South Africa more acceptable in the international community. 
This was to be achieved by seeking South Africa's cooperation on Namibia. 
2. Second, to further United States geopolitical interests, seek to link the resolution 
of the Namibian question with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. 
South Africa was to be persuaded to agree to a timetable for Namibia's 
independence in return for the potential of security against 'communist influence'. 
3. Third, seek to have the Clark Amendment255 repealed so that UNITA could be 
supplied with anns without congressional approval, and seek to make UNIT A 
more acceptable to the Frontline States by putting some distance between UNIT A 
and South Africa. 
4. Fourth, MPLA needed to be assured of government security in Angola with the 
withdrawal of South Africans from southern Angola. 
Contradictions between some of the components were ironed out as the negotiations 
proceeded between the United States, the Cubans and the South Africans. 
This position was a significant shift from Mr Crocker's strategy of raising the stakes high 
enough to make it so expensive for the other party that it was forced to negotiate. 
255 On 20 December 1975, the V.S. Senate passed an amendment to the Department of Defense 
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Democrat sponsored an amendment to the foreign aid bill that extended the ban. 
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However, the reality on the ground was very different. All sides to the conflict were 
raising stakes. In the pursuit of this strategy, South Africa and UNIT A were United 
States' allies. As Nujoma observed:256 
While the U.S. was supplying UNITA bandits and even training its soldiers in the 
usage of Stinger missiles in Zaire, Chester Crocker was continuing his talks with 
the Angolans and Cubans about the latter's withdrawal. The MPLA Government 
was willing to be flexible, but the South Africans continued to make an end to the 
war and implementation of Resolution 435 impossible by making completely 
unacceptable demands for rapid withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces 
from Angola. The reverse was happening, with the arrival at Port Namibe late in 
1987 of massive Cuban reinforcements, the first contingent being the labour force 
needed to construct the essential air bases at Kahama and Matala so that Cuban 
MiG 23s could engage the South Africans, even over northern Namibia itself, 
without refuelling. 
Cuba and MPLA were ready to match and raise the stakes further. In fact, by 1987, the 
balance shifted in favour of the Cuban and MPLA forces, when the MPLA forces 
attacked the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale and downed ten South African Mirage 
jets. Subsequently, Mr Crocker proceeded to extricate South Africa from this situation 
despite the fact that South Africa continued its presence in southern Angola. In fact, in 
September 1987, it gained some ground in a new military offensive. However, its policy 
was not very sophisticated - it was still fighting a colonial style war that has been 
compared by some with that of the United States in Vietnam?S7 
The September 1987 attack by South African forces raised the stakes again and the 
Cubans and Angolans matched them by increasing the number of Cuban forces to 40 000. 
By December 1987 Cuba increased its troop strength in Angola to about 45000, and later 
to 50 000. Concurrently, 15000 of those soldiers were moved south toward the Namibian 
border where, in Pretoria's view, they threatened South Africa's military position in 
northern Namibia. In early 1988, Defence Minister Magnus Malan admitted his 
government's worry that SWAPO guerrillas might push straight into Namibia behind a 
Cuban shield. "By mid-January 1988 Cuban-piloted MiGs hit the South African forces 
south of Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban military command concluded that they could 
256 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, pp. 371-373. 
257 Rich, "The United States, Its History of Mediation," p. 88. 
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exploit the weaknesses in the South African position in southern Angola by escalating the 
war-to a level beyond which Pretoria dared not to gO.,,258 
By the beginning of 1988, South African dominance in southern Angola was over. 
SWAPO's 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade also fought alongside FAPLA at Cui to 
Cuanavale, though South Africans could not bring themselves to admit this.259 
South Africa'S Defeat at Cuito Cuanavale 
South Africa made a final assault on Cuito Cuanavale in late March 1988 although it had 
lost its air superiority. At that time, some 3000 SADF forces were trapped south of Cuito 
Cuanavale with little hope of retreating because of Angolan air superiority. SWAPO's 
PLAN forces were also moving south, challenging the South Africans in the 'no go' 
zone. As Africa Conjidentiar60 reported, it was South Africa's worst nightmare. In May 
1988, President Kaunda of Zambia had commented:261 
For the first time the apartheid regime had met defeat at the hands of an African 
army - the Angolan forces - and the movement of Cuban troops towards the 
southern borders posed more danger to it. It was clear that the Boers were anxious 
to see that the Cubans did not delve deeper into the conflict in the southern part of 
Angola. With this background South Africa would succumb to pressure and 
loosen its hold over Namibia and eventually shed the system of apartheid. 
With its soldiers trapped in southern Angola, and with increasing pressure within South 
Africa for its government to accept Resolution 435, South Africa was now ready to talk. 
Military significance of the battle at Cuito Cuanavale lay in the number of white South 
African casualties. For the first time, this number was large enough to jeopardize the 
capacity of the apartheid regime to deal with the domestic political consequences of such 
losses. After years of having fought a low-level 'bush war' in Angola, in which casualties 
were largely confined to black troops, South Africa found itself involved in a major 
military engagement, one that would produce in time the largest tank battle in Africa 
since World War H. Such an escalation represented for Pretoria a psychological-political 
258 A confidential source quoted by Rich, "The United States, Its History of Mediation," p. 88. 
259 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 373. 
260 Africa Confidential. (27 May 1988), p.1 
261 Times o!Zambia, (19 May 1988), p. 1. 
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threshold, one that the Cubans readily appreciated and sought increasingly to turn to their 
own advantage. 
In April, following their heaviest war losses ever, South Africans began withdrawing 
from their positions around Cuito Cuanavale, and concurrently through diplomatic 
channels the Pretoria government signalled its willingness to enter into serious 
negotiations with Angola and Cuba?62 This shift in military balance of power also 
translated into a "willingness by the United States to admit Cuba to the negotiations on 
Angola over the objections of the anti-Cuban factions in the State Department.,,263 
this march towards resolving the conflict was further helped by the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit in May 1988 in Iceland. At that time, Mr Crocker and his Soviet counterpart, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin met and agreed on the necessity of peace in 
southwest Africa. No doubt, this congruence of views reduced the manoeuvrability of 
Cuba, MPLA and South Africa.264 
Subsequently, in mid-July 1988, a major breakthrough was achieved between Cuba, 
Angola, and South Africa. They met at Governor's Island in New York to discuss 
fourteen principles for a comprehensive settlement. These principles included "the right 
to self-determination and peace, non-aggression, non-interference, and respect for 
territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, as well as recognition of the roles of the 
United States as mediator and the permanent members of the Security Council as 
f fi I t ,,265 guarantors 0 a ma agreemen. 
In short, the battles in 1987 and 1988 at Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque highlighted 
Pretoria's inability to tolerate substantial white casualties as well as the ability of the 
262 Stultz, "South Africa in Angola and Namibia," p. 84. Jabri, "European Involvement in the Western 
Contact Group." 
263 Haass and O'Sullivan (eds.), Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 119. 
264 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, p. 157. 
265 Ibid., p. 158. 
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Cuban troops to inflict casualties on the SADF. This realization moved South Africa 
generally in the direction of a negotiated settlement in the region.266 
In the words of Clough and Herbst,267 South Africa's "confidence in the power of guns 
and ideology" appeared suddenly to dissolve before the promise of serious bargaining 
with the country's external opponents. Ten rounds of formal negotiations ensued, 
beginning in early May in London, and these discussions, together with two sets of secret 
or informal talks, finally resulted in the signing by Cuba, Angola, and South Africa of the 
so-called Angola-Namibia accords in New York on December 22, 1988. These accords, 
which ended more than thirteen years of military conflict in the area, stipulated that the 
three parties agreed to: 
1. A timetable for Narnibian independence (pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
435), the process itself to begin on April 1, 1989, and to be supervised by 
UNTAG; 
2. Elections for a Namibian Constituent Assembly, to be held on November 1, 1989; 
3. Withdrawal of all South African troops from Namibia within one week of the 
announcement of the results of the aforementioned elections; and finally, 
4. Phased departure of all Cuban troops from Angola, to be completed by July 
1991.268 
President Castro's statement at the 1986 NAM meeting in Harare, challenging South 
Africa that he was ready to take the war to South Africa itself, was in no small measure 
responsible for South Africa and its allies beginning to take the issue of the Namibian 
question seriously. 
It could be argued that conditions were ripe for negotiations, because the Soviet Union 
was unable to sustain the regimes in Angola and Mozambique. However, such an 
argument is difficult to sustain in the light of the developments of 1988 and 1989. It was 
Cuba that had achieved successes in the field during the period. Support for UNIT A 
through the Republic of Congo had all but dried up. I was also told by Cuban politicians 
during my visit to Cuba that Cuban support was not contingent upon the survival of the 
266 Ibid., p. 93. 
267 Clough and Herbst, South Africa's Changing Regional Strategy. 
268 Stultz, "South Africa in Angola and Namibia," p. 80. 
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Soviet Union?69 Conditions were ripe for negotiations for different reasons - the military 
equation in Angola and Namibia had changed in favour of SWAPO and F APLA. There 
was also a great deal of pressure on the white government in South Africa from its own 
white constituents; there was already an exodus of whites from that country, and internal 
resistance against the white regime was growing in the country. There was therefore 
concern in South Africa that whites' survival in South Africa was threatened if the 
government did not negotiate the implementation of Resolution 435. The United States 
saw this as an opportunity to achieve its geopolitical ends and at the same time resolve 
the Namibian question without raising its own involvement in the conflict. 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 
The agreement on Cuban troops' withdrawal was signed after further meetings in 
Brazzaville, Geneva and New York. It was a bilateral accord between Angola and Cuba. 
South Africa also voluntarily committed itself to de facto cessation of hostilities.27o The 
New York Tripartite Agreement signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 22 
December 1988 embraced both the Namibian agreement (withdrawal of South Africans) 
and Angolan agreement (Cuban withdrawal).271 SWAPO was not directly consulted 
during the negotiations, but Cubans and Angolans were kept briefed of its position. This 
state of affairs "was both a testimony to Namibia's subsidiary position in Reagan 
administration's hierarchy of foreign policy concerns, and a tacit concession to Pretoria's 
desire to minimise the role played by SWAPO in bringing about Namibia's 
independence.,,272 Negotiations were in fact restricted to states. 
Nevertheless, as a result of these initiatives, the way was now clear for the process of 
implementation of Resolution 435 to begin. On 16 January 1989, the Security Council 
endorsed the Tripartite Agreement signed on 22 December 1988.273 This agreement had 
set down 1 April 1989 as the date on which the Resolution 435 implementation process 
would begin. 
269 Personal conversations in Havana on 7 September 2001. 
270 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
271 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, p. 159. 
272 Dobell, SWAPO's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991, p. 72. 
273 United Nations Security Council Resolution 628 (1989) 
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In October 1988, in anticipation of developments towards the resolution of the Namibian 
question, SWAPO also held a Consultative Conference between SWAPO and progressive 
Namibians (including Messrs Immanuel Ngatjizeko, Anton Lubowski, Frieder Rohn, 
Gert Hanekom, Klaus Dierks, Bernd Riehmer, Peter Borsutzky, Hans Rohr, and Christo 
Lombard) in Kabwe, Zambia. Prominent exiled SWAPO leaders present at this 
conference included, among others, Messrs Sam Nujoma, Hage Geingob, Theo-Ben 
Gurirab and Hidipo Hamutenya.274 This meeting was meant to be a confidence-building 
measure or 'get-to-know-each-other' meeting to overcome the fear of the unknown. 
The process of implementation of Resolution 435 began with the United Nations Special 
Representative moving to Namibia along with the United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) to prepare the territory for holding elections for the Constituent 
Assembly. 
From SWAPO's perspective, the process of elections was not as smooth as one would 
expect. SWAPO faced many challenges. As a liberation movement, it was not legally 
banned, but was not allowed to operate freely -- all kinds of restrictions were imposed 
that were tantamount to a ban. It had not legally maintained an office in the territory for 
nearly 30 years, and given the size of the country it was not easy to establish offices all 
over the country prior to elections. In addition, SWAPO was concerned whether the 
elections were going to be free and fair since elections were going to be organized by 
South Africa. But given the support of SWAPO throughout the country, it was sure that it 
would win even if there were a semblance of free elections. 
As regards the security of SWAPO leaders, we recognized that there would be no 
absolute security. SWAPO headquarters was shot at several times. During the night some 
people would drive by and shoot at the headquarters as if for target practice. SWAPO 
members were insulted and intimidated by DTA. SWAPO rallies were monitored. Often 
at these rallies there would be people wearing DT A T-shirts, but SWAPO cadres did not 
274 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
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expel them from the rallies and therefore did not give them the reason to disrupt our 
rallies. 
Additional problems were created by the fact that a colonial civil service was still in 
charge of the elections. For example, SWAPO was scheduled to launch its Election 
Manifesto on 2 July 1989, but all the copies of the manifesto were held up at the border, 
and we had to launch the manifesto without distributing copies at the rally. We had to 
promise the people that they could get their copies at the office the following Monday. 
Fortunately, because of the pressure put on the civil service, the copies arrived by 
Monday. The colonial administration's purpose in creating these obstacles was to deny 
SWAPO an opportunity to display its manifesto to the crowd that would certainly have 
made an impact, as DT A did not even know the concept of election manifestos. 
Similarly, when SWAPO sought to hire busses from Du Toit Transport in Windhoek to 
transport its supporters to the voting booths to cast votes, SWAPO was infonned that all 
the busses had already been hired. We were infonned that DT A had booked all the busses 
allegedly to block SWAPO from having access to them, though it was difficult to verify. 
Eventually, SWAPO arranged for hiring the busses through the South African Congress 
of Trade Unions (SACTU) from South Africa and paid over R2.S million for this service. 
These busses turned out to be a great boost for us. Their drivers were great SWAPO 
supporters - they played music, and, using loudspeakers, urged people to come out and 
vote. SWAPO was therefore able to overcome a serious handicap. 
The administrator general, Mr Pienaar, was a gentleman in the apartheid context or 
mould, but was definitely not a friend of SWAPO. He was there to see that SWAPO did 
not win the elections, and, if it did win, it would not win by a two-thirds majority. 
Mechanisms devised to prevent SWAPO from winning were (1) registration of white 
South Africans, including fonner residents, to swell DT A ranks, and (2) a system of 
central counting of votes. These were some of the mechanisms for maximizing support 
for DT A and rigging the elections. 
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The South African administration succeeded in registering white South Africans to vote 
in Namibian elections because SWAPO was too late in protesting such actions. The 
administration had issued a considerable number of South African whites with Namibian 
identity papers so that they could vote in the Constituent Assembly elections.275 Further, 
on 16 April 1989, the Namibia Communications Centre reported that a Colonel Botes of 
Brigade '91 SW A that was to be 'demilitarised', wrote to all the soldiers: 
to cooperate, to work hard and cannily, to retain a Christian democratic 
dispensation in this country. I therefore request all of you to participate in the 
election campaign beginning on June 26. Make sure that you register as a voter 
and also that you vote. Even if you now live in the RSA [South Africa], I 
specifically ask you to make arrangements to travel twice to SWA (Namibia) -
first, to register, then on November 1, to vote. 
When SWAPO's Directorate of Elections realized that whites were coming from South 
Africa to vote, and were, after voting, going back to waiting planes that had been 
chartered apparently for that purpose, it decided to take some action to thwart this effort 
or, at least, to minimize its effect. Knowing that the planes taking the 'voters' back were 
bringing back some more voters, SWAPO sent its own busloads of voters to queue up at 
the polling stations at the airport before the plane arrived. Consequently, incoming whites 
were forced to join the queue at the back, thus disrupting the turn-around schedules of 
their planes. 
SWAPO was even more concerned with central counting of votes. As SWAPO was 
popular in the north, its concern was that all the ballot boxes would be loaded in a plane 
from Ovamboland, and then flown to the coast where they could be dumped in the ocean 
and replaced with DT A filled boxes for counting in Windhoek. 
The international community, too, criticized the provision of central counting of votes, 
and agreed with SWAPO's position: "The international community found the proposed 
system unacceptable in several respects. First, encoding ballots corresponding to the 
275 The Namibian (10 February 1989) 
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voters' ID cards compromised ballot secrecy. Second, proposed centralized counting 
departed from internationally acceptable counting locally.,,276 
SWAPO therefore decided to fight against these mechanisms, and particularly central 
counting as it was a make-or-break issue with serious implications for the outcome of 
elections. SWAPO sent a message outlining its concerns to the United Nations Secretary 
General. This message was supported by President Mugabe in a letter on behalf of the 
Frontline States. His letter cast aspersions on the competence of the Special 
Representative and asked for an African to be appointed to deputize him. Botswana's 
seasoned diplomat at the United Nations, Mr Joseph Legwaila was appointed as deputy to 
Mr Ahtisaari and that helped precipitate change. Elections proceeded with the 
understanding that counting of votes would take place at source. Thus, SWAPO's views 
on the subject prevailed. 
UNT AG and the Special Representative Mr Ahtisaari also came under a great deal of 
criticism from South Africans who accused them of being biased towards SWAPO. 
Consequently, to prove the point that they were not friends of SW APO, they distanced 
themselves from us. But, instead of being neutral, UNTAG and Mr Ahtisaari seemed to 
have become friends with the other side. However, after election results were out, Mr 
Ahtisaari explained that he had to behave that way to prove to the South Africans that he 
was impartial. We know that both Mr Ahtisaari and Mr Hashim Omayat, Director of 
United Nations Elections, were more concerned about the process and their role in that 
process of making sure that it succeeded. They were not necessarily concerned with the 
outcome of the elections. Of course, that was the role of the Special Representative. 
This was proven during the 1 st April debacle. The war had ended on 31 March 1989, and 
PLAN combatants inside Namibia were ready to report to UNT AG reception points. 
Instead, they were attacked by the South African forces. Nujoma points out that277 
Ahtisaari allowed himself to be convinced that there were no SWAPO forces in 
Namibia before 31 March 1989. When fabricated evidence of PLAN 'incursions' 
276 NDI for International Affairs, Nation Building: The U.N and Namibia, p. 33. 
277 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 297. 
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was produced, Ahtisaari swallowed the lie and agreed to pennit the South African 
re-deployment of its 101 st Battalion, who were in combat readiness. This 
diabolical secret plan had the full support of both the Reagan administration and 
British Prime Minister Thatcher. 
SWAPO Wins the Election 
The United Nations supervised elections were held from 7-11 November 1989, which 
gave SWAPO 41 seats (57.3% of the vote), the DTA 21 seats (28.6%), the UDP four 
seats (5.6%) and four other parties split the remaining six seats. There was a 
misunderstanding in the camp of the non-SWAPO parties, who were 'programmed' by 
South Africa, that SWAPO would need a two-thirds majority to fonn government.278 
Therefore they thought that because SWAPO failed to get a two-thirds majority, it was 
obliged to fonn a government of national unity. This concern with two-thirds majority 
was visible everywhere - even academics talked about it. However, SWAPO was not 
concerned about getting a two-thirds majority, nor was there any strategy towards that 
end. Its focus was to win as many votes as possible. 
I told other parties that SWAPO got an absolute majority of 41 seats out of 72 seats, i.e., 
57.3 % and therefore could fonn the government by itself. In their continued belief that 
SWAPO would be obliged to fonn a coalition government, the DT A even rejected 
SWAPO's offer made to Mr Staby of the DTA to accept an appointment as Minister of 
Trade and Industry. Mr Dirk Mudge thought that SWAPO should have offered the post to 
DT A, and they would have negotiated the conditions under which they would accept such 
an offer, not realizing that it was SWAPO's own desire to instil a sense of inclusiveness. 
It was the president who had called on a citizen to do his national duty by serving in his 
cabinet. By rejecting this offer to Mr Staby, DT A lost out. Of course, two-thirds majority 
was needed only to adopt the constitution. My repeated statements that SW APO was 
conscious of its historic role to unite all Namibians to forge national unity made no 
difference, and the DT A continued to have difficulty with the new reality. 
278 See Chapter Four for the implication of two-thirds majority in the drafting of the constitution. 
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Fallacious views were also held in certain circles that SWAPO wanted to create a one-
party state. There was a general belief that, in the absence of a clear two-thirds majority, 
SWAPO would be unable to impose a one-party state. Subsequent elections in which 
SWAPO won two-thirds majority have shown that SWAPO never had any such 
intentions. Proportional representation also ensured that there would always be an 
opposition. 
With the election for the Constituent Assembly over, the stage was now set for the 
elected representatives of the people of Namibia to craft the basic law of the country. 
Work on the drafting of the constitution of Namibia started in mid November 1989. 
Conclusion 
The United Nations played a vital role in furthering the cause of Namibians to win 
independence. Its actions became more focused after the creation of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia and the appointment of Mr Sean McBride as commissioner for 
Namibia. 
The United Nations is nonetheless a cumbersome body, and its Security Council far too 
dependent on the western powers to make its decisions stick. They are also the main 
funding countries for many of the United Nations initiatives. Further, veto powers of five 
members of the Security Council ensured that no resolutions went through the Security 
Council that were contrary to their own interests. On southern African issues, western 
members had frequently resorted to vetoing draft resolutions about sanctions against 
South Africa. In that sense, the emergence of the Western Contact Group, with a clear 
focus on its members' own self-interests, was, in retrospect, a useful development, for, 
the western powers' interests could at last be balanced with solutions to the Namibian 
question and the apartheid situation in South Africa .. 
The 'positive sum' strategy followed by the United States was an offshoot of such a 
development. One corollary of this strategy could be that the gains of different parties 
depended on their strengths. SWAPO kept the pressure on South Africa and the 
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international community through armed struggle against occupation and through keeping 
a focus on attacking in the international fora the illegal occupation of Namibia by South 
Africa. SWAPO worked with the United Nations, WCG, FLS, NAM, OAU and other 
international organizations to ensure that the interests of Namibians were best served. 
SWAPO also realized that part of its strategy must be to placate the concerns of the 
members of the WCG regarding their own interests. 
Oddly, the success of Mr Crocker's positive sum strategy did not benefit from the 
escalation of stakes by the United States and South Africa, but from escalation of stakes 
by Cuba, as this escalation made the United States and South Africa more receptive to 
finding ways for resolving this regional conflict. However, it cannot be denied that the 
increased involvement of Cuba was a result of the escalation of stakes by the United 
States and South Africa. 
In the end, with the independence of Namibia, the positive-sum game was played out-
Namibians represented by SWAPO were pleased that a negotiated settlement was 
reached. South Africa gained as it began to be seen in a totally different light, willing to 
make changes in its policy towards southern African countries and within South Africa 
itself. Members of the WCG were pleased because their economic, ethnic, and 
geopolitical interests were preserved. Cuba was happy that its men could come home 
after having completed their internationalist duty. FLS, OAU, and NAM were happy 
seeing the last colony in Africa become independent. The United Nations was pleased 
that it had fulfilled its mandate. Indeed, the success of its mission in Namibia gave it the 
much-needed boost. This success came at a time when the western criticism of the United 
Nations programmes and the costs involved was particularly acute. 
The type of solution that emerged as a result of events outlined in this chapter had 
significant impact on the evolution of the Namibian state. Transition of Namibia to 
independence was peaceful. Its relations with Europe, the United States, the Russian 
Federation, China, OAU, FLS, NAM and the neighbouring countries, including South 
Africa became conducive to peace in the region. In this new milieu, a sense of inclusivity 
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developed that had a bearing on the drafting of the constitution. A spirit of give and take 
prevailed. 
Further, the nature of transition in Zimbabwe, followed by the settlement of the Namibian 
question, strengthened the hands of the moderates in South Africa as they embarked upon 
their own transition towards a democratic majority ruled outcome. As Saunders opined, 
"Whatever the exact relationship between the transitions from the perspective of present-
day South Africa, the Namibian transition, though it began disastrously, appears to have 
been remarkably successful.,,279 The National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs280 amplified this point further: 
The timing of this accomplishment will have a real effect on the evolving 
situation in South Africa. It is difficult to know the extent to which events in 
Namibia influenced the substance or the timing of President De Klerk's promising 
actions. What is clear, however, is that a smooth implementation of UN 
Resolution 435 was an essential precondition of any opening in South Africa. 
279 Christopher Saunders (1992), "Transition in Namibia 1989-1990 and the South African Case," 
Transactions, 17 (1992), p. 215. 
280 NDI for International Affairs, National Building: The U.N and Namibia, p. 84. 
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Chapter Four 
Drafting of Namibia's Constitution 
Constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 
government, the government of will instead of law. In modern times the 
growth of political responsibility has been added to this through the 
winning of initiative in the discretionary matters of national policy by 
people's representatives; but the most ancient, the most persistent, and the 
most lasting of the essentials of true constitutionalism still remains what it 
has been almost from the beginning, the limitation of government by law. 
Charles Grove Hainel81 
Introduction 
The evolution of constitutionalism has been the process of limiting the power of the state. 
In that sense, Paine's dictum that "a constitution is not the act of a government but of a 
people constituting a government,,282 is fully valid. Commenting on this dictum, 
McIlwain283 observes that the consequence of the validity of Paine's dictum is that the 
forms and limits followed in this 'constituting' become the embodiment of a 
'constitution', superior in character to the acts of any 'government' it creates. He further 
argues that if this constituent act of the people entrusts certain definite powers to their 
government, 'enumerated powers,' as we term them, it is a necessary inference that this 
government cannot exercise any powers not so 'enumerated.' Thus, all constitutional 
government is by definition limited government or limiting of government. As noted 
above, Haines, too, emphasizes that "constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a 
11' . . t ,,284 lega ImItatlOn on governmen . 
281 Baines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts. 
282 Paine, Rights of Man. 
283 Charles Boward MeIlwain (1947), Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern ,!thaea, N.Y., Comell Univ. 
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Legal limitations on the government are, however, not arbitrary. They are or should be 
based on certain fundamental values, unalterable by ordinary legal process. These 
fundamental values are an inheritance of the long history of human thought and specific 
national history and context. Preambles to most of the constitutions acknowledge and 
recognize these values. Fundamental values based on the inheritance of the long history 
of human thought include democracy, freely elected representatives of the people, rights 
of man, sovereignty, and liberty.285 Similarly, certain values are driven by a national 
context. Namibia's Constitution talks about "the rights that have for so long been denied 
to the people;,,286 the Preamble to the United States Constitution refers to the need for 
domestic tranquillity and common defence;287 the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution 
stipulates "that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action 
of government;,,288 and the French Preamble states: "The French people hereby solemnly 
proclaim their dedication to the Rights of Man and the principle of national 
sovereignty .... By virtue of these principles and that of the free determination of peoples, 
the Republic offers to the Overseas Territories expressly desiring this to adhere to them 
new institutions based on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity and 
conceived with a view to their democratic evolution.,,289 
Specifically, the Namibian Constitution's Preamble states as follows: 
Whereas the said rights are most effectively maintained and protected in a 
democratic society, where the government is responsible to freely elected 
representatives of the people, operating under a sovereign constitution and a free 
and independent judiciary; 
Whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the people of Namibia by 
colonialism, racism and apartheid; 
Whereas we the people of Namibia: 
have finally emerged victorious in our struggle against colonialism, racism 
and apartheid; 
285 See for instance, preambles to the constitutions of France, Namibia, South Africa, the United States, and 
Zambia. 
286 Namibia, Constitution o/the Republic o/Namibia, Preamble. 
287 United States, Constitution, Preamble. 
288 Japan, Constitution, Preamble. 
289 France, Constitution, Preamble. 
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are detennined to adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and 
our children our resolve to cherish and to protect the gains of our long 
struggle; 
desire to promote amongst all of us the dignity of the individual and the 
unity and integrity of the Namibian nation among and in association with 
the nations of the world; 
will strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster peace, unity and 
a common loyalty to a single state; 
committed to these principles, have resolved to constitute the Republic of 
Namibia as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State securing to 
all our citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. 
Compromising of Vision by Different Interest Groups 
The process of constitution making is influenced by the vision and self-interest of various 
interest groups, parties, classes, sectoral interests, and individuals participating in the 
process. Self-interest is invariably cloaked in phrases, such as 'public good,' 'essential 
for stability,' and so forth. Consequently, the final draft of a constitution is always a 
compromise. As an illustration, during the discussion on the text of the Preamble to the 
Namibian Constitution, one of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Mr de Wet of 
ACN, was particularly concerned about the Preamble. Reflecting on what he thought 
were biases, he had said: 
Although we accept as resolved by the Standing Committee, that the Preamble 
should reflect the historical context of the birth of the new state of Namibia and 
the aspirations of its nation, we do not accept, as it is partly done in the draft, that 
the Preamble is the place where political views or bitterness of only one of some 
of the political parties or disputable historical facts are reflected, such as the rights 
which the inhabitants, or some of them, have allegedly been denied, those who 
have struggled against whom and who were victorious in such Struggle.290 
The victims of apartheid saw this statement as an attempt at clouding the realities of 
apartheid, and denying its impact on the lives of the majority in Namibia. His comment 
focused entirely on the self-interest of the whites. However, such statements were rare 
290 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal 
Arrangements, Minutes of the Meeting of 30 January 1990. 
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and should not be taken as a general view of the whites or their representatives at the 
Constituent Assembly. 
As the United Nations had played a significant role in the process of Namibia's 
nationhood, considerable influence was also wielded by some of the members of the 
international community on the outcome of the final document. Various parties involved 
in addressing the Namibian question, i.e., South Africa, the Western Contact Group, 
ethnic parties and the liberation movement, tried to influence the ultimate outcome of the 
nature of the Namibian state to suit their own vision or interests. The important 
provisions of the constitution, the Constitutional Principles, were 'imposed' on the 
Constituent Assembly because the West wanted to ensure that the liberation movement 
did not opt for socialism that might compromise the interests of the settlers. 
This interplay of conflicting interests has a sociological aspect - of how we view human 
nature. The processes of constitution making at the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 
1776, and at the Assemblee Constituante in Paris in 1789, also provide examples of the 
interplay of conflicting interests in the shaping of the final document. For instance, at the 
Federal Convention, the participants held a "generally dismal view of human nature." 
Alexander Hamilton had argued, "Men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious." Echoes 
of Machiavelli were clearly discernible in his statement. That is why James Madison 
preferred a 'republic' in which whims of masses are filtered through their representatives 
and agents, to direct 'democracy. ,291 However, it would be a fallacy to believe that the 
representatives and agents can be expected to be any less ambitious, vindictive and 
rapacious. That is why the rule oflaw instead of the rule of will is so important. 
In Windhoek, the situation was similar to the one that prevailed in Philadelphia. 'Dismal 
view of human nature,' or of the nature of politicians or power-holders also could be 
sensed in the interplay of the self-interest of communities represented by the participants 
in the Constituent Assembly and their desire for 'safeguards'. The Windhoek Assembly 
in fact reflected the racial and ethnic nature of the Namibian society divided by long 
291 Kaplan, Warrior Politics, p. 63. 
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years of apartheid. The impact of this racial and ethnic nature will be highlighted in this, 
and the next two chapters. 
Politics being largely about images, especially in the public sphere, vanous 
representatives at the Windhoek Assembly were concerned about how their 
constituencies would perceive their interests being addressed by their elected 
representatives. White representatives were concerned about protecting property rights of 
the whites and special privileges enjoyed by them. These included exclusive schools; the 
position enjoyed by their languages, namely, German and Afrikaans; representation in the 
parliament; and civil service job and pension guarantees. In this effort, their demands had 
already received a boost from the Western Contact Group and the Constitutional 
Principles espoused by them. Other parties that relied on their ethnic constituencies also 
sought to ensure representation in the parliament by arguing in favour of a bicameral 
parliament. Still others argued for the inclusion of tribal authority structures within the 
framework of the constitution, as has been the case in Botswana and Zimbabwe.292 
Thus, events leading to the framing of Namibia's constitution had many variables, often 
conflicting, with different interests and parties trying to influence the clauses in the 
constitution that rule the machinery of government, the assignment of rights, and the 
procedures for amending the constitution. 
In this chapter, some aspects of the emergence of the Namibian constitution have been 
compared with those of the French and V.S. constitutions, because they were two 
important countries known to have held conventions or conferences to draft their 
constitutions. Namibia, followed later by South Africa, was the only country in Africa at 
that time that drafted its own independence constitution through a Constituent Assembly. 
Many other African constitutions were drafted in Europe. 
292 For instance, in Botswana, the Tribal chiefs are represented at the highest level in the House of Chiefs 
and District Councils Chiefs are non-elected members of the Councils: 
http://www.locgovinfo.co.zwlMozambique_Study_Tour_to_Botswana.htm. accessed 3 November 2003. 
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Drafting of Namibia's Constitution 
The primary purpose of United Nations Resolution 435 was to hold free and fair elections 
for electing the Constituent Assembly that would draft the constitution of independent 
Namibia. It was not intended to hold elections for an independent Namibia. This was in 
compliance with the agreed Constitutional Principles. 
Ten political parties had qualified to participate in the United Nations supervised 
Constituent Assembly elections of 1989.293 These included Aksie Christelik Nasionaal 
(ACN), Christian Democratic Action for Social Justice (CDA), Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance of Namibia (DTA), Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN), Namibia National 
Democratic Party (NNDP), Namibia National Front (NNF), Namibia Patriotic Front 
(NPF), SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D), SWAPO of Namibia (SWAPO), and United 
Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF). However, only seven parties won seats: SWAPO 
41, DTA 21, UDF 4, ACN 3, and NPF, and FCN and NNF 1 each. 
The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly took place on 21 November 1989, at 
Tintinpalast, which is now the seat of parliament in Windhoek. The leader of the majority 
party, Mr Sam Nujoma, chaired this meeting. "A number of procedural issues had already 
been agreed to through consultation and published as the Constituent Assembly 
Proclamation of 6 November 1989.,,294 First order of business was the election of the 
chairman of the Constituent Assembly. There were two nominations, Mr Hage Geingob 
of SWAPO and Mr Andrew Matjila of DT A. After voting, I (Hage Geingob) was elected 
chairman. 
I knew well, as did the rest of the SWAPO leadership, that the Namibian society was 
divided because of years of apartheid and racial stratification in the provision of services 
and opportunities. During campaigns for elections it was clear that the Namibian society 
293 Democracy Factfile, http://www.sardc.netlsd!sdjactfile_namibia.htm. accessed 3 November 2003. 
294 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 424. 
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had remained divided. Therefore, the first job for me was to promote a spirit of 
consultation, mutual respect and reconciliation. In my opening remarks, I emphasized?95 
The people of Namibia ... have given us a mandate to hammer out and adopt in a 
spirit of compromise, a spirit of give and take, a constitution that will launch our 
country and people into nationhood. This is a trust we dare not betray .... 
Obviously there will be differences of opinion on very vital matters, but through 
debate and consultation we should be able to find solutions and move forward. As 
chairman I will try my level best to be as impartial as is humanly possible. 
Towards all the political parties I will endeavour to be courteous and expect that 
the same spirit will prevail in this house. 
Immediately thereafter, Mr Sam Nujoma said, "Namibia is a huge country with a small 
population. Therefore all Namibians, regardless of colour, creed or place of origin, have a 
place in our beautiful country. It is for us only to reach out to one another and mould a 
new nation out of diversity.,,296 
These two speeches set the tone for the things to come. Leaders of some other parties also 
made statements of reconciliation. 
Acceptance of Constitutional Principles 
Prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, suspicions had run high. Non-
SWAPO parties knew little about SWAPO and were suspicious that it would want 
socialism in Namibia. Furthermore, some of the non-SWAPO parities having close links 
with the South African apartheid regime were suspicious of any government dominated 
by blacks. I sensed their suspicions and sought to build confidence by alleviating the 
fears of various ethnic groups. Towards that end, I decided to have one-on-one informal 
meetings with many of the Constituent Assembly members even prior to the first meeting 
of the assembly. Such interactions that emphasized a shared vision for a new Namibia 
helped create a favourable climate for the work of the Constituent Assembly. 
During the confidence-building period before the drafting of the constitution started, I 
discovered that some whites would seek to reserve some of the privileges they had 
295 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of21 November 1989. 
296 Ibid. 
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enjoyed during the apartheid era. This came out during a courtesy call I paid on Mr 
Jannie de Wet of ACN with a view to getting to know what his fears were. Mr de Wet 
was very happy to meet with me. He told me that the whites would be happy if the 
education system and standards were maintained. He identified fifteen schools that he 
would like to be reserved for the whites. If that could be given to whites there would be 
no problem, he said. I listened and said that I would report to the committee for the 
drafting of the constitution to see how they could deal with this issue. 
White parents, with whom Mr de Wet had talked, took this issue further to Administrator 
General Mr Pienaar's attention. Mr Pienaar then brought it to the attention of the Drafting 
Committee of 21. What the parents, led by Ms Dominee de Klerk, demanded were three 
conditions: Christian character of education (that had characterised education in this 
country for years), maintenance of the standard of education, and instruction in mother 
tongue, especially in Afrikaans and German medium schools.297 Perhaps it should be 
mentioned that the administrator general did not seek to influence the proceedings of the 
Constituent Assembly, nor would he have been allowed to do so by me as the chairman 
because the work of the Constituent Assembly had nothing to do with him. 
In any case, demands of whites brought to the attention of the Drafting Committee by Mr 
Pienaar were rejected as they were aimed at perpetuating white privileges. At this time, 
Mr Dirk Mudge made a very profound statement, "The impression must not be created 
that it is now only black people who are opposed to privatisation [of schools]. There are 
hundreds of white people who are opposed to that; for, privatisation would be a sort of 
'rykmans-apartheid' (meaning rich man's apartheid).,,298 
There was also a perception in some speeches at the first Constituent Assembly meeting 
that SWAPO lacked commitment to democracy, as almost all the leaders of the 
opposition referred to the importance of the 1982 Constitutional Principles. Mr Sam 
Nujoma observed: "Before and during the elections, certain perceptions had been created 
297 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal 
Arrangements, Minutes of the Meeting of 11 Dec. 1989. 
298 Ibid. 
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that SWAPO was a socialist organization and was not committed to such ideals as 
'gh rt t ,,299 democracy, n t to prope y, e c. 
This perception was propagated by 'instant' democrats, i.e., white oppressors who denied 
Namibians their human rights including democracy, who were second-guessing 
SWAPO's democratic credentials. They believed that SWAPO would reject the 
Constitutional Principles proposed by the Western Contact Group and by so doing incur 
the wrath of the West. Instead, SWAPO pulled the rug from under their feet by adopting 
the Constitutional Principles. There were no disagreements within SW APO about the 
acceptance of these principles. SWAPO agreed in its caucus that we propose to accept the 
Constitutional Principles at the very first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. These 
Constitutional Principles300 included the provision that: 
Namibia would be a sovereign, unitary, and democratic state with a constitution 
that provided for a system of government with three branches, an elected 
executive branch elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be 
responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be responsible for the 
passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible 
for the interpretation of the constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the 
authority of law. In addition, the constitution was to include a declaration of 
fundamental rights including right to life, personal liberty and freedom of 
movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including 
freedom of speech and free press; to freedom of assembly and association, 
including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the 
law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of 
private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, 
religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights was to be consistent 
with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved 
individuals would have the right to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these 
rights. 
Adherence to the Constitutional Principles was in keeping with the essential requirement 
that the final constitution had to be approved by the United Nations Security Council. 
Unanimous adoption of this suggestion by all participants in the Constituent Assembly 
removed doubts harboured by many and warmed the different parties towards each other, 
thus making the work of the Constituent Assembly go much more smoothly. 
299 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 425. 
300 United Nations (1991), Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, U.N. Dep. Of Public Inf., p. 1292. 
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Acceptance of SWAPO's Draft Constitution as the Working Draft 
The same afternoon, a Committee on Rules and Standing Orders was established.3ot The 
committee did most of the work and quickly. A week later, on 28 November, it presented 
its report containing draft standing rules and orders to the Constituent Assembly. After a 
few minor corrections, the report was accepted and the assembly proceeded to appoint a 
Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements to address 
any new issues arising in the process of deliberations of the assembly. Membership of the 
new committee was the same as that of the Committee on Rules and Standing Orders that 
it replaced. 
Various political parties had their own draft constitutions for independent Namibia with 
diverse positions on many of the constitutional elements. The Constituent Assembly 
reflected on various procedures for considering and reconciling the different drafts. I was 
not averse to resolving differences clause by clause, but there was unanimous concern 
that such a process could be time-consuming, time that the Namibians did not have, for, it 
was imperative that they wrested reigns of power from South Africa as soon as possible. 
The process was, however, speeded up when, at its 30 November meeting, the assembly 
adopted a motion by Mr Nahas Angula of SWAPO, as amended by the proposal of Mr 
Rukoro of NNF. The motion adopted stipulated that various parties represented at the 
assembly would submit their constitutional proposals or ideas to the acting secretary of 
the assembly no later than 4 December 1989. It was also agreed that each party would 
have the right of introducing their proposals by way of statements to the assembly on 4 
December. The motion further mandated and instructed the Standing Committee to 
receive and consider other proposals regarding the future of Namibia, identify and 
formulate working categories for a future constitution or areas of material dispute in 
301 Members of this committee were Mr Hage Geingob (Chairman), Mr E. Tjiriange, Mr H. Ruppel, Mr 
Hidipo Hamutenya, Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab, Mrs P. Ithana, Mr N. Iyambo, Dr M. Tjitendero, Mr N. Angula, 
Dr P. Katjivivi, Mr N. Bessinger and Mr B. Amathila (all from SWAPO), Mr D. Mudge, Mr P.M. Junius, 
Mr H.E. Staby, and Mr A. Matjila (all from DTA), Mr V. Rukoro (from NNF), Mr J.G.A. Diergaardt (from 
FCN), Mr M.K. Katjiuongua (from NPF), Mr J.W.F. Pretorius (from ACN), and Mr R.R. Diergaardt (from 
UDF). 
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various proposals, and to make proposals for establishing committees to deliberate and 
negotiate on the above. The Standing Committee was asked to report back to the 
assembly on or before 12 December. 
On 4 December, each party introduced its own version of a constitution for independent 
Namibia, and its constitutional ideas. Debates on various ideas continued in the 
Constituent Assembly for the next two days. DT A President, Mr Muyongo, stated, 
"Namibia is a state that abides by the principles of territorial integrity and rejection of 
. ,,302 
secesslOn. 
A spirit of give and take, of confidence building, also spilled over in the work of the 
Standing Committee. Occasionally, there were lighter moments to break the monotony. 
During the 8 December 1989 meeting, during our discussion on fair trial, I suggested that 
the two proposals be married. Mr Ruppel broke into laughter, "Marry the DT A! Who 
would have thought we would marry the DTA!" Mr Bames, too, joined in, "Who would 
have thought we would take up such a marriage!,,303 
SWAPO's suggestion that the Assembly adopt the 1982 Constitutional Principles as the 
starting point had already created a favourable climate for working together. The 
committee's work was made easier still as a result of a suggestion from Mr Dirk Mudge 
ofDTA. He recognized that SWAPO was in the majority, and suggested that SWAPO's 
draft constitution be adopted as a working draft, and discussions could take place around 
it on issues where different drafts were at variance with it. Mr Mudge stated, "We did 
spend many hours together and we have, and I am not apologizing for that, taken your 
proposal as the basis for our discussion, not because it is the best proposal but because it 
represents the views of the majority and we have to take that into account.,,304 All 
members of the committee unanimously accepted this suggestion, and it set the stage for 
addressing specific issues. 
302 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of 4 December 1989. Ironically, nine years 
later he led an armed rebellion against the state for the secession of the Caprivi Region. 
303 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Committee on the Rules and Standing Orders, Minutes of the Meeting 
of 8 December 1989. 
304 Ibid. 
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The Constituent Assembly provided an opportunity of free and unfettered expression of 
opinions by members on each and every paragraph of the draft constitution until 
consensus was reached. In fact, the Drafting Committee of 21 persons never had to vote 
on any issue during its meetings. My approach was not to curtail filibustering but to allow 
debate to go on until late hours. The end result was that various members would 
eventually agree on the issue at hand, often without making any change to the original 
proposal. On the other hand, if I sensed that the views of the members were so strong and 
the debate was becoming acrimonious, I would call for a tea break to cool off the 
atmosphere. During the tea-break, I would consult with key players, such as Mr Dirk 
Mudge, Mr Rukoro, and others from non-SWAPO parties, and Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab, Mr 
Hidipo Hamutenya, Dr Mose Tjitendero, Mrs Pendukeni Ithana, Mr Nahas Angula, Mr 
Hartrnut Ruppel and others from SWAPO's side to bring the discussions on track. 
The Standing Committee submitted its first report to the assembly at its 12 December 
meeting. As I was the chairman of the committee as well as the chairman of the 
assembly, Mr Ruppel of SWAPO introduced the report. He reported that:30S 
1. There was a unanimous agreement to employ the constitutional proposals 
submitted by the majority party elected to the Constituent Assembly as a working 
document. 
2. There was a broad agreement between parties on a number of issues and therefore 
only minor amendments and discussions were required. These issues included the 
preamble, general provisions of the constitution, citizenship, fundamental rights, 
the electoral system, procedure to amend the constitution, the environment, the 
language issue, definition of the territory, education, and local government and/or 
regional councils. 
3. There were a number of issues that needed further discussions but in respect of 
them there was no material dispute. These included: State organs including, inter 
alia, the police, the defence force, prisons and the ombudsman, the economic 
system and its institutions, land reform, state succession, and transitional 
provisions. 
4. There were two important areas requiring further deliberations, namely the 
executive and specifically the role of the president within the executive, and the 
composition of the legislature. 
305 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of 12 December 1989. 
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The report also recommended that the Standing Committee be allowed to continue with 
its deliberations and negotiations with a view to reaching agreement or to identifying 
constitutional issues in respect of which material disputes existed. 
d d . I 306 This report was a opte unanImous y. 
Executive vs. Ceremonial Presidency 
There was general agreement between the framers of the Constitution at Windhoek that 
executive power should not be unchecked. There were, however, differing views on how 
these powers could be subjected to oversight. DTA members concentrated on arguing 
that Namibia should have a constitutional or ceremonial presidency as against executive 
presidency. At the 8 December 1989 meeting of the Standing Committee, Mr Mudge had 
stated: 
We know that you also agree with a democratic society. So it is just a matter of 
finding a solution to a problem which has been worrying us for a long time, the 
fear of dictatorship, the fear of concentrating power in one person, our fear that 
we might end up with an undemocratic society, the fact that things can get out of 
hand and it is now for us to discuss this problem. You must explain to us now 
how you see that there could be some restrictions, some restraints placed on the 
state president so that he cannot do things on his own. 
Mr Ruppel elaborated on SWAPO's position and in response, Mr Mudge stated: 307 
We feel very strongly about the concentration of power, because as we see it, 
power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The proposals in the 
working document, as I see it, have the inherent danger of establishing the system 
whereby the head of state exercises absolute power. We have listened to 
Honourable Ruppel only now, we will consider the proposals. In the meantime, 
we are of the opinion that the head of state in this proposal will exercise absolute 
power. 
DTA had argued that providing for a constitutional head of state would be in line with the 
Westminster type of democracy. It was interesting that they opposed executive 
presidency despite the fact that in South Africa, with whom DT A had longstanding 
306 Ibid. 
307 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Committee on the Rules and Standing Orders, Minutes of the Meeting 
of 18 December 1989. 
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relations, there was an executive state president. Concern was also expressed that 
executive presidencies in Africa were not on the whole successful. 
SWAPO, on the other hand, viewed the African experience in a different light. Problems 
of many African countries were not a result of executive presidencies, but of inadequate 
constitutional checks and balances. In the absence of checks and balances, trouble could 
come from wherever the executive power rested. SWAPO did not share the concern of 
non-SWAPO parties about executive presidency. It therefore argued strongly in favour of 
executive presidency, subject to appropriate constitutional checks and balances. 
SWAPO members were also unanimous in their belief that executive presidency was 
essential for building a unified state -- Namibia needed a leadership structure that would 
promote cohesiveness by bringing together various ethnic and racial groups that had been 
divided under apartheid rule. Anything short of that structure had the potential of 
undermining the fragile unity of the society. Therefore, SWAPO argued for a strong 
central government and against Namibia's becoming a federal state. 
One finds evidence of similar concerns during the constitutional debates at the Federal 
Convention in Philadelphia. "The decision to establish the office of the president caused 
'considerable pause', according to James Madison. Virginia's George Mason feared that 
the office would create a "foetus of a monarchy." But with Congress and the Court 
holding sufficient countervailing power, the framers were able to establish an office that 
was powerful yet under control.,,308 
At the Windhoek Constituent Assembly, the framers of the Constitution agreed to make 
the president the head of state and of government, provided that he or she shall share 
executive power with the cabinet comprising the prime minister and ministers. In fact, the 
308 Victor Camber (1995), Giving up on Democracy: Why Term Limits are Bad/or America, Washington, 
DC, Regnery Publishers, p. 119. 
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final document emphasized: "The President shall in the exercise of his or her functions be 
obliged to act in consultation with the Cabinet.,,309 
Some of the non-SWAPO members of the assembly also argued that the terms of office 
of the president should be limited to two, five-year terms. The United States example was 
quoted very often, despite the fact that when the framers of the constitution in 
Philadelphia had established the presidency 
they did not limit the terms of office. They felt that a democracy did not need 
artificial limits, that there might indeed be situations where the country needed 
continuity and leadership of an established president. One of the reasons the 
Framers were able to write a strong executive into the constitution was that they 
knew who was going to be the first president and trusted him with such authority. 
And George Washington did not let them down.310 
Despite the fact that no term limits were set at the Philadelphia Convention, George 
Washington had set a precedent by stepping down after his second term, a standard that 
became firmly established when Thomas J efferson stepped down after his second term in 
1808. 
Similarly, in Namibia, by the time the Constituent Assembly met for the first time, it was 
already known that Mr Sam Nujoma had led SWAPO to victory and would be the first 
head of state. Therefore, the debate regarding the presidency was not just at an 
ideological level, it was very much about the personality they knew. 
However, in the spirit of give and take, SWAPO agreed to the provision of a two-term 
presidency but remained unconvinced by the reasoning given to justify it. SW APO 
members felt that limiting the terms was unnecessary and undesirable. First, dictating that 
a person cannot contest elections for the third term, and dictating that the citizens cannot 
vote for that person was tantamount to abridging the person's and voters' natural rights. 
Many of them also felt that elections themselves provided term limits. If citizens did not 
309 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 27. 
310 Camber, Giving up on Democracy, p.120. 
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wish a person to continue in office, they could vote himlher out. Further, limiting terms 
denied the country access to an experienced office holder. 
Diffusion of the executive power of the president as a result of hislher sharing executive 
power with the cabinet, and limit on the number of terms the president can serve, helped 
alleviate the concerns of the opposition parties. Time will tell if such an arrangement is 
successful in protecting Namibia from the possibility of any dictatorial tendencies. 
The issue dealing with the nature of presidency was resolved within a week and, on 20 
December, the Standing Committee was able to present its second report informing the 
Constituent Assembly that the committee had succeeded in resolving all the substantive 
issues in principle, subject only to technical and minor further amendments and 
discussions on details regarding the system of proportional representation and a second 
house of parliament. 
At this stage, the committee also agreed that the draft constitution and the principles 
agreed on should be referred to a panel of three eminent lawyers311 who were to be 
instructed to finalize the draft incorporating the said principles for submissions to the 
Standing Committee for further deliberations. The committee also resolved that the three 
lawyers should have had no previous involvement in the drafting of the proposals for any 
of the parties elected to the Constituent Assembly and that they should receive 
instructions from the Constituent Assembly. 
This report was also adopted with considerable satisfaction. In their comments, various 
members of the Constituent Assembly applauded the spirit of cooperation that existed 
between various parties. Mr Dirk Mudge said, "Our party wants to put it on record that if 
deliberations in a future government would take place in the same spirit of goodwill, 
understanding, in the same spirit of give and take, the people of this country need not fear 
311 Lawyers recommended by the committee were Adv. Arthur Chaskalson, Prof. Marinus Wiechers and 
Prof. Gerhard Erasmus. The appointed lawyers were invited to sit in the Constituent Assembly and 
Standing Committee me.etings to get a. feel of ~e politic~l context of the discussions. They did not 
participate in any diSCUSSIons unless speCIfic questIOns were directed to them. 
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the future, but they can look forward to the future with confidence.,,312 Mr Moses Garoeb 
of SWAPO commented: "The responsibility is ours as leaders to ensure that this infant 
democracy that we are in the process of establishing, will not only be born, but will be 
institutionalised and stabilized.,,313 Mr Katjiuongua of NPF said, "Let's hope that this is 
the first important sign of many good things to come our way.,,314 Similarly, Mr Justus 
Garoeb of UDF said, "The elected representatives of the Namibian people have come to 
the unanimous consensus to bury the past, to get rid of all factors threatening confidence 
and cooperation to work out a formula for lasting peace and prosperity for our people.,,315 
Organization of the Legislature 
Organization of the legislature differs a great deal from state to state. Elster316 identifies 
three stages in the process of evolution of the legislature: 
In the first stage, there is a strong monarchy which is perceived as arbitrary and 
tyrannical. In the second stage, this monarchy is replaced by a parliamentary 
regime. In the third stage, when it is discovered that parliament can be just as 
tyrannical and arbitrary as the king, some form of checks and balances is 
introduced. 
As the Constituent Assembly turned its attention to working out details about the nature 
of the legislature, some of the concerns of the members of the assembly were to bring 
about accountability and establish a system of checks and balances. However, at the same 
time, one could see that the reasoning behind non-SWAPO parties arguing for a 
bicameral parliament was informed not just by their desire to enhance accountability. 
They believed that under proportional representation, with the whole of Namibia as one 
constituency, SWAPO would continue to secure a majority in the National Assembly for 
years to come. However, if a second house were created with equal representation from 
various regions, with elections based on a constituency system, SWAPO would fail to 
gain a majority in the second house. 
312 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of20 December 1989. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies. 
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Non-SWAPO parties' thinking was based on the belief that the composition of regions 
would remain the same as that prevailing in the pre-independence era irrespective of their 
population sizes. As SWAPO's power base was perceived to be restricted to one northern 
region where most of the Oshiwambo speaking people lived, non-SWAPO parties felt 
that they stood a good chance of controlling the second house as they could gain 
majorities in many other regions. 
Arguing in favour of a bicameral parliament, Mr Katjiuongua appealed: 317 
Chairman said the first day when he became chairman that it was a process of 
give and take. Now, I think I have been giving (laughter) and I don't want the 
people to break the part of their deal. I have been giving and so far I have not 
scored any point. So really brothers and sisters I must report back home. So, I take 
it here you will not die here if you do compromise .... to provide mechanisms by 
which all of us in bigger or smaller numbers feel that we are part of the same 
process .... That is one reason why I feel strongly that we must have a bicameral 
legislature. 
What the non-SWAPO parties did not realize was that the situation was bound to change 
once the constitutionally established Delimitation Commission completed its task of 
redrawing regional boundaries. When the Delimitation Commission created new regions 
with approximately equal populations, the old Ovamboland was divided into four 
regions, Otjikoto, Ohangwena, Oshana, and Omusati. This development was sure to 
change the composition of the second house. In a sense, population concentration in the 
afore-mentioned regions could ensure SWAPO majority in the house by virtue of the fact 
that there were to be four times the number of representatives from former Ovamboland. 
Under the old arrangement, only two candidates could be sent to the National Council 
from former Ovamboland, but under the new delimitation arrangement, eight could be 
sent from the same area that had been divided into four regions. However, it needs to be 
mentioned that it was not clear at the time what the outcome of the work of the yet to be 
established Delimitation Commission would be. Nevertheless, SWAPO was sure of its 
popularity in the different regions, but the non-SWAPO parties underestimated its 
317 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Committee on the Rules and Standing Orders, Minutes of the Meeting 
of 18 December 1989. 
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popularity.3lg SWAPO, therefore, had no difficulty accepting the non-SWAPO parties' 
proposal of a bicameral parliament. 
The concept of bicameralism, as sought and secured by non-SWAPO parties, was ill 
conceived for various reasons. First, Namibia was conceived to be a unitary state and not 
a federal state, and regions were administrative rather than political units. Second, as in 
the United States, this was an attempt to balance rights attached to individuals with rights 
attached to regions. In Philadelphia, James Wilson had argued against rights attached to 
states, "Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men or for the 
imaginary beings called States?,,319 Advocates of individual rights had argued, "States 
ought to be represented in the federal assembly proportionally to their population, 
whereas those who believed in the rights of states argued for equal representation .... In 
the United States the compromise was equal representation in the upper house and 
. I' th I ,,320 proportlOna III e ower. 
In Paris, on the other hand, the principle of bicameralism was rejected after debate. 
However, with the later addition of a senate to the legislature, France today has a 
bicameral parliament. 
Bicameralism was adopted in Namibia, a unitary state, in the spirit of compromise by 
SWAPO. However, the attempt of the non-SWAPO parties was to curtail the power of 
the head of state, and that of the ruling party represented in the National Assembly. In the 
end, little purpose was served by this provision as short-term expectations of the non-
SWAPO parties to control the second house failed to materialize. In future, however, it is 
entirely possible that two different political parties could control the two houses. SWAPO 
also accepted the concept of bicameral parliament, because it considered that the regional 
aspect of the second house would be very useful in bringing democracy closer to the 
people. This thinking was in tandem with SWAPO's belief in the de-concentration of 
318 After the first Regional Council elections held in 1992, SWAPO's control of the National Council was 
assured with an enlarged majority. 
319 Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies. 
320 Records of the Federal Convention of 1786, p. 483. 
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power from the centre to the periphery to make decisions more relevant to the 
developmental needs of the regions. 
Bicameralism was accepted by the Constituent Assembly with 72 members of the 
National Assembly elected on proportional representation basis, and 26 members of the 
National Council elected, two from each of the thirteen regions, by the regional 
councillors who themselves had been elected from their constituencies.32l 
However, in stipulating the administrative working of the two houses, legal draftsmen 
created a serious mistake in drafting the relevant provisions by largely sticking to the 
SWAPO draft that provided only for a unicameral parliament. They drafted the article 
envisaging two houses, but overlooked making the necessary provision for staffing. 
Article 51(1) of the Constitution provides that the speaker shall appoint a person as the 
Secretary of the National Assembly. However, no such provision exists for the National 
Council. This error has come to haunt the executive and the legislature, making it 
necessary to amend the Constitution in the near future or to seek an interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court. 
Bill of Rights 
A Bill of Rights is enshrined in Namibia's constitution. Though inclusion of the Bill of 
Rights in constitutions, as an element for curtailing the power of the state over citizens, 
has a relatively long history, it is a new idea in Africa. Subsequent to Namibia's 
including the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, most other countries in Africa that made 
transition to democracy during the last decade, including South Africa, incorporated 
some form of Bill of Rights in their new constitutions. 
In the case of Namibia, impetus for the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
came from the Constitutional Principles. Furthermore, recognizing that the United 
Nations had played a very important role in the Namibians' struggle for liberation, it 
would have been ironic for the new state not to value the provision of human rights. 
321 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Chapter 8. 
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These were also the very principles Namibians had fought for. In fact, the basic rights 
and freedoms in the Namibian constitution are largely, but not exclusively, derived from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).322 
Even if these outside influences were not there, and the constitution did not enshrine 
human rights provisions, Namibia would certainly have become signatory to the two 
conventions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as it did soon after securing 
independence. In 1992, Namibia also ratified the OAU's African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and People's Rights. However, the framers of the Constitution felt so strongly 
about human rights that they decided to include them in the Constitution323 and protect 
them against any dilution by providing that: 
No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3 hereof, in so far as 
such repeal or amendment diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained and ,defined in that Chapter, shall be permissible under this 
Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have 
any force or effect. 324 
This provision, however, does not stop the legislature from enhancing fundamental rights 
provisions. 
Framers of American and French Constitutions had, however, thought very differently 
about human rights, despite the fact that they considered these rights to be important in 
some ways: 
Some of the American delegates thought a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as 
it might suggest that every right not included in the enumeration could be freely 
violated by the government. Because the Constitution restricted the powers of the 
government by enumerating them, it was felt that enumerating the rights might 
. '1 1 b . d trio t' 325 slml ar y e vlewe as res c lve. 
322 A useful source on the human rights provisions in the constitution is: Gino J. Naldi (1995), 
Constitutional Rights in Namibia: A Comparative Analysis with International Human Rights, Cape Town. 
Juta. 
323 Namibia, Constitution o/the Republic o/Namibia, Chapter 3. 
324 Ibid., Article 131. 
325 Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies. 
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Further, C.C. Pinckney of the South Carolina House of Representatives took a different 
approach but towards the same end. He argued that a Bill of Rights generally begins 
"with declaring that all men are by nature born free. Now, we should make that 
declaration with a very bad grace, when a large part of our property consists in men who 
are actually born slaves.,,326 A Bill of Rights was consequently left out of the American 
Constitution. 
However, the issue of human rights was not to go away so easily. Just five days before 
the Philadelphia Convention adjourned, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry raised the 
question of adding the bill of rights to the constitution. Again, just three days before the 
convention adjourned, Pinckney and Gerry sought an addition of a clause regarding the 
liberty of the press. This provision, too, was rejected because "the power of Congress 
does not extend to the Press.,,327 It has been suggested that "perhaps the lateness of the 
Convention, perhaps the desire not to present more opportunity for controversy when the 
document was forwarded to the States, perhaps the belief, asserted by the defenders of the 
Constitution when the absence of a bill of rights became critical, that no bill was needed 
because Congress was delegated none of the powers which such a declaration would 
deny, perhaps all these contributed to the rejection.,,328 Soon thereafter, however, many of 
the founding fathers urged an amendment to the constitution to include a declaration of 
rights and consequently, ten amendments were ratified.329 As regards rights not 
enumerated in the constitution, the Ninth Amendment stipulates: "The enumeration in the 
constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people." This amendment is thus a positive affirmation of the rights that are not 
enumerated but are protected by other provisions. 
326 See the Records of the Federal Convention of 1786. 
327 United States, Amendments to the Constitution: First Through Tenth Amendments, 
http://www.frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov, accessed 15 December 2002. 
328 Ibid. 
329 These amendments deal with freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, freedom to bear arms; 
protection against unreasonable. se~ches and seizure~, protection against being held answerable for any 
crime unless on presentment or mdlctment by a grand Jury, speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, and 
protection against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. 
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In Paris, at the Assemblee Constituante, arguments against the inclusion of the Bill of 
Rights in the constitution reflected the fear of granting too many rights rather than too 
few. "Two of the most prominent moderates, Lally-Tolendal and Malouet, argued that a 
Bill of Rights might give the people exaggerated, confused, and dangerous ideas about 
their liberties, and argued for a postponement.,,330 
In Windhoek, despite the international character of Namibia's struggle for independence, 
and despite the framers' commitment to human rights, various political parties had very 
different purposes for seeing the enshrining of the Bill of Rights in the constitution. 
SWAPO was concerned with ensuring that apartheid did not re-emerge, and that adequate 
provision existed to reverse the wrongs of apartheid. It therefore argued in favour of 
Article 23 dealing with apartheid and affirmative action. DT A, on the other hand, strove 
to ensure that property acquired by the whites was protected against appropriation. 
However, partly because of the provisions stipulated in the Constitutional Principles and 
partly because the provisions sought by various parties were within the framework of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, general consensus ensued fairly quickly for the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the constitution. 
The Electoral System 
The nature of democracy depends on, inter alia, the type of representation achieved. As 
John Stuart Mill pointed out,331 
Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The 
pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the 
whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly 
conceived and hitherto practised is the government of the whole people by a mere 
majority of the people, exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with 
the equality of all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a 
government of privilege, in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess 
practically any voice in the State ... to the complete disenfranchisement of 
minorities. 
330 Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a 1860 Premiere Serie (1789 a 1799)(1875-1888), pp. 222-23,320 
and 322-23. Quoted in Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies. 
331 John Stuart Mill (1991), Considerations on Representative Government, Buffalo, Prometheus Books. 
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In pre-independence Namibia, "government of privilege, in favour of numerical 
majority" was denied in favour of government of privilege, in favour of the white 
minority. As majority rule was sure to follow at the time of independence, members of 
the Windhoek Constituent Assembly, knowing that the choice of electoral system can 
influence representation greatly, focused on their own parties' chances in the parliament. 
An understanding of the pros and cons of different electoral systems was therefore 
important. The United Nations Institute for Namibia had done extensive work on 
comparative electoral systems,332 and its work was available to the members of the 
Constituent Assembly. This work outlined all the different electoral systems and provided 
pros and cons for each. Rather than making specific recommendations, the study sought 
to outline the implications of various electoral systems vis a vis the philosophy and theory 
of representation, the franchise, the administrative machinery for elections, determination 
of results, nature of constituencies, voter registration, election campaigns, voting and 
voter security, ballot security and counting of votes, and the treatment ofresults.333 
Members of the Constituent Assembly also had first-hand knowledge of elections, 
because elections for the Constituent Assembly had just ended. As the campaign and 
elections for the Constituent Assembly proceeded, various implications outlined in the 
United Nations Institute for Namibia study also became clear. Illustrations of some of 
these implications are outlined in Chapter 3. Because of these experiences and the 
information available to the members of the Constituent Assembly, there was 
considerable debate in the Constituent Assembly on the choice of electoral systems. 
In considering the choice of an electoral system for Namibia, a consensus had emerged 
that National Assembly elections should be held on proportional representation basis. 
Different parties in the Windhoek Assembly had, however, favoured proportional 
representation for different reasons. SWAPO members had agreed to this system because 
332 Ncube and Parker, Comparative Electoral Systems and Political Consequences; and Dieter, Elections 
and Electoral Systems. Both of these documents provide a comprehensive overview of types of electoral 
s stems, as well as of their respective advantages and disadvantages. 3~ Ncube and Parker, Comparative Electoral Systems and Political Consequences, p. 201. 
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they felt that they, having spent decades out of the country, might not do so well if 
elections were held on a constituency basis which tends to favour local personalities. 
SWAPO was also pleased with the proportional representation system used for the 
election of the Constituent Assembly as it had allowed it to gain a majority in the 
assembly. Non-SWAPO parties, on the other hand, supported the proportional 
representation system as it favoured smaller parties' representation in the National 
Assembly. Thus, the proportional representation system offered something to every party. 
As the proportional representation system allowed better opportunities for smaller parties 
to gain seats in the parliament, it was considered a more democratic system than the first-
past-the-post system. 
Although the framers of the constitution were unanimous in their choice of the electoral 
system for the National Assembly, there was considerable disagreement in the choice of 
electoral system for electing members of the National Council. The thinking of various 
non-SWAPO parties favouring a constituency-based system for electing regional 
councillors was very similar to their thinking on having a bicameral parliament. They had 
thought that SWAPO's power base would be eroded with the creation of a second house, 
and once again they thought that they, being strong in many regions, would do better in 
elections based on a constituency system. As already explained in this chapter, SWAPO 
was happy to oblige, knowing well that the delimitation of constituencies would 
contradict some of the assumptions of the non-SWAPO parties. 
Regrettably, in this debate, the most important aspect of proportional representation was 
completely lost, that "rational underpinning all proportional representation systems is to 
reduce the disparity between a party's share of the national votes and its share of the 
. t ,,334 R Id 335 t "F thn' 11 d' 'd d th '1' parhamentary sea s. eyno s no es, or e lca y IVI estates, e preval mg 
academic wind clearly blows in favour of proportional representation and against 
plurality." Lijphart336 also supports the view that divided societies need a proportional 
334 Andrew Reynolds (1999), Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern A/rica, Oxford, Oxford 
Univ. Press, p. 90. 
335 Ibid., p. 93. 
336 A. Lijphart (1993), "Democracy in Divided Societies" Journal o/Democracy, 4, 4, pp. 18-38. 
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representation system to protect the interest of the minorities. According to him, the 
proportional representation system in such societies has consistently posted the best 
records. 
As regards presidential elections, there was unanimity that the president should be elected 
by direct, universal and equal suffrage, with Namibia as one constituency. Further, the 
elected candidate must receive over 50% of the votes cast. If necessary, a number of 
ballots should be conducted until such a result is achieved. This provision was included 
in the constitution.337 So far, however, outcome of the first round has resulted in meeting 
this requirement. 
Thus, because of the interplay of the interests of various political parties represented in 
the Constituent Assembly, Namibia ended up with three electoral systems. 
The president is elected based on first-past-the-post system with the condition that the 
candidate must secure at least 50% of the votes cast. He/she does not have to be the 
leader of the political party with a majority in the parliament. The president is directly 
accountable to the people every five years but is not accountable to the parliament. 
He/she does not sit in the parliament. His/her powers are thus defined and limited only by 
the constitution that provides for the sharing of executive power with the cabinet. 
Members of the National Assembly are elected on a proportional representation basis, 
based on party list. The party determines the order in which names of candidates appear 
on the list. Finally, members of regional councils are elected from constituencies on a 
first-past-the-post system. Regional councillors from each region, in turn, elect two 
representatives from within themselves to the National Council. 
Thus, Namibia's electoral system allows for the possibility that the president is an 
independent candidate or candidate of one party, and the majority in the National 
Assembly, and therefore members of cabinet are from another party. This would be 
337 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 28. 
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similar to the situation in France and Russia. If such a situation prevailed in the distant 
future, it could curtail the president's powers considerably as he/she would be required to 
exercise his/her powers in consultation with the cabinet with a majority from a different 
party. 
Procedure for Amending the Constitution 
Constitutions should strike the right balance between rigidity and flexibility. It should 
neither be easy nor impossible to change them.338 
On the one hand, 'Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in 
their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their 
frenzy.' On the other hand, we should keep in mind the dictum of constitutional 
lawyers, ascribed to Justice Robert Jackson: the Constitution is not a suicide pact. 
It must be possible to unbind oneself in an emergency. Society must not be 
confined too tightly.339 
Mechanisms for amending constitutions should strike the right balance between rigidity 
and flexibility. The Windhoek Assembly opted to entrench fundamental rights and 
freedoms.34o Further, the article stipulating specific majorities required in parliament or in 
a referendum for amending the constitution may not be repealed.341 Any other provisions 
of the constitution can be repealed or amended by a majority of two-thirds of all the 
members of the National Assembly and two-thirds of all the members of the National 
Council. In case an amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of the constitution 
secures a majority of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly, but fails to 
secure such majority in the National Council, the president has the option of subjecting 
the amendment or repeal of the relevant provision of the constitution to referendum.342 
Mechanisms for amending the constitution chosen by the Windhoek Assembly seem to 
be very adequate. This standard clause was in fact lifted from the existing constitutions -
indeed, similar provisions exist in almost all the constitutions. If anything, Namibia's 
338 Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a 1869 Premiere Serie (J 789 a 1799)(1875-1888), p.517. 
339 EIster quoting John E. Finn (1991), Constitutions in Crisis, 5; Tenniniello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 
1 37 (1949). 
340 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 31. 
341 Ibid., Article 132. 
342 Ibid. 
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constitution is slightly harder to change than most. This provision was also in SWAPO's 
original draft that was adopted as a basis for drafting the Namibian Constitution. This 
provision guards against instability so that the constitution remains unaffected even when 
majorities fluctuate between forty-nine and fifty-one percent.343 Furthermore, the 
requirement of a two-thirds majority of all members in both houses ensures serious 
consideration of the issue. 
Adoption of the Constitution 
On 25 January 1990, I, as the Standing Committee chairman, tabled the draft constitution 
of the Republic of Namibia at the Constituent Assembly meeting. Debate of the draft 
started on 29 January. For the next one and a half days statements were made by different 
parties, and on 30 January the assembly started considering the draft clause by clause. 
This debate continued the next day, but before adjourning, Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab moved 
that independence day should be determined to be 21 March 1990. This motion was 
carried unanimously. The country was to become independent on the midnight of 21 
March 1990.344 
Work on the finalization of the constitution continued until 6 February when the draft 
was finalized. The stage was now set for the adoption of the constitution. One of my 
concerns was whether the constitution would be adopted by consensus or by majority 
vote. So far the Constituent Assembly had done everything by consensus; thus, I felt that 
we should adopt the constitution by consensus as well. Adoption of the constitution by 
consensus would also send a message of unity and oneness at this historic moment. 
Therefore I lobbied all members to endorse the constitution by consensus first, and then 
to enter reservations if any. I feared that if reservations were entered before the adoption 
of the document, it could have diluted the unanimity that was being sought. All, even by 
Mr Pretorius, former National Party stalwart, accepted this proposal. In pursuit of this 
ideal, I also made a last minute dash to see the Baster Kaptein, Mr Hans Diergaard, to 
persuade him, and he agreed by stating that he had no quarrel with the constitution or the 
343 Eister, Arguing and Bargaining in the Two Constituent Assemblies. 
344 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of 31 December 1989. 
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incoming SWAPO government, but had a quarrel with Mr Pik Botha, the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of South Africa, who had told him that he would not have to abdicate his 
position ifhe were to join the Security Council Resolution 435 process. 
On the morning of9 February 1990 in front of the current parliament building, I declared, 
"We therefore adopt this constitution by consensus. Any objection? No objection," and 
brought down the gavel quickly. The constitution was adopted unanimously.345 It must 
have seemed to those who were not insiders, and who were not aware of behind-the-
scene consensus building efforts, that I brought the gavel down quickly so as not to give 
anybody a chance to change their mind. May be so - but not really. 
The miracle of 80 days was accomplished. As the day of independence was set to be 21 
March 1990, work on the process of nation building had to start. At the time of adoption 
of the constitution, I had compared nation building with the building of a house - the 
Namibian House. I had said that the foundation for that house was the constitution. The 
building blocks, the different ethnic groups: Damaras, Ndongas, Afrikaners, Hereros, 
Germans, Ovambos, etc. Mortar to hold these different bricks was composed of the laws 
passed by the parliament. When one finalises the laying of the bricks, one plasters the 
wall, paints it with colours. I further said, "We painted our house with the blue, white, 
yellow sun, green and red, our national colours. Once the house is painted, no one would 
see the bricks or different ethnicities. All that everyone would see is a strong house in 
which the children of Namibia will be able to live in peace, security, and harmony." 
All the members of the Constituent Assembly signed the constitution on 16 March 
1990.346 In his 16 March 1990 report, the United Nations Secretary General transmitted 
to the Security Council the full and definitive text of the Constitution of Namibia, 
together with a comparison between the new constitution and the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles.347 The Constitution duly met the Security Council's approval. 
345 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes o/the Meeting 0/9 February 1990. 
346 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes o/the Meeting 0/16 March 1990. 
347 United Nations, Yearbook o/the United Nations 1990, p. 950. 
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For Namibia, constitutional democracy is a new concept, and its success will largely 
depend on Namibian society's ability and willingness to internalise the constitution. First 
steps in this process of internalisation were taken in 1989 when the elected Constituent 
Assembly comprising citizens of Namibia met within the country in Windhoek348 to draft 
the constitution, decide on the day of independence and also to elect the first president as 
a transitional measure, and deem him to have been elected under Article 28 of the 
constitution. 
Furthermore, the way in which the constitution was to be implemented was prescribed in 
Article 135 which stated that: "This Constitution shall be implemented in accordance 
with provisions of Schedule 7 hereof." Important provisions of Schedule 7 include the 
president's appointing the prime minister and administering to him or her the oath or 
affirmation set out in Schedule 2 of the Constitution; the Constituent Assembly's 
deciding the day on which the National Assembly would meet, at a time and at a place 
specified by the prime minister; the members of the National Assembly, with the prime 
minister as the chairperson, would take the oath/affirmation prescribed by Article 55 
before the judge-president or a judge designated by the judge-president for this purpose, 
and elect the speaker of the National Assembly.349 
Constitutional Provisions and Personality Issues 
The constitution stipulates in Article 32 (3)(i)(aa) that the president appoints a prime 
minister. In terms of Article 36, the prime minister is the key advisor and assistant to the 
president in his execution of the functions of the government. 
Although the Constitution is not explicit on the number of cabinet members, it mentions 
functions of a finance minister, a defence minister and a foreign minister. Therefore the 
size of the cabinet depends on the president, and, in the carrying out of this function, he 
348 Most of the African countries' constitutions were drafted outside the countries and by people comprising 
the citizens and representatives of the colonizing states. In Namibia, on the other hand, constitution was 
drafted by Namibians in Namibia. 
349 Namibia, Constitution a/the Republic a/Namibia, Schedule 2. 
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consults with the prime minister as the primary constitutional assistant and advisor to 
himlher. 
Consultations between the president and the prime minister were routine and very useful 
during the first term and during half of the second term, and executive relations were 
close. However, after the second elections (1994) when, for the first time, the president 
was elected directly by the people (as per the constitutional requirement) and received 
72% of the votes, relations between the president and the prime minister changed. 
Perhaps, the president, now having been elected directly by the people, thought that he 
was mandated to rule and was accountable only to the people. 
However, a brave cabinet and also the last SWAPO Party Congress held in August 2002 
proved that the president could still be called to order in Namibia.350 There can 
nevertheless be attempts by presidential coteries to encourage the president to be 
'presidential'. These sycophants, who surround the president, are interested in their own 
survival and seek to please the president by 'informing' him that he was very popular 
with the people. This sycophancy may be reflected in their behaviour of promoting 
omnipotence of the presidency. It can take many forms; such as the way the president is 
addressed (head of state and head of government, commander in chief, tatekulu, 
revolutionary, founding father, etc.), as had been the case in Zaire under President 
Mobutu, and in Malawi under President Banda. As Bratton and Van de Walle351 put it: 
"Presidentialism implies systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one 
individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks." 
Such a trend seems to be emerging in Namibia. For instance, in 2003, President Nujoma 
issued a circular stating that all members of government including leaders of the 
legislative organ should obtain permission from the 'appointing authority', i.e. from him, 
to travel out of the country. This authority was in the past delegated to the prime minister 
as the head of government administration. There has been an attempt or desire to take all 
350 Members of the Cabinet often disagreed with the president's views. 
351 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle (1998), Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime 
Transitions in Comparative Practice, Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 65. 
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decisions at the head of state level. In the same year, the president also assumed the 
responsibility of the portfolio of information and broadcasting as he wanted to "put that 
house in order" which presumably no minister could do. Such attempts at 
micromanagement are the beginning of presidentialism. As Kamuzu Banda of Malawi 
put it in 1972, ''Nothing is not my business in this country: Everything is my business, 
everything. The state of education, the state of our economy, the state of our agriculture, 
the state of our transport, everything is my business.,,352 
However, in Namibia we have not yet reached that level of assumption of power over 
everything by one person. At the last SWAPO Congress, many of the 'impositions' by 
the president were resisted and the president, although not happy, had to live with the 
objections.353 We are thus at the crossroads of presidentialism. Time will tell which way 
Namibia will go. 
The next two chapters deal with some of the specific aspects of state formation that 
provide a glimpse of the direction Namibia might take. 
Conclusion 
Events leading to the adoption of the constitution of Namibia show interplay between the 
self-interests of various players. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there were many players 
attempting to manage transition to independence in Namibia in a way that furthered their 
own interests. Influencing change by influencing the provisions of the constitution was an 
important aspect of this process. Positions were taken by the Western Five to ensure that 
Namibia became a liberal democracy with all the attendant rights provisions in its 
constitution; and almost all the parties drew on the 1982 Constitutional Principles to 
ensure that their interests were protected. However, it was the spirit of compromise that 
352 Ibid., p. 65. 
353 At the Third SWAPO Congress, the president insisted that certain number of women be declared elected 
without following the laid-down procedure. He insisted on this action as he wanted the women to believe 
that he cared for them though no woman had been appointed to the top four positions. To make up for that 
discrepancy, the president sought to increase women's representation through unconstitutional means. At 
the Central Committee meeting held in August 2002 the president also tried to endorse four candidates for 
unopposed acceptance but there was resistance and other nominations were made. The president accepted 
the decision but other nominees lacked the courage to accept the nominations. 
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eventually resulted in achieving an outcome satisfactory to all: (1) Namibians were happy 
with the independence of their country; SWAPO was happy that its many years of 
struggle had at last borne fruit; and even non-SWAPO parties were happy with the 
process of reconciliation and inclusivity; (2) at a time when the United Nations was 
coming under increasing pressure for its alleged ineffectiveness, it was glad to see the 
culmination of a successful mission; (3) the Organisation of African Unity, the Frontline 
States and members of the Non-Aligned Movement were happy to see the last colony in 
Africa become independent; (4) the United Kingdom, France, and Germany managed to 
protect their economic and settler interests in the region; (5) the United States of 
America secured its economic and geopolitical interests in the region, and (6) South 
Africans were glad to see the end of pariah status in the community of nations; and (7) 
Angola and Cuba were happy to see the end of South African incursions and clandestine 
support for UNIT A. 
Keeping in mind that the constitution has been in existence for the last thirteen years, it 
has proved its value on all fronts. It has ensured fundamental human rights of the citizens, 
and its provisions for constitutional amendment have worked effectively. Its provisions 
are enforceable - though time will tell whether Namibia succeeds in meeting this 
condition. One thing is sure, if attempts are made by influential persons to undermine the 
constitution, backed by the ruling party having two-thirds majority in the National 
Assembly, the constitution can be wrecked. So, at present, the integrity of the constitution 
depends on SWAPO's commitment to it. Survival of the constitution and its effectiveness 
would depend not just on individuals internalising the constitution but also on the 
evolution of society and social groups, and, in turn, civil society, that is ready to defend 
the constitution. 
Such developments are already taking place as discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
However, the western nations continue to demand from the African states what does not 
even prevail in their own countries. For example, no elections are perfect - problems 
arose in the V.S. presidential elections of 2000 as mentioned in Chapter Six. Had that 
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happened somewhere in Africa, elections would have been subjected to considerable 
criticism. 
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Chapter Five 
State Formation and Consolidation: 
The Forming of a Government 
The contemporary state in sub-Saharan Africa is not African .... Nor is the 
African state a state. 
Pierre Englebert354 
Introduction 
Africa has a long and illustrious pre-colonial history. Civilizations flourished in many 
parts of the continent. Great Zimbabwe, rock art, evolution of agriculture and metal 
working, emergence of trading communities, trade routes, existence of many kingdoms 
and historically documented political cultures are evidence of those civilizations.355 As 
connah356 notes, "There were cities and states in tropical Africa long before the colonial 
ambitions of European peoples transformed that continent. The appearance of such cities 
and states was one of the most significant developments of tropical Africa's history prior 
to the colonial experience." 
During the pre-colonial era, social and political structures of different societies were 
evolving on their own timescale and in their own way. Early history of Africa shows that 
many societies were organized according to democratic values. Citizens used to value 
consultation and leaders' accountability to the masses. For instance, in the Asante 
Kingdom in West Africa, "at the annual meeting of the Asantemanhyiamu, representative 
assembly of the Asanteman or the Asante nation, the King and Chiefs in Council would 
354 Englebert, "The Contemporary African State," p. 767. 
355 See for instance, R.S. Rattray (1923). Ashanti, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press; R.S Rattray (1929). Ashanti 
Law and Constitution, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press; Ivor Wilks (1975), Asante in the Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975; Joseph O. Vogel and Jean Vogel (eds.) (1997), Encyclopedia of 
Precolonial Africa, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefields; Graham Connah (2001), African Civilizations: 
Precolonial Cities and States in Tropical Africa - An Archaeological Perspective, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
Cambridge Univ. Press. For Namibia see Frieda-Nela WiIliams (1991), Precolonial Communities of 
Southwestern Africa: A History of Ovambo Kingdoms 1600-1920, Windhoek, National Archives of 
Namibia; Brigitte Lau, "Pre-colonial Namibian Historiography: What is to be Done?" in Wood (ed.), 
Namibia: 1884-1984. 
356 Connah, African Civilizations, p. 6. 
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discuss 'all matters of political and judicial administration. Chiefs would answer all 
questions relating to their respective provinces, and were subject to the consequences of 
appeals, from their local Judicial Courts, to the Supreme Court of the King in 
C ·1 ",357 ounCt. 
There was a general distrust of power. The assembled people would admonish a newly 
enstooled person of authority that they did not wish for greediness; nor that his ears 
should be hard of hearing; nor should he act on his own initiative, but he should consult 
with representatives of the people and pay attention to other useful maxims of like 
. rt 358 Impo . 
Such examples existed in many parts of Africa. In Namibia, too, structured societies 
existed in the pre-colonial era. In the area that came to be known as Ovamboland, a 
king's royal power was based on classic coordinating and arbitrating functions. Supreme 
administrative and judicial powers were exercised by him, but under the supervision of a 
powerful council of commoners.359 
Despite the fact that many African societies had fairly sophisticated political culture, 
literature on the pre-colonial history of the continent is rather weak. Lau360 notes that in 
the colonia11iterature, "the mere word 'pre-colonial' suggests that there is an entirely 
undifferentiated mass of events and processes about which only one thing is known: its 
point of termination." Yet, in my view, earlier societies were no stranger to three 
universalities as follows: 
1. First, societies develop institutions to make rules. Nomenclature of such 
institutions and methods of their operation might differ but they essentially serve 
the same purpose. In different places they might be called parliaments, Panchaits 
357 Davidson, The Black Man's Burden, pp. 60-6l. Davidson quotes r.B. Freeman (1886), The Western 
Echo, 1, p.8. 
358 Davidson, The Black Man's Burden, p. 6l. Davidson quotes Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, 
p.82. 
~59 Gervase Clarence-Smith and Richard Moorsom, "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in 
Ovamboland, 1844-1917," in Wood (ed.), Namibia 1884-1984, p. 177. 
360 Lau, "Pre-colonial Namibian Historiography," in Wood (ed.), Namibia: 1884-1984, pp. 90-99. 
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and Lok Sabha (in India), Congress (in the United States), or Ohale (a gathering 
place under the tree in the Oshivambo speaking culture of Namibia). 
2. The second universality is that societies create institutions to carry out the 
adjudication function. This function might be performed by a supreme court, a 
high court, an elders' council, or a privy council. Each one of these institutions 
plays the same role of interpreting the laws, customs and practices so as to 
determine if they are being fairly interpreted and implemented. 
3. The third universality is that in every society there is an executive branch that 
executes the decisions of the 'court', and implements laws of the 'parliaments'. 
This executive branch may consist of emperors, kings, queens, presidents, prime 
ministers, chiefs or Gaob (in the DamaraINama language of Namibia), or 
Omukaniilwa (King in the Oshindonga language of Namibia) or Oba (in Nigeria). 
These chief executives are assisted by some form of civil service structure for the 
execution of state functions. 
Indeed, earlier Namibian societies developed differentiated structures to make rules, 
established institutions for adjudication, and had some form of executive structures. 
The Nature of Postcolonial State in Africa 
During the colonial period, political structures and practices of Africans were 
manipulated, distorted, co-opted and even dismantled by the Europeans.361 Europe had in 
fact worked hard to deny Africa its own history. That is why much of the colonial 
literature talks about the beginning of colonialism being "the point of termination" of the 
earlier history of Africa. Who knows how state formation in Africa would have 
progressed had the evolution of societies not been undermined by slave trade and 
colonization! 
As African modern states could not draw on their history, the concept of state, as it exists 
today, goes back only to the second half of the eighteenth century and is western in 
361 Naomi Chazan and others (1988), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 77. 
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concept. It is therefore no surprise that Englebert362 feels that the contemporary state that 
emerged in sub-Saharan Africa is not African: 
The contemporary state in sub-Saharan Africa is not African. It descends from 
arbitrary colonial administrative units designed as instruments of domination, 
oppression and exploitation. No doubt after some 40 years of independence these 
states have been transfonned, adapted, endogenized. Yet, their origin remains 
exogenous European, not African, and set up against African societies rather than 
having evolved out ofthe relationships of groups and individuals in societies. 
Badie363 working with the notion of ''''the imported state" holds similar views. He argues 
that many of the features of the imported state drawn from the period of colonial rule 
continue to characterize today's African state. 
An essential feature of colonial rule had been a functional notion of government that did 
not distinguish between decision-making and implementation roles.364 Kasfir36S notes, 
"The political culture bequeathed by colonialism contained the notions that 
authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule and that political activity was merely a 
disguised fonn of self-interest, subversive of the public welfare." As various African 
countries were decolonised, changes that took place were essentially the rearrangement of 
the political structures. "The transfer of power, ipso [acto, implied a shift in the location 
of control and in the composition of decision-making structures.,,366 The new leaders 
sought to concentrate power at the centre. This consolidation of power with strong 
authoritarianism occurred throughout the continent.367 
At the same time, however, most leaders who had led independence movements and had 
subsequently assumed political power also believed quite genuinely that they had a 
mission to build a new society. This conviction supported their belief in building a strong 
362 Englebert, "The Contemporary African State," p. 767. 
363 Bertrand Badie (2001), The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order, Stanford, 
Stanford Univ. Press. See also Joel S. Migdal (2001), State in Society, Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press, 
for a competent survey of how states and societies transform. 
364 Migdal, State in Society, p. 40. 
365 Nelson Kasfrr (1983), "Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview," in Phillip Mahwood (ed.), Local 
Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa, New York, John Wiley, p. 34. 
366 Chazan and others, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, p. 41. 
367 Ibid., p. 44. 
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state. The concept of strong state was, however, narrowly defined in tenns of 
concentration of power. Consequently, their sense of mission and of work not yet 
completed drove some of the leaders to perpetuate their regimes, curtail opposition, and 
contain any efforts from any quarter that they considered inimical to the success of their 
mission. There were, of course, a few who saw their newly gained position as a 
comfortable job for life and were unwilling to give it up without a fight. 
While visionary leaders were needed to help the newly independent countries make 
transition from subsistence, agrarian, and rural economies to urban, industrial economies, 
they often failed in ensuring such a transformation. Arat368 claims that this failure was 
primarily a result of their iron grip that did not allow for the evolution of social 
institutions. Weakness of social institutions and other mechanisms resulted in the leaders 
escaping control mechanisms that would hold them accountable. However, that would be 
a simplistic view. There were many reasons for their failures. These reasons included 
economic dependence of the newly independent countries on the West, lack of skills and 
resources necessary for making the transformation, imposition of Cold War geopolitics 
and acceptance and support of despots by the West. 
It also needs to be acknowledged that transformation of societies is an evolutionary 
process. Transition from subsistence, agrarian, and rural economies to urban, industrial 
economies can be achieved only with investment in human resource development over a 
long period of time. Examples of Asian countries show that this time lag before they 
could make social and economic transformation is close to half a century. Thus, there 
cannot be any instant gratification in this process of transformation. However, according 
to Mazrui:369 
The problem [in Africa] has always been how to carry out cultural adjustment.. .. 
This re-adjustment that is needed in culture is a better balance between the 
continuities of African culture and Africa's borrowing from Western culture. 
Until now, Africa borrowed Western tastes without Western skills, Western 
consumption patterns without Western production techniques, urbanisation 
368 Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries, p. 67. 
369 Ali A. Mazru (2002)i, "Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future," 
Development Policy Management Network Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 1 (February 2002), p. 17. 
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without industrialisation, secularisation (the erosion of religion) without 
scientification. 
This shift in cultural values continued to put constraints on Africa's development. 
During the sixties, seventies and eighties, the first set of African leaders emerged 
building an organic state, where claims ofthe individual were subordinated to the good of 
the society to help speed up the process of development. This system worked relatively 
well in promoting the welfare of the society (for example in education and health 
achievements), but individual rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and property rights, were very often compromised. 
On the other hand, in the nineties, with increased emphasis on globalisation and with the 
emergence of the United States as the only superpower, emphasis on an individualistic 
state gained momentum, despite most African leaders' aversion to it. Very often these 
leaders had little choice but to conform, often unwillingly, as their countries' economic 
situation had made them dependent on international help, and international help came 
with strings attached. These leaders came under great pressure to introduce electoral 
democracies, and their countries' constitutions had to include human rights provisions. 
This pressure continued to the extent that the pendulum swung in a direction completely 
opposite to the organic state. However, institutions of their states were not geared to 
make this transition smooth. Economies collapsed and unrest became the norm rather 
than exception. Structural readjustment policies of global financial institutions did not 
help the matter. These developments compromised the viability of the state. 
Consequently, there was considerable rethinking to strike a balance between the organic 
state and the individualistic state as neither of these was seen as the objective, correct 
view.37o This thinking also began to be embraced by global financial institutions and 
other donor agencies. 
370 Terence H. Qualter (1986), Conflicting Political Ideas in Liberal Democracies, Toronto, Methuen, p. 
44. 
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Thus, the nature of state that emerged in Africa was influenced by its colonial predicate, 
the nature of structures imposed on the new state by the colonizer, the nature of 
leadership that emerged on independence, and a desire for instant gratification. The state 
also continued to be influenced by global political and economic changes. These 
influences pulled the state in different directions. 
Consequently, all is not well with the state in Africa. As Schwab371 noted somewhat 
exaggeratingly, "So called nations are currently demarcated solely by civil wars, ethnic 
conflict, tumultuous tyrannies, cross-border invasions that threaten international peace 
and security, countless refugees, long-harboured racial animosity, and brutalities that are 
often of an unspeakable nature." Englebert's372 reflection provides some of the reasons 
for Schwab's observation as follows: 
By the standards of Max Weber's classical definition, a state is 'a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory.' Few would argue that, in many respects, 
most African states fail to meet these criteria: theirs is a dubious community of 
heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities; 
their claim to force is rarely effective and much less monopolistic; their frequent 
predatory nature fails the test of legitimacy; and their territoriality is generally at 
best hesitant and contested. 
This view is borne out by the prevailing circumstances in many countries in Africa. Many 
of these challenges could have been met successfully with the states embracing 
democracy but any such embrace by political leaders was tentative. Of course, most 
political leaders talked about democracy during the period of struggle for independence 
but not beyond. Democratic rhetoric during the liberation struggles was nothing more 
than an instrument that brought about a sense of homogeneity that was necessary for the 
rise of the nation state. Habermas373 argues that, during the struggle for independence, the 
state had to achieve consensus around "an idea that was vivid and powerful enough to 
371 Peter Schwab (2001), Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs, New York, PaIgrave Macmillan, p. 29. Out of 
54 African states, perhaps just five fall in the category that Schwab describes. 
372 Englebert, "The Contemporary African State," p. 767. For Weber's definition, see Max Weber, "Politics 
as a Vocation," in Max Weber (1958), Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, C. Wright Mills (ed.), Hans H. 
Gerth (tr.), New York, Oxford Univ. Press, p. 78. 
373 J. Habermas, "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," in 
Ciaran Cronin and PabIo De Greiff (eds.) (1998), The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp 105-128. 
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shape people's convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than the 
dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights." Ake374, too, shares this view: 
[In Africa] the triumph of democracy may be more apparent than real. Democracy 
has had an embattled history struggling to survive in an environment in which 
support for it was rarely ever more than lukewarm and invariably ambivalent, 
confused or opportunistic, and opposition to it powerful, resourceful and 
unrelenting. By all indications it would be more appropriate to be lamenting the 
demise of democracy rather than celebrating its universal triumph. 
Diem375 opines that at some point in the development of a nation or nations, desire for 
self-government sprouts, and in the process a set of myths is developed to explain and 
justify the creation of a new state, and to simplify the process of socializing its members. 
Democracy was such a myth created during the period of liberation struggle. In many 
countries, other myths were created soon after the end of colonialism, such as the myth of 
'the importance of having only one party being better for development,' the myth of 'the 
leaders' importance for the survival of the state,' etc. 
As could be expected, another set of myths could easily be created, and were indeed 
created, to serve as a tool to make the birth of a nation-state difficult. Colonial 
experiences show that colonizers had created their own myths to serve their ends. Some 
of these myths included the colonizing states' 'civilizing mission,' 'superiority of the 
European culture,' 'traditional religions being just superstitions,' 'whites being superior 
to blacks,' 'blacks not having the ability to manage their own affairs,' and 'hatred 
between indigenous tribes.' 
These negative myths can often become self-fulfilling and quite damaging, and may 
require the emergence of an extraordinary personage or personages for the renewal of the 
aspirations of the people not only towards the creation of the nation-state, but also to gain 
their self-respect and dignity. Many of the first leaders of independent countries in Africa 
fall in this category. Ghana had Kwame Nkrumah, Kenya had Jomo Kenyata, Tanzania 
374 Claude Ake (2000), The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar, Senegal, Council for Dev. Of Social 
Science Res. in Africa, p. 28. 
375 Gordon Neal Diem (1999), 'Myths of the Nation-State," Formulations (Spring 1999). Diem's other 
myths can be seen at http://libertariannation.org/alf63d1.html, accessed 19 May 2003. 
1'. 
157 
. had Julius Nyerere, Malawi had Kamuzu Banda, Zambia had Kenneth Kaunda, Namibia 
had Sam Nujoma, and South Africa had Nelson Mandela. 
Influence of such leaders often goes beyond their term of office. Even succeeding leaders 
seek to be legitimised by their links to the visionaries and founders of the state. In fact, in 
many countries, most of the ruling elite oftoday either had worked with the visionaries or 
subscribe to their thinking. For example, President Moi, in order to gain credibility with 
the electorate, had to claim that he was following in the footsteps of Jomo Kenyata. 
However, many of the leaders failed democracy at least in the western sense of the word. 
Some failed because of their conviction that they knew best and there was no need for 
opposition, some failed because they saw opposition, a natural outcome of democracy, as 
a threat to their own positions, some failed because of their wholesale reliance on 
"parliamentary democracy distilled from the fruits of a mature capitalism,,,376 and still 
others failed because of their failure in replacing colonial instruments that were 
manifestly designed for domination, oppression and exploitation with the ones for 
popular participation. Often, most of the structures had been retained, with a shift only in 
the location of control and in the composition of decision-making structures. Any latent 
benefit for the new state through correct restructuring was therefore lost. This failure 
occasionally resulted in traditional Africa drawing "back into the defense of individual or 
clusters of individuals while at the same time extending their effectiveness in many ways 
subversive of the state.,,377 
Quite often failure of African states is also attributed to so called tribalism. Tribalism is 
not unique to Africa. As recently as the 1980s and early 1990s there was a resurgence of 
nationalism that led to many peoples' struggles for autonomy in the Soviet Union, and 
other countries, such as Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.378 However, nationalism is 
not just restricted to Eastern Europe or Central Asia. In Western Europe and North 
376 Davidson. The Black Man's Burden, p. 223. 
377 Ibid., p. 225. 
378 Tom Naims (1993), "Demonizing Nationalism," London Review of Books (25 February 1993), quoted in 
Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, p. 77. 
r 
I • 
158 
America where most of the countries are considered to be traditional nation states, 
nationalism has resurfaced demanding greater autonomy e.g., in Cyprus, the militants 
among the Basques in Spain and France, the Quebecois in Canada, the Welsh, the 
Scottish, the Bretons, and the Catalans and other groups within the EU. In Africa, there 
has been a growth of political movements based explicitly on ethnic background. The 
Ethiopian province of Eritrea achieved independence after a protracted civil war; civil 
~ar between black Christians and Arab Muslims in the Sudan continues; and Zanzibar 
negotiated a new relationship with Tanzania.379 There was also trouble in Namibia in the 
Caprivi region, in Zimbabwe in the Matabele region, and in South Africa between the 
ANC and the Inkata Party. In Rwanda, conflict between the Tutsis and the Hutus resulted 
in genocide that shamed Africa and the world. 
Wilford and Miller380 correctly point out that "nationalism is propelled by an 'us and 
them', insider/outsider, inclusive/exclusive dynamic, this can be carried to exaggerated 
and dangerous extremes in divided societies: barriers - whether physical, social, material 
and/or psychological- are erected and inter-ethnic differences can spiral into violence as 
self-consciously distinctive groups take up arms in order to realize their claims to 
autonomy." 
Indeed, tribalism and other 'isms' can be and often are exploited by politicians to further 
their own interests but there are also many examples of leaders seeking to achieve 
inclusivity. SWAPO sought inclusivity in Namibia, United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) sought inclusivity in Zambia, Chama Cha Mapinduzi sought similar objectives in 
Tanzania, and Frente de LibertaVao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) successfully achieved 
this objective in Mozambique although the FRELIMO government and Resistencia 
Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) rebels fought a bitter civil war whose origin could 
be ascribed not only to tribalism but also to differences in ideology. One characteristic of 
these success stories has certainly been the leaders' commitment to inc1usivity and 
379 Ibid., pp. 80-83. 
380 Rick Wilford, Robert L. Miller (eds.) (1998), Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Politics of 
Transition, London, Routletge, p. 2. 
159 
discouraging the politics of division. In this context, Wilford and Miller381 correctly point 
out: 
Barriers or cleavages, whether structured by region, religion, ethnicity or class, may 
be bridged - by power-sharing and provision for segmental autonomy 
(consociationalism), decentralization (regional or local government), the devolution 
of powers (federalism) andlor an array of public policies that promote, or at least 
accommodate, multi-culturalism - the politics of divided societies are likely to be 
unstable. 
In Namibia and South Africa, the South African government sought to divide societies 
through apartheid: 
Apartheid foregrounded race and ethnicity in its policies. By so doing, it often 
created divisions and conflict where none had existed before. For instance, the 
creation of Bantustan boundaries based on ethnic affiliation belied the melting-pot 
nature of South African society. Racial and ethnic intermingling had been a 
feature of its history. There were also strong cultural and religious affiliations that 
became embryonic nationalisms .... African nationalism ... was an identity which 
embraced different ethnicities in order to create a single political movement for 
assimilation into the broader social and political framework. 382 
This effort of the South African government was not unique. It was in fact the modus 
operandi of the colonizing states. Mamdane83 
views each group as a creation of the institutional segregation imposed by the 
colonial system's pattern of indirect rule; each maintained by separate systems within 
it: the centralized authority and the associated decentralized native authority. In 
essence, the two different status categories were designed to make the colonial system 
functional for the colonizer, whose alien rule demanded solutions to the 'native 
question.' 
Thus, the problem is not 'tribalism' but the political system and political leadership that 
do not strive for inclusivity. There is therefore no reason for Africans to decry their ethnic 
origins or the concept of tribe in itself. They should in fact be proud of their origin and 
the part of the culture that comes from it. Regrettably, even when the political system 
emphasizes inclusivity, some problems arise because of our adding '-ism' to our tribes; 
381 Ibid., p. 2. 
382 Ibid. p. 69 
383 Charles Jarmon (1999), "Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa in a review," Canadian 
Review of Studies in Nationalism, 26. 
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when we begin to think that we are better than others; or when we decide to blame our 
own shortcomings on imaginary actions against our own tribes. 
For example, in Namibia, the government had invested a considerable amount of 
development funds in the Caprivi region, and there was a higher percentage of Caprivians 
in the civil service than the proportion of their population in the country would have 
warranted, but Mr Muyongo led an aborted rebellion there, alleging that Caprivi was 
being discriminated against. 
Mr Muyongo's action could only be explained by the fact that he, having been a member 
of the 'ruling' elite during the colonial era, was not happy with being just in the 
opposition in independent Namibia. To vent his own frustration at not having support, he 
used his tribe or region, alleging that 'we' were excluded. However, when these same 
politicians are successful, they are successful not because of their tribe but on their own 
merit. Success is always in terms of'!' but personal failure is attributed to the tribe 
having been discriminated against. 
At the practical level, we need to acknowledge that ethnicity is a fact and is not going to 
go away. "To say that the revival of nationalism is merely a self-deluding, irrational 
response to circumstance does not diminish the fact that it is a reality, and it is a 
dangerously misleading approach simply to demonize it.,,384 Not recognizing this reality 
has often resulted in great turmoil. Demonising ethnicity, for example, resulted in the 
massacre of the Jews, of the Tutsis, and of the Kurds. Recognizing the strengths of 
diversity on the other hand encourages a sense of inc1usivity, and a desire to find means 
to resolve conflicts. Leaders of Africa fighting against colonialism recognized this fact. 
They sought to be inclusive under the umbrella of nationalism within the confines of the 
colonial state.385 However, in the post-colonial era, "striving to transform colonial 
territories into national territories, they would find Africa's wealth of ethnic cultures both 
384 Nairns, "Demonizing Nationalism", p. 78. 
385 H. Seton-Watson (1977), Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of 
Nationalis, London, Methuen, p.332. 
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distracting and hard to absorb into their schemes. They would fall back into the colonial 
mentality of regarding it as 'tribalism', and, as such, retrogressive.,,386 
This failure to absorb ethnic diversity in the independent state's scheme of things cannot 
itself be a justification for treating ethnic loyalties as retrogressive. More often than not, 
there are other factors that play on ethnicity. "The glib use of the blanket term 
nationalism [read tribalism] obscures the range of factors - economic, historical, social-
that vary from case to case. Economic dislocation can make populations ripe for the kind 
of scaremongering, scapegoating and xenophobia that some leaders employ in a bid to 
gain political power.,,387 The challenge for Africa is therefore to contain the exploitation 
of ethnicity for re-traditionalizing the African societies by tribal politics.388 
Each one of these factors, colonial heritage, weaknesses of institutions, lack of 
commitment to openness and democracy, desire for control, and unfettered political 
ambition, has implications for the process of state formation. How the politicians address 
the challenges thrown up by these factors will determine the future of the state in Africa. 
State Formation in Namibia 
It is against this background of African experience that Namibians started the process of 
state formation in independent Namibia. Many 'nations' existed before the colonization 
of the territory, but the final territorial shape of the state was completely determined by 
successive colonial powers, as had been the case with all the African countries. In the 
case of Namibia, these boundaries were also established by the League of Nations, as the 
territory became a class "C" Mandate. 
Other factors that determined the process of state formation in Namibia were subsets of 
the colonial predicate characterized by German and South African policies of occupation, 
racism, and economic exploitation. Key racial policies that had far-reaching implications 
386 Davidson, The Black Man's Burden, p. 99. 
387 Naims, "Demonizing Nationalism," p. 78. Text within brackets mine. 
388 See, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, 
Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press. 
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for Namibia included the introduction of a 'homelands' policy, thus isolating various 
ethnic groups; a white-controlled civil service that denied blacks an opportunity to gain 
administrative positions and therefore experience; and inequity in resource allocation to 
racially and ethnically-stratified social services, such as education, health, pensions, 
etc.389 One could also argue that it was precisely these racist policies that helped people 
galvanize under SWAPO to demand an independent state. 
In 1964, the South African government sought to institutionalise apartheid in Namibia by 
accepting the recommendations of the Odendaal Plan.39o This plan, among other things, 
recommended the fragmentation of black populations into small ethnic divisions or 
'Bantustans'. In recommending the creation of Bantustans, the Odendaal Commission 
had argued that various ethnic groups harboured "strong feelings against other groups" 
and wanted their own 'homelands' (As stated earlier, this is a classic example of a myth). 
These 'homelands' were to be similar to those whose creation was recommended in 
South Africa by the 1954 Tomlinson Report.391 This report had established the Bantustan 
concept that led to the 'nominal independence' of the Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda, 
and Ciskei homelands. With few resources of their own, these entities were captive pools 
of labour for South African industries and mines. Similarly, based on the Odendaal Plan, 
South Africa had tried to create many nations in the territory of Namibia based on 
ethnicity, keeping the major part of the territory for the whites. This arrangement was 
primarily designed to create dependence instead of interdependence. Specifically, only 
30% of the land, mostly sandveld, was parcelled out to homelands.392 Subsequently, 
ethnic authorities (as against territorial authorities) were created to 'rule' these 'ethnic' 
nations. Creation of ethnic authorities not only fragmented the administration along racial 
lines but also propagated a myth that different ethnic communities didn't get along with 
each other. 
389 For details see South Africa (Republic), Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa 
Affairs, 1962-63. 
390 Ibid. 
391 South Africa (Union) (1955), Report of the Commission for the Sodo-Economic Development of the 
Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa (U.G. 6111955), Pretoria, Govt Printer. 
392 South Africa (Republic), Native Nations Act No 54 of 1968. 
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However, in reality these ethnic authorities were only a front for addressing the 'native 
question,' with most of the control remaining with the white ethnic authority, the 
Administration for Whites, which was also the central authority. At the same time, South 
Africa was working towards eventually giving 'independence' to the 'homelands' in a 
way that created client states of the white state in the territory without the latter having 
accompanying responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants of these client states. This 
ethnicity-based segregation and stratification was in fact aimed at dividing the indigenous 
population, impoverishing it and making it subservient to white interests. Contract 
workers who served in 'white areas' were not allowed to bring their families with them, 
and once their term of work ended, they were forced to return to their homelands. Blacks 
who worked on white-owned farms were treated as serfs. The end result of this policy of 
creating a cult of ethnicity was the intensification of resentments and antagonisms. 
It was in this climate that the country's aspirations for liberation were born. The struggle 
for an independent state found its roots in the inhabitants of the territory being unhappy 
with the contract-labour system. Those working on contract labour in Cape Town formed 
the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC), which became the Ovamboland People's 
Organization (OPO) to protest against contract labour. Of course, victims of this system 
were not just Ovambos but all the ethnic groups living in the territory. Thus, OPO 
represented the interests of all the people in the territory despite suggestions in certain 
quarters that OPO was strictly an ethnic organization.393 That OPO represented all 
contract workers and was a multi ethnic organization was best illustrated by the fact that 
its constitution was drafted by Mr Emil Apollus, an Orlaam who was brought up in the 
Nama culture. Nevertheless, in order to correct any misconception, OPO was rechristened 
on 19 April 1960 as South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to represent all 
the N amibians. 
393 See Peter Katjavivi, "The Development of Anti-colonial Forces in Namibia," in Wood (ed.), Namibia: 
1884-1984, pp. 557-584. 
164 
In retrospect, one finds that dynamism in the struggle for the liberation of the territory 
was to await the emergence of SWAPO, and more significantly, the vision of Messrs Sam 
Nujoma, Fanuel Kozonguizi and Mburumba Kerina. However, Mr Nujoma outclassed 
and outlasted the other two. In fact, it was not until he came on the scene that we had an 
extraordinary personage to fight for the rights ofNamibians in a racist society. Until then 
the focus of SWAPO's predecessors was either regional interests or improvement in the 
conditions of work of contract workers. 
With the birth of SWAPO, the Namibian people's focus shifted to a broader canvas of 
self-determination and independence not just of the Ovambos or the Hereros or the 
Damaras, but of the whole territory known as Namibia, and all the people inhabiting it. 
The creation of SWAPO as a nationalist movement was thus the first attempt at forging a 
new relationship between various people of the territory. The composition of the 
executive committee of the liberation movement also showed a clear shift away from that 
of earlier ethnic parties. Although members of the central committee of SWAPO served 
on this committee by virtue of their competence, the leadership was not unaware of the 
importance of a balanced representation of different population groups within its 
structures. 394 
394 The composition of SWAPO illustrates that, even during the struggle, it was representative of all the 
Namibian people. The line up of the leadership of SWAPO during the early years 1969 - 70 was as follows: 
President was Mr Sam Nujoma, who is an Ovambo from a small group known as Okandjera; National 
Chairman was Mr M. Kerina and was later on followed by Mr D. Meroro, both Hereros; Secretary General 
was Mr Ismael Fortune, a coloured, who was replaced by Mr J. Kuhangwa, an Ovambo; Information 
Secretary was Mr E. Appolus, an Orlaam; Administrative Secretary was Mr M. Garoeb, a Damara; and 
Organizing Secretary was Mr Hage Geingob, a Damara. Similarly, in independent Namibia, line up of the 
leadership in the SWAPO government and other government institutions was as follows: President, Mr 
Sam Nujoma, an Ovambo; Prime Minister, Mr Hage Geingob, a Damara; Deputy Prime Minister, Mr 
Hendrik Witbooi, a Nama; Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Mose Tjitendero, a Herero; Deputy 
Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Z. Kameeta, a Herero, then replaced by Rev. Kandjore, a 
NamalHerero; Chairman of the National Council, Mr C. Nehova, an Ovambo; Deputy Chairman Mr M. 
Mensha, a coloured; Chief Justice, Mr J. Strydom, an Afrikaner; Judge President, Mr T. Peek, a Herero; 
Ombudswoman, Ms B. Gawanas, a Damara; Auditor General, Mr F. Tjingaete, a Herero; Vice Chancellor, 
Dr Peter Katjavivi, a Herero. However, majority of the ministers as well as permanent secretaries in the 
civil service are Ovambo speaking because Ovambo speaking Namibians constitute the majority of the 
population. Further, and somewhat worrisome is the fact that Namibia's security institutions are not 
properly balanced because of historical reasons. 
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Transition to Independence 
As described in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, Namibians' struggle under the 
leadership of SWAPO at international fora, at home, and on the battlefront resulted in 
Namibia becoming independent on 21 March 1990. 
However, the occasion of handing over the instruments of power to the new government 
provided its own procedural, diplomatic and security challenges. As the chairman of the 
Independence Committee, I had last minute discussions with the SWAPO leaders on 
various issues. They were unanimously of the opinion that South African presence in 
Namibia was illegal, and therefore the illegal regime should have no role in handing over 
the instruments of power. Consequently, it was decided that the United Nations Secretary 
General should swear in the president and by so doing confer independence on Namibia. 
However, being worried about security on that day and not knowing what the South 
Africans might do, I proposed that we invite Mr De Klerk to the independence 
celebrations. My argument was that having Mr De Klerk at the ceremony would 
guarantee security, as South Africans would not sabotage the celebrations attended by 
their own president. Some members of the committee opposed my proposal but 
eventually accepted it. 
As a result of this decision, we were faced with two new problems. After we 
communicated our decision to the South Africans, they were happy with the invitation 
but were concerned that their president's status would be compromised. They feared that 
he might be booed and humiliated when speaking. We gave them our assurance that our 
people would not embarrass him in any way, as he was there on the invitation of their 
own leaders. Frankly, we were not sure that the masses would behave in the manner we 
had hoped they would, but the South Africans accepted our assurance. Fortunately, 
nothing happened on that day to embarrass the new government. 
The second problem was with the Frontline States. When I informed their representatives 
that we had invited Mr De Klerk to independence celebrations, they were deeply 
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disappointed. Representatives of the Frontline States felt betrayed -- How could SWAPO 
create a situation to compromise their position when they had supported SWAPO all 
along! In order to diffuse this situation, I met with Mr Ami Mpungwe, who later became 
the high commissioner of Tanzania to South Africa and Namibia. I invoked the issue of 
sovereignty of Namibia, stating, "Comrade, we know that you have been supporting us to 
decide on our own future namely self-determination. We are now deciding on our own 
future. We, as sovereign people, have decided to invite Mr De Klerk." For me, this was 
indeed a sad moment, because we had to disagree with our frontline supporters at this 
most significant moment. Of course, in line with their principled stand, they refused to 
attend the pre-independence banquet hosted by Administrator General Pienaar, but they 
did attend independence celebrations. 
Namibia got its independence not exactly at twelve o'clock midnight, but about twenty 
minutes after midnight. But everyone 'stopped' their watches, as had happened in just 
about every country that gained independence, to declare Namibia independent at twelve 
midnight sharp, on 21 March 1990. President Sam Nujoma declared Namibia free 
forever. 
Work on shaping the government of independent Namibia had already been going on in 
SWAPO settlements, in its health centres, at its schools and at the United Nations 
Institute for Namibia. SWAPO's structures in exile were in fact largely an embryo of the 
government, and therefore it was easy for the ministers to operate from their offices on 
the very first day. It must also be stated that most of the civil servants inherited from the 
colonial regime were cooperative and helpful. Some of those who were hesitant were the 
ones in the white administration. Others in the so-called ethnic administrations were very 
happy. 
Besides, a delay of ten years in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 
was a blessing in disguise as it gave time to both SWAPO and the whites to prepare for 
change, although regrettably precious lives were lost during that time. During this period, 
SWAPO moderated its position on many issues in the light of the new geopolitical and 
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economic realities. Whites also made up their minds whether they accepted the change or 
not. A small number of whites who did not want to face the change left, and those who 
remained were psychologically ready to accept a black government, although many 
wished that it would not be a SWAPO government. 
Creating a Civil Service for the Independent State 
Unti11979, all public service functions in the territory were administered through South 
Africa's various government departments based in Pretoria. Personnel sections in the 
departments concerned carried out appointments, promotions, transfers, payments, and 
other administrative issues dealing with personnel. On 2 October 1979, South Africa 
opened a branch of its Public Service Commission in Windhoek, called the Central 
Personnel Institution, to create an 'independent' civil service in the territory. Government 
departments were transferred back from Pretoria to Windhoek. Exceptions were the 
Departments of National Security, External Affairs and Excise and Import Duties, as well 
as the Police, the South African Defence Force (SADF), and Railways and Harbours.395 
On 1 July 1980, the Government Service Act, 1980 (Act 2 of 1980) was promulgated by 
the then administrator general (head of the colonial government) after its adoption by the 
'National Assembly' of the occupied territory. This Act established a three-tier 
government in Namibia: the first tier to handle central government issues under the 
supervision of the administrator general; the second tier comprising eleven 'ethnic' 
governments;396 and the third tier comprising local authority administrations. The Act 
also provided for a Government Service Commission that started its work on I July 
1980.397 
All personnel who were employees of South African government departments working in 
the territory were given a choice either to take up employment in the newly created 
395 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
396 Ethnic governments were for various population groups identified in Section 3 of the Act. They were 
Basters, Bushmen, Caprivians, Coloureds, Damaras, Hereros, Kavangos, Namas, Ovambos, Tswanas, and 
Whites. Although some of these representative authorities were established nominally, most of the work 
continued to be centralized at the Administration for Whites. These structures continued until Namibia 
became independent. 
397 Dierks, Chronology ofNamibian History. 
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government service of the occupied territory or stay on as seconded personnel until such 
time as their services were no longer needed. Those opting for the latter were expected to 
go back to South Africa once their service ended. Posts not filled with South Africans 
were filled by persons recruited from within the territory. 
Although the administrator general was the head of government at that time, the 
Government Service Commission, established in terms of section 4(1) of the Government 
Service Act as an executive body, decided on the establishment or abolition of 
departments or transfer of functions; control, organization and readjustment of any 
department; number and grading of posts; number of persons to be employed; issues 
affecting economy and promoting efficiency in the management and functioning of 
departments; scales of salaries, wages or allowances; and persons to be appointed, or 
promoted. The Central Personnel Institution, established as a government department, 
functioned as the secretariat of the Government Service Commission. As the secretariat 
of the commission, it exercised all the powers of this government arrangement. Thus, for 
all practical purposes, it was the de facto administration. 
On 1 January 1989, public service employees were granted general pay increases by the 
colonial government. In addition, the Administrator General took certain actions a few 
days before Namibia was to become independent that had serious implications for the 
N · 398 d· hi b· h new government. uJoma note In s auto lOgrap y: 
As his [Administrator General's] time in the country shortened, he set about doing 
all he could to benefit those who had run the country with him during the illegal 
occupation of the apartheid South African regime, by promoting them beyond 
their proper rank, increasing their pay, and, ... transferring pension funds out of 
the country and even making it possible for officials to take out lump-sum 
pensions there and then. In the closing days of the South African colonial 
administration it became necessary for the Minister [designate] of Finance [of the 
government of independent Namibia], Dr Otto Herrigel, to dash from one bank to 
another telling managers not to honour cheques made out on instructions from the 
Administrator-General. 
398 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 438. 
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As a result of these actions of the departing colonial government, the new government 
faced numerous challenges of gaining control from the old establishment and developing 
new structures in keeping with the needs of a sovereign country. However, as mentioned 
earlier, SWAPO was well prepared to take up the responsibility of running the country on 
the day of independence. The United Nations Institute for Namibia had already worked 
out the offices, ministries and agencies that would be needed by the independent 
country.399 Based on this work, specific recommendations for new offices, ministries and 
agencies were made in the Report of the Committee on the Restructuring of the Public 
S . 400 ervlce. 
Immediately after the country became independent, the president, by Proclamation 3 of 
1990, amended the Government Service Act by, inter alia, abolishing government 
departments and creating new offices, ministries and agencies in line with the provisions 
of the Constitution of independent Namibia as recommended by the Committee on the 
Restructuring of the Public Service. This proclamation also established a national civil 
service for the country. By the same proclamation, functions, duties and responsibilities 
of the Central Personnel Institution were transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
At the same time, a new Public Service Commission was constituted in accordance with 
the Public Service Commission Act (Act 6 of 1990). 
Subsequently, the process of regrouping the administrative departments and collapsing 
ethnic administrations into new offices and ministries began. The government also started 
actively pursuing the policy of affirmative action to bring into the civil service those who 
had been left out of the civil service because of their skin colour. 
As a result of the speed with which the new public service was created, and new 
personnel recruited and posted, a great deal of structural arbitrariness had crept into the 
399 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and 
Development, Chapter 21. 
400 Namibia (1990), Report of the Committee on the Restructuring of the Public Service, mimeo., 
(Chairman: Hage G. Geingob). As I was occupied elsewhere, the report was presented by Dr Mose 
Tjitendero). 
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system.401 Further, the creation of new offices, ministries and agencies,402 new 
recruitments, and the constitutional provision (Article 141) that "any person holding 
office under any law in force on the date of independence shall continue to hold such 
office unless and until he or she resigns or is retired, transferred or removed from office 
in accordance with law,,403 resulted in considerable expansion in the size of the civil 
service. This growth in the size of the civil service put unsustainable fiscal strain on the 
state. In order to correct this situation it was necessary to streamline the structures, put 
right people in right jobs, and eventually right-size the civil service.404 
Therefore, in 1992, the Office of the Prime Minister began the process of restructuring 
··1 . c. . th c. 11 . 405 the CIVl servIce 10cusmg on e 10 owmg: 
1. making the civil service representative of the diversity in population; 
2. curtailing the size of the civil service to ensure that it did not put constraint on the 
budget to the extent that the government's ability to invest in goods and services, 
and capital projects was curtailed; 
3. ensuring that the civil service was manned by competent, skilled and dedicated 
personnel; 
4. the introduction of mechanisms for performance evaluation of the senior civil 
service personnel; and 
5. various government offices, ministries and agencies defining their goals and 
setting targets against which the performance of civil service personnel could be 
measured. 
When undertaking the task of restructuring the civil service, the Office of the Prime 
Minister had to be mindful of the fact that experiences of many other countries that had 
replicated colonial administration had not been all that promising. In some of these 
countries, administration continued to be dominated by the group that was favoured by 
401 Geingob, "From Colonialism to Freedom and Democracy." 
402 These offices, ministries and agencies included Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the National Planning Commission, and Office of the 
Ombudsman. 
403 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 141(1). 
404 These days calls are being made by SWAPO Youth League that right people be put in right jobs. For the 
Youth League, "right people" means SWAPO members. If such a situation becomes a reality, it would be a 
retrogressive step because government must represent and be seen to represent all Namibians, not just 
SWAPO members. Right people are those who are loyal to the government of the day. See Chrispin 
Inambao, "Youth League Exhorted to Keep Pushing for 'Jobs for Comrades,'" The Namibian (10 June 
2002). 
40S Geingob, "From Colonialism to Freedom and Democracy." 
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the colonial administration. However, Namibia had the advantage of having to rebuild the 
civil service because inherited ethnic structures were completely unacceptable. 
Civil service restructuring is, of course, not a new concept. Many countries have sought 
to carry out refonn of civil service bureaucracies as there is ample evidence across a 
range of countries that well-functioning bureaucracies can promote growth and reduce 
poverty through sound policy inputs and delivery of critical public goods and services at 
least COSt.406 In the last few decades, emphasis on refonns has, however, been varied. 
Refonns pursued in the 1980s were primarily concerned with addressing fiscal concerns 
arising from overstaffing and unsustainable wage bills. Later on, emphasis was on 
facilitating policy agility in government and ensuring that policies were implemented. 
More recently, refonns have focused on improving operational efficiency and service 
quality.407 Namibia needed to emphasize and integrate all of these refonn initiatives. 
The first stage of the restructuring exercise involved the staff of the Office of the Prime 
Minister determining the existing situation in and responsibilities of various offices, 
ministries and agencies, followed by making recommendations on staff contingent and 
reallocation of personnel - all in consultation with various offices, ministries and 
agencies. In addition, personnel offices were established in all offices, ministries and 
agencies to coordinate personnel issues with the new Public Service Commission. An 
essential element of the mandate of the staff of the Office of the Prime Minister was that 
in carrying out the restructuring exercise they must not touch political offices, and no 
attempt should be made at speculating the future of any political office. 
Subsequently, the report of the restructuring/rationalization study408 was presented to the 
cabinet at its Swakopmund meeting of 14 and 15 December 1992. As the report was 
produced in record time, I, as the prime minister, could not review it before its 
406 World Bank (1997), World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, New York, 
Oxford Univ. Press, p. 79. 
407 Navin Girishankar and Nick Manning (2000), "Strategies and Sequencing in Public Sector Reform," 
paper submitted to the World Bank on 12 October 2000, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/ 
civilservice/strategies.htm, accessed 3 January 2003. 
408 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister (1992), Rationalization of the Civil Service, Windhoek, Office of 
the Prime Minister. 
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submission to the cabinet. In fact, other members of cabinet also did not get an 
opportunity to go over the report prior to the meeting. Therefore, at the start of the 
meeting, I made it a point to mention that the report had not been reviewed by anyone, 
and errors and omissions could be expected. 
Almost immediately after the meeting started, it became apparent that the staff members 
responsible for the report had not taken heed of the instructions about political offices. 
The report contained specific recommendations about the merger or elimination of 
certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Labour, and the 
Ministry of Trade and IndUStry. This situation resulted in alienating many of the cabinet 
members who were to decide on the future of the report. Had I not forewarned the 
president and then the cabinet members at the start of the meeting about errors and 
omissions, the cabinet would have completely scrapped the civil service reform initiative. 
However, the crisis was averted, and the cabinet began examining the report's findings. 
The cabinet recognised that steps needed to be taken to stem any further expansion of the 
public service and the related expenditure, to improve the performance of the civil 
service, and to address the issue of duplication of functions among government bodies. In 
order to address these issues, the cabinet resolved that (1) each office, ministry or agency 
should undertake its own rationalization exercise, taking into account the work already 
done in this area; (2) all vacant posts other than teaching posts should be frozen; and (3) 
no post should be activated without the express authority of the Prime Minister in 
I · 'hhT 409 consu tabon WIt t e reasury. 
Again, on 2 November 1993, the cabinet dealt with the issue of the size and cost of the 
civil service in the context of the budget deficit. It decided that civil service should be 
rationalized so as to reduce the cost of personnel expenditure to 40% or less of the 
budget.41o This concern with the deficit also prompted the cabinet to decide in February 
409 Namibia (1995), Report of the Wage and Salary Commission (November 1995) (Windhoek, Govt. of 
Namibia, Paragraph 2.22. 
410 Ibid. Paragraph 2.23. 
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1994 to deregulate, commercialise or privatise some of the non-core functions carried out 
by the civil service. 
However, in all these areas progress was slow for various reasons. Primary reason for this 
slow progress was that the President had let it be known that he did not want to "rock the 
boat" and that each ministry would be responsible for the restructuring and rationalization 
of its own operations. In my view, making each office, ministry and agency responsible 
for its own rationalization was a serious mistake, because it sought only to appease those 
who were afraid that their ministries might be shrunk or even declared redundant. 
Consequently, the process of rationalization and its coordination by the Office of the 
Prime Minister lost direction, and the size of the civil service grew. 
In spite of the fact that there was agreement that large civil service was untenable, many 
actions of the ministries and extraneous issues resulted in the growth of the civil service 
and growth of expenditure on the civil service as a percentage of the budget. For instance, 
1. Ministries demanded more staff for the decentralization of their activities. 
2. Coming into force of the new Labour Act in 1992 brought new elements into the 
restructuring process, such as the role of trade unions, and increase of benefits of 
civil service staff members. 
3. The need for the government to address the unemployment problem faced by the 
demobilized PLAN cadres and other unemployed youth resulted in the 
recruitment of some 10 000 Namibians into civil service. In other words, the 
maintenance of peace required that the government become, at least temporarily, 
employer oflast resort. 
4. The absence of quality data on the size of the civil service, the labour market, and 
the economy (micro as well as macro) added to the complexity of the problem. 
These were serious constraints on the rationalization exercise. As Girishankar and 
Manning411 point out, only about a third of the countries succeeded in achieving 
satisfactory outcomes of civil service reform and some could not sustain outcomes 
411 Girishankar and Manning, "Strategies and Sequencing in Public Sector Reform." 
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despite their being desirable. However, they note that comprehensive civil service 
refonns "seem to work in middle income and transitional countries where governments 
are motivated by arrangements that enable citizens, particularly the poor to express their 
preferences and to hold public officials accountable for translating these preferences into 
results." They also identified four factors associated with the poor track record of many 
countries as follows: 
1. Quality of data on civil servIce perfonnance was poor and inconsistent. 
Standardized indicators were neither fully developed nor operationalised for 
monitoring and evaluation. 
2. Capacity building efforts were overly based on wage enhancements. They did not 
look sufficiently at the incentives provided in other arrangements, including the 
significance of job security and pension prospects. 
3. Refonns were technocratic as they assumed that the introduction of fonnal rules 
would be sufficient to change behaviour. Participatory processes to nurture refonn 
constituencies in government, the private sector, and civil society were largely 
absent. 
4. Refonns did not balance choices with labour market realities - focusing for 
example on budget scenarios without also looking at how salary levels could 
affect projected demand for civil service jobs. 
These factors were also present in the civil service prior to and during the first few years 
after Namibia became independent. In order to address these issues, the Office of the 
Prime Minister established a Wage and Salary Commission on 18 January 1995. Some of 
its tenns of reference included 412 
1. studying and analysing the existing and proposed remuneration policy of the 
public service, labour markets from which personnel must be recruited, salaries 
and wages paid in the private sector, government fiscal policy, the current macro-
economic environment as well as the macro-economic development objectives, all 
the relevant policies and laws, and other related matters; 
412 Namibia, Report of the Wage and Salary Commission. 
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2. consulting public service trade unions, pennanent secretaries and interest groups; 
and 
3. drafting a remuneration policy for the public service in tenns of which salaries in 
the public service can be developed and maintained. 
The commission began its work by collecting and analysing data. As time series on most 
of the data were not available,413 trends were hard to establish. Quality of data even on 
the size of the civil service was suspect. As per the available figures, at the time of 
independence, there were 46 651 posts on the establishment, of which 42 562 were 
filled.414 This number did not include defence force personnel and some of the police 
force and other civil service personnel who had gone back to South Africa. The defence 
force personnel were, of course, members of the South Africa Defence Force and were 
therefore not a part of the Namibian civil service during the colonial era. Others, e.g., 
some of the police force members and some civil service staff members, were seconded 
to Namibia from the South African civil service. They, too, were not reflected in civil 
service numbers. 
subsequently, by the end of 1991, with the creation of new offices, ministries and 
agencies and with the promotion of affinnative action, another 15 000 posts were created 
and filled. By 1995/96, according to the State Revenue Fund Estimate,41S the number of 
authorized posts had risen to 78 038 and posts filled were 62 777. However, figures about 
posts filled were suspect. The Wage and Salary Commission's report416 pointed out that 
comparison between the staff-in-post return and payroll infonnation showed considerable 
discrepancy. On one occasion, a difference of some 4000 posts was discovered. Reasons 
were many. For instance, the Ministry of Health had included in its returns the staff of 
mission hospitals, which were grant-aided institutions but were not part of the civil 
service. Payroll printouts were also inaccurate as they included some of the names more 
413 Prior to independence, most ofNamibian data was subsumed in South African data. In other cases, base 
had changed (e.g., prior to independence working age was 10 years and above, but soon after Namibia 
became independent, the age was raised to 14 years and above). 
414 Namibia, Report of the Wage and Salary Commission. 
415 Namibia, Ministry of Finance (1995), State Revenue Fund Estimate 1995/96, Windhoek, Ministry of 
Finance. 
416 Namibia, Report of the Wage and Salary Commission, Paragraph 3.10. 
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than once, e.g., once for salary, again for outstanding car or housing loan. In addition, 
there were instances where the civil servants who had left the civil service continued to 
appear on payroll printouts because they still had outstanding loans.417 
Furthermore, authorized posts were nowhere near the staff-in-post. The budget (1995/96) 
made provision for 68912 posts when the payroll figure was only 62 777. Consequently, 
expenditure on personnel as a percentage of the budget was considerably overstated. 
During 1999 and 2000 there was also considerable pressure on the government to address 
the unemployment problem. Many of the unemployed were those who were in exile 
during the liberation struggle. In order to address this problem, the government requested 
the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security (CCDS), chaired by me, to establish a 
Technical Committee of the Security Committee with the mandate to review the overall 
unemployment situation of ex-PLAN fighters. This committee began the process of 
review on the basis of a paper submitted by me, entitled "The Peace Plan." Under this 
plan, there was comprehensive registration of unemployed PLAN cadres. These cadres 
were to be issued identity papers. 
The plan was supported by the cabinet, but was nearly scuttled because the president was 
misled about the cost of the process of registration of the former fighters. The president 
was about to recall all the permanent secretaries working on the technical committee. 
These permanent secretaries, as former commanders of PLAN, were keys to the success 
of the process. 
This development transpired, when I was out of the country. On my return, I took the 
matter to the cabinet and asked the ministers whether they would like the process to be 
continued or abandoned. All of them agreed that the process of registration should 
continue. Subsequently, the process was successfully completed with the civil service 
hiring 10 000 unemployed cadres. This initiative turned out to be a peace plan in reality; 
417 Ibid., Paragraphs 3.10, 3.12, 3.13 
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for a possibility that they would have grabbed land, as had happened in Zimbabwe, could 
not be ruled out. 
Because of various reasons already outlined above, by the end of 1999, the number of 
civil service staff-in-post had risen to 69 060. Breakdown of this number was as 
foUOWS:
418 
• Number of civil servants (excluding teachers and security forces): 29152 
• Teachers: 25 308 
• Security personnel (including defence and police force): 14000 
Of course there are no hard and fast rules for deciding the optimal wage scales for the 
civil service. "The correct framework is a level of pay consistent with the operation of a 
motivated and professional public service at a scale the country can afford on a sustained 
financing basis.'.419 Similarly, there is no prescribed matrix for determining the size of the 
civil service. Comparisons with GDP and population are useful only as guides to 
judgement. Radwan420 suggests that on a very tentative basis, the following measures 
could be considered: 
1. Public sector wage bill as percentage of GDP. For most countries this figure 
varies between 10% and 25%, with a shift towards the lower end if the 
government is not involved in any big way in the country's economy. 
2. Number of government employees as percentage of total population. This figure 
can give an idea of the extent to which the government is acting as an 'employer 
of last resort.' For instance, breakdown of the numbers might indicate that the 
government has taken on large numbers of civil servants in the lowest grades on 
meagre wages. These are often the most unproductive government employees, but 
the extent of such a problem will not be immediately apparent by examining the 
wage bill alone. 
3. Number of government employees as percentage of total employment. This 
matrix is similar to the preceding one except that it corrects for developing 
countries that have a relatively high proportion of children in the population, 
leading to a relatively low public servant to population ratio. 
4. Public sector wage bill as percentage of total public sector spending. If this ratio 
rises over 25%, governments risk reducing their effectiveness by squeezing non-
418 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister (2000), Namibia: A Decade of Peace, Democracy and Prosperity 
1990-2000, Windhoek. Office of the Prime Minister, p. 51. 
419 Ismail Radwan, "Administrative and Civil Service Reform: Common Problems," paper submitted to the 
World Bank on 8 June 2000, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/common.htm. accessed 
3 January 2003. 
420 Ibid. 
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wage expenditure such as goods and services, maintenance, and capital 
expenditure. 
5. Average government wages compared to per capita GDP. A larger number of 
dependents and low standards of living imply that this ratio will tend to be larger 
in developing than developed countries. However, this does not mean that 
government employees are overpaid. 
6. Recruitment growth rates. When government recruitment grows faster than GDP, 
revenue or population growth rate, either financial stability (growing deficits) or 
future performance (through reduced wages or reduced non-wage expenditure) 
will be jeopardized. 
7. Military spending. Governments that spend a larger proportion of their budget on 
the military sector are likely to jeopardise future development objectives. 
In December 1999, public service wage bill of Namibia as percentage ofGDP was 21%. 
The proportion of core civil service wage bill (excluding teachers and security forces) of 
Namibia as percentage of government budget was 22.57%.421 However, this figure was 
above 50% ifteachers and security forces were considered as part of the civil service. 
The size of the civil service (excluding teachers and security forces) as percentage of 
population was 1.8%. When teachers and security forces were considered as part of the 
civil service, this figure rose to 4.26%. For the whole of civil service, recruitment growth 
rate was rather high with an annual growth rate of 4.96%. However, after initial 
recruitment of 15 000 civil servants in 1990, a substantial portion of whom were recruited 
in security forces, annual growth rate of civil service had been just 1.82% -- lower than 
GDP, revenue or population growth rates. 
With the exception of the public service wage bill as a percentage of government 
expenditure, all other parameters were within reasonable limits suggested by Radwan as 
mentioned above. As regards the public service wage bill, a significant part of this 
problem lay in the fact that government had been the employer of last resort for a 
substantial number of civil service staff members. For instance, in 1995, the number of 
civil servants in the lowest three salary bands was 93.1 % of the total. Even the lowest two 
bands accounted for 69% of the civil servants. The lowest band that included unskilled 
421 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister, Namibia, p. 52. 
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workers, such as cleaners and gardeners, accounted for 42.5% of civil servants.422 In the 
short tenn, this situation could only be resolved with the creation of labour-intensive jobs 
in the private sector or the privatisation of labour-intensive activities, such as 
maintenance of buildings, cleaning services, and lawn/garden maintenance. 
Shortage of experienced workforce in the country has also constrained the government in 
its effort to build quality civil service. One challenge for the government, as in many 
other countries, has been the difficulty in attracting, motivating and retaining high quality 
employees. In order to meet this challenge, the government needed to pay particular 
attention to designing recruitment and training programmes that could address this 
constraint. 423 
Education is certainly the most important component for the development of skills. The 
government realized this fact not only within the context of the civil service, but in the 
broader context of improving the lives of the people in every respect. Overcoming the 
educational deficit created by the Bantu education system needed considerable 
investment over a long period of time. As a first step, primary education was emphasized, 
and by the end of 2002, of all the children who should be in school, 97% were in school. 
Enrolment in secondary schools had also grown steadily. At the tertiary education level 
(University of Namibia, Polytechnic of Namibia, and colleges of education), enrolment 
had gone up from 4731 in 1990 to 10 212 in 1999. Enrolment in vocational training 
centres also saw significant increases from 174 in 1992 to 1151 in 1999. By 1999, tertiary 
institutions (excluding vocational training centres) were graduating 2300 students 
annually, with one-third of them being teachers.424 These figures, though far better than 
those prevailing at the time of independence, indicate a rather small base from which the 
civil service as well as the private sector attempt to recruit. The civil service also has to 
compete with the private sector for the best candidates. 
422 Namibia, Report of the Wage and Salary Commission, Paragraph 3.15. 
423 Linda Van Gelder (1999), "Administrative and Civil Service Reform: Staffing in Countries with Limited 
Human Resources," paper submitted to the W orId Bank on 14 July 1999, 
http://wwwl.worIdbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/limitedrecruit.htm. accessed 3 January 2003. 
424 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister, Namibia, pp. 173-176. 
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As the ultimate objective of rationalization and restructuring is to build a competent civil 
service committed to serving all Namibians, mechanisms were developed so that only 
those who met the highest standard were recruited and promoted in the public service. 
With these mechanisms for recruitment and promotion strictly on merit, the system was 
immunized against too much political say or patronage.42S However, it is recognized that 
there would always be some element of nepotism, but if meritocracy were not 
compromised, it would not threaten the maintenance of high standards.426 
Introduction of this concept of meritocracy to control the baser, biologically-wired 
tendencies of nepotism was seen as vital, because the executive recognized that 
inefficiencies in many countries' public services often emanated from treating public 
service positions as jobs for friends and relatives. For instance, in Namibia, prior to 
independence, all high-level civil service positions were reserved for the privileged 
whites. There was little emphasis on the qualifications of a person. What mattered most 
was the colour of the skin. In fact, a majority of white civil servants had only high school 
diplomas. 
The government of independent Namibia changed that situation. In order that qualified 
blacks were not left out of the system because of their lack of experience, the new 
recruitment policy emphasized training and education more than experience. I used to say 
in those early days that one could not possibly gain experience when one was excluded, 
as was the case during the apartheid era. One can gain experience only when one is given 
425 The Wage and Salary Commission had, in fact, recommended that the Public Service Act should be 
amended to stipulate that civil servants would not become members of any political party. As 
implementation of this recommendation could easily be challenged in a court of law, the Office of the 
prime Minister sought legal opinions from the United Kingdom and the United States on the best method of 
addressing the issue. According to these legal opinions, in the United Kingdom the management staff 
cannot participate in politics because they deal with policy issue, others can participate. In the United 
States, all civil service staff are prohibited from participating actively in politics. However, in Namibia 
because of Article 17 everyone is enjoined to participate in political activity but management cadres have 
been prohibited to contest for political office. Based on information obtained and extensive discussions, the 
cabinet decided that anyone in the civil service staff could join political parties and contest elections, but 
the managerial staff may not contest elections without first going on leave for campaigning. If successful 
in elections, the staff member must resign from the civil service position. If unsuccessful, he/she can 
continue to hold his post. This arrangement has so far worked well. 
426 See, for instance, Adam Bellow (2003), In Praise of Nepotism: A Natural History (New York, 
Doubleday, Introduction. 
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a chance. That is why I used to joke in 1991 that I was the most experienced prime 
minister, although I was in office for just one year. There was no training to become a 
prime minister. Being on the job gave me the necessary experience. 
In order to promote meritocracy, recruitment to even the highest civil service positions is 
carried out on a competitive basis. Posts are advertised in the national media. 
Introduction of performance evaluation and measurability, and accountability at both 
individual and organization levels also ensure that the public service does not sanction 
mediocrity. Finally, the government's objective is to appoint permanent secretaries for a 
fixed term with the letter of appointment specifying the targets that must be met. This 
could, however, be done only after the ministries became focused on outcomes and 
targets, and the government has developed an integrated approach for supporting the 
meeting of targets. After all, what is the point of setting targets if the treasury is unable to 
provide the necessary resources for meeting these targets! 
The government had also established the Wage and Salary Commission to review wages 
and salaries as well as conditions of service so that the best people could be attracted to 
the civil service. The commission recommended various changes in a number of areas 
that were endorsed by cabinet as its central initiatives. The focus of the initiatives was to 
take appropriate actions to right size the civil service and establish a 2% growth rate cap 
on expenditure on personnel. Altogether the commission had made 54 recommendations 
dealing with pay policy and pay levels, downsizing of public service, management 
support, and the Labour Act. By 2002, thirty-nine of the recommendations had been 
implemented. Salaries and wages within the civil service were made competitive with the 
private sector. As a result, by 1999, the government had been able to recruit qualified, 
competent, and dedicated civil servants for senior posts. 
The new policy of recruitment also sought to promote equity within the framework of 
affirmative action provisions of the constitution. By 1999, some 95% of civil service 
employees were the ones who belonged to disadvantaged groups during the apartheid era. 
The ratio of men to women also improved from 72:27 in 1992 to 45:55 in 1999. Thus, in 
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1999, women were a majority in the civil service. At the management level, too, progress 
had been made. During the colonial era, women were a rarity at this level, but by 1999, 
18% of the managers in Namibia's civil service were women. This was still not 
satisfactory, but progress continued to be made on this front. At non-management levels, 
the ratio of men to women was 8:10.427 Composition of the civil service was beginning to 
reflect the population mix at large. 
Restructuring the public service could not by itself increase effectiveness. In order to 
emphasize good management practices, it was decided to introduce performance 
measurement mechanisms and to train public service personnel. Performance 
measurement emphasized results and effectiveness and not just process and efficiency. 
As Osbom428 points out, there is a vast difference between measuring process and 
measuring results. Outputs do not guarantee outcomes. For instance, the university may 
graduate a large number of students, but if they cannot be placed satisfactorily, what good 
is the output? 
In order to support an outcome orientation, different ministries' structures were critically 
examined with a view to enhancing the integration of their activities. For instance, there 
were at least five ministries or departments that had been engaged in employment 
generation activities through small enterprises - Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Youth 
and Sport, Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing, Ministry of Trade 
and Industry and the Department of Women's Affairs. To coordinate their efforts, a 
Cabinet Committee on Social Issues was created. 
In 1997, the Office of the Prime Minster also introduced the General Principles of the 
Public Service Charter to emphasize service to the public.429 The General Principles 
focus on: 
• Identification of service standards that the public expects; 
427 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister, Namibia, p. 52. 
428 David Osbom (1993), Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the 
Public Sector, New York, Penguin. 
429 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister (1997), Public Service Charter, Windhoek, Office of Prime 
Minister. 
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• Courteous service; 
• Ready availability of infonnation; 
• Non-discrimination; 
• Consultation; 
• Value-for-money in service provision to the public; and lastly 
• Transparency and accountability in service provision to the public. 
The objective of introducing the charter was to stress that the public servIce 
430 
employees: 
• worked for better quality in the delivery of services; 
• made sure that everyone was told what kind of service they could expect to 
receive; and 
• made sure that people knew what to do if something went wrong. 
Concurrently with the introduction of the Public Service Charter, standards were being 
created to provide quality service with minimum delay. 
The government also re-examined its budgetary processes and introduced budgeting for a 
period longer than one year. Earlier, at the end of each year, many offices and ministries 
would go on a spending spree to ensure that they spent the monies allocated to them. If 
they did not spend their allocations, they lost them, or, worse still, had their allocations 
for the next year reduced. Such an approach was obviously counterproductive. The 
government therefore introduced the Medium Tenn Expenditure Framework with a three-
year rolling budget. Capital projects were also funded for the life of the project instead of 
annually. This new approach, it was hoped, would help promote effective planning. 
Various initiatives for restructuring the civil service were carried out by the Public 
Service Commission and its secretariat, Department of Public Service Management with 
its directorates of human resource management and human resource development, and 
the Efficiency and Charter Unit. 
430 The objective of the Charter is similar to that of the British Citizens' Charter. 
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By Public Service Act (Act 13 of 1995), the Public Service Commission was 
reconstituted as a recommendatory body instead of an executive body. By this act, the 
commission is mandated to advise the president and the government on the following:431 
1. the appointment of suitable persons to specified categories of employment in the 
public service with special regard to the balanced structuring thereof; 
2. the exercise of adequate disciplinary control over such persons in order to assure 
fair administration of personnel policy; 
3. the remuneration and the retirement benefits of any such persons; and 
4. all other matters which by law pertain to the public service. 
In addition, its mandate includes recommendations to the pnme minister on 
appointments, promotions, transfers on probation, transfer and secondment of staff 
members, retention of staff members after retirement age additional to the establishment, 
retirement and discharge of staff members, suspension of staff members, appointment of 
persons additional to fixed establishment and other specific matters related to conditions 
of service. The Public Service Commission also considers appeals from public service 
staff members who are aggrieved by any of the decisions of the government. 
The commission reports to the parliament annually. As none of the commission members 
is a member of parliament, its report is tabled by the prime minister. He is also 
responsible for answering any questions emanating from the report. Lately, these reports 
are being debated in the parliament, providing an opportunity to the members of 
parliament to elicit more infonnation on the functioning of the government. This practice 
started as a result of one dynamic member of opposition, Ms Nora Shimming Chase, 
springing a surprise on the prime minister in 2000 with her request to debate the report. 
As already stated, one of the challenges Namibia faced and continues to face is the 
shortage of a professional labour pool the civil service can draw on. Therefore, civil 
service had to get involved in the management of the public service that included 
431 Namibia, Public Service Commission Act (Act 6 of 1990), and Public Service Act (Act 13 of 1995). 
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initiatives for the training and empowennent of staff. The Department of Public Service 
Management was therefore tasked with the responsibility of strengthening the strategic 
and management planning capacity of government institutions, advising on value for 
money, and changing civil service culture through training and empowennent of staff. 
The department, through its Directorate of Human Resources Development has, since its 
inception in the first year after independence, focussed on training and development of all 
public service staff of Namibia. It delivers a range of training courses and workshops to 
different offices, ministries and agencies tailor-made to suit their training needs. The 
directorate also works closely with the University of Namibia's Centre for Public Service 
Training (CPST) founded in 1994. An average of 300 public service staff members, 
including many senior managers, has been trained annually by the CPST in conjunction 
with the Directorate of Human Resource Development. 
In 1999, after making an extensive senior management needs assessment in all offices, 
ministries and agencies, it was concluded that a complete job-modelling programme for 
the entire public service needed to be initiated. This programme once completed would 
be able to provide a database on job profiles and competencies needed for these specific 
jobs. Focussed and meaningful training programmes and plans could then be developed 
for each job category. This database would also be helpful in building individual career 
paths and succession plans for each post. The programme would also support the 
recruitment and selection process. 
In 1996, the cabinet also approved the establishment of an Efficiency and Charter Unit 
(ECU) within the Office of the Prime Minister as a focal point of public service refonn. 
The unit commenced its operations in June 1997. Some of the essential objectives of the 
unit are 
1. to develop charters on the principles enshrined in the Public Service 
Charter; 
2. to introduce efficiency scrutiny in all offices, ministries and agencies as 
well as to monitor the process and advise the secretary to cabinet; 
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3. to develop and solicit cabinet's support for outsourcing policy so as to 
increase organisational effectiveness; 
4. to introduce organisational perfonnance management for public servlce 
organisations by developing effective methodology for measuring 
organisational effectiveness; and 
5. to provide a routine review of progress on the Wage and Salary 
Commission recommendations as well as to provide input to the National 
Development Plan components regarding public service refonn. 
Growth of the Public Service Charter programme requires that individual customer 
service charters, relating to specific service delivery functions, be developed. The ECU 
consulted with all the pennanent secretaries within all offices, ministries and agencies to 
detennine priority areas for functional charter development. A charter programme, 
indicating fifty-nine functional areas, was drawn up. A time schedule for the completion 
of specific charters was also worked out. 
In September 1998, the ECU developed an efficiency scrutiny methodology and 
published it as a "How to ... " guide. Publication of this document was followed by 
seminars conducted by the ECU in the use of this guide. Subsequently, the ECU became 
involved in assisting offices, ministries and agencies in the development of functional 
charters covering such areas as patients, immigration, foreign missions, customs and 
excise, and primary and secondary education. The first charter, the Patients Charter, was 
launched at the end of 1998. 
The ECU also perfonned an analysis of submissions by various offices, ministries and 
agencies to the High Level Committee (committee comprising the cabinet secretary and 
all pennanent secretaries) on their core and non-core functions. This infonnation 
provided a baseline for future work on outsourcing. Seventy-three areas were identified 
that had the potential for outsourcing. However, progress was somewhat restricted 
because of lack of an agreed policy on outsourcing and because some offices, ministries 
and agencies had already started their outsourcing activities. 
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Nevertheless, the ECU continued to provide support to individual 
outsourcing/commercialisation projects, such as the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication Project (MWTC 2000)432, laboratory services, the medical stores, the 
Energy Fund, and the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. The ECU also became involved in 
the outsourcing initiatives of the government garage, the National Institute for 
Educational Development (NIED), Namibia Qualifications Authority, Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism,433 veterinary laboratories, financial institutions, agricultural 
engineering, commercial extension services and research, and rural water resources. 
As the absence of coherent and accurate data relating to all offices, ministries, and 
agencies had been a significant gap in the government infonnation system, various 
departments in the Office of the Prime Minister have been busy addressing this problem. 
Eventually, the database will need to be tested when it links to payroll. A treasury 
committee has been overseeing this facet of the database. By 2000, this data was already 
being mined to extract perfonnance data. 
In April 1999, the Office of the Prime Minister also initiated a perfonnance and 
effectiveness management programme. In the first phase, starting in September 1999, five 
ministries (Ministry of Basic Education and Culture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Health and Social Services, Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services, and Ministry 
of Higher Education, Vocational Training, Science and Technology) were targeted for a 
pilot implementation phase. This programme would, in the long term, link closely with 
the outsourcing programme, National Development Plans (NDPI and NDP2), 
perfonnance-based budgeting, and the development of strategic plans. 
432 This project dealt with the commercialisation of many of the ministry's activities, such as, road 
maintenance, and management of airports. 
433 This project's focus was the management of wildlife resources, and commercialisation of tourism 
establishments, such as Namibia Wildlife Resorts. 
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Effectiveness of the new structures depends on the executive's broad policy 
commitments and its ability to follow through on policy implementation. Four stages the 
process of policy formation and implementation goes through have been identified:434 
Stage 1: The executive sets broad policy commitments, binding it to implement a 
particular policy; 
Stage 2: Departments prepare policy and budget proposals and deliver broad 
policy commitments; 
Stage 3: The executive provides adequate budgets, removes procedural obstacles, 
and anticipates the likely reaction of external veto players (legislature, 
constitutional court); and 
Stage 4: Departments implement. 
In case broad policy commitments are infrequently implemented, or partially 
implemented, one goes through these steps to determine the causes of executive policy 
unreliability. Perhaps the executive has made unrealistic, unaffordable broad policy 
commitments; or departmental preparation of detailed policies and budgets is 
characterized by delayed, unplanned, or poor quality proposals; or maybe the executive 
does not ensure adequate budgets, remove procedural obstacles, or effectively anticipate 
veto points; or departmental implementation is characterized by delayed, poor quality, or 
unauthorized initiatives. Failures in Step 1 and Step 3 can be termed as governmental 
unreliability, and those in Steps 2 and 4, departmental unreliability at individual level 
(minister/permanent secretary) and at bureaucratic level (departmental officials).435 
In Namibia, cabinet makes broad policy commitments. However, in order to (1) ensure 
that policy is technically correct, (2) examine whether such policy has worked elsewhere, 
(3) determine whether it can be implemented, and (4) determine whether the actors that 
must adopt the policy will comply, most of the groundwork for broad policy initiatives is 
done by one of the standing committees of the cabinet. For this purpose, nine executive 
committees are in existence as follows: 
434 World Bank, "Case Studies: Policy Management Reform within the Core Executive," 
http://www 1. worldbank.orglpublicsector/ civilservice/CaseS tudiesPolicyMangement. pdf, accessed 4 
February 2003. 
435 Ibid. See also Gordon Evans and Nick Manning, "Poor Policy Management," paper submitted to the 
World Bank, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/common.htm. accessed 4 February 
2003. 
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1. Overall Policy and Priorities Cabinet Committee 
2. Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security 
3. Cabinet Committee on the Public Service 
4. Cabinet Committee on Law and Order 
5. Cabinet Committee on International Relations and Protocol 
6. Cabinet Committee on Economic Development and Parastatals 
7. Cabinet Committee on Legislation 
8. Cabinet Committee on Land and Social Issues 
9. Treasury Cabinet Committee 
Unfortunately some of the committees have never met, and as a result, one of the most 
strategic elements of good governance has been in disuse. Consequently, coordination of 
the implementation process of executive policy has been only partially successful. 
The Department of Cabinet Secretariat and Policy Analysis supports the work of the 
cabinet and its standing and ad hoc committees through professional and technical 
support, research and evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of cabinet 
decisions. Implementing offices, ministries and agencies report to the department that in 
turn reports to the cabinet on a biannual basis. This system needs to be improved to 
reduce instances of policy unreliability. Certainly, the standing cabinet committees could 
become more involved in overseeing the progress of implementation of policy. At this 
stage, primary inputs from offices, ministries and agencies are obtained by the High 
Level Committee that seems to work as a buffer between the accounting officers and the 
cabinet. This buffering reduces the accountability of the executive as well as civil service 
officials in various implementing agencies. There is therefore a disconnect between 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Promoting accountability is seen as the key to success of policy formulation and 
implementation. Of course, ministers are accountable to the cabinet on a day-to-day 
basis, to the parliament particularly during the budget session, and to the citizens during 
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the elections. Accountability of the senior civil servants should be assessed specifically 
based on outcome targets established by the executive. As already mentioned, once these 
targets are stipulated in the letters of appointment of senior civil servants, increased 
accountability could be brought to bear on them. In turn, such a development would 
encourage the executive to set realistic policy commitments and provide all the necessary 
support for successful policy implementation. 
After Namibia emerged from an apartheid colonial background, the government of 
independent Namibia has been putting into practice new initiatives, many of them learnt 
from other countries, and many drawing on the mistakes of other countries. In Chapter 
Six, some selected aspects for strengthening the state are considered, duly recognizing the 
experience of other countries. 
Conclusion 
State formation in colonial Namibia was impacted greatly by the principle of divide and 
rule as articulated in the policy of apartheid propagated by South Africa. After the 
country became independent, the new government's challenge was to replace the 
imposed apartheid institutional structures with structures that reflected the aspirations of 
the people of Namibia. Despite all the handicaps, Namibia had the advantage of starting 
with a clean slate as the apartheid edifice had to be dismantled completely. 
Additionally, because the Namibian territory was contiguous with its colonizer, and 
because of South Africa's intention of incorporating it as its fifth province, some 
infrastructure development did take place, even if for the benefit of the whites. Once 
independence was achieved, the same infrastructure including roads, banking institutions, 
hospitals, and schools were opened up for everyone, and all Namibians became the 
beneficiaries. The extent of Namibia's head start, provided by the presence of a decent 
infrastructure, becomes clear when one examines the problems faced by other countries, 
where the colonizer did not develop any infrastructure. To build on this infrastructure, 
Namibia'S priority has been to maintain it and expand it to the larger population. 
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In developing its executive and administrative institutions, Namibia has not been able to 
draw much on the 'pre-colonial' experience of its society, because the colonizers had 
extensively undermined the evolution of pre-colonial institutions. However, the 
government began the process of shaping a new society drawing on the experience of 
other countries in Africa and elsewhere - these experiences flow from the leaders of 
SWAPO, who had spent many decades outside the country in many parts of Africa and 
beyond. 
The leadership recognized that new relationships between individuals and societies 
needed to be strengthened through inc1usivity. Through its policy of reconciliation, 
balanced restructuring, and affirmative action, the government laid the foundation for 
harnessing heterogeneity. Therefore, the essence is not African states' exogenous origins, 
but how governments transform societies to emphasize statehood and give expression to 
the aspirations of a heterogeneous society. That is where Sorensen's436 contention, that 
practical experiences are important for the ways in which government is organized, 
becomes relevant. 
In Namibia, new executive and civil service structures have been established, and new 
institutions are being created to enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. It is 
a long process, but the experience of the last thirteen years has been positive. The 
outcome of this process will determine whether Namibia remains a viable state or joins 
the list of failed states. 
436 Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, p.4. 
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Chapter Six 
State Formation and Consolidation: 
Strengthening the Institutions of State 
Many forms of Government have been tried. and will be tried in this world 
of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. 
Indeed. it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government 
except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. 
Wins ton ChurchUt37 
Introduction 
Most states were fonned on an artificial basis. In Africa, people were forced together, 
separated, and divided, with cartographers drawing lines on maps, first in Berlin in 
1885,438 then in Paris in 1919, and finally after World War 11. States so created carried 
within them seeds of conflict - not only in Africa, but elsewhere too -- in the Middle 
East, in Europe, in the Balkans, and in Asia. These seeds of conflict included racial, 
ethnic and religious antagonisms, alien imposition of geopolitical 'solutions', endemic 
poverty, andlor extreme social stratification. 
These pathologies posed serious challenges to the state with predictable regularity, such 
as the Balkan wars of the last decade of the twentieth century, the crisis over Iraq (whose 
present borders resulted from Franco-British rivalries and casual mapmaking); dispute 
between Greece and Turkey; and the endless struggle between the Arabs and the Jews 
over land that each thought had been promised them.439 In Africa ethnic and religious 
conflicts resulted in numerous civil wars, e.g. in Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and in numerous other African states. Ethnic, 
437 Hansard (11 November 1947). 
438 "The Berlin Conference of 1884-85, by recognizing the existence of the 'Congo Free State', was the 
signal for France and Britain to extend their sphere of influence, preliminary to creating new colonies and 
protectorates. The boundaries between one colony and another were often drawn arbitrarily, with scant 
regard for traditional allegiance; thus, the Bakongo were split between the French Congo, the Belgian 
Congo and Angola." See, Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, 4th ed., p. 25. 
439 Richard Holbrooke, "Foreword," in MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. p. ix. 
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racial, religious and territorial conflicts resulted in what Machiavelli called 'the multitude 
not holding together. ,440 
Overcoming such pathologies requires work at national level. Reconciliation needs to be 
emphasized and fundamental reasons of conflict addressed. Many of these fundamental 
reasons are to be found in people's and groups' perceptions of being left out, and social 
and economic stratification based on race, ethnicity, and/or religion. 
A recent survey441 carried out in twelve African countries illustrates citizens' specific 
concerns and expectations, and particularly their expectations from the political and 
economic processes in their countries. In all of these countries, an overwhelming number 
of respondents felt that the government should be responsible for meeting basic needs of 
the citizens. 
Significantly, most respondents in all the countries surveyed believed that democracy 
could deliver on their expectations. They supported a populist view of democracy, 
emphasizing freedom of speech and responsiveness of the government to the needs of the 
people. Majority of the respondents in most countries were also predisposed to judging 
the performance of democracy primarily in terms of its record in improving their social 
and economic condition. Furthermore, the majority of respondents felt that their 
countries' problems were economic, with fewer than one out of three expressing any 
satisfaction with the condition of the national economy. Corruption was seen as 
pervasive. 
For the majority of respondents in Nigeria and Namibia, ethnicity was more important 
than any other group affiliation. In other countries including Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
440 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy. 
441 "Key Findings About Public Opinion in Africa," Afrobarometer Briefing Paper. No 1 (April 2002). 
Afrobarometer.org/paper&/afrobriefnol.pdf (15 October 2002). Countries surveyed included Botswana, 
Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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South Africa people thought that the government treated their group unfairly, which 
suggests that ethnicity is important for them as well.442 
In Africa, citizens' preference of socialized democracy has its root in what Osabu-Kle443 
calls consensualism. He further argues that an attempt at re-democratisation is more 
likely to succeed if it is informed by cultural context. In other words, one could say that 
democracy is not valueless. 
Democratic governments include committed socialists and proponents of free markets 
alike. In fact, discussions on the role of the government in the economy define the "left-
right" political spectrum, as we know it today. Social democrats stress the need for equity 
and social welfare as the core of the government's economic policies, and centrists and 
conservatives usually put much greater stress on the free-market economy.444 
In poor countries, the expectation of the people, and indeed their life condition, prompts 
democracies to concentrate on social elements. At the same time, social democrats, like 
their centrist and rightist counterparts, recognize that free market is the engine of 
economic growth and prosperity. However, in African countries where traditional rural 
societies coexist with industrial ones and the information age, emphasis on free market is 
viewed with suspicion because of the negative impact of capitalism on Africans' lives.44s 
Saul and Leys446 agree with this view: 
Africa south of the Sahara exists in a capitalist world, which marks and constrains 
the lives of its inhabitants at every turn, but is not of it. ... This is what explains 
why sub-Saharan Africa, with some 650 million people, over 10 percent of the 
world's population, has just 3 percent of its trade and only 1 percent of its Gross 
Domestic Product; and why income per head-averaging 460 dollars in 1994-
has steadily fallen, relative to the industrialized world .... Some forms of capital 
442 There is a possibility that people's belief that their group was treated unfairly is a result of politicians 
creating such an impression to gain political advantage. 
443 Daniel T. Osabu-Kle (ed.) (2000), Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa, 
Peterborough, Canada, Broadview Press. 
444 Howard Cincotta (ed.), What is Democracy? (Washington, D.C., V.S. Dept of State), 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubslwhatsdemlhomepage.htm, accessed 10 January 2004. 
44S L.M. Thompson and L.L. Thompson (2001), A History of South Africa, 3d ed., London, Yale Univ. 
Press, p. 1. 
446 John S. Saul and Colin Leys (1999), "Sub-Saharan African in Global Capitalism," Monthly Review (Jul-
Aug 1999). 
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see plenty of profitable opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa, but the likelihood 
that the region is going to be developed by capitalism seems smaller than ever. 
There are many reasons for this pessimism. Returns from "colonialism imposed cash-
crop production for export, and mineral extraction" yield returns that are falling because 
of falling demand of these goods in the global market. Secondly, Africa, because of skills 
gap, is so far not ready to benefit from the manufacturing sector. Any attempts at takeoff 
"into manufacturing for internal consumption is blocked by an inability to compete with 
imports and by tiny domestic markets; meanwhile collapsing infrastructures, political 
risk, and poorly trained workforces tend to make manufacturing for export 
. . I ,,447 
uncompetltlve, even at very ow wages. 
Consequently, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a push for free market by 
the donor community as well as international organizations aggravated the problems of 
nation states struggling to introduce social democracy. Ake448 noted that liberal 
democracy allowed the subordination of the state to the market by offering a concept of 
politics which was a radical departure from previous concepts of politics and which 
nullified the very raison d'etre of politics. As capitalism took hold, liberal democracy 
abandoned political participation in any meaningful sense, embraced competitive elitism 
and finally, degenerated into apolitical stasis. Thus, liberal democracy undermined the 
version of democracy that most people sought in the developing world. 
Namibia'S Challenges 
The Freedom House's449 1991 survey on freedom, based on a combination of political 
rights and civil liberties, showed that globally only 41 countries were democratic and the 
rest were partly democratic or not democratic. The list of democratic countries included 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, pp. 25-26. 
449 See Freedom House surveys, http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 30 December 2003. Freedom 
House survey measures democracy only in liberal democracy terms and does not take into account citizens' 
economic rights, other than right to property. I do not agree with this circumscribed approach. However, in 
the absence of any other index that measures democracy, I have had to rely on this survey to show that 
some progress has indeed taken place in Africa. 
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only four African countries: Botswana, Mauritius, the Gambia, and Namibia.45o By the 
end of the century, 119 countries had electoral democracies.451 By the end of 2003, the 
list of democratic countries in Africa had expanded to eleven: Benin, Botswana, Cape 
Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and 
South Africa.452 In addition, seventeen African countries had shown considerable 
improvement and were classified as partly free. 
Of course, Botswana and Mauritius had been democratic well before Namibia became 
independent, but at the beginning of the decade of the nineties Namibia became the lead 
country in what Huntington453 calls the third wave of democratisation in Africa. Many 
countries, including South Africa, watched the developments in Namibia with great 
interest as they sought to bring about multi-party, majority rule in their countries. 
Immediately after Namibia became independent, the government prioritised its focus. It 
committed itself to overcoming past hatreds within races and between communities, 
consolidating peace and democracy, establishing and consolidating institutions for 
promoting the welfare of the citizens, and strengthening the economy of the country. This 
chapter complements Chapter Five in outlining and analysing Namibia's experience in 
addressing many of these issues. 
The Challenge of Reconciliation 
In Namibia, South Africa's policy of apartheid colonialism had left considerable negative 
feelings between different racial and ethnic communities. The colonial government's 
policies were aimed at protecting the interests of the privileged minority with total 
disregard for the interests of the majority black population. Apartheid policies also 
succeeded in driving a wedge between different ethnic groups. Political and civil service 
450 R Bruce McColm, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," in Freedom Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1991), 
p.23. 
451 Freedom House (1999), Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th 
Century, Washington, D.e., Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org!reports/century.html#tablel, 
accessed 30 December 2003. 
452 See Map of Freedom 2003, http://www.freedomhouse.org/pdf docs/researchlfreeworldl20031 
map2003.pdf, accessed 30 December 2003. 
453 See Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
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structures in the country complemented each other in promoting the policy of divide and 
rule. 
During the struggle for independence, it was not unusual for one person from a family to 
be a member of the Koevoet (meaning 'Crowbar' - the name given to the South African 
created 'counter-insurgency' killer force) and the other a fighter with the liberation 
movement. Independent Namibia's new government's first task was to replace apartheid 
structures with those that reflected the new reality of independence, and to make a 
conscious effort at minimizing hatred and mistrust built up over a century of 
1 . 1· 454 co orua Ism. 
SWAPO therefore committed itself to promoting a policy of reconciliation with the 
objective of laying the groundwork for peace and harmony in a country that was ravaged 
by long years of war. In fact, almost a year before Namibia became independent, the 
President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, announced the policy of national reconciliation, 
neutrality and non-alignment, which the SWAPO Central Committee had adopted. At that 
time, he said that in our future non-racial democracy, even those who had fought on the 
side of the South African forces of occupation would be treated as equal citizens.455 As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, the President of SWAPO as well as I, as the chairman of the 
Constituent Assembly, again emphasized this point at the opening of the Constituent 
Assembly meeting in Windhoek.456 
In order to minimize racial and ethnic conflict in new Namibia, the government's policy of 
reconciliation sought to find solutions to the issues underlying the conflict and worked to 
alter the adversaries' relationship from that of resentment and hostility to friendship and 
harmony. The underlying strength of reconciliation as against other conflict handling 
454 Geingob, "From Colonialism to Freedom and Democracy," p. 211. 
455 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p. 375. 
456 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Minutes of the Meeting of 21 November 1989. 
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mechanisms, such as force, adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation, is that it is 
a voluntary initiative of the conflict parties to acknowledge their responsibility of guilt.457 
Assefa458 identifies the following core elements of reconciliation: 
1. Honest acknowledgment of the hannJinjury each party has inflicted on the other; 
2. Sincere regrets and remorse for the injury done; 
3. Readiness to apologize for one's role in inflicting the injury; 
4. Readiness of the conflicting parties to 'let go' of the anger and bitterness caused by 
the conflict and the injury; 
5. Commitment by the offender not to repeat the injury; 
6. Sincere effort to redress past grievances that caused the conflict and compensate the 
damage caused to the extent possible; and 
7. Entering into a new mutually enriching relationship. 
In the case of Namibia, it was not possible to fulfil the requirements of all the core elements 
of reconciliation identified by Assefa, because most of the perpetrators of apartheid, i.e. 
South African forces and South African administration personnel, left the country as soon 
as Namibia became independent. 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that peace and harmony prevailed in the country, SWAPO 
took a number of actions prior to and soon after independence. First and foremost, under 
the aegis of the United Nations and the WCG, SWAPO negotiated a blanket amnesty for all 
before the Namibian exiles returned home. SWAPO felt that its cadres could be targeted for 
their actions during the liberation struggle. However, negotiating of a blanket amnesty 
meant that all perpetrators of apartheid atrocities were also given amnesty. 
Because Namibia was an international territory prior to independence, the international 
community, too, was keen to create conditions that would bring about lasting peace, and 
was therefore in favour of blanket amnesty - so as to close a dark chapter in Namibia's 
history. As a result of this effort, the Western Contact Group stipulated in its Proposal for a 
Settlement of the Namibian Situation459 that South Africa must free Namibian political 
457 Hizkias Assefa, "The Meaning of Reconciliation," at www.xs4all.nll-conflic!lpbp/part1l2Jeconc.htm. 
accessed 15 March 2003. 
458 Ibid. 
459 United Nations Document S/12636 (10 April 1978). 
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prisoners, and subsequently Namibians detained outside the country must be released by 
SWAPO. Specifically, the proposal required that 
1. The Administrator-General will make arrangements for the release, prior to the 
beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political 
detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and 
freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or 
imprisonment. 
2. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of 
Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the 
electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. 
The South African administration in Namibia was to take the action first, followed by 
SWAPO. Both parties complied with these requirements. 
Although all the parties had accepted blanket amnesty as a practical approach towards 
reconciling the society, six years later, in 1996, some media in Namibia began criticizing 
the government for not bringing to book the wrongdoers. This criticism started after the 
publication of Namibia: Wall of Silence460 and a German television crew's attempt at 
making a program on holding a truth commission in Namibia, 461 and gained momentum 
after South Africa created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as provided for in the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 24 of 1995. 
Namibian and South African situations were, however, very different. In South Africa, 
there was no amnesty for returning exiles, and African National Congress cadres did not 
have an intermediary, such as the United Nations, to protect them. Secondly, officials of 
the past administration were afraid that they might be held accountable for their actions. 
Therefore, in South Africa, amnesty had to be negotiated, and establishing a truth 
commission was seen as the way to proceed. Church leaders in the country agreed with 
the concept but felt that the commission needed to be recast as the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission: "The idea had been for those involved in atrocities committed 
460 Siegfried Groth (1995), Namibia: Wall ojSilence, Wuppertal, Peter Hammer Verlag. See also The 
Namibian (26 March 1996). 
461 FX1 Update (March! April 1996). 
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under the apartheid regime to disclose their experiences and so become eligible for amnesty 
under specific legal provisions.'.462 
However, during the hearings and after the work of the commission was completed, 
many of the victims and their relatives continued to feel that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission had not helped promote reconciliation. As I had followed the proceedings of 
the commission with considerable interest, it was agonizing to see late Mr Steve Biko's 
wife remark after the testimony of his killers, "Now that I know who killed him, I want 
justice." Relatives of many victims repeated such demand for justice. 
There was little follow up on justice for the wronged, and therefore there was no closure. 
In fact, hearings of the commission had opened in East London on 15 April 1996 amidst a 
threat of legal action by families of certain victims of human rights violations. They were 
particularly opposed to the granting of amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights abuses, 
arguing that it deprived the victims of the right to seek redress in the courts.463 
Reconciliation efforts therefore lacked an important ingredient:464 
An attempt at reconciliation without addressing the injustice in the situation is 
indeed a mockery and belittling the suffering of the victim. Justice and equity are at 
the core of reconciliation. The central question in reconciliation is not whether 
justice is done, but rather how one goes about doing it in ways that can also 
promote future harmonious and positive relationship between parties that have to 
live with each other whether they like it or not. Justice is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for reconciliation. 
According to Assefa, 465 in a number of instances reconciliation commissions obtained 
voluntary acknowledgement of guilt by offenders but failed to get them to demonstrate 
sincere remorse, or take active steps to compensate and repair the relationship vis a vis the 
victims. Some compensation could certainly be worked out in the form of better 
opportunities for the victims through affirmative action. 
462 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (1997), Report of the UNRlSD International 
Conference and Public Meeting, Geneva, 9-10 July 1997, Geneva, UNRISD. 
463 FXI Update (MarchlApriI1996). 
464 Assefa, "The Meaning of Reconciliation." 
46s1bid. 
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Recent studies suggest that reconciliation in South Africa has not worked. "A survey 
conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation suggests that the 
majority of white South Africans are unconvinced that they played a role in apartheid 
abuses. And over 40% of those surveyed think apartheid was a good idea, badly 
executed.'.466 The same study reports that 57% of the whites place responsibility for the 
atrocities on the doorsteps of anti-apartheid activists and 'troublemakers' in black 
communities. Further, 81 % of whites claimed that there was no moral difference between 
an act committed in defence of the apartheid system and an act committed as part of the 
liberation struggle. Worse still, 46% of white South Africans believed that "the TRC was 
an ANC-inspired witch-hunt to discredit its enemies." Interestingly, Theissen and 
Hambel67 found that "the results of the survey do not differ considerably from the 
political culture of West Germany during the first decades after the end of the Nazi 
. " regtme. 
This approach to expose the wrongdoers through their own public confessions, and then let 
most of them go free with only limited recourse to justice, for the satisfaction of the 
wronged was not considered a viable option for Namibia for various reasons. First, such an 
approach would have negated the provisions of blanket amnesty; second, many of the 
wrongdoers had left the country and it was impossible to secure their willingness and 
participation in the process; and, third, those arguing in favour of bringing the wrongdoers 
to book, based on the 'revelations' in Namibia: Wall of Silence, had their own political 
agenda -- they had sought to bring to book any alleged wrongdoers from only one side, i.e., 
SWAPO. Their objective was to manipulate public opinion against SWAPO. If wrongdoers 
were to be brought to book, it was reasonable to argue that wrongdoers from all sides must 
be brought to book, i.e., the South Africans, the colonial administration, the DTA 
government of occupied Namibia, and SWAPO. 
466 Gunnar Theissen and Brandon Hamber, "A State in Denial: White South African's Attitude to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission," http://www.und.ac.za/und/indic/archivesiindicator/autumn98. accessed 
17 November 2002 
467 Ibid. 
203 
However, some of the people who asked for accountability were genuine in their demand. 
They wanted to know the fate of their family members, a child, a brothe~ or the husband. 
Nobody told them of the fate of their loved ones. In order to address their concerns, 
SWAPO published a complete list of all the SWAPO members who had died in exile and 
the cause of their death.468 Yet, some citizens continued to demand a general apology from 
SWAPO. 
Two years prior to the publishing of Namibia: Wall of Silence, in my address to the 
National Assembly I said that no war was good, because it caused enormous suffering to 
the people. Some innocent people get caught in the crossfire. Therefore, one did not engage 
in war for the sake of war but as the last resort. If diplomatic efforts failed, one would be 
justified in going to war. War is the failure of diplomacy. SWAPO took up arms only after 
all peaceful means, including agitation at home, petitioning at the United Nations, seeking 
justice at the highest court, the International Court of Justice, had failed. Indeed, in one's 
lifetime, there might come a time to submit and a time to fight for one's rights. SWAPO 
decided to fight. 
Besides, the N amibian war of liberation was unconventional because of its use of guerrilla 
tactics -- what the Boers call 'bush war'. As it was a 'bush war', there was no due process 
of law through which one could ascertain as to who was innocent and who was guilty of 
spying. Occasionally, innocent people were labelled as spies. Therefore, some people who 
might have been innocent felt stigmatised. They wanted to have recourse to a mechanism 
that would clear their names. That is an understandable concern; for, to be accused wrongly 
is painful. 
However, as I argued in the National Assembly, there were others who had also suffered. 
Many were killed as a result of spies providing information to South Africa. Such 
treachery resulted in many children and women dying at Cassinga. Those who were 
labelled wrongly or rightly were still alive and could make their case, but those who died as 
468 SWAPO (1996). Their Blood Waters our Freedom, Windhoek, SWAPO. This document accounted for 
7792 people. All of them were declared to be heroes. 
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a result of betrayal did not stand a chance. Therefore, I argued in favour of closing the 
chapter and moving on. Closing the chapter meant that no one would be stigmatised. No 
one would be denied opportunity to work. 
Further, the fact is that SWAPO was a party to full amnesty, and the government 
followed through on that position in independent Namibia. It hired and trained those who 
were detained outside the country. Some of the top civil servants in Namibia are the ones 
who were detainees during the struggle. Dauth,469 acknowledging SWAPO's 
commitment to reconciliation, points out, "Regarding the former detainees, Swapo has in 
fact pursued something of a quiet and unofficial process of rehabilitation and 
reconciliation, offering many ex-detainees a return to the Swapo fold and employment in 
the bureaucracy." During my interview with another scholar, I had stated, "Those who 
have been arrested now have positions. So we have reconciled, we have made up. In our 
own way .... We do not now stop the reconciliation and start the witch hunt.,,470 
Regrettably, however, this issue of detainees comes up like clockwork at election time, and 
some of the parties have no hesitation in using it as an electioneering ploy regardless of the 
consequences of their actions. Were the government to abandon the policy of 
reconciliation, those who tortured Mr Ekandjo, now the Minister of Home Affairs, would 
not be holding positions in the police force. Amnesty and reconciliation have ensured that 
Mr Ekandjo and these police officers are talking. If Namibia were to reopen the issue of 
general amnesty, it would destroy all that has been gained through reconciliation. 
Therefore, the SWAPO government chose to stick to the blanket amnesty provisions and 
encouraged the conflicting parties to 'let go' of the anger and bitterness. Its approach has 
been to concentrate on redressing past wrongs, and creating conditions for citizens to enter 
into a new mutually enriching relationship. It was this thinking that prompted the founders 
of Namibia to incorporate a commitment to reconciliation in the preamble to the 
469 Timothy Dauth (1996), "Review of Siegfried Groth's Namibia - the Wall of Silence: the Dark Days of 
the Liberation Struggle" (23 April 1996), http://www.hartford-hwp.com!archives/37/054.html. accessed 22 
February 2004. 
470 My interview with Mr Peltola on 13 January 1993 in Windhoek. Quoted in Dauth, "Review of Siegfried 
Groth's Namibia: the Wall of Silence." 
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country's constitution: "We the people of Namibia will strive to achieve national 
reconciliation and to foster peace, unity and a common loyalty to a single state." 
Affirmative Action 
The government sought to promote reconciliation by addressing pro actively, through the 
policy of affinnative action, social and economic inequities created by apartheid. Its 
challenge was, and continues to be, the fact that the victims of social and economic 
inequities are not a minority but the vast majority. In recognition of this fact, the drafters 
of the Namibian Constitution provided for the creation of legislative instruments for 
affinnative action for 
the advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially, economically 
or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the 
implementation of policies and programs aimed at redressing social, economic or 
educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of past discriminatory 
laws or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring of the public service, the 
police force, the defense force, and the prison service.471 
The constitution also recognizes that women traditionally suffered special discrimination, 
and therefore their rights need to be affinned. 
Promotion of equity requires that all people have access to education and skills, means of 
production, and other ingredients that equip them to take advantage of the opportunities 
opening up to them. Over the period 1990-2002, many inequities in the provision of 
services were corrected. Health, education, old-age pension, and infrastructure are now 
equally accessible to all. 
On the economic front, too, the government has taken concrete actions by vigorously 
following the policy of economic empowerment of Blacks. For instance, Blacks are being 
given fishing quotas to help them break into the fishing industry. They are also being given 
mining rights for smaller scale mines. 
411 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 23. 
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However, allegations have been made by some that only a few are getting rich through this 
process, with the majority being left out. Questions are being asked if the government's 
policy is to empower blacks or individuals. "Worryingly, black economic empowennent 
initiatives are not taking place within a transparent and competitive policy framework.'.472 
There is some truth in such allegations. A new economic class is being created without any 
deep transfonnation of the society. Those who have already been "affinned" continue to 
be reaffirmed again and again. 
Application of affinnative action in a society with diverse ethnic groupings requires 
sensitivity. During the first decade of independent Namibia, the government was attuned 
to the need for sensitivity in the application of affinnative action provisions. President 
Nujoma was mindful of keeping a balance in appointing ministers and officials to other 
high posts. Within the civil service, too, I concentrated on ensuring that its composition 
reflected the diversity of the population. However, as already pointed out, of late, voices 
favouring of nepotism are gaining ground. 
This development is a matter of concern for effective administration. One does not favour 
a cousin if he or she cannot handle the job, for to do so would be a disservice to self, to 
the cousin, to the party, and to the country. SWAPO, of course, has educated all kinds of 
cadres who can be given positions, because they can do the job, but all Namibians have 
legitimate claims on the motherland. After all, it is not only SWAPO cadres who pay the 
taxes that provide the salaries of these people. And it is not only SWAPO that contributed 
to the struggle -- many Namibians contributed to the struggle in their own different ways. 
Of course, sober minded Namibians do not doubt that SWAPO members bore the brunt 
of the struggle -- that is why SWAPO members hold all the ministerial positions, and all 
permanent secretary positions. The President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker are all 
SWAPO members. They occupy these positions not only because of their being SWAPO 
cadres but also because of their competence. SWAPO's contribution is duly recognized 
472 Robin Sherboume, Almost all the Ingredients for Trouble Ahead - The Economics of Corruption: 
Implications for Namibia (IPPR Briefmg Paper), Windhoek. Inst for Public Policy Research, 
http://www.ippr.org.naIBriefing%20PapersIBPCor.pdf. accessed 20 November 2003. 
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not only by the government but also by the electorate. This, however, should not mean 
that political affiliation should be the key to public service employment. 
Lately, accusations are surfacing that one ethnic group is being favoured by the 
government. Paramount Chief Kuaima Riruako of the Herero claimed, "Government and 
semi-government agencies are dominated by SWAPO and Oshivambo.'.473 He alleged 
that all the commanders of the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) are Ovambo; most of the 
ambassadors are Ovambo; almost all parastatal companies are run by Ovambos. 
Ovambos also "get most government bursaries, loans for housing and new businesses, 
and land reform and resettlement projects." Such concerns, real and perceived, are 
beginning to undermine reconciliation. 
If these developments go unchecked, Namibia might have to contend with a serious 
challenge of ethnic and political nepotism in the years ahead. This may involve both 
deteriorating effectiveness and increasing popular discontent. SWAPO and the electorate 
bear an enormous responsibility of either choosing inc1usivity, unity, peace and 
development or divisiveness, nepotism and their attendant evils. 
Politicians are at least partly responsible for this problem. As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
President Nujoma certainly had the foresight to harness heterogeneity by pursuing the 
policy of inclusivity, but of late this policy is being undermined. 
During the last fourteen years, northern Namibia, the traditional area of the Ovambos, 
received a disproportionately large amount of development funds. Although, this 
development was a result of the government's seeking to help Namibian businesses tap 
the Angolan market once Angola's civil war ended, the fact remains that inequity thus 
created is resulting in undermining the government's initial focus of striking a balance 
between various groups in expending development funds, and hiring within the civil 
service and other agencies. 
473 Africa Confidential, 24, 23. 
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The SWAPO Youth League, too, has been pushing for restricting government jobs to 
SWAPO cadres only. Recently it issued a statement474 stressing that point: 
We would like to call in the strongest possible way upon all Swapo Party Youth 
League structures ... to scrutinise all the appointments to strategic positions from 
management cadre upwards in the Swapo Party Government's Ministries and 
parastatals to see to it that the call is implemented unconditionally and no 
questionable appointments are carried out. [Loyal Swapo members] have endured the 
hardships of the struggle both in and outside the country. They have been thrown into 
the seas, ... have their limbs amputated and languished in jails for endless period of 
time. It is them and them alone that can claim political ownership of this country. 
And no newspaper, NGD, and no party other than Swapo can claim that legitimately. 
Unfortunately, these demands promoting partisan favouritism have largely gone 
unchallenged by the government or SWAPO leaders. In the same context, the Africa 
Conjidentiat75 reported: 
Namibia's delicate inter-ethnic balance, carefully maintained since Independence 
in 1990 by President Sam Nujoma, is the hot political topic. After much 
uncertainly, Nujoma will retire next year when his term runs out and a special 
congress of the ruling South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) will 
pick his successor. The almost certain winner, Foreign Affairs Minister Hidipo 
Hamutenya, is seen by his critics as the architect of policies that have made his 
own people, the Oshivambo (about half of the 1.8 million population) ever more 
powerful in politics, business, the army and the civil service .... That is why some 
minority leaders privately urge Nujoma to stay on for a fourth, unconstitutional, 
five-year term .... Another ex-DTA member of parliament, Paramount Chief 
Kuaima Riruako of the Herero, campaigns for a federal system modelled on 
Germany's .... Riruako claims that government and semi-governmental agencies 
are dominated by SWAPO and the Oshivambo. 
Accusing individual ministers, particularly Mr Hidipo Hamutenya, of ethnic nepotism, 
however, is unwarranted, when President Nujoma as the constitutional and executive 
head of the government is ultimately in charge of the cabinet and government policy. He 
can appoint and remove ministers who do not follow his policies. After all, the buck stops 
with the president! 
474 The Namibian (1 July 2002). 
475 Africa Confidential, 24, 23. 
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However, it is possible that in the implementation of policy, ministers could undermine 
or promote inclusivity within the workings of their ministries or in committees they chair. 
They might grant contracts, loans, quotas, and licences to their own ethnic groups, or 
offer jobs to people from their own groups. To avoid that happening. I emphasized the 
importance of the diffusion of the decision-making process. 
Such developments have alienated a number of citizens, who feel affirmative action 
benefits are available only to people belonging to a particular group regardless of whether 
or not one had been disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices. This issue will 
most likely be a major electoral issue during the 2004 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. 
The land reform initiative of the government, as a part of its affirmative action effort, also 
is not meeting its objectives. Certainly, in order to empower the landless, the government 
has been buying land since 1991 to resettle the landless. It allocated some 20 million 
Namibian dollars annually on acquiring land. In the 2003 budget, this figure was raised to 
N$50 million for the year. Land acquired so far, however, falls far short of the demand of 
the landless. 
If the problems of unemployment and landlessness are not addressed, Namibia's policy of 
reconciliation could be compromised. When I was the prime minister, I frequently appealed 
to the whites to release unused land to help settle the landless, but my appeals met with 
little success. Consequently, the process of change has been very slow. But the landless can 
become restless for the land they rightly consider their own. This is the challenge that the 
government and the landowners must address urgently. Therefore, the government 
established a Permanent Technical Team with the mandate to prepare a policy document 
to shape Namibia's land reform prograrnme.476 
Developments in Zimbabwe point to the importance of addressing the issue of land reform. 
After Zimbabwe became independent, it devoted considerable effort towards promoting 
476 The Namibian (25 August 2003). 
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reconciliation, but continued economic inequities undermined this effort. President Mugabe 
sought to reconcile the divided nation by incorporating blacks in the civil service, including 
white ministers in his cabinet, assimilating some 30 000 freedom fighters in the new anny, 
repealing discriminatory laws, introducing free education and health services,477and even 
maintaining some trade relations with apartheid South Africa. 
He also sought to address the land question and appealed to the western nations for help in 
addressing this intractable problem. However, such help did not come. As a result, Whites 
continued to control means of production. In fact, the West supported them in maintaining 
this control. Under such circumstances, there was little chance of reducing economic 
inequalities. 
As a result, the policy of reconciliation in Zimbabwe lasted only for a few years. Ingham-
Thorpe478 noted that President Mugabe's policy of reconciliation in Zimbabwe left intact 
many oppressive and inequitable structures. For example, the land-reform issue was only 
partly resolved. "Land issue faced the government with an acute dilemma. It needed to 
satisfy the demand for land of its own Black supporters, including those former guerrillas 
not absorbed into the anny and who, possessing few employable skills, eked out a 
precarious existence in the urban centres.'.479 Violence, massive youth unemployment and 
the trauma ofunmet expectations since demobilization began to take their toll. 
Rather than helping President Mugabe resolve this problem, the West sought to 
undermine him in order to protect white landowners. The Whites, too, lived under the 
illusion that Mr Mugabe needed them more than they needed Mr Mugabe. This situation 
created tensions in the society. It is true that the situation was politicised, but then which 
politician does not politicise a situation that is a vote getter. Does the capture of Saddam 
Hussein ring a bell! Soon after Saddam Hussein was captured, President Bush's ratings 
went up after falling for many months. 
477 Tordoft: Government and Politics in Africa, pp. 229-233. 
478 Ingham-Thorpe, "Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Reality or Illusion." 
479 Tordoft: Government and Politics in Africa, p. 230. 
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It is also being alleged that in Zimbabwe, the situation is still not getting resolved, because 
land confiscated from the Whites is not being given to the freedom fighters but to the 
ministers, defence force officials, and other important people48o who hardly need 
reaffirming. Such a development would be a further blow to reconciliation. If this 
allegation is true, it is, in my opinion, wrong to give land to those who have already been 
affirmed through having senior positions within the government. Those who have been 
affirmed should purchase land, as is the usual case in Namibia. 
Namibia has been spared the agony of Zimbabwe as it has sought to address the land 
question through the soft option of willing-seller-willing-buyer. However, the issue is 
not resolved yet. Me1ber481 argues that the Constitutional Principles ensured civic rights 
but did little to redistribute wealth. According to him, the provisions of the constitution 
paved the way for democracy that benefited mainly a materially privileged minority by 
protecting its interests. 
His argument is valid. The cause of such a state of affairs lies in the Constitutional 
Principles imposed upon the Namibians by the Western Contact Group. Regrettably, pieces 
of legislation dealing with commercial and communal land have also maintained the status 
quo,482 despite the fact that the National Land Conference of 1991 raised the expectations 
of the landless. At the same time, the land conference had concluded, after acrimonious 
debate, that addressing the question of ancestral land was complicated and attempts at 
finding any solutions based on ancestral claims would be impractical. For example, 
questions were asked: Who were the original owners of the land? Should Windhoek be 
returned to the San, the Damaras, the Namas and the Hereros? The participants also 
480 I. Currin (2003), "Zimbabwe Land Grab," Cornwall Park Simmentals News and Views (7 September 
2003). Currin alleges that "Basically the only 'operating' occupied farms now 'belong' to the rich, like the 
President, his wife, Government ministers, senior Anny or Air Force officers, and cronies of the President, 
many of whom 'own' more than one farm." See 
http://www.comwall-park-simmentals.co.nzlnews.asp?NewsID=137. accessed 5 February 2004. 
481 Renning Melber, "Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia, " in Renning 
Melber and Christopher Saunders (2001), Transition in Southern Africa - Comparative Aspects: Two 
Lectures, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p. 22. 
482 Lisa Thompson (1998), "Development and Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia," 
Security, Development and Gender in Africa, Monograph No. 27 (August 1998), 
http://www.iss.co.zalPubsJMonographsIN027INamibia.html#Anchor-29666. accessed 15 March 2003. 
212 
debated on the nature of land tenure, and it was decided to maintain freehold land 
ownership. That is how the policy of willing-seller-willing-buyer came into being, and that 
is why the government has had to acquire land at market prices to resettle the landless. 
In 2003, increased militancy is emerging, demanding the resolution of the land issue. In 
November 2003, Namibia Fann Workers Union's (NAFWU) General Secretary, Alfred 
Angula, announced that NAFWU would occupy unused land in fifteen commercial fanns 
within a week.483 The plan was supported by the National Union of Namibian Workers 
(NUNW). Fortunately, this situation was averted before it became unpleasant: 
Behind the scenes it was understood that top Swapo leadership had laid down the 
law to the unions in no uncertain tenns, saying if the land invasions had gone 
ahead, security forces would have been deployed to prevent illegal action. 
However the message was delivered to the unions, via either Swapo or 
Government, it has surely had the effect of restoring confidence that the Namibian 
Government will not allow Namibia to be 'the next Zimbabwe' .484 
Regrettably, neither the President nor any minister issued any public statement against 
such an action, other than a mild statement made by the Pennanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Lands. He said that the illegal occupation of fanns was of "no assistance" to 
government. "Should the fann workers tempt the law, the law will react accordingly. ,,485 
Evidently, the President did not want to be seen taking position against the unions. As the 
party had 'laid down the law,' one is left wondering if the government was subordinated 
to the party, as was the case in Zambia during President Kaunda's time. In Zambia, this 
subordination was enshrined in the United National Independence Party's (UNIP) 
Constitution, and political leaders frequently used the phrase 'the party and its 
government.' 
Incidentally, this situation had developed when the National Assembly was debating the 
amendment to the Agricultural (Commercial) Refonn Act to make provisions for taxation 
on commercial land. I had argued for such a provision five years ago. On 15 January 1998, 
483 "Namibia Land Grab Threat," News24 (5 November 2003), 
http://www.news24.comlNews24/AfricalNews/0 .. 2-11-1447 _1440972,00.html, accessed 1 January 2004. 
484 "Land Refonn Key to Respect for Life - MP," The Namibian (4 November 2003). 
485 ''Namibia Land Grab Threat," News24 (5 November 2003). 
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I had written to Mrs Pendukeni Ithana, who was the Minister of Lands, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement at that time, as follows:486 
I feel that the issue of land tax needs to be addressed comprehensively, keeping in 
mind the objective to be achieved and giving due consideration to how our efforts 
might be undermined. As you know, Article 16(2) of the constitution stipulates that 
''the state may expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of 
just compensation" (please note,just compensation and not market value) but we had 
introduced the concept of willing seller willing buyer, and fair market value. 
However, the result was that the landowners began demanding exorbitant prices 
overnight. As we contemplate introducing land tax, we have another chance to correct 
the situation. Therefore it is important that any loopholes that may be exploited by the 
landowners are plugged. In fact, you can be sure that the landowners would seek out 
any loopholes just as they undermined the willing seller willing buyer concept. With 
these concerns in view, some of the mechanisms that come to mind are as follows: 
• A commercial agricultural land ceiling could be established for each ecological 
zone that would be taxed only nominally, and land beyond that ceiling could be 
taxed punitively. This provision would encourage more productive use of the land 
within the ceiling and possibly bring the rest of the land to the market. Any 
exceptions to this provision should be clearly stipulated in advance to eliminate 
the possibility of ad hoc decisions by bureaucrats. 
• Sale or transfer of agricultural land to companies or individuals including 
relatives could be subject to capital gains tax which could be pegged at the 
marginal tax rate of 35% based on the market value, and land transfer tax. 
Exemption from capital gains tax may be granted if the land is sold to the 
government with the result that the government can negotiate to pay for the land, 
say, 30% less than the market value. Taxation on surplus land beyond land 
ceiling, capital gains tax and land transfer tax will not only result in making the 
retention of surplus land non-viable, it would make it impractical to transfer land 
to other family members or relatives. Consequently, it is hoped, land prices will 
come down substantially and there would be a rush to sell the land to the 
government at very reasonable prices. 
• Loss or profit from farms may not be offset against another business. Because of 
the absence of this restriction, many businessmen and professionals own land not 
to use it productively but only to serve as a profit sink. Introduction of this 
provision will therefore result in the need by owners to make the farms viable, 
thereby creating jobs, or, if they do not wish to do that, to sell it, thereby 
facilitating the acquisition of land by the government to settle the landless. In 
addition, with this tax loophole plugged, profits from other businesses will be 
taxed, thus increasing government revenue. 
486 Personal communication as the Prime Minister to Mrs Pendukeni Ithana, Minister of Lands, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement dated 15 January 1998. 
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I also suggested to the Minister that land refonn should go beyond just allocation of land. 
After settling people on land, an attempt should be made to bring them together in a 
farming cooperative or a farming enterprise managed by professionals, until such time as 
the farmers themselves are trained to take over the responsibility of running the farm as a 
commercially viable entity. Eventually, the farm should become these fanners' property. 
Some of the provisions, such as taxation on land, are now being considered in the 
amendment to the act, but these amendments do not address the issue of establishing a 
framework for making the fanns viable under the new owners. 
While the government's actions and proposals emanate from the urgency it attaches to 
addressing the land issue, providing land to the landless without giving them the necessary 
skills is unlikely to result in economic emancipation. In a letter to The Namibian, 
Thiessen 487 argues in a similar vein: 
The fatal mistake that is being made is that land ownership is regarded as being 
synonymous to prosperity .... If we look at most of the resettlement schemes, I am 
afraid that the Namibian Government is rather promoting poverty, instead of 
fighting it. Many productive fann units are turned into subsistence units, with 
government having to carry the burden to keep the resettled people going, not 
because they are black, no, but because they, to a great extent, lack training and 
knowledge. 
I agree with this view. In my communication of 15 January 1998 to Mrs Pendukeni Ithana, 
I had also emphasized:488 
We need to develop strategies for addressing other issues ofland refonn to ensure 
that the reallocated land does not just become a place for squatters. I say this 
because the resettlement efforts so far on the fanns purchased by the government 
have been a serious disappointment. Previously productive fanns have been run 
down by their treatment as other "communal" areas and productivity and output 
have plummeted. The primary reason for this state of affairs, I suspect, is that we 
have been rather disorganized in our resettlement effort. Adequate administrative 
structures were not created to oversee the proper functioning of the fanns in tenns 
of the carrying capacity of the land, availability of water, suitability or otherwise 
of crop production, availability of the relevant technology and its maintenance, 
housing for the people moved to these fanns, imparting skills to these people, 
487 The Namibian (23 December 2003). 
488 Personal communication to Mrs. Pendukeni Ithana. 
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extension services, etc. These are equally important issues if the people's lives are 
to improve. 
One could also argue that those who are allocated land, and are resettled on it, do not see 
land as a panacea. If given a choice between land and a reasonable job in the city, a large 
number of "land hungry" citizens would opt for ajob. 
Further, in implementing our affirmative action policy, we must guard against reaffirming 
the rich and influential by allocating land to them. They should buy land with bank loans if 
necessary, as many others including me have done. State land and communal lands could 
be developed for resettling the landless instead of buying land. Funds presently used for 
buying land could be used to improve state and communal lands. This way, the land 
problem could be addressed, without disrupting existing productive farms. 
Development oflodges on erstwhile farming land should also be encouraged, as hospitality 
services have the potential of creating many jobs. Eco-tourism provides excellent 
opportunity to set up tourist lodges, even in the most desolate areas. For instance, when a 
tourist lodge was built in Twyfelfontein, an area that had no prospect for jobs, sixty jobs 
were created, thus supporting sixty families or some 600 Namibians. 
The government's approach should therefore be to (1) resettle landless who wish to make 
a living through farming, and provide them with all the necessary skills and help with 
inputs; (2) for those who have no interest in farming, create jobs in the hospitality 
industry (game lodges), agro-industries, etc. This way, the country as a whole will 
develop. This combined approach would, in my view, be a creative way of addressing the 
land question. 
Participation of the Blacks in the economy has been at a very low level. The government's 
Transitional National Development Plan of Namibia pointed out the challenge in 1992 as 
follows:489 
489 Namibia, National Planning Commission (1992), Transitional National Development Plan 1991/1992-
1993/1994, Windhoek, National Planning Commission, p.ll. 
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The most striking feature of the formal economy is the lack of participation in it by 
the majority of the people. It is not just that a small section of the population 
receives a disproportionate share of the national income, but also that a relatively 
small number of people produce most of the national income. The need for 
redistribution is clear but the principle means of achieving general prosperity will 
be through economic growth and through employing increasing numbers of people. 
This low level participation of the majority in the economy resulted in significant disparity 
between the rich and the poor. In 2002, Namibia's Gini coefficient was estimated to be 
0.64. In comparison, Gini coefficients for India and South Africa are 0.28 for urban India, 
0.35 for rural India, 490 and 0.57 for South Africa.491 Although, the Gini Coefficient has 
increased over the years almost everywhere, Cardan492 notes, 
Reported Gini coefficients generally measure pre-tax income rather than after-tax 
consumption, which means that it systematically overstates the degree of income 
inequality. Once we consider taxes and transfer payments ("welfare"), it becomes 
apparent that while the distribution of income may be unequal, the distribution of 
actual consumption is more equal than press releases and pundits would have us 
believe. 
Indeed, in mostly agrarian economies, such as those prevailing in most of Africa, rural 
populations don't rely on monetary economies, thus skewing Gini coefficients. Yet, most 
governments in Africa have had to cut back on social services, through which transfers 
take place. Very often such cut backs have been based on IMF prescriptions. These 
observations suggest that promoting equity requires a more aggressive stance, including 
guiding and controlling the market. However, donor resistance to guiding and controlling 
the market has made such an approach difficult. As Thompson493 pointed out: 
The [Namibian] government is defining its character according to the neoliberal 
economic paradigm which is internationally, not regionally oriented, and 
internationally, not nationally scripted. The orientation is reinforced, implicitly 
and/or explicitly, by international development agencies. As a result, social 
490 Mohan Guruswamy (2003), "Population is Not Our Real Problem!" (11 August 2003), 
http://www.rediff.com!newsl2003/aug/llguru.htm. accessed 25 August 2003. 
491 James Heintz, "Out of Gear? Economic Policy and Performance in Post-apartheid South Africa," PER! 
Research Brief, Vo\. 1 (2003). 
492 William Art Cardern, " What is Wealth Inequality?" (Ludwig von Mises Institute), 
http://www.mises.org, accessed 25 August 2003. I also do not agree with the way Gini coefficients are 
calculated. In most of these calculations, governments are often not consulted. Therefore, they reflect a one 
sided view of the disparity. 
493 Thompson, "Development and Security in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia." 
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security, especially for those in rural areas, remains illusory, both nationally and 
regionally. 
These are some of the challenges that Namibia still faces but national and international 
constraints will continue to hamper its efforts. For example, any attempt at land 
redistribution without compensation is not only against the provisions of the constitution,494 
but would also surely result in undermining our own economy and alienating the donors 
and international opinion, as has happened in Zimbabwe. However, the government 
acknowledges the fact that unless the land question is addressed and economic inequity 
corrected, all the gains made in securing peace, rule oflaw, and democracy would be lost. 
Finally, it must be stressed that affirmative action should not be seen as a permanent 
fixture. It should be a stopgap measure to correct the inequities. Once the objectives are 
achieved through equal opportunity and rooting out of discrimination based on colour, 
provisions for affirmative action should be removed. However, experience elsewhere 
shows that once introduced it is not easy to do away with affirmative action provisions. 
For instance, in India, "it was believed that caste-based discrimination was so pervasive 
that only a concerted, affirmative government effort could erase caste bonds.'.495 
Therefore, drafters of the Indian Constitution provided for affirmative action in favour of 
those groups listed in one of its schedules. These groups include those who were oppressed 
as a result of the caste system, and those from areas that lacked facilities. The provision 
was expected to last for a limited period of time, but those who are listed in the schedule 
continue to lobby for its retention. As a result of political pressure, the schedule has also 
been revised many times to include an increasing number of groups. 
It is indisputable that there were huge inequities in India, and affirmative action has 
certainly helped raise the living condition of the scheduled castes, tribes and areas, but 
corrective measures have created different types of inequities. Today, not only has caste-
494 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 16. 
495 Alexander Volokh (1996), "Quotas in India have yet to Create Harmony," Los Angeles Daily Journal (5 
November 1996). 
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based affinnative action "succeeded in making people more aware of what caste they 
belong to,,496 but has also contributed to compromising meritocracy. Affinnative action 
should help those who need help and not those who have been scheduled as a group to 
receive help generation after generation in perpetuity. After fifty years, it may be time to 
do away with the relevant schedule, but that is unlikely to happen. It is, however, possible 
that eventually everyone in the country is listed in the schedule, which would be 
tantamount to doing away with the schedule. 
Similarly, in Malaysia, affinnative action was instituted in 1969 as Bhoomiputra policy to 
give Malays preference in business opportunities and university admissions. This policy 
has helped, but the main reason for its success has been the fact that 
The Malaysian economy was growing at a remarkable 6-7 per cent a year during 
these decades. This growth created new job opportunities to absorb the Bumiputra 
("sons of the soil") into the labour force .... However, even after 20 years of 
affinnative action, Malays are not proportionally represented in management 
positions and the professions, and they still find themselves over-represented in 
the less productive parts of the economy.497 
Paraphrasing Prime Minister Mahathir's Book, The Malay Dilemma, Vongs498 argues that 
Bhumiputra policy "has not worked because of Malays' cultural habits. Malays' relaxed, 
folksy and fatalistic lifestyle makes it difficult for them to compete with the Chinese .... 
Mahathir ... knows that Malays will not let the policy go lightly." 
In Namibia, too, it would be difficult to roll back affinnative action because the 
beneficiaries are unlikely to support any government that curtails their benefits. Legally, 
too, there could be difficulty with any such rollback as affinnative action is a part of the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms clauses of the Constitution. These clauses cannot 
be diluted. While Article 23 provides that the Parliament would enact legislation for 
affinnative action, the question that arises is whether the relevant legislation can be 
496 Ibid. 
497 Rachel Jafta, "The High Cost of AffIrmative Action," in David Welsh and R.W. Johnson (eds.) (1999), 
Ironic Victory: Liberalism in Post-liberation South Africa, Oxford, Oxfor Univ. Press. 
498 Mahathir Bin Mohamad (2003), The Malay Dilemma, Singapore, Select Books, paraphrased by Pueng 
Vongs, "Affmnative Action in Other Countries," in Altemet.org (11 July 2003), http://www.alternet.orgl 
print.html?StoryID=16391, accessed 30 December 2003. 
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amended to dilute affinnative action provisions. If ever such a situation arises, it might be 
necessary to seek the ruling of the Constitutional Court. 
The Age of Democracy 
If the twentieth century contributed to the promotion of democracy, it also added to the 
confusion about the concept of democracy. The concept of democracy was trivialized by 
military dictatorships and totalitarian regimes as they sought to 'legitimise' their power 
by labelling themselves as democrats, and claiming to have the support of the people. 
Recognizing the value people attach to democracy, some political leaders seek to create 
an illusion of democracy. However, this illusion does not go much beyond these leaders 
adding ornate phrases, such as 'Democratic Republic,' 'Peoples Democratic Republic,' or 
'Socialist Republic' to their countries' names. 
What is important is not the name but the values incorporated in the political system. 
The success of democracy often depends on the democratic values cherished by citizens 
with whom ultimate power rests. As Ake499 points out, 'democracy' as a political concept 
is extremely precise - it means popular power. 
This popular power can be exercised through either direct democracy or representative 
democracy. Direct democracy works only where groups are small, but if groups are large, 
representative democracy works better, e.g., at the national level. Under representative 
democracy, people elect officials to make political decisions, fonnulate laws and 
administer the country for the public good. Dahl500 defines five standards of democracy: 
1. Effective participation: All citizens must have equal and effective opportunities 
for making their views known to others. 
2. Voting equality: Every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to 
vote, and all votes must be counted as equal. 
499 Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, p. 7. 
500 Robert A. Dahl (2001), On Democracy, New Delhi, Affiliated East-West Press, pp. 37-38. 
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3. Enlightened understanding: Each citizen must have equal and effective 
opportunity for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely 
consequences. 
4. Control of the agenda: Citizens must have the opportunity to decide how and, if 
they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda. 
5. Inclusion of adults: All adult citizens should have the full rights that are implied 
by the first four criteria. 
Dahl501 further observes, "No state has ever possessed a government that fully measured 
up to the criteria of a democratic process. None is likely to. Yet ... the criteria provide 
highly serviceable standards for measuring the achievements and possibilities of 
democratic government." 
In addition, to make democracy sustainable, it is necessary to establish certain norms that 
allow citizens to freely make political decisions by majority rule, ensure the protection of 
minority rights, limit the power of government, and allow pluralism, i.e., existence of 
different political parties, organisations and associations. In an authoritarian society these 
groups are controlled and restricted, but in a democracy, pluralism is encouraged and 
government's powers are restricted through constitutional provisions (See Chapter Four). 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, democracy gained considerable ground, 
because it represents the institutionalisation of freedom. Arguing in favour of democracy, 
Dahl502 lists at least ten advantages of democracy in comparison with any feasible 
alternatives to it as follows: 
1. Democracy helps to prevent government by cruel and vicious autocrats. 
2. Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that non-
democratic systems do not, and cannot, grant. 
3. Democracy insures its citizens a broader range of personal freedom than any 
feasible alternative to it. 
4. Democracy helps people to protect their own fundamental interests. 
5. Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for persons 
to exercise the freedom of self-determination - that is, to live under laws of their 
own choosing. 
6. Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for 
exercising moral responsibility. 
501 Ibid., p. 42. 
502 Ibid., pp. 44-61. 
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7. Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible alternative. 
8. Only a democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of political 
equality. 
9. Modem representative democracies do not fight wars with one another. 
10. Countries with democratic governments tend to be more prosperous than 
countries with non-democratic governments. 
Dahl,503 however, cautions, "Democracy cannot guarantee that its citizens will be happy, 
prosperous, healthy, wise, peaceful, or just. To attain these ends is beyond the capacity of 
any government, including a democratic government. What is more, in practice 
democracy has always fallen short of its ideals," but "democracy is a far better gamble 
than any alternative to it." Churchill, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter, had made 
similar observation much earlier in 1947.504 
Simensen505 notes that 1989 stood out as a democratic divide in contemporary African 
history. As late as the beginning of 1989, thirty-eight out of forty-five African countries 
were under military or one-party regimes, Two years later, thirty-one African countries 
had become multiparty states with elected assemblies. Huntington506 labelled this 
transformation as the third wave of democratisation. 
Democratic Transition in Namibia 
Democratic transformation in Namibia started on 1 April 1989, when the process of 
implementing the United Nations settlement plan started. Elections for a Constituent 
Assembly were held under the supervision of the United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG). Subsequently, Namibians elected by the people began the process of 
drafting the country's constitution. The process of drafting the constitution has been 
discussed in Chapter Four. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the constitution had to adhere 
to prescribed Constitutional Principles. These parameters and SWAPO's commitment to 
democracy ensured that Namibia would adopt a democratic constitution.507 
S03 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
S04 Hansard (11 November 1947). 
sos Simensen, "Democracy and Globalization," p. 391. 
S06 See Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
507 SWAPO, Draft Constitution, 1989. 
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However, adopting a democratic constitution does not necessarily make a country 
democratic. It is only a starting point: 508 
A minimum criterion is multiparty elections to a national assembly. But examples 
abound as to how this can be combined with various forms of discrimination 
against political opposition, manipulations at elections, curtailment of personal 
freedoms, limited constitutional powers for the assembly, and continued 
privileges for military or oligarchic elites. The concepts of 'militarised 
democracies' in Latin America and 'authoritarian democracies' in Asia indicate 
the limitations of such 'formal democracies'. There is a clear contrast between 
these and what we may call 'real democracies' or 'liberal democracies', based on 
plural societies, rule of law, a neutral military, and personal freedoms. 
These issues explain why we tend to refer to one country as being more democratic than 
the other. Also, it is for these reasons that there were only eleven African countries 
considered by the Freedom House survey to be democracies in 2003.509 This number 
could easily have been six or sixteen had the cut off point for a functioning democracy 
established by the Freedom House been different. 
Narnibians and their political representatives, however, consistently sought to ensure that 
real representative democracy was established and strengthened in the country. 
Institutions continued to be set up and strengthened to sustain the five standards outlined 
by Dahl, viz., effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control 
of the agenda, and inclusion of all adults. These five standards require that people can 
choose their representatives freely or seek to become representatives, have an opportunity 
to express their views freely, and have freedom of association. 
Since 1990, democracy has become firmly rooted in Namibia, with all the political 
parties and organizations as well as the masses committed to the democratic 
constitutional system, both in its formal acceptance and in the observation of rules. 
Initially, the first president of Namibia was elected by the Constituent Assembly by a 
simple majority of all its members.5lO Subsequently, the country has held two direct 
S08 Simensen, "Democracy and Globalization," p. 393. 
S09 See Freedom House survey, http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 15 December 2002 
SlO Namibia, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 134. Article 134 also provides that "the first 
president shall be deemed to have been elected." This provision was designed to ensure that election by the 
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presidential elections and two parliamentary elections at fixed dates. In addition, two 
regional council elections, and two local government elections have so far been held. 
Any organization is free to observe these elections. All who did observe the conduct of 
elections confinned them to be free and fair. 5 I I However, from a national perspective, 
endorsement of the fairness of elections by outsiders is not as important as the citizens' 
confidence in the fairness of the elections. Perhaps endorsement by foreign observers is 
important in the initial phase, but I feel that beyond it, continued preoccupation of the 
international community with the legitimisation of elections every time through foreign 
observers does not help build confidence of citizens in their own democratic processes, 
systems or institutions. After all, Africans do not go to the United States or Great Britain 
to legitimise their elections! The only sustainable guarantee for elections to be free and 
fair is the internalisation of democratic values by the citizens, a belief that democracy is 
good for the country, and faith in the established processes, systems and institutions. 
Despite its success in holding free and fair elections, the government of Namibia 
continues to seek ways to strengthen electoral democracy. All the political parties in the 
parliament are being funded by the state proportional to their representation in the 
parliament. However, some in the opposition still claim that the ruling party is at an 
advantage, as it has the support of the state machinery. Some of us, in SWAPO, on the 
other hand, are concerned that we have so far not been able to devise a mechanism for 
funding emerging parties, which have not yet secured a seat in the parliament. Perhaps, 
provision should be made for the emerging parties that wish to contest election for the 
National Assembly, to have access to threshold government funding. 
Constituent Assembly was indeed one of the two tenns the president was allowed to serve and also to 
ensure that his actions during the flrst flve years were legal. 
SIl For instance, see Sustainable Democracy: Elections 99, 
http://www.sardc.netlsdJelections99/mozambigue/ .. %5Cnamibia%5Cnam opener.html. accessed 18 
February 2004. Dr Brigalia Barn, team leader of the nine-member SADC electoral commissioners' 
observation group, said, "Namibian elections had been conducted professionally .... I visited 18 stations and 
everything looked flne. People waited patiently to vote, without intimidation. All mobile units were 
accompanied by party agents ... People slept overnight to watch the election material... This is good." 
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Further, women's representation in elected offices is improving considerably. According 
to March 2003 statistics published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union,sl2 Namibia stands 
eighteenth in world classification of countries based on women in national parliaments. It 
is surpassed only by South Africa, Seychelles and Mozambique in Africa. In March 2003, 
27.8% of the seats in the National Assembly were occupied by women. In the National 
Council, however, women's representation was just 7.7%. For sub-Saharan Africa, these 
averages were 13.6% and 13.7% respectively as compared to Nordic countries where 
40.1 % of the seats in the parliaments were occupied by women 
Recognizing that increasing the number of women representatives in the National 
Council would require involving more women in politics in the thirteen regions, the 
government decided to improve the situation initially by ensuring that a sufficient number 
of women contested local government elections. The Electoral Act was amended to 
provide that at least 30% of the candidates contesting local authority elections on party 
tickets must be women. During the last local government election, not only did women 
candidates participate, they won seats far in excess of 30%. In fact, of all the seats won 
by SWAPO, 41 % were won by women. The next step of the government would be to set 
similar minimums for regional government elections and eventually for national 
elections. 
A democratic culture is also becoming rooted in Namibia. In the 1999 regional 
government elections, there was one instance where SW APO and DT A won three seats 
each in a region. As a result of the tie, the elected representatives could not elect the 
governor for the region outright. However, the two political parties resolved the issue by 
sharing the position of governor - with SWAPO governor holding office for the first half 
of the term, and DT A governor holding office for the remaining half. Such 
accommodation is compelling evidence of the strength of the system, the culture of 
tolerance, and a political culture of inclusivity. 
SI2 Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments," http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 
accessed 4 April 2003. 
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During the last presidential and parliamentary elections, we saw another important 
development. Political leaders of different political parties not only accepted the people's 
will but also graciously conceded victory to the winner. When results were being 
declared in the presence of all the presidential candidates, with the exception of the 
Congress of Democrats (COD) candidate who was represented by another member of his 
party, it was touching to see the defeated candidates congratulate the winner. Mr K. 
Kaura, the presidential candidate for the DTA, embraced the president-elect, Mr Nujoma, 
and congratulated him on his victory. Similarly, Mr Katjiuongua, presidential candidate 
for DCN congratulated the president elect and assured him of his support. 
This development is a refreshing change in Africa, where the losing candidates in many 
countries refuse to accept electoral results. Where elections have been free and fair, but 
the losing candidates object to the fairness of the results, violence often ensues. This is 
one area where many African countries continue to fail. I dub this regrettable 
phenomenon as the 'Savimbi syndrome' because Mr Savimbi refused to accept electoral 
defeat. 
In countries, where defeated candidates reject the outcome of elections, the problem is 
much deeper. Rejection of the outcome of elections is tantamount to the rejection of the 
process or questioning the legitimacy of the process. In Namibia, we believed that the 
integrity of the process could be ensured only if the electoral commission is strong and 
transparent. If the commission is and is seen to be transparent, the losing parties will 
accept the outcome of the elections. 
In Namibia, the commission was administratively located in the Office of the Prime 
Minister, but when I was the prime minister, I favoured the commission's relocation. The 
government conducted a dialogue with various opposition parties about all aspects of the 
commission's structure and its functioning. A committee comprising representatives of 
SWAPO and opposition parties was established to take all parties' concerns into 
consideration. In my capacity as the Prime Minister, I presided over the committee's first 
meeting, but Mr Tjiriange, Minister of Justice, chaired subsequent meetings. 
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The committee established the criteria for the appointment of the members of the 
Commission, and the Director of Elections. It was agreed that the post of the director 
would be advertised. The president would choose one candidate for the post of director of 
elections and forward hislher name to the National Assembly for its endorsement. 
Further, it was decided that the Commission would have its own vote within the national 
budget. Now, the Electoral Commission's budget is presented to the National Assembly 
by the speaker. It could be argued that the success of elections in Namibia could partly be 
attributed to the government's working with the opposition to create a sense of 
inclusivity. 
Thus, emphasis must not be just on democratic elections but also on processes, systems 
and institutions of democracy. This three-tiered structure is important as processes 
stipulate what needs to be done; systems facilitate what needs to be done; and institutions 
oversee processes and systems and correct the situation if something goes wrong. 
The United States presidential elections of 2000 illustrate the point. The elections were 
flawed, with some people having been excluded by the process. Counting of votes, too, 
had come under criticism. We, in Africa, ridiculed the process. However, there was 
transparency, and systems were in place to address the flaw. Everyone knew what the 
problem was and what the solution could be. Journalists were embedded in the 
headquarters of both the parties, and each party's representative would appear on the 
television everyday to explain hislher party's position. 
The process had gone awry, but the system did not result in any power vacuum or 
legitimacy crisis. Mr Clinton was still the President. People had faith in the system, even 
if the process went wrong. Consequently, no soldiers were marching in the streets. 
Eventually, the parties to the conflict went to the Court to resolve the situation. Even 
before the Court ruled, some 76% of those polled by a polling agency said that they 
would accept the Court's decision. When the Supreme Court ruled, its verdict was 
accepted by the aggrieved party, Mr Gore, "I accept the finality of this outcome ... Now 
~. , 
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the US Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt.. .. While I strongly disagree 
with the court's position, I accept it." He also asked his supporters to unite behind his 
rival, Mr Bush, "We close ranks when the contest is done."S13 
African states need to learn from this example. We need to instil faith in our processes, 
systems and institutions, but that can be done only by promoting inc1usivity, transparency 
and accountability. 
Although Namibia has established a strong and sustainable electoral democracy, some 
concerns remain about the selection of candidates for inclusion in the party-list. The 
party-list system depends on the party hierarchy, and the party list reflects this hierarchy. 
The order on the list does not necessarily mean that the best or most popular candidate is 
on top. More popular candidates with the electorate might in fact be put nearer the 
bottom. This situation could result in depriving the electorate of having their favoured 
candidates representing them in the National Assembly. This weakness does not exist in 
constituency-based systems. However, in most parliamentary systems that is not the case. 
Further, as already mentioned in Chapter Four, having a party-list system based on the 
whole country as a constituency does not promote accountability of the candidates to the 
electorate, as is the case in constituency-based systems. 
In order to overcome some of these weaknesses, SWAPO gave the party president the 
right to select thirty people for inclusion in the party list. These thirty candidates form the 
first thirty names on the list, with their hierarchy determined by the party president. The 
rest of the forty-two positions on the list are contested at the Party Congress. The 
interested candidates' names are, so to say, 'put in the pot to boil and survive.' Delegates 
at the SWAPO Congress vote for these candidates. A candidate who gets the maximum 
number of votes gets to be the 31 st candidate on the list, and so on until the party's list of 
72 candidates is complete. 
Sl3 "Partisan Rancour must be put aside," in The Guardian (U.K.) (15 December 2000). 
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As the Westminster type parliamentary system based on proportional representation does 
not allow independent candidates to contest elections, there have been instances where 
failed party members created civil society organizations a few days before elections with 
the sole purpose of contesting elections. They are able to raise funds, often from outside 
the country, ostensibly for their role within the civil society, but these funds are used for 
electioneering. Regrettably, such a situation undermines the civil society's credibility. 
The Congress of Democrats (COD), one of the opposition parties that contested the last 
presidential and parliamentary elections, started as a civil society grouping of 'all' 
Namibians. It was claimed to be a forum for democracy, where all Namibians, regardless 
of their political affiliation, were welcomed. I stated to my staff members, namely Mr 
Simataa and others, "Mark my words, the forum will be changed into a political party." 
Indeed, it happened. It became the Congress of Democrats. 
The proportional representation system, however, has one significant advantage -- it 
increases the representation of smaller parties in the parliament, who are likely to be 
completely left out in a winner takes all alternative. Therefore, the proportional 
representation system ensures that there will always be an opposition. 
In line with Dahl's five standards of democracy already referred to, democracy needs to 
go beyond just electoral democracy. It needs a vibrant and free media, and a strong civil 
society. Free media is necessary for promoting enlightened understanding and effective 
participation, and a strong civil society is necessary to allow citizens to have effective 
participation and control of the agenda. 
Media Freedom 
During Namibia's struggle for independence, some of the representatives of the media 
played a very important role, despite the fact that they had to work under the constraints 
imposed by the colonial administration. Particularly, editors of the English language 
media, such as Ms Gwen Lister of The Namibian, and Mr Hannes Smith of the then 
Windhoek Advertiser, were outspoken critics of the apartheid regime and were a source of 
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great strength and infonnation for the liberation struggle. In the post-colonial era, the 
media continue to perfonn an important function of infonning the people, educating them 
about democracy, and challenging state authority on issues that they consider vital for the 
welfare of the people and for the welfare of democracy. 
Prior to Namibia's independence, the media regularly confronted the colonial 
government. After independence, some members of the media still continue to be 
confrontational. They have difficulty adapting from colonialism to independence and 
democracy, to make the transfonnation from being confrontational to being constructive. 
What the new environment needs is not speculation but accuracy, not rumours but 
facts. 514 Ronning515 correctly argues the new type of sensationalist African newspapers 
"are highly critical of government, both the new and the old, which personalise political 
issues, run campaigns against officials and politicians, expose scandals of economic, 
political and private character ... which often shows poor journalistic judgement and 
oversteps unwritten, but internationally accepted ethical rules." 
The media's obsession with sensationalism weakens the interpretation of journalism as 
the great leveller, a righter of wrongs, a humbler of the mighty, a watchdog against the 
abuse of power, an agent to 'comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable,' which is 
very much in question today.516 "One venue of critique sees journalism as having shifted 
from watchdog to mad dog, mindlessly attacking authority (especially governments), 
avoiding 'serious' news about public affairs in favour of scandals, celebrities and 
'infotainment. ",517 
514 During the first quarter of 2003 and beyond, there was considerable speculation that President Nujoma 
might seek to amend the constitution to accommodate his desire to stay in office for a fourth term. See, for 
example, The Namibian (30 August 2002). 
515 Helge Ronning (1996), "Urban Character of the African Press," in Tore Slatta (ed.), Media and the 
Transition of Collective Identities, Oslo, University of Oslo, pp. 39-40. 
516 Robert A. Hackett, "The News Media and Civic Equality: Watch Dogs, Mad Dogs, or Lap Dogs? in 
Edward Broadbent (ed.) (2001), Democratic Equality: What Went Wrong?, Toronto, Univ. of Toronto 
Press, pp. 297-298. 
517 June Callwood (2002), Dalton Camp Lecture delivered at St. Thomas University, Fredericton, New 
Brunswick (23 October 2002) and excerpted in The Toronto Star (2 November 2002). 
' .. 
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Often media undennine the government's efforts to communicate with the masses and 
often threaten the legitimacy of elected democratic authorities.sl8 In this obsession with 
attacking authority, the media have little time for facilitating public discourse on matters 
of concern to the citizens, despite the fact that such discourse is important for the creation 
of infonned public opinion. 
A different critique sees the media not as mad dogs, but as lap dogs, excessively 
subservient to the economic and political elite. Significantly, the ability of the economic 
and political elite to brandish anti-establishment views is that they own their own 
newspapers. As AJ. Liebling famously said, "Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to 
those who own one."SI9 These days it is difficult to see much air between media owners, 
ruling political parties and the corporate world. 
Nevertheless, the media is a powerful instrument for shaping opinion. As Cohens2o points 
out, media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it 
is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about." The media, thus, sets 
the agenda through the issues it raises, through the issues it does not raise, e.g., minority 
opinions, and through producing meanings. 
In the developing world, media sometimes choose to be negative to please the outside 
world. Some even view their role to be in opposition to the government, allegedly 
because the opposition itself is weak. Others just like challenging the government. I recall 
that at the 1993 Prime Minister's Consultative Conference with the Media, the Editor of 
the Windhoek Observer, Mr Smith, stated that he likes testing the boundaries as to how 
far he can go before the government cracks down on him. So far, however, there has been 
no such crackdown. 
518 See James Fallows (1996), Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy, New 
Y orle, Pantheon. 
519 Callwood, Dalton Camp Lecture. 
520 Bemard C. Cohen (1963), The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, p. 13. 
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Namibian print media is either privately owned, or political party owned. All of them are 
urban based and therefore have small readership. Rural communities don't have access to 
these newspapers. Consequently, a large percentage of the population remained 
uninformed about political, social and economic developments in the country, except 
through radio, word of mouth, or political discussions. 
In order to correct this imbalance, the government started its own newspaper to inform 
Namibians, particularly rural Namibians, about the government's development initiatives 
and extend them an opportunity to provide their feedback. The government newspaper 
did not cut into other media's circulation base, as most of its readers are rural Namibians. 
The government-owned media, of course, focus on government policy, but the 
government-owned newspaper, the New Era, maintains a fair amount of editorial 
freedom. It also does not hesitate to criticize the government's position when thought 
necessary. Occasionally it has come under criticism by the politicians for not adequately 
covering parliamentary debates and other government policy issues. 
The government's decision to launch its own newspaper was criticised by the private 
media and the opposition parties, labelling it as an attack on media freedom.m Just 
because the government started its own newspaper does not mean that other media's 
freedom is curtailed. But, at one time, the cabinet had decided that the government 
offices, ministries and agencies should not advertise in certain newspapers. That was, in 
my opinion, wrong and could certainly be viewed as impinging on media freedom. 
There is also no restriction on electronic media. In fact, in addition to government funded 
radio stations, a number of other radio stations have sprung up, serving their own 
communities. An autonomous commission· grants licenses for operating radio and 
television stations. In Namibia, radio and television are more influential than the print 
media as broadcasting covers the whole country. National Broadcasting Corporation's 
(NB C) radio services with their call-in programmes provide citizens with a means to 
interact with government officials. Citizens raise questions and concerns, the talk show 
S2I See The Namibian (2 May 2002). 
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host obtains responses from the government and other sources, and the responses are 
broadcast the same day. 
NBC radio service also used to host "Prime Minister's Question Time", where citizens 
would write to the prime minister for a response on the radio. This programme ran for 
seven years, but it was discontinued because of political machinations by certain political 
elements. Regrettably, there have also been other attempts by government ministers to 
influence the programming of electronic media. Such interference can be eliminated only 
if the leadership values media freedom, freedom of expression, and the public's right to 
know. In this context, Namibia also has to address the issue of right to information. 
Independent Namibia made a good start by ensuring the freedom of media, but like all the 
attributes of democracy, media freedom and promotion of responsible and responsive 
media need to be cultivated by a new cultural idiom, by making it a part of the country's 
political vernacular. 
Civil Society 
Civil society organizations touch upon all the five standards of democracy articulated by 
Dahl/22 and therefore, establish their importance in a democracy. However, new 
democracies lack several conditions necessary for the stability of democratic institutions. 
Some of these conditions include the lack of effective parties, the lack of encompassing 
unions, the lack of national bourgeoisies, and the lack of a crystallized structure of 
interests to be represented. 523 
Therefore, with renewed interest in democracy, the concept of civil society gained 
increased prominence, and the literature on civil society burgeoned.524 The primary 
reason for this increased interest in civil society is the appreciation that it is necessary for 
the favourable outcome of the future of democracy, for new democracies need "to create 
522 Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 37-38. 
523 Adam przeworski (1995), Sustainable Democracy, New York, Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 53. 
524 Michael Bratton (1994), "Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa," IDRC Reports, 11, 6, p. 1. 
This document has an excellent bibliography on civil society with particular emphasis on Africa. 
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the channels and the incentives for all the major political forces to process their interests 
within the framework of representative institutions.,,525 
While civil society is a set of organizations that serve as channels for processing the 
interests of different groups, definitions of civil society are diverse and very often 
ambiguous, because different scholars have sought to focus on normative, non-normative, 
or empirical definitions.526 Scholars have reflected on whether organizations representing 
family, clan, race or economic interests should be considered elements of civil society. 
Shils527 includes economic institutions in the framework of the civil society. Janoski528 
views civil society as a set of institutions that overlap the state, public, private, and 
market spheres. Allen529 is of the opinion that conceptually civil society is 
diffuse, hard to define, empirically imprecise, and ideologically laden. 
Analytically it is vacuous, and concepts such as class or gender contribute far 
more to understanding recent political change than can 'civil society'. Its 
popularity and continued employment rest on its ideological underpinning, 
notably on claims that civil society is necessarily distinct from the state, in 
opposition to the state, and the source of (liberal) democratic values and 
pressures. It is thus the proponents of liberal democratic reform, notably those 
external to African polities that 'need' civil society. 
However, pragmatic considerations, such as needing to promote accountability of 
government, and seeking the support of the donor community, make it necessary for the 
governments of newly independent states to work with civil society. Civil society in 
newly independent states is also important because of its contribution to the 
independence of their countries. Efforts of labour movements, student unions, churches, 
intermediate elites, e.g., lawyers, academics, and journalists, resulted in the overthrow of 
the colonial yoke, dictatorships, and one party states in many parts of Africa. Similar 
examples exist in recent times in Eastern Europe. 
525 Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy, p. 64. 
526 See Bahmueller, "Civil Society and Democracy Reconsidered." 
527 ShiIs, "The Virtue of Civil Society," p.3. 
528 Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society. pp.12-13. 
529 Chris AlIen (1997), "Who Needs Civil Society," Review of African Political Economy, 24, 73, pp. 329-
337. 
234 
For the purpose of this study, Bratton and Diamond's definitions should be adequate 
because of their precision. Bratton530 defines civil society as "a sphere of social 
interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication." 
He further emphasises that civil society lies beyond the household. Its activity may be 
motivated by a quest for private advantage, but it is not private. "It is collective action in 
which individuals join to pursue shared goals, and it takes place in the institutional 
'commons' that lie beyond the boundaries of the household."S31 
Diamond532 defines civil society in empirical terms, "Civil society is the realm of 
organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially se1f-
sufficient, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules." 
Thus, civil society operates in a space that is not under the control of the state. It is 
premised on the notion of voluntary interlocutors that supposedly incarnate different 
. I· t t 533 SOCIa In eres s. 
Bratton534 notes that civil society's roots are to be found in both the liberal and Marxist 
traditions. De Tocqueville emphasized "the importance of voluntary associations in 
promoting democratic citizenship," and Gramsci emphasized "the role of social 
institutions in either buttressing or challenging state power." As "civil society 
manufactures political consent, it is the source of legitimation of state power. The right of 
any elite to exercise state power is ultimately dependent upon popular acceptance.,,535 If, 
however, citizens believe that ruling elites are abusing the power granted them, some of 
the citizens might launch an oppositional critique, which becomes popularised and 
eventually results in bringing about change. 536 
530 Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa," p. 2. 
531 Ibid., p. 3. 
532 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, p. 221 
533 Ibid. 
534 Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa," p. 1. 
535 Ibid., p. 9. 
536 Ibid. 
, 
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In Namibia, labour unions and other worker organizations, student and teacher 
organizations, and churches played an important role in Namibians' struggle for 
independence. As the territory had considerable white colonial settlement, most of the 
civil society organizations were there, as in other colonies, to serve the interests of the 
Whites. Black associations that emerged to counter the oppression, therefore, had to 
struggle against both the colonial state and the white civil society organizations.537 
Namibian migrant workers, despite the fact that Namibian workers were denied the right 
to legally organize themselves, formed the first informal civil society organization of 
blacks. In 1893, this organization staged its first strike at the Gross Otavi copper mine to 
protest against working conditions. Subsequently, in 1920, the first African trade union 
was formed under the aegis of the South Africa based Industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union. It was led by Mr Clemints Kandalie and had its headquarters in Luderitz 
Bay with branches in Windhoek and Walvis Bay, but it was ruthlessly suppressed by the 
occupation regime. A similar fate met the attempt at opening a branch of the South 
African Food and Canning Workers Union in 1949.538 
As already mentioned in Chapter 5, Namibian contract workers in South Africa formed 
the Ovamboland Peoples' Congress in 1957 under the leadership of Andimba H. Toivo 
ya Toivo with the aim of fighting against the hated migrant labour system. This 
organisation was later transformed into OPO and eventually into SWAPO. 
After SWAPO's consultative conference in Tanga, Tanzania in 1969-70, the liberation 
movement decided to establish the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). 
Subsequently, SWAPO began the process of training trade unionists for NUNW and 
established a School of Trade Unions at Nyango in 1978.539 Soon thereafter, internal 
wings ofNUNW were established. 
537 Helge Ronning, "Democracy, Civil Society and the Media in Africa in the 90s," in Tore Slatta (ed.) 
(1996)., Media and the Transition of Collective Identities, Oslo, Univ. of Oslo, pp. 39,145. 
538 United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, p. 264. 
539 Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) (1998), Still Fighting for Social Justice: A Survey of 
Trade Unions, Women Organisations, Communal Farmers' and Service Organisations in Namibia, 
Windhoek, LaRRI, p. 11. 
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During the 1980s, the colonial government tried to weaken the influence of NUNW by 
setting up and financing some unions outside the NUNW. As a result, at the time of 
independence, there were eight trade union federations divided along political lines. 
However, a majority of workers supported NUNW.540 In 1989, the exiled and internal 
wings ofNUNW were merged, during a consolidation congress held in Windhoek, 
In independent Namibia, too, the labour movement continues to play an important role in 
influencing government policy. For instance, at the National Land Conference, of which I 
was the chairman, NUNW presented its position paper. It stated that the labour 
movement in Namibia was "fundamentally opposed to any attempt that regards the 
market as a mechanism for redistributing land from the privileged propertied minority to 
the landless majority.,,54IThe labour movement has also been involved in other issues:542 
Namibia's trade union movement is well aware of the fact that it cannot narrowly 
pursue the interests of organised workers alone. There have always been and still 
remain very close links with other socially and economically disadvantaged 
groups .... As a result of its history as a progressive force during the liberation 
struggle, the NUNW unions have also maintained close links with other organs of 
civil society that advocate on behalf of the economically and socially 
disadvantaged. The NUNW's affiliation to the Namibia NGO Forum (NANGOF) 
is a testimony to this link. 
While it is true that NUNW has often spoken on behalf of the economically and socially 
disadvantaged, it has oftentimes been reckless and careless in its comments.543 Their 
comments about land grabs, attacks on government ministers, and opposition to the 
privatisation of Air Namibia have been most unfortunate. Labour unions need to realize 
that such actions are detrimental to nation building - militancy for the sake of militancy 
is counterproductive. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I am glad that SW APO 
540 Ibid. p. 28. See also G. Bauer, "Labour Relations in Occupied Namibia," in G. Klerk and others (1997), 
Continuity and Change: Labour Relations in Independent Namibia, Windhoek, Gamsberg Macmillan; and 
P. Peltola (1995), The Lost May Day: Namibian Workers Struggle for Independence, Helsinki, Finish 
Anthropological Society in association with the Nordic African Institute. 
541 NUNW, NUNW Position Paper, June 1991. 
542 Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRIJ, Still Fighting for Social Justice, pp. 29-30. 
543 See The Namibian (2 May 2003, 18 November 2003). 
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condemned the NUNW threats about land grabs and forewarned the union members that 
those who attempted to occupy land would be removed and arrested. 
NUNW has been opposing the privatisation of Air Namibia in the interest of its members. 
However, in the larger context, it is doing great disservice to the economically and 
socially disadvantaged, because Air Namibia is bleeding the government coffers, leaving 
that much less for social programmes. 
Like the labour unions, Namibian churches also played an influential role in first 
supporting the liberation movement and then, helping the disadvantaged groups. 
Dobe1l544 notes that "the Namibian churches' staunch backing of SWAPO provided it 
with a moral legitimacy enjoyed by few, if any, ostensibly Marxist-Leninist guerrilla 
movements, and secured for it not only the powerful backing of international church 
bodies, but widespread support from generally conservative church congregations around 
the world." 
In this regard, the heroic deeds of many members of the clergy are worth mentioning. 
Reverend Michael Scott was the first person to petition to the United Nations against 
South Africa's occupation of Namibia. Bishop Colin Winter's opposition to apartheid 
resulted in his being deported by South Africa. Pastor Gowaseb and Bishop Auala had 
written an open letter to South African Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, about the evils of 
apartheid. Reverend Kameeta (now Bishop), Pastor Tjirimue, and many others were 
members of SWAPO and as such participated fully in the liberation struggle. Pastor 
Marcos Kooper and Reverend Theophelos Hamutuganelwa were two of the earlier 
petitioners to the United Nations against apartheid and the occupation of Namibia. These 
notable members of the Namibian community suffered greatly for their belief in the 
rights ofNarnibians. 
S44 Dobell, SWAPO's Strugglefor Namibia, 1960-1991, p. 65. See also Erastus Haikali, "Churches and the 
Liberation Struggle in Namibia," in Wood (ed.), Namibia: 1884-1984, pp. 635-637. 
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In post-colonial Namibia, churches, in addition to their work for their own religious 
constituencies, continued to play an important role in educating the masses about AIDS, 
helping the relief effort during periods of drought, and helping women's organisations in 
diverse areas. In fact, the Emergency Management Unit in the Office of the Prime 
Minister works very closely with the churches during drought periods in identifying the 
most vulnerable individuals, families and groups and involving the churches in 
distributing food to the vulnerable. However, religious bodies' involvement in politics is 
limited. "For reasons of innate caution and self-preservation, these established religious 
bodies tend to prefer ad hoc rather than prolonged involvements in national politics."s45 
Another set of civil society organizations dealing with women's issues came into 
existence during the liberation struggle when various political parties organised women's 
wings. According to the LaRRI study,546 women's groups in Namibia fall in four main 
categories, viz., religious groups, income-generating groups, women's wings of political 
parties, and women empowerment groups. Although the first two categories are 
important and do valuable work at local level, women's wings of political parties and 
women empowerment groups have a national sway and are involved in influencing 
government policy. For example, the SWAPO Women's Council argued and won support 
for having nomination quotas for women for local government elections. Before 
independence, the then Secretary for SWAPO Women's Council, Mrs Pendukeni Ithana 
had laid a firm foundation for the women's role in SWAPO and government. 
Important women's empowerment groups include Namibian National Women's 
Organisation (NANAWO), Namibian Women's Association (NAWA) , Sister Namibia, 
Women's Action for Development (WAD), Young Women's Christian Association, and 
Women Solidarity. These groups work on diverse issues affecting women, such as 
lobbying for reform of laws to ensure equality for women, promoting women's rights, 
undertaking empowerment initiatives, helping victims of rape and violence, supporting 
housing initiatives, educating women about health issues, disseminating information on 
545 Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly." 
546 Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI), Still Fighting for Social Justice, p. 31. 
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AIDS, teen pregnancies and other social issues, and organlsmg self-help groups. 
However, "class, race and party politics still keep women divided. As a result women's 
groups do not lobby as a united front on issues such as women's representation in 
government, politics, AIDS, engendering of education and the economy, access to water, 
inheritance laws, etc."S47 
Students and teachers, too, had been involved in the struggle for independence. While in 
the past, protest was unorganised, the formation of the Namibian National Students' 
Organization (NANSO) in 1984 resulted in a concerted attempt by black students to fight 
for equality in education.548 With NANSO's affiliation to SWAPO, the students had 
taken their place in the wider struggle for independence. However, after the country 
became independent, NANSO disaffiliated, resulting in the break up of NANSO into 
NANSO and the 'Mighty NANSO', with the latter still affiliated to SWAPO.s49 Teachers 
were organised under the banner of the Namibia National Teachers Union (NANTU) and 
the Teachers Union of Namibia (TUN) to fight for the eradication of inequalities in 
education and advocate social equality. 
There are of course, many other unions and associations operating within the country, 
such as farmers unions, chambers of commerce and industry, the Cheetah Conservancy 
Fund, Drug Action Group, Legal Assistance Centre, Media Institute of Southern Africa, 
Namibia Housing Action Group, Namibia Institute for Democracy, Namibia Nature 
Foundation, Namibia Sports Council, National Youth Council of Namibia, and many 
more that are doing excellent work. All of these organisations network through the 
Namibia Non-governmental Organisations Forum (NANGOF). 
Other organizations, such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and the Study 
and Research Group on Democracy and Social and Economic Development Africa 
(GERDDES-Afrique) have assisted multiparty democracy initiatives in sub-Saharan 
547 Ibid., p. 55. 
548 During the colonial period education had remained racially stratified, with white pupils getting the most 
qualified teachers and the bulk of resources (See also Chapter Five). 
549 Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI), Still Fightingfor Social Justice, p. 35. 
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Africa. Similarly, there are a number of largely foreign-funded associations with a 
political focus that have greatly contributed to national development and democracy in 
Namibia. These include organizations such as the Africa Group of Sweden, the Ford 
Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the German Development Service, 
International Cooperation for Development, and Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung. Of course, 
these associations have their own agendas as well, but their primary focus is on 
Namibia's development. 
For the civil society to carry out its role unhindered, it is important that its institutions 
have autonomy from the state in their functioning and operations. Regrettably, however, 
inadequate funding of civil society organizations, particularly organizations such as 
human rights organizations and women's groups, as against church organizations and 
trade unions, has been a serious constraint on their work in many of the developing 
countries. 
Their ability to raise funds locally is limited as the majority of citizens are poor. 
Therefore, ''they often turn for support to governments and external donors, a 
compromising strategy that distorts the accountability owed to members. Assistance from 
western bilateral agencies, the United Nations, and a host of international NGOs such as 
CARE, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, and the African Development 
Foundation has been crucial for the survival of many local NGOs. Yet, the foreign origins 
of this assistance render it suspect in the eyes of local authorities."sso 
It is not unusual for the government to feel that donor agencies have their own agendas, 
which they seek to push through local civil society organizations. These agendas may be 
politically motivated, or may indeed be very noble, but they are suspect. There have been 
instances of international donor agencies funding opposition parties allegedly to 
'promote' democracy, but such support could easily make the ruling party feel slighted. 
To the extent that civil society is a battleground where states and other powerful actors 
seek to "intervene to influence the political agendas of organized groups with the 
550 Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly." 
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intention of defusing opposition,,,ssl one can appreciate the reaction of the government to 
the funding of opposition parties by foreign agencies. 
However, the fact remams that civil society organizations need funds to operate 
effectively. The state could help some of the organizations that are apolitical, but state 
help for most other organizations could easily compromise their work, as they could be 
subjected to demands from the state. Indeed, because of certain NOOs' prominence in the 
economic and political life of various countries, such as labour unions, governments 
(including elected ones) might find it difficult to resist controlling them. 
Namibia's civil society organisations face many challenges, such as inadequate funding, 
lack of skilled personnel, and, above all, near absence of a culture of volunteering one's 
time to help civil society organisations. Therefore, many of the initiatives of civil society 
will continue to be funded by foreign donors. However, with foreign funding come 
strings. In fact, many NGOs complain that "the work around funding proposals and 
reporting detracts from the organisation's work. Some NOOs experienced a lack of 
understanding for 'NOO realities' on the side of the donors who often perceive their own 
systems as the best and attach little value to local ones."SS2 
Some of the initiatives, such as violence against women, teen pregnancies, and AIDS 
education programmes could be funded, at least partly, by the government. These 
initiatives are being given expression by the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Child 
Welfare. Further, as the education level of the Namibians improves, human resource 
constraint will be relieved. However, a cultural shift would be needed to motivate citizens 
to contribute time to the society's welfare. These initiatives are being promoted by 
environmental groups, the Crisis Help Line, and focused fund-raising projects, for 
example in establishing cancer care units. 
SSI Julie Heam (2001), "The 'Uses and Abuses' of Civil Society in Africa," The Review of African Political 
Economy, 28,87, pp. 43-53. 
sS2Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI), Still Fighting for Social Justice, p. 31. 
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Civil society constitutes an arena in which states and other powerful actors intervene to 
influence the political agendas of organized groups with the intention of defusing 
opposition.ss3 Since 1991, governments in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe have 
proposed or enacted legislation designed to strengthen official authority over NGOs, 
usually under the guise of developing a national regulatory framework for associations. 
Other NGOs that are involved in political activism have withered or changed character as 
key leaders have taken posts in the new post-authoritarian governments or plunged into 
party politics. Indeed, many of Africa's new democracy-specific civil associations have 
turned out to be nothing more than "political-action committees" or proto-parties that 
have more in common with "political" than "civil" society.ss4 
Bahmuellersss believes that actually or potentially, civil society has other indispensable 
functions in the democratic order, such as integrating individuals and groups into the 
larger social order; supplementing or substituting for government programs; mediating 
between individuals and the state; educating citizens for democracy; and tempering 
narrow selfishness by extending exclusive loyalties. However, as Bahmuellers56 points 
out: 
Not every aspect of civil societies as we find them, as opposed to how we might 
imagine them, is good or desirable. But if the state guaranteed the ethical 
worthiness of civil associations, it would assault the very liberty that liberal 
democracy aims to protect. ... Nevertheless, the necessity to preserve democratic 
liberties does not mean that 'anything goes' in the life of civil society if liberal 
democracy is to remain truly liberal. The actions of hate groups have often 
crossed the line between the permissible and the forbidden. Irrational, distasteful, 
or even loathsome speech ought to be protected, but not incitement to violence or 
violence itself. In principle, liberal toleration extends to every loyalty that allows 
others their own loyalty. 
Therefore, while the state makes civil society liveable, perhaps even possible, it needs to 
I . 557 contro Its excesses. 
S53 Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly." 
S54 Ibid. 
S55 Bahmueller, "Civil Society and Democracy Reconsidered." 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
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Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is increasingly being seen by central governments as an important 
contributor to good governance. Nations with the best long-term record of democratic 
governance have also been involved ln implementing various forms of 
decentralisation.558 This correlation has prompted many central governments to work 
towards decentralising political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities to lower-level 
governments.559 
Nyiri560 points out that the rationale for decentralisation is manifold. Normative 
arguments in favour of decentralisation include increased citizen participation in public 
affairs, minority rights protection against majority rule, and increased acceptance of 
grassroots diversity, such as local customs and traditions. "In addition to the normative-
inherent ideas behind administrative decentralization, there exists an instrumental line of 
argumentation that concerns the organizational outcome of decentralization." These 
outcomes include greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public 
affairs, prevention of system overload and breakdown, and prevention of abuse of central 
government, or provision of a "bulwark against tyranny." 
However, decentralization is not easy to define because of its many forms and several 
dimensions. "Indeed, a wide variety of institutional restructurings are encompassed by 
this label, and several variants may be operating at the same time within a country, and 
even within a sector."S61 Depending on the mix of these variables, there are many types 
of decentralization, such as deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatisation. 
Because of such a wide scope of decentralization, it is not unusual to find some 
components of decentralization present in every country. 
558 Richard Vengroff (1994), Decentralization in Africa: A Review of the Experience in Rural Development 
(AID commissioned Concept Paper), p. 8. 
559 Jennie Litvack. Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird (1998), Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing 
Countries, Washington, D.C., The World Bank. p. 1. 
560 Zsolt Nyiri, Decentralization and Good Governance: Ten Years of Hungarian Experience (Storrs, CT, 
Univ. of Connecticut), http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/puhlic/documents/nispacee/unpan005561.pdf, 
accessed 13 Apri12003. 
56) Litvack. Ahmad and Bird, Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries, p. 4. 
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Despite the diversity of decentralization options, the history of the development of 
decentralisation in Africa has been somewhat inconsistent and not very encouraging. 
"Much of the inconsistency can be attributed to the fact that the correlation between 
'formally' announced programs of decentralization and a serious and successful effort at 
its implementation is quite low, or in some cases nonexistent."s62 One of the reasons for 
this discrepancy is that during the 1980s most African countries were preoccupied with 
reforming their economic systems and seeking to increase the role of the market and the 
environment in which it operates. "Role of the public sector in promoting development 
. d l' 1 t'" 563 receIve Itt e atten Ion. 
However, in some states the policy of decentralization was emphasized partly to 
encourage democratic sentiment, and partly to promote a development culture from 
grassroots up. But, paradoxically, at a practical level that has not always been the case. 
Very often considerable vocal emphasis was placed on decentralization, but in reality 
attempts were made to concentrate power at the centre. Appropriate legal provisions also 
helped concretise this contradiction. In addition to talking about 'participation of 
citizens,' 'promotion of regional or local development,' and 'role of regionall1ocal 
governments in reinforcing democracy,' constitutions of various countries or 
constitutions of political parties put stringent limits on what could be 'delegated' to 
regional governments. 
Vengroff564 notes that many governments believed that centralization of power was 
important for achieving political integration and development. Secondly, "even when 
decentralization was implemented, it rarely meant more than deconcentration or 
delegation.,,565 Tordoff566 argues that the reluctance of central governments to share some 
of their powers is not based just on their unwillingness to dilute their authority: In recent 
years sub-national groups were stimulated into activity by the democratic process and 
562 Vengroff, Decentralization in Africa, p. 5. 
563 Paul Smoke (2001), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Current Concepts 
and Practice, Geneva, UNRID, p. 1. 
564 Vengroff, Decentralization in Africa, p. 5. 
565 Nyiri, Decentralization and Good Governance, p. 6. 
566 Tordotl; Government and Politics in Africa, pp. 10-11. 
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made demands for independence or greater autonomy, that state governments had to 
accommodate or resist. Examples include Zanzibari pressure for greater regional 
autonomy in Tanzania; the post-1991 experiment in ethnic federalism in Ethiopia and the 
Ethiopian acceptance of Eritrea's secession; and the anchoring of South Africa's 
constitution to a layer of potentially strong provincial governments. However, until the 
1980s and beyond, most states shied away from such sweeping decentralization 
measures. Thus, the so-called decentralization undertaken by Zambia in 1968-9 and 
Tanzania in 1972 really amounted to a deconcentration of administrative authority. 
Another reason for not transferring too much power to the regIOns has been the 
realization that the process of decentralization opens the governments to political 
pressures at local level: 
Politicians with a regional power base will be able to play on their opposition to 
the central government, providing in concrete and immediately identifiable terms 
- a new road, an industrial park, training programmes for the region's 
unemployed - that they have the interests of the local population to the fore, and 
that the central government is far too distant to be of any practical and profitable 
use in the community.567 
In Namibia, some work on decentralization has been done, but there have been reasons 
for ambivalence. Namibia is a large country with a small population. In fact, the country 
has a population density of some two persons per square kilometre. The average 
population of the thirteen regions is 130 000. There are wide economic and social 
disparities between these regions, with most of the regions having very little capacity to 
raise any finances locally. A significant portion of this population already lives under one 
of the twelve town council jurisdictions. The government also feels that there is a need to 
strengthen unity in a state that was tom apart by apartheid, there is a shortage of trained 
human resources, and the burden on the exchequer, resulting from another layer of civil 
service structure at the local level, could be quite substantial. 
There is also concern that if regions have unequal resource bases, those with more 
resources could well demand a bigger share, or poorer regions could demand a fairer 
561 HOTsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State. p. 247. 
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share. The national government fears that such developments could easily result in 
divisiveness, as has been the case in Nigeria where oil-producing states have often sought 
to keep the revenues from oil or complained that they got no benefit from their resources. 
Though Nigeria is a federal state, one cannot rule out the possibility of such divisiveness 
emerging even in unitary states if the government opts for extensive administrative and 
fiscal decentralization. 
Such pressures are already beginning to show in Namibia: 
A group claiming to represent the Nama in the south is threatening to sue the 
Namdeb Diamond Corporation (government-De Beers diamond producer) for 
compensation for huge revenues from the Sperrgebiet (prohibited area) of 
southwestern Namibia over the past century. The chairman of Democratic Action 
for Namaland (DAN) , veteran politician and journalist Emil Appolus, says 
Oshivambo appoint themselves to senior jobs in town and regional offices in the 
south. The government, says Appolus, has failed to help the poverty-stricken 
Nama and located them out of state-backed joint ventures with foreign companies 
in diamonds, fisheries and grape cultivation. 568 
Galvin and Habib569 point out, "Decentralization is an inherently political process. It is 
favoured by political and socio-economic actors because it is seen to advance their 
interests." They point out that the interests of various actors are quite different. Societal 
interest groups are interested in bringing development closer to the people. State 
technocrats are interested in more efficient delivery of services through decentralization, 
and economic elites support decentralization "in the hope that it will undermine the 
regulatory capacity and lead to the shrinkage of the national state."S70 National leaders, 
on the other hand, feel that decentralization undermines the management of development 
571 
resources by the centre. 
In the case of Namibia, despite its ambivalence, the government has remained committed 
to decentralization within a unitary state, but the nature of decentralization is somewhat 
568 Africa Confidential, 24, 23. 
569 Mary Galvin and Adam Habib (2001), Final Report: Donors, State-NGO Relations, and the Politics of 
'Community-oriented' Decentralization: South Africa's Rural Water Supply with an eye to the Namibian 
Experience, Durban, Donor Funding Projects, Univ. of Natal, p. 2. 
570 Ibid. 
571 P. Mawhood (ed.) (1993), Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Decentralization in 
Tropical Africa, Johannesburg, Africa Inst of South Africa. 
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different. "SWAPO accepted decentralization as an aim, but maintained that this would 
not in any way compromise Namibia's unitary state." 572 
The government's commitment to decentralization flows from its commitment to 
democracy and its desire to seek citizens' participation in national as well as local affairs. 
At the local level, the government seeks to involve citizens in stipulating developmental 
initiatives. I have often said that one of the advantages of decentralization is that the 
citizens know on what door to knock in the neighbourhood, if they have a problem with 
water or access to education or clinics or problems with the law and order situation. For 
them, the central government is too far away. The government's objective is, thus, to 
ensure that in the unitary state developmental disparities in the regions are addressed with 
concrete local inputs, and support of the centre. However, the process of decentralization 
does not stop at regional level; it needs also to trickle down to local government levels, 
including rural settlement areas. 
National government has already gone quite far in political decentralization. Structure, 
establishment, and composition of regional councils and local governments are stipulated 
in Chapter 12 of Namibia's Constitution. In line with these provisions, the president 
appointed a delimitation commission with the approval of the parliament to demarcate the 
boundaries of regions and constituencies. Based on the recommendations of this 
commission, the country was divided into thirteen regions and ninety-five constituencies 
in 1992. Members of the regional councils and the local authorities are elected. 
Subsequently, the parliament passed a number of relevant pIeces of legislation to 
establish a legal framework for regional and local governments. These include the 
Regional Councils Act of 1992, the Local Authorities Act of 1992, the Council of 
Traditional Leaders Act of 1997, and the Traditional Authorities Act of 2000. Since 1992, 
regional and local government elections have been held regularly. Regional Councillors 
m Galvin and Habib, Final Report: Donors, State-NGO Relations, and the Politics of 'Community-
oriented' Decentralization, p. 2. 
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also elect two representatives from within the elected council members to represent the 
region in the twenty-six member National Council, the second house of the parliament. 
In 1996, the cabinet approved a detailed decentralization policy, and its implementation 
started in 1998. The Directorate of Decentralisation Co-ordination created within the 
Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing is spearheading the process of 
implementation.573 "In this directorate special emphasis would be placed on legislation 
review and policy formulation to create the necessary framework to devolve functions, 
authority, and financial responsibility" to the regions.574 Other responsibilities of the 
directorate are to ensure that "policy issues are adequately articulated both at horizontal 
and vertical levels and there is systematic monitoring of the implementation process."S75 
The objectives of decentralization in Namibia include extending, enhancing and 
guaranteeing participatory democracy; ensuring rapid and sustainable development; 
transferring power to the regional councils and the local authorities based on national 
ideals and values; and improving the capacity of regional and local government councils 
to plan, implement, manage and monitor delivery of services to their constituents.576 
Thus, the government strives to promote participatory democracy, empower the local 
population to make its own decisions and determine its own destiny. It also aims at 
improving public sector management, so that in the long run there is close linkage 
between taxes paid by the people and the quality of services provided. This approach 
should also enable the citizens at the local level to hold their appointed and elected 
leaders accountable. 
The Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing has provided leadership 
for the implementation process. For example, with the passing of the two acts and the 
573 Namibia, Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing (2001), Strategic Plan 200112-
200516, Windhoek, Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing, p. 39. 
574 Namibia, Office of the Prime Minister, Namibia: A Decade of Peace. Democracy and Prosperity 1990-
2000, p. 308. 
575 Ibid. 
576 HABITAT, National Country Report, http:/209.88.21.39/mainlpublications/countryreport.asp, accessed 
2 May 2003. 
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abolition of the Peri-urban Development Board, decision-making was transferred to 
elected councils -- a major step towards promoting democratisation and decentralization. 
The National Planning Commission has also played an important role in promoting the 
decentralization thrust, notably through its assistance with the regional planning process, 
and its insistence on the role of regional councils in the endorsement of sectoral 
development proposals emanating from the respective regions. 
Since 1996, when the cabinet approved the decentralization policy, some progress has 
taken place in political, fiscal and administrative decentralization as follows. 
1. Political Decentralization 
Political decentralization in Namibia seems to be on the right track. All the sub-national 
level governments (regional and local authority councils) have a governmental character. 
The municipalities have autonomy over their planning and financial matters. For the 
purpose of effective implementation of decentralization, the government has established 
different coordinating and development committees and decided their functions as 
follows: regional development coordinating committees, constituency development 
committees, local authority development committees, village development committees, 
settlement committees, and ward development committees. 
The coordinating and development committees are formed with representatives from 
relevant stakeholders including representatives from locally based organizations and 
NODs. The grass roots groups of the people's organizations have the opportunity to 
negotiate and implement their programmes for sustainable development. For example the 
Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia is one of the vibrant grass roots organizations, 
reaching into most of the regions in Namibia, with more than 70 new groups formed 
during 2002. These are 
Savings scheme groups that access blocks of land through negotiations with local 
authorities on behalf of their members, and give loans to their members from their 
own savings for income generation, school fees and emergencies 
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Regional development coordinating committees have been established in every 
region for the purpose of effective coordination of planning and development; and 
development committees have been established in every constituency, local 
authority area and settlement for effective coordination of planning and 
development of the areas. 
political leaders for both regional and local authority councils, who gained office through 
direct elections, hold regular meetings with members of regional councils who hold 
office for a period of six years. The municipalities elect mayors and deputy mayors as 
well as chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the councils from among the council 
members. These officials hold office for a period of one year and may be re-elected for 
another term. 
In the case of regional councils, the chairperson (also called "governor") presides over 
council meetings. The governor is the political head of the region and represents central 
government in the region. The regional councils are obliged to form a vital link with their 
constituencies, settlements, towns and the local communities 
2. Fiscal Decentralization 
While one of the guiding principles of decentralization is the decentralization of 
resources, there are difficulties in transferring fiscal control to the regions for various 
reasons. These reasons include diverse resource bases of the regions, lack of sufficient 
number of financial managers, and diverse abilities of the regions to raise revenue. 
The government also needs to manage resource allocation to overcome the inequities 
created during the apartheid era. Therefore, fiscal allocation to regions remains the 
responsibility of the national government, but the government recognizes that fiscal 
authority must always follow functions -- resources for effecting implementation should 
accompany all mandates or functions and responsibilities assigned to sub-national 
governments. 
251 
While regional councils depend on the national government for their finances, 
municipalities enjoy a great degree of autonomy in regard to their finances. However, 
lower level local authorities, especially of towns and villages, largely rely on the central 
treasury because of their inability to raise enough resources for developmental needs. 
3. Administrative Decentralization 
The decentralization policy of Namibia stipulates that each line ministry will appoint 
officials to regional and local authorities to perform decentralized functions on their 
behalf. Such officials performing the delegated functions will be placed under the overall 
charge and supervision of regional officers. The process of administrative 
decentralization was started with the passing of the Decentralisation Enabling Act of 
2000. Administrative decentralization at regional levels is really deconcentration. 
However, at local government level, the relevant local authorities are responsible for 
recruiting and administering their own staff. 
Thus, Namibia has moved quite effectively in some areas of decentralization. In a recent 
survey of thirty African countries to determine the level of political decentralization, 
computed from the mean of the number of elected sub-national tiers, the score for the 
existence of direct elections for local governments, and the score for turnout and fairness 
of such elections, only three countries achieved the highest scores, viz., South Africa, 
d d N 'b' 577 U gan a an amI la. 
In the area of administrative decentralization, the progress in Namibia has been slow. As 
already stated, the national government's position is that administrative deconcentration 
is a better option for Namibia. However, progress has been made in clearly defining in 
law the roles of national and local governments, but work still needs to be done on 
577 Stephen N. Ndegwa (2003), Decentralization in Africa: Emerging Trends and Progress," in Findings 
(World Bank) (August 2003). This article is based on World Bank (2002), Decentralization in Africa: A 
stocktaking Survey, Washington, D.e., World Bank. 
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defining where the responsibility for service delivery resides. In the survey referred to 
above, Namibia scored quite poorly in carrying out administrative deconcentration.578 
Work on fiscal decentralization has also moved slowly, and, as already mentioned, it is 
unlikely that any major fiscal decentralization would take place in the foreseeable future. 
As things stand, the sub-national tiers control less than 5% of the national public 
expenditure. 
Overall, Namibia ranks seventh in Africa on the Decentralization Index after South 
Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Nigeria. However, I feel that the survey is 
prescriptive. It takes one set of decentralization norms to rank: the countries, but as 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, decentralization has many hues. What is 
important is a commitment to decentralization and a follow up on the policy - the nature 
of decentralization must of necessity take local conditions into account. 
Further progress towards decentralization in Namibia will depend on addressing many of 
the legal, institutional and administrative weaknesses that hinder transparent, predictable, 
responsive decision making, improvement in local resource generation, proper allocation 
of resources between levels of government,579 and allocation of responsibility for 
personnel. 
Indeed, the process has been slow, but the most positive aspect is the fact that the 
government recognises that these initiatives are important for enhancing democracy at 
different levels through popular participation. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Litvack, Abroad and Bird, Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries, p. 30. 
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Anti-corruption Initiatives 
Just as civil society plays a significant role in strengthening democracy, initiatives to 
keep the society free of corruption, through enhanced accountability and 'answerability,' 
are considered vital for the health of the state. J.S. NyeS80 defines corruption as 
Behaviour which deviates from normal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes 
such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a 
position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive 
relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of 
public resources for private-regarding uses). 
Similar public-office-centred definitions have been provided by a number of scholars.S81 
Others have provided what Heidenheimers82 calls market-centred definitions and public 
interest-centred definitions. Emphasizing a public-interest definition, Rogow and 
Lasswells83 point out that "a corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system 
of public or civil order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. 
A system of public or civil order exalts common interest over special interest; violations 
of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt." Market-centred definitions 
also recognize that there is an authority that distinguishes between the rules applicable to 
public officials and those applicable to businesspersons operating in the free market. 
In Africa, the West and western financial institutions point to the linkage between 
corruption and the economies of various countries. In fact, controlling of corruption 
defined as the misuse of public office or public responsibility for private (personal or 
sectional) gain has been an important theme of the neo-liberal policies of adjustment, 
conditionality and democratisation in Africa.584 The proponents of structural reform link 
580 J.S. Nye (1967), "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political 
Science Review, 61,2, pp. 417-427. 
581 See, for example, M. McMullan 1961), "A Theory of Corruption," Sociological Review, 9, 2. pp. 181-
200; and David H. Bayley (1968), "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," Western Political 
Quarterly, 19,4, pp. 719-732. 
582 Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1978), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New 
Brunswick, Transaction Books, pp. 5-6. 
583 Amold A. Rogow and H.D. Lasswell (1963), Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice Hall, pp. 132-134. 
584 Szeftel, "Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda," pp. 221-240. 
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political corruption to authoritarianism as an explanation of developmental failure, 
thereby identifying the arguments for democratisation and good governance with those of 
liberalization. However, structural reforms have produced disappointing results -
corruption has continued to flourish and has even increased in Africa.585 In fact, open or 
covert competition for 'spoils' has often been central to the political process in many 
countries, not least in Africa.586 
The extent of corruption in Africa has been particularly telling. As Szeftel587 observes, 
cliente1ism has been a key mechanism through which political interests have built the 
electoral support necessary to ensure access to the state's resources. He also feels that 
there is a need to shift African politics towards issues of social justice and government 
performance and away from a concern with the division of state's resources. 
Thus, one could argue that one of the reasons for the push towards democracy was a 
direct result of the economic crises created wittingly or unwittingly by the previous one 
party regimes and dictatorships. However, the emergence of democracies in Africa did 
not necessarily counter corruption. Democratic governments inherited the problems and 
opportunities for 'accumulating' the spoils of power. There is a need to learn from "the 
lessons of cases where democratisation has actually increased the sources and scale of 
corruption without strengthening countervailing political or institutional capacity."s88 
Going through the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Indices (CPI) for 
the last few years shows that many of the African countries that embraced democracy, so 
far have not improved their situation measured in terms of the CPI score.589 
In fact, as the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Indices show, 
generally most of the African states have continued to score worse on the CPI index from 
year to year. Based on a ranking of 10 to 0, with 10 for corruption free states, Botswana 
585 Ibid. 
586 Baylies, Cohen, and Williams, "The Struggle for Spoils," pp. 1-3. 
587 Szeftel, "Clientelism, Corruption and Catastrophe," pp. 407-441. 
588 Baylies, Cohen, and Williams, "The Struggle for Spoils," pp. 1-3. 
589 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (7 October 2003), 
http://www.transparency.org!cpiJ2003/cpi200e.en.html. accessed 31 December 2003. 
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scored 6, 6.4, and 5.7 respectively in 2001, 2002, and 2003; and Namibia scored 5.3 in 
1998, and 5.4, 5.7, and 4.7 respectively in 2001, 2002, and 2003. In 2001, 2002, and 
2003, Malaysia scored 5, 4.9, and 5.2; South Africa scored 4.8, 4.8, and 4.4; Mauritius 
scored 4.5, 4.5, and 4.4; Egypt scored 3.6, 3.4, and 3.3; Zimbabwe scored 2.9, 2.7, and 
2.3; Zambia scored 2.6,2.6, and 2.5; and Kenya scored 2, 1.9, and 1.9.590 These statistics 
do not paint a rosy picture of African states' efforts to overcome corruption. 
However, perception of corruption should not be taken on face value. Botswana and 
Namibia improved their positions in 2002 but during 2003 there was a decline in their 
scores. 59! Nothing had changed fundamentally to account for this decline. Zvekic592 
argues that the perceptions of corruption are out of line with experience of corruption, 
and surveys have shown that perceptions of government corruption were four times 
higher than actual experience of corruption in Namibia, and 40 times higher in Botswana. 
"These discrepancies suggest that perceptions may be shaped more by media reports of a 
small number of high profile incidents, of the accounts of friends or neighbours, or an 
overall low level of confidence in the ethics of the public sector, than any direct personal 
experience. " 
However, perceptions cannot be dismissed. "Public perceptions will remain part of any 
standardized methodology, as citizen input provides an important measure of anti-
corruption efforts and trends. Once the gap between the perception of corruption and any 
direct experience of it decreases, it will present an indicative measure in itself of the 
levels of success and effectiveness of anti-corruption policies, programs and 
. t·" 593 mterven IOns. 
Corruption rears its ugly head when conditions are right for it. These conditions include 
poverty, declining civil service salaries, political uncertainties, lack of job security, 
590 Transparency International, Corrnption Perception Index for 2001. 2002. and 2003, http:// 
www.transparency.org/cpiJ2003/cpi200e.en.html, accessed 10 January 2004. 
59) Ibid. 
592 "UN Expert Advises on Anti-corruption in Southern Africa," Xinhuanet (10 October 2002), 
http://english.enorth.com.cnlsysteml20021l 011 0I000432271.shtml, accessed 14 December 2003. 
593 Ibid. 
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absence of social welfare net, and greed. Some structures that promote monopolies also 
allow or even promote corruption. As corruption breeds, demand for more regulation 
grows. Additional regulation, in turn, increases the discretionary power of many public 
officials thus increasing opportunities for more corruption: 
This systemic weakness is exacerbated by poorly defined, ever-changing and 
poorly disseminated rules and regulations, accountability is typically weak, 
political competition and civil liberties are restricted. Laws and principles of 
ethics in government are poorly developed, if they exist at all, and the le,fal 
institutions charged with imposing them are ill-prepared for this complex job.59 
Though causes of corruption are complex and are rooted in the particular political and 
economic conditions of a specific society,595 it is relatively easy to point to these causes. 
However, there is no simple method of dealing with the problem: 
A combination of direct and indirect approaches needs to be adopted. On the one 
hand, broad reforms such as liberalization and democratisation - if applied with 
sensitivity to specific context and regulated properly - could provide the platform 
for clean governance and management. However, the fight against corruption also 
demands specific reforms to create a culture of accountability, introduce public 
service reforms, raise civil awareness and put incentives for proper behaviour in 
place. Finally, anti-corruption policy needs to be driven by effective institutional 
vehicles to direct and carefully prioritise and sequence initiatives. Ultimately, a 
strategy to counter corruption must target government, civil society and private 
. t 596 mves ors. 
Klitgaard597 notes that virtually all forms of corruption are proscribed by virtually all 
countries, and asks why these countries do not take more steps to reduce corruption. He 
believes that "it may be because they lack sufficient will or sufficient local capacities, 
such as proper strategies and structures (including incentives), to prevent corruption." 
The World Bank598 proposes that corruption can be fought by liberalizing the economy. 
Rolling back the state, too, seems to be an attractive solution, but the answer is not that 
simple. Turning over a government agency's functions to the market merely results in a 
shift from a public monopoly to a private monopoly, with the corresponding transfer of 
594 Gray and Kaufmann, "Corruption and Development." 
595 Heymans and Lipietz, Corruption and Development: Some Specific Perspectives. 
596 Ibid. 
597 Klitgaard, "International Cooperation Against Corruption," p.3. 
598 World Bank. World Development Report 1997, pp. 105-106. 
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rent without much of an improvement in allocational efficiency.599 "The answer is not so 
much a minimalist state and more market, but a transfonned state. Such a state would act 
in limited spheres, with a strengthened regulatory capacity to 'clean up' the market 
sphere and allow it to flourish in a transparent and competitive fashion.,,60o 
The initiative for tackling corruption on a broad front requires that a number of reforms 
and other actions be undertaken as follows:601 
1. Controlled liberalization of the economy backed by the refonning of the state in 
areas that require the kind of discretion on the part of state officials, which could 
lend it to abuse. These reforms should take place in the context of clear and 
enforceable regulatory policies and mechanisms. The refonns could include 
establishing of regulatory framework for transparent and accountable conduct in 
the business of government, including simplified tax system, a regulated financial 
sector, and clearly stipulated procurement procedures. 
2. Carrying out of public sector reforms to enhance accountability, civil awareness, 
incentives for proper behaviour, and provision of institutional vehicles for driving 
anti-corruption efforts. These refonns should focus on making the departments 
more effective, sharpening their strategic focus, better equipping civil servants for 
their tasks, and clear reporting by public institutions of their failures and 
successes in terms of agreed upon objectives. 
3. Strengthening democracy to enhance executive accountability to the legislature, 
and independent judiciary and decentralized government. "Democracy alone does 
not mean no corruption. The political leadership in a democracy purposefully 
needs to develop the means to combat corruption. A vibrant opposition, the free 
flow of public infonnation and transparent procedures are all vital elements for 
showing demonstrable political will and developing such a culture of honest 
government. ,,602 
4. Creation of dedicated institutions to combat corruption. "Experience in countries 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Botswana, Chile, Poland, and Uganda suggest 
that institutions dedicated to the fight against corruption can and have played a 
I · b' . ,,603 ro e m corn atmg corruptIOn. 
S. Promotion of ethics and social responsibility in the public service and the private 
sector. 
The many high profile scandals and bankruptcies in the United States in 
recent months, from Enron through Global Crossing to WorldCom, 
underscore the need for there to be far-reaching reforms to strengthen 
ethics and social responsibility in business .... That is why TI argues for 
S99 Heymans and Lipietz, Corruption and Development: Some Specific Perspectives. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Gray and Kaufmann, "Corruption and Development"; Heymans and Lipietz, Corruption and 
Development: Some Specific Perspectives. 
602 Heymans and Lipietz, Corruption and Development: Some Specific Perspectives. 
603 Ibid. 
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civil society monitoring of both governments and businesses. They are 
both part of the problem, and only by engaging with them both together, 
can we begin to find solutions, and a level playing field for all 
stakeholders in society, including company employees, the community at 
large and all those who care about ending poverty and securing a 
sustainable ecosystem for the future.604 
6. Above all, there is a need for political will for the success of anti-corruption 
initiatives. As the chainnan of Transparency International observed at the time of 
launching CPI of 2002:605 
Politicians increasingly pay lip-service to the fight against corruption but 
they fail to act on the clear message ofTI's Corruption Perceptions Index: 
that they must clamp down on corruption to break the vicious circle of 
poverty and graft. Seven out of ten countries score less than 5 out of lOin 
the CPI 2002, which reflects perceived levels of corruption among 
politicians and public officials - and many of these are poorest countries. 
Keeping corruption in check thus requires that there is a strong political will and a proper 
national integrity system with appropriate institutions and practices. Pillars of this 
national integrity system include an elected legislature that is at the forefront of the fight 
against corruption; a committed executive; an independent judicial system; the Office of 
the Auditor-General; the Ombudsman; independent anti-corruption agencies that are 
more skilled than the police in dealing with sophisticated white-collar crime; a strong 
civil society; a private corporate sector; and international actors.606 In many states where 
there is one dominant party, as in Namibia and Botswana, it is even more important for 
the government to strengthen the national integrity system as it would, in turn, strengthen 
democracy. 
Transparency International also identifies the ideal rules and practices for various 
institutions. These include free and fair elections, provision of judicial review of official 
actions; public service ethics, monitoring assets and integrity testing; minimizing conflict 
of interest, nepotism and cronyism; better public procurement procedures as it is in this 
area that the public and private sectors do business; good financial management; right to 
information (infonnation, public awareness and public records); giving the citizens a 
604 Peter Eigen (2002), "Corruption is Unsustainable," statement by Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency 
International on the launch of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2002 (28 August 2002). 
60S Ibid. 
606 Transparency International, TI Source Book 2000. 
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voice; putting in place a competition policy that focuses on containing corruption; 
appropriate laws to fight corruption; and mechanisms for measuring progress.607 
Indeed, in some parts of Africa considerable effort is being made to tackle corruption but 
success, if any, has been slow in materializing. Many reasons could be advanced for this 
failure but three most likely ones are: 
1. The existence of forces of authoritarianism, some linked to the constitution itself, 
and the others who struggle to maintain their political and economic power come 
what may; 
2. Emphasis on lip service to anti-corruption initiatives but little effort to implement 
the initiatives; and 
3. Weaknesses of anti-corruption institutions (lack of competent personnel, political 
interference, lack of resources. 
Namibia'S Anti-corruption Efforts 
In independent Namibia, the new government emphasized democracy, openness and 
transparency. I had personally been involved in spearheading anti-corruption initiatives 
within the civil service. In order to emphasize the government's commitment to fight 
corruption, a commission (Frank Commission, named after Justice Frank, who was the 
chairman of the commission) was appointed to look into instances of corruption in both 
public and private sectors. The mandate of the commission was only to investigate 
specific instances of corruption. It submitted a four-volume report to the president, and I 
made recommendations to the Cabinet on the actions that the government could take 
against those identified as having indulged in financial irregularities. Recommendations 
included actions such as prosecution, blacklisting businesses (banning them from 
tendering for government contracts), and disciplinary measures against civil servants. As 
a result of government's action against erring civil servants, one permanent secretary was 
dismissed and another one was suspended (until cleared on further investigation, which 
showed that she was only negligent and inefficient because of her inexperience). 
601 Ibid. 
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Salaries of civil service staff were improved to bring them in line with private sector 
remunerations to remove any temptation at "rent seeking". Civil service staff members 
were also allowed to have their own businesses, if they so wished, as long as there was no 
conflict of interest. This policy has, however, come under criticism: 
In Namibia the situation is often clouded by the fact that those making the rules 
that promote black economic empowerment are often those benefiting from them 
since there are no limitations on the business interests a public servant can have. 
Furthermore, in a situation where whistle blowers are likely to come from the 
established business community, there is always the danger that such actions can 
be written off as the work of disgruntled racists and issues of corruption quickly 
b . f 608 ecome Issues 0 race. 
This allegation still has to be proven. In the meantime, the government has taken concrete 
actions against corruption. When irregularities at the National Housing Enterprise were 
brought to the attention of the cabinet, the matter was taken to the court. Similarly, when 
irregularities in the use of funds for boreholes were reported in the media, a commission 
was appointed to examine these irregularities, and the cabinet took corrective actions 
based on the commission's findings. Only recently, when the husband of a 
parliamentarian, who was a civil servant, was accused of embezzlement, he was 
sentenced to 22 years imprisonment by the high court. Four state enterprises, Social 
Security Commission, Roads Authority, Road Fund Administration and the Namibia 
Airports Company, where indications of financial malpractices were detected, are also 
under investigation. Learning about the possibility of malpractices at these corporations, 
President Nujoma said, "Those who are found guilty of such malpractices must face the 
full wrath of the law.,,609 
Indeed, independence of the judiciary has greatly helped promote a culture of 
accountability. This independence is evidenced by the fact that the government loses 
608 Robin Sherboume, "Almost all the Ingredients for Trouble Ahead - The Economics of Corruption: 
Implications for Namibia," in IPPR Briefing Paper, Windhoek, Inst for Public Policy Research, 
http://www.ippr.org.naIBriefing%20PaperslBPCor.pdf. accessed 9 January 2004. 
609 Chirstof Maletsky, ''Nujoma Returns, Breathing Fire Against Those Who 'Milk System'," in The 
Namibian (30 January 2004). 
261 
almost half of the cases in the courts of law and has always abided by the courts' 
1· 610 ru mgs. 
However, Advocate R. V. Rukoro611 was quite critical of the inefficiencies in the process 
of countering corruption: 
Government responded to the allegations of impropriety in the public sphere by 
establishing ad hoc commissions or committees of inquiries, ... [but] it could be 
said generally that the government's response has not always met desired 
standards of transparency and accountability. In some cases, the media and the 
public were left with the impression that government sought to either cover up 
wrongdoing or was not diligent in its efforts to address the problem. 
I agreed with Mr Rukoro's criticism. The process was indeed slow. Until 1997, 
government's actions to counter corruption were largely ad hoc. When the Cabinet 
decided that institutional mechanisms needed to be devised to address the issue of 
corruption in a coherent way, I was tasked with the responsibility of taking the anti-
corruption initiative further. One of my proposals was for the political leaders to declare 
their assets. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, in 1997, the Office of the Prime Minister also introduced 
the General Principles of the Public Service Charter to emphasize the service element of 
the public service. Subsequent to the introduction of the General Principles of the Public 
Service Charter, various ministries and departments that deal directly with the public 
have been drafting their individual charters, such as the Patients Charter. 
In the same year, Namibian parliamentarians produced a document entitled Agenda for 
Change that calls for the adoption of a parliamentary code of conduct. 
In 1997, an Ad Hoc Committee on the Promotion of Ethics and Combating of Corruption 
and its Technical Committee were established under my chairmanship with the mandate 
610 The fact that the government loses so many cases might suggest that the government's investigative and 
prosecution competencie~ are li~t:d. .. . 
611 R.V. Rukoro (1997), 'NamIbIa s Imttative to Combat Corruption and to Promote Ethical Behaviour," 
paper presented at Eighth International Anti-Corruption Conference (1997). Adv. Rukoro was at that time 
the Attorney General of Namibia. 
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to address the requirements for countering corruption and promoting ethics in a holistic 
way. Mr Rukoro was asked to send two Namibians to examine anti-corruption initiatives 
in other countries. He himself went to Hong Kong, which had achieved considerable 
success in countering corruption. The government also hired the person who had 
developed Hong Kong's anti-corruption legislation. 
Subsequently, the Technical Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Promotion of 
Ethics and Combating of Corruption crisscrossed the country to get feedback from the 
citizens, and held an international conference on combating corruption. I recall one of the 
United States representatives having said after the conference, "So far so good. Now we 
will see how you act on the proposals." 
The proposals were submitted to the Cabinet. One of the proposals was to establish an 
independent anti-corruption commission, but the Cabinet, on the advice of an expert, felt 
that there was no need for such an anti-corruption commission. The ombudsman or the 
prosecutor general could easily carry out this responsibility. The Cabinet felt that the 
prosecutor general's office would be the best place where responsibility for countering 
corruption could rest. 
However, there was general displeasure with this decision. The general feeling within the 
government was in favour of establishing an independent anti-corruption commission. 
Subsequently, in March 2000, the Cabinet changed its thinking and approved the 
establishment of an independent anti-corruption body, and in September 2001, the 
parliament passed the anti-corruption legislation, establishing the basis for the creation of 
an anti-corruption body. 
Clearly, the challenge of containing corruption requires continuous effort. In Namibia, 
the process was started in the immediate postcolonial period with the establishment of an 
elected legislature, holding of free and fair elections at regular intervals, providing for an 
independent judiciary, establishing offices of the auditor general, and of the ombudsman, 
promoting the Public Service Charter to emphasize service to the public, strengthening 
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local government structures, ensuring the independence and freedom of the media, 
providing political space to the civil society, providing opportunity and freedom for 
citizens to have a voice through chat shows, enacting the Public Service Act to secure the 
accountability of public officers, promulgating anti-corruption legislation (that also 
provides for the establishment of anti-corruption agencies), and facilitating a more 
representative private corporate sector (National Chamber of Commerce and Industry612). 
The General Principles of the Public Service Charter and other initiatives have forced 
various departments to re-examine what they do and why. That in turn has resulted in 
significant restructuring for enhanced efficiencies, effectiveness and accountability. 
Improvement in the ranking of Namibia in TI's Corruption Perceptions Index until 2002 
indicates that progress was being made. 
Specifically, the fight against corruption requires that the government continue to be on 
guard and keep on creating conditions for strengthening various institutions. Some of the 
issues that the government still needs to focus on include: 
1. Stringent application of the provisions of the Public Service Act in securing the 
accountability of public service officers. 
2. Drafting and implementation of the various public service charters. 
3. Establishment of the anti-corruption agency. 
4. Strengthening government's auditing standards. 
5. Articulating ethical principles for judges. 
6. Promoting ethical business practices and corporate code of conduct through 
agencies, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
7. Stipulating guidelines for multinational and national aid agencies, multinational 
corporations, and NGDs. 
8. Promoting Code of Conduct for African Parliaments (1998). 
612 prior to government's action, black businessmen and women were not allowed to join the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. 
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Threats to Democracy 
Today, more people in Africa live in democratic countries than ever before. One may 
disagree about the nature of democracies in many countries, but the fact remains that 
these countries have made considerable strides towards democratisation. It would 
therefore be wrong to view Africa in terms of what some call Afro-pessimism.613 
There are also many countries in Africa that are brutalized by civil wars and controlled 
by dictators, a condition that emphasizes the need for global effort to resolve conflicts 
and promote democracies in these countries. But equally, it is important to ensure that 
the countries that have made transition towards democracy have a chance to let it flower. 
This requires building institutional structures that ensure accountability of elected 
officials, subordination of the military and police to the elected officials, an independent 
and respected judiciary, political and legal equality of citizens, state officials who are 
themselves subject to the law, and respect for individual and group liberties.614 
In addition, people should be free to organize, demonstrate, publish, petition, and speak 
their minds. Newspapers and electronic media should be free to report and comment, and 
to expose wrongdoing. Minority groups should be able to practice their culture, their 
faith, and their beliefs without fear of victimization, and executive power is constrained 
I 615 M ·616 £ h . 'h £ by other governmenta actors. azrul re ers to t ese reqUIrements as 't e our 
fundamental ends of democracy." These are accountable rulers, actively participating 
citizens, an open society, and social justice. 
It is not that rulers in Africa don't know these requirements of democracy; yet, as 
Lewis617 states, "The search for stable and legitimate government, the quest for unity 
among heterogeneous societies, and the aspirations for economic attainment have been 
perennial themes since the end of the colonial era." 
613 See also Chester Crocker (1994), "Stop the Pessimism about Africa," USA Today (12 September 1994). 
614 Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa: African and International Imperatives, 
http://democracy.stanford.edulSeminarlDiamondAfrica.htm, accessed 25 April 2003. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Mazrui, "Who Killed Democracy in Africa?" pp. 15-23. 
617 Peter Lewis (ed.), Africa: Dilemmas o/Development and Change, Boulder, Westview Press, p. 1. 
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Therefore, a question that is more relevant is not why the progress of the fundamental 
ends of democracy is so slow, but why the political leaders have failed, or chosen not to 
promote accountability, allow citizen participation in the affairs of the state, open up the 
society, and bring about social justice in line with the citizens' desire for peace, 
accountability, honesty, a say in the government, freedom to choose, and economic 
development. 
Zakaria618 notes that Freedom House's survey has "separate rankings for political 
liberties and civil liberties, which correspond roughly with democracy and constitutional 
liberalism, respectively." While most countries do better on political liberties, most do 
poorly on civil liberties. Zakaria619 further argues, "To date few illiberal democracies 
have matured into liberal democracies .... Thus the problems of governance in the 21 st 
century will likely be problems within democracy. This makes them more difficult to 
handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle oflegitimacy [of elections]." 
Part of the problem lies in the fact that in most African countries, politics is the only 
game in town. This situation has resulted in most people seeking to secure a piece of the 
pie that power or association with power might offer. Consequently, as Ake620 notes, 
"The use of state power for accumulation, associated as it is with statism, monopoly 
power, and the interposition of coercion in the labor process, raised to new heights the 
premium on the capture of state power." He further notes that "every interest group is out 
for itself; each wants to appropriate and privatise state power to its own benefit.,,621 The 
Cold War preyed on this weakness, with the East and West often supporting despots for 
their own political ends. 
Indeed, there is also a belief that aligning oneself with the winning political party would 
be good for one's own welfare. This, in turn, results in one party becoming dominant to 
618 Fareed Zakaria (1997), ''The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs (Nov.lDec. 1997). 
619 Ibid. 
620 Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, p. 6. 
621 Ibid., p. 94. 
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the extent that the country becomes a de facto one party state. Political elites, too, begin 
to delude themselves into believing that they are the popular choice. Regrettably, in many 
cases in Africa, democratisation has meant replacing a self-appointed dictator with an 
elected one.622 Diamond623 points out that "When countries have been brutalized and 
devastated as horribly as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola, it is conceivable that the 
electorate will give power to a warlord like Charles Taylor simply to sue for peace. Such 
an election may bring peace, but not likely democracy (as recent Liberian experience is 
showing)." 
Another consequence of 'the only game in town' hypothesis is that leaders, even if they 
are committed to democracy, are reluctant to relinquish power, as they see no financial 
and personal security, or role for themselves beyond their political position. If they 
consider their future secure, they might be more likely to accept limitation of their power 
and be responsive to the demands of accountability, open society and participation by 
citizens. In other words, they would be more willing to promote good governance 
(efficient and effective civil service, anti-corruption initiatives, and protection of human 
rights). 
Such threats to democracy that have their roots in the need for individual financial and 
personal security can be overcome by strong legislative instruments and other 
institutions. For instance, there need to be effective mechanisms to ensure financial and 
personal security of leaders beyond their terms of office, to keep the military 
professional, the judiciary free, and the police force competent in protecting citizens' 
rights and effective in ensuring that citizens have faith in its ability to protect them 
against crime. In addition, social and economic development policies need to be attuned 
to the needs of the people. 
622 Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, p. 187. 
623 Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa. 
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Mazrui624 believes that Africa has copied the West, much to its detriment. He further 
argues that Japan modernised without culturally westernising, so did Turkey. "Africans 
decided to culturally Westernise without economically modernising." His observation is 
valid, as not much can be achieved in any effort towards neutralizing threats to 
democracy without considerable investment in skills development. Diamond625 notes that 
the elements of what Linz and Stepan626 call "useable" bureaucracy "that African 
countries most lack is a cadre of highly trained, professional economic technocrats who 
understand the dynamics of markets domestically and internationally and the basic 
requirements for generating economic growth." For overcoming this constraint, Irele627 
suggests that: 
The contemplative life entailed by the intellectual and moral function of the 
university must be given greater weight in our context, through forms of action 
that are geared towards the improvement of our society. In other words, the 
process of reflection has to serve not only as the mobilization of consciousness 
but also as the arming of our collective will and the strengthening of our resolve 
for building a new and better world in Africa. 
Thus, threats to democracy come from politicians feeling insecure about their future, 
weak legislature, lack of professionalism in the military and police force, and weak 
economies. Overcoming these threats and weaknesses is essential to strengthening 
democracy. 
Democratic Audit 
In 1788, James Madison, V.S. democrat and president, said, "But what is government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature .... In framing a government that 
is to be administered by men over men the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on government: but 
624 Mazrui, "Who Killed Democracy in Africa?" 
625 Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa. 
626 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), "Toward Consolidated Democracies," Journal of Democracy, 7, 
2, pp. 20-21. . . . 
627 F. Abiola !rele (2000), "The Pohttcal Kingdom: Toward Reconstruction in Africa" (19 June 2000), 
http://www.africahome.comlcommunity/africanistlcategories/scholar/ecopoliticS/ 
EpEAZAupAZdEYAxAwf.shtml, accessed 14 April 2003. 
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experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.,,628 This statement 
sums up the necessity of establishing mechanisms that strengthen the government's 
ability to govern, citizens' ability to hold the government accountable, and the necessity 
of mechanisms to hold the government accountable. Therein lie the appeal and 
importance of democracy - people governing their own society. 
Of course, in a modern society, people govern through their elected representatives, but 
in recent times, with citizens becoming more informed, there is high level of distrust of 
politicians, as well as the felt outrage over shortcomings in government performance 
because of the high demands citizens put on their politicians and the political system.629 
In Sweden, economists who conduct an annual survey of the economy have also "pointed 
to the problems within the political system as one explanation for weak economic 
performance.,,630 Similar concerns have been expressed in Afric~ where apartheid, 
dictatorships and institutional inefficiencies undermined democracy as well as 
economies. However, democracy does not automatically guarantee economic success.631 
As the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa632 
points out: 
The relationships between free markets, democracy, development and poverty 
reduction are complex. I will advocate the market approach but in the context of a 
strong and capable state .... A capable state is far more likely than not to be found 
in a situation of deepening and genuine democracy .... How can democratisation 
help to ensure the creation of capable states? The predominant test of good 
governance in recent years has been whether competitive elections and smooth 
transitions take place. But, as a recent World Bank report on Africa notes, "a 
sharp distinction should be drawn between formal and real democratisation." ... 
We have not yet reached a stage in Africa where governments that perform poorly 
are sure to be forced out of office through public opinion and the ballot box; or 
where the mere threat of this serves ~ a deterrent to bad governance. 
628 Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers, New York, MentorlPenguin Books. 
629 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Heymans and Lipietz, Corruption and Development: Some Specific Perspectives. 
632 K.Y. Amoako (2000), The Market. Democracy and Development in Africa: Keynote Address at the 40th 
Anniversary of the Africa Confidential (19 ApriI2000), London. 
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This condition has garnered considerable interest in developing some mechanism for a 
'democratic audit.' According to David Beetham,633 for the democratic system of 
government to fulfil its representational obligations, it ought broadly to seek to satisfy the 
two basic principles: popular control over political representatives and processes of 
decision-making; and political equality in the exercise of that control. In order to carry 
out democratic audit, Beetham's two principles could be extended into a set of questions 
which may then be applied to render a descriptive analysis of a given state's institutional 
arrangements in systematic terms, and measuring systematically how far the two 
principles are satisfied across a wide spectrum of institutional processes and practices.634 
Beetham writes that democracy is not an 'all-or-nothing' affair but a matter of degree.63s 
The approach being sought therefore needs to be both qualitative as well as quantitative 
benchmarking. 
Three main criteria have been identified for such benchmarking by the Swedish 
Democratic Audit study.636 These include (1) popular government - Are people free to 
govern themselves in an organized fashion? (2) constitutional government - Does the 
legal system satisfy certain fundamental requirements that are respected by administrative 
authorities and the general public? and (3) effective government - Does the political 
system have the institutional capacity to carry out its decisions? Similarly, Beetham637 
identifies four factors that facilitate democratic consolidation - the experience of 
transition itself, a country's economic system, its political culture, and its constitutional 
arrangements. 
Defining democracy this way has several implications. First, the benchmarks include 
more than just a minimal definition of democracy. This means that democracy is more 
than a bundle of minimum requirements or threshold values. It is more than universal 
633 Beetham, Auditing Democracy in Britain. 
634 Smart Weir (1994), British Democracy in Balance: How Britain Compares with Five other Democratic 
Nations, London, Charter 88 Trust, p. 3. 
635 Beetham, Auditing Democracy in Britain. 
636 "Demokrati och Dialog," quoted in Micheletti, Democratic Audit o/Sweden. 
637 Beetham, "Conditions for Democratic Consolidation," pp. 157-172. 
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suffrage, free elections, and the liberal freedoms of speech, press, and association.,,638 
These are only threshold requirements: 
Democracy is not simply popular government - the political system has also to 
meet requirements to do with constitutional and effective government. Democracy 
does not only mean effective government - the need for effective leadership also 
has to be weighted against the need for popular consent and for legal objectivity. 
It is obvious that good democracy requires that a balance be struck between 
popular, constitutional, and effective government. Too much of one criterion can 
lead to a deficit in another. The balance that is struck is also time-bound. New 
political problems and new time periods require a reassessment of the balance 
between popular, constitutional, and effective government.639 
Another important aspect of any democratic audit is that it must be carried out by 
agencies independent of the government if undue bias is to be avoided. However, this is 
not to suggest that perceptions are not important. Government must not only be 
democratic, it must be seen to be democratic. Using the Swedish model of democratic 
audit that draws on standards articulated by Dahl and mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
what follows is a glimpse of how Namibia's democracy has done since 1990. However, 
there is a caveat: Just because I am using the Swedish normative tools to carry out the 
audit for Namibia does not mean that it is necessary to draw parallels between an 
established and mature democracy and a new democracy. Beetham's assertion, that 
democracy is not an 'all-or-nothing' affair, suggests that it is the progress that matters. 
The African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) also 
recognizes the importance of sustaining progress in political, economic and corporate 
governance. In July 2002, African heads of state and government adopted the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).640 Among other things, "the mandate of the African 
Peer Review Mechanism is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states 
conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and 
standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance. The APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the 
638 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
639 Ibid. 
640 See http://www.au2002.gov.zaldocs/summit_counciVaprm.htm. accessed 5 January 2004. 
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participating member governments." The primary characteristics of process of review 
. I d 641 mcu e: 
• periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating states to ascertain 
progress being made towards achieving mutually agreed goals and compliance 
with agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codcs and 
standards; 
• spurring countries to consider seriously the impact of domestic policies not only 
on internal political stability and economic growth but also on neighbouring 
countries. It will promote mutual accountability, as well as compliance with best 
practices; and 
• keeping in mind that African countries are at different levels of development, on 
joining the mechanism, a country will be assessed (the base review) and a 
timetable (Programme of Action) for effecting progress towards achieving the 
agreed standards and goals must be drawn up by the state in question, taking into 
account the particular circumstances of that state. 
Thus, democratic review is just one aspect of this broader approach taken by the leaders 
of African governments. So far, eighteen countries have asked to participate in this 
process. Regrettably, Namibia is not one of them. On 4 April 2003, Prime Minister 
Gurirab stated, "Thinking through time, let me now take up the much talked about but 
manifestly deceptive issue of the NEPAD's so-called Peer Review Mechanism (PRM). 
Firstly, I shall, with due respect, consign it to the dustbin of history as a sham. Secondly, 
PRM is an unworkable notion. I see it as a misleading, new name for the old, discredited 
structural adjustment fiasco, under which African leaders have been clustered between 
d b d ,,642 good guys an a guys. 
64llbid. 
642 Theo-Ben Gurirab (2003), Address at the Dinner of the Chamber of Mines of Namibia (4 April 3003), 
http://www.samn.org.zaldocuments/d000029t1index.php. accessed 5 January 2004. 
272 
His concern is not with NEP AD getting involved in issues of economic growth, 
investment, employment creation, capacity building and social transfonnation but with 
NEP AD's involvement in political, security and conflict resolution issues.643 
My perspective, however, is different for the simple reason that economic growth, 
employment creation, capacity building and social transfonnation take place only in the 
correct political milieu. Therefore, political issues cannot be left out of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). Therefore, it would be important to conduct an audit at 
regular intervals, and then determine if Namibia is becoming more democratic and more 
prosperous or less so over time. 
The sections that follow provide an assessment of Namibia's democratic audit based on 
the categories identified by the Swedish democratic audit study. 
Popular Government 
Control of the Agenda: In a representative democracy, the legislative assembly should 
have the deciding say over its own agenda. That would require the assembly to be 
pro active rather than reactive. However, in Namibia that is not the case for two reasons. 
First, most of the agenda of the National Assembly is detennined by the executive, for 
the simple reason that the ministers and deputy ministers combined fonn a disciplined 
majority in the National Assembly. Second, there is very inadequate debate in the 
parliament on various issues by political parties in opposition. However, during the 
budget session, SOme very stimulating debates take place. During this debate, expenditure 
of every cent is questioned. There have been other occasions, too, when lively debates 
have taken place, e.g., on a motion for constitutional amendment to allow a third tenn for 
the president, on married persons' equality bill, and on commercial and communal land 
bills. 
Enlightened Understanding: "Popular government is realized through free and open 
public debate. Democracy is a method for solving conflicts through dialogue and 
643 Ibid. 
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deliberation. This means that democracy requires a functioning public sphere.,,644 In 
Namibia, currently the most important institution in the public sphere is the mass media. 
However, as elsewhere, "We see an American trend, where journalists dramatize events 
in such a way that citizens cannot really assess the facts of a case. There is a focus on 
political personalities and an overexposure of political wrong-doings.,,64s There is also 
lack of public fora for debate on national and regional issues.646 
The state-owned Namibia Broadcasting Corporation (NB C) has provided a forum 
through its programmes, such as the Chat Show, the Open Line, Talk of the Nation, and 
the Feedback Programme (where government representatives respond the same afternoon 
to issues raised in the Chat Show in the morning). 
However, NBC has been criticized often by the civil society as well as politicians.647 
According to the Director of Legal Assistance Centre, "Civil society representatives feel 
that interference in television programming by State House and ruling party politicians 
has severely compromised the editorial policy of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation 
(NBC).,,648 At a Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) conference, the Director of 
the Legal Assistance Centre also pointed out that people with dissenting viewpoints are 
not given airtime on NBC.649 Politicians, depending on the party they belong to, either 
feel that NBC does not do enough to inform the citizens about the government's 
initiatives, or believe that NBC is the mouthpiece of the political party in power.650 
Despite these real or perceived limitations of NBC, its work and programming are 
helping involve the citizens in debating national issues. That cannot be said about other 
electronic media operating in Namibia. The fact is that in Namibia government-owned 
media exist along with the privately-owned as well as opposition-owned media, and 
644 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
64S Ibid. 
646 "African Media on Wrong Track, Charges President" The Namibian (7 May 2001). 
647 Ibid.; "African Media Workers Lament Slow Progress," The Namibian (8 May 2001). 
648 The Namibian (20 November 1002). 
649 Ibid. 
650 Ibid. 
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influence of the government on the programming of NBC is not much different from the 
influence exerted by owners of other media. 
Namibian law also protects the media practitioners' right of freedom of expression. In 
fact, throughout independent Namibia's history, no journalist has ever been arrested, no 
cameras have been confiscated, and there is no censorship. It is in recognition of these 
reasons that MISA chose to establish its headquarters in Namibia. Hopefully, with 
increased education and the evolution of a healthy political culture, other electronic 
media would also become an instrument for promoting a more direct democracy. 
Effective Participation: Effective participation is the most important ingredient of 
democracy and finds expression in election campaigns, through which those in power are 
called into account. Though participation in election campaigns was high soon after 
Namibia became independent, some observers have expressed concern at the low level of 
attendance at rallies, and fewer citizens exercising their franchise at the polling booth. 
Low turnout might be seen as an expression of satisfaction with the performance of the 
government, or lack of any real issues on which public is divided. I recall that when the 
Congress of Democrats appeared on the scene, there was excitement during the electoral 
campaign. Voters turned out in large numbers to support their respective parties. Thus, 
when voters' interests are at stake, they do come out to vote. 
Local and regional self-governments provide another ingredient for effective 
participation, as they are important arenas for citizen involvement and training in 
democracy.651 The constitution also provides for the National Assembly to initiate, 
approve, or decide to hold referenda on matters of national concern.652 However, during 
the past thirteen years, no referendum has been held. Perhaps the primary reason for this 
has been that one party controls both the houses of parliament with a considerable 
majority. 
651 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
652 Namibia, Constitution of the Republic ojNamibia, Article 63(2)(g). 
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In Namibia, as in the rest of Africa, the institutionalisation of a viable multiparty political 
system is proving to be a fonnidable task. Over the last thirteen years, there has been a 
steady shift away from smaller parties. For instance, since 1989, SWAPO's share of votes 
in National Assembly elections has steadily gone up from 57.3% to 76.3% in 1999; and 
votes secured by the DTA have fallen from 28.34% in 1989 to 9.40% in 1999. Other 
political parties have also lost ground. The government has sought to facilitate the 
evolution of credible political parties by funding their parliamentary offices and their 
election efforts. However, this has not helped. The primary reason for this failure of non-
SWAPO parties is that they lack a specific agenda for Namibia. It can only be hoped that 
the situation will improve over time. However, the proportional representation system has 
ensured that even smaller parties find a seat in the parliament. 
Decision-Making Eguality: This requirement demands that "all citizens and social groups 
should have the same right to participate in the political community. This means that 
systematic under-representation of any social group can be a serious problem for 
democracy.,,653 Indeed, Namibia's Constitution recognizes and enshrines equality for all, 
and it goes further by recognizing the need for affirmative action to help those who were 
disenfranchised in the past, such as women. The Constitution recognizes that women's 
equality needs to be actively promoted. In order to carry out these tasks, the civil service 
was restructured with the enactment of the Public Service Act of 1995. Several other 
relevant laws have been passed by the parliament to promote equality. The Labour Act of 
1992 improved the position of N amibian workers. As a result of demand by all parties in 
their election manifestos it is now stated policy of all the parties that the party lists should 
include at least 30% women. 
Citizen Tolerance: Citizen tolerance deals with citizens' views and perceptions about 
issues that may not be to their liking. Therefore, citizen tolerance deals with citizens' 
rights and freedoms. As mentioned earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Five, in 
Namibia, the policy of reconciliation has helped reduce hatreds of the past. But there is 
653 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
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evidence in certain quarters of strong likes and dislikes, e.g. dislike ofhomosexuals654 but 
no gay person has been persecuted in the country. Indeed, society could tolcrate such 
likes and dislikes, as long as rights of individuals are not compromised. Not long ago, 
even in the United States, homosexuals could not come out of the closet, and the debate 
on the rights of homosexuals continues. In fact, in February 2004, President Bush 
appealed for the enactment of a Constitutional Amendment that would prohibit gays from 
marrying each other.655 Namibia is going through a slightly earlier phase of intolerance. 
There are also other issues that pose difficult dilemmas in assessing citizen tolerance. For 
instance, it is debatable whether the freedom of expression implies tolerance for 
. ., 656 
pornography or raCIst aSSOCIatIons. 
Constitutional Government 
The second basic principle of democracy is limitation of state power. Three indicators of 
constitutional government may be used, viz., rights and freedoms, rule of law or due 
process, and separation of powers. Namibia's constitution has been recognized "as the 
linchpin of Namibia's multiparty democracy.,,657 According to Bauer: 658 
This is because the Namibian constitution contains entrenched clauses 
guaranteeing fundamental human rights including freedoms of association and 
expression and an uncensored press. The constitution also includes the 
proscription of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and the death penalty and it 
enshrines the right of individual property ownership .... At its adoption in 1989, 
Namibia's constitution was hailed as one of the most democratic in Africa and the 
world. 
Bauer further observes that ''until fairly recently, the ruling party SWAPO had carefully 
observed provisions of the constitution." 
In the observance of the provisions of the Constitution, some criticism of the ruling party 
has come, because the government sought to amend the constitution to allow the 
654 "President Urges 'Gay Purge'," The Namibian (20 March 2001); "SWAPO Women add Voice on 
Homosexuality, Prostitution," The Namibian (28 May 2001). 
655 The New York Times (25 February 2004) 
656 Micheletti, Democratic Audit of Sweden. 
657 Economist Intelligence Unit (1998), Country Profile 1997-98, London, EeU, p. 7. 
658 Gretchen Bauer (2001), ''Namibia in the First Decade of Independence: How Democratic?" Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 27, 1, p. 37. 
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incumbent president to contest elections for the third tenn. Oespite the fact that the 
amendment was in line with the provisions stipulated in the constitution, and the 
incumbent won the third term in office with 76% majority, it was alleged by the critics 
that the implication for the third tenn would be increasing concentration of power within 
the Office of the President.6s9 This argument, however, is not supported by examples 
elsewhere, e.g., in the United Kingdom and Canada where there are no limits on the 
terms of office. However, there is one significant difference. Unlike the president of 
Namibia, prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada sit in the parliament and 
are accountable to it. Further details on this theme are provided in Chapter Four. 
While it is difficult to find correlation between the third term and the concentration of 
power in the Office of the President, there have been some instances where the President 
exceeded his authority. For instance, the President sent Namibian troops to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (ORC) without consultation with the cabinet. There were 
charges that "President Nujoma violated the constitution by failing to consult with 
Parliament before sending Namibian troops to the ORC in August 1998, given that 
Article 96 of the constitution calls for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful 
rneans.,,660 However, "this article ... is merely one of several 'principles of state policy' 
. b' d' ,,661 and therefore IS not m mg. 
In any case, as soon as the National Assembly met, I, as the prime minister and leader of 
government business in the parliament, made a statement infonning the legislators of the 
development. I stated that in the light of the fact that dissidents in the Caprivi region had 
received weapons from Savimbi's UNITA, it was a matter of national security for 
Namibia to ensure that a pro-UNIT A government did not take power in the ORC. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ibid. 
661 The Namibian (19 October 1998) 
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There was, of course, debate on the government's stand, but, as Keulder662 points out, the 
National Assembly is little more than the executive in disguise. He further points out that 
ministers and deputy ministers in the National Assembly outnumber ordinary SWAPO 
members of the National Assembly. As this would almost always be the case with any 
majority government, this criticism cannot be seen as a criticism of SWAPO but of the 
opposition for continually faring so badly in elections, and perhaps of the size of the 
National Assembly or cabinet. The argument certainly gives one pause that there might 
be a justification for combining the two houses of parliament and increasing the number 
of elected representatives in a unicameral parliament. 
The government also came under criticism for allegedly exceeding its powers in its 
response to the attempted Caprivi secession particularly with regard to the declaration of 
emergency proclamation. However, such allegations are baseless. Article 3(f) of the 
constitution empowers the president to "declare martial law or, if it is necessary for the 
defence of the nation, declare that a state of national defence exists: provided that this 
power shall be exercised subject to the terms of Article 26(7) thereof." In terms of Article 
26(7): "The President shall have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law. Martial 
law may be proclaimed only when a state of national defence involving another country 
exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia: provided that any proclamation of martial 
law shall eease to be valid if it is not approved within a reasonable time by a resolution 
passed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly." As some 
elements had taken up arms against the state in support of the Caprivi succession, the 
president was fully justified in issuing an emergency proclamation. 
Effective Government 
This principle concerns strong government. Effective government might be measured by 
three indicators, viz., resource control, decision-making capability, and outcome control. 
662 C. Keulder (1999), A Review of the Namibian Budget Process: A Report for the National Democratic 
Institute, Windhoek, Univ. of Namibia, pp. 5-7. See also ChristofMaletsky (2001), "Nujoma Keeps Nation 
Guessing OD Fourth Term," The Namibian (7 June 2001). 
.; 
I 
279 
Economic conditions are considered by many to have significant implications for the 
success or failure of democracy.663 Bratton and Van de Walle664 suggest that very few 
democracies in Africa appear economically prepared for democracy. They are of the view 
that Namibia is one of the democracies that is prepared for democracy. 
Ever since the country became independent, the government has attempted to manage the 
economy without resorting to excessive borrowing from outside the country.66S The 
budget deficit, which had increased to almost 6% in 1997-98, by 2003, once again had 
been brought within the manageable limit of 3%.666 Similarly, the annual real GDP 
growth rate, that averaged 5% during the first five years after independence, but 
subsequently dropped, is beginning to improve. However, the country continues to face 
the very serious challenge of diversifying its economy, and promoting distributive justice. 
So far, the government's record regarding decision-making capability has been quite 
effective, as it has a majority in the parliament. Even in instances where a consensus of 
opposition parties is desired, the government has consulted freely to secure consensus. 
Finally, effective government requires that the government have the capacity and 
capability to successfully initiate and implement laws. Bauer667 observes that 
a significant amount of what could only be called progressive legislation has been 
promulgated since the country gained its independence in 1990. Among other 
things, such legislation has facilitated political participation and representation, 
has empowered previously disadvantaged groups of people, has enabled the 
operation of many organizations of civil society, and has helped to keep 
government accountable. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Five, public servIce 
charters are being developed to enhance effectiveness and accountability of the 
government. 
663 Bauer "Namibia in the First Decade ofIndependence: How Democratic?" p 50. 
664 Bratton and de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, p. 240. 
66S Bank of Namibia (2000), Annual Report 2000, Windhoek, Bank of Namibia. 
666 Namibia, Ministry of Finance, Government Budgetsfor the years 1990 to 2003. 
667 Bauer "Namibia in the First Decade ofIndependence: How Democratic? p. 40 . 
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An attempt has been made to outline positive and negative developments that define the 
progress of democracy in Namibia. However, an overall assessment cannot be made in 
absolute terms. What is needed is the establishment of a foundation dedicated to 
assessing the progression of democracy from year to year to point out strengths and 
shortcomings - to inform and educate. As John Patten, a British government Minister 
said in 1991, constitutional codes "are meaningless unless they exist within a country 
which has a political culture that renders them viable ... the greatest protector of citizen's 
rights ... are citizens themselves .... The protector of freedom in the end is the political 
culture, not some document, however weighty.,,668 The African Peer Review Mechanism, 
initiated by the African Union, should be able to address some of these concerns if 
Namibia eventually decides to support it. 
Conclusion 
Since 1990, the Namibian government has been able to forge a stable, coherent, viable, 
and durable state. Democracy has been concretised. Reconciliation is largely a reality, 
and individual freedoms have been guaranteed. 
However, a number of issues still need to be addressed. Human rights will need to be not 
just rights but embedded in culture. There has, for instance, been some criticism of rights 
for homosexuals. Though there have been no instances of any victimization, it is 
necessary to promote a culture of tolerance, even if the majority of Namibians don't 
agree with certain social practices or lifestyles. 
Second, the process of decentralization needs to be continually pursued to enhance 
participation of citizens at the local level. Indeed, implementation of the policy of 
decentralization is seen to be essential for the growth and internalisation of democracy. 
This process needs to be accelerated. 
668 J. Patten (1991), Conservative Political Centre lecture: Political Culture: Conservatism and Rolling 
Constitutional Changes,London, CPC. 
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Third, there is a need to ensure that policies and institutions are not undennincd with 
every cabinet reshuffle. Recent events of cabinet reshuffle and the latest statements by the 
leadership in the government have cast doubt on the predictability of Namibia's future 
policies.669 The issue is not whether the president has the power to reshuffle the cabinet, 
for, according to the constitution, it is the president's prerogative to appoint and dismiss 
political office bearers, but the matter of concern is that frequent reshuffles create 
uncertainties and rob the ministers of the motivation to improve their ministries. 
Fourth, Namibia's democracy has so far not been fully tested. Though elections have 
been held regularly, Namibia has not gone through the succession process. However, now 
that the president has declared that he will no longer be available for candidacy in the 
2004 presidential elections, an important aspect of democracy may soon be tested. 
Anti-corruption initiatives have been taken up, but this aspect too needs to be 
strengthened by rethinking many of the processes to enhance accountability and reducing 
discretionary powers of state employees. The anti-corruption legislation has already been 
passed, and hopefully the necessary institutional structure for combating corruption will 
be put in place in the not too distant future. 
Fifth, Namibia's economy is stuck at an average annual GDP growth rate of some 3%. 
Resource-based, location-specific investment has been forthcoming, but skills-based 
investment, particularly in manufacturing, has stagnated despite the very generous 
investment incentives. Governments within southern Africa also need to focus on 
increased regional cooperation for developing national economies. In 2000, the African 
Union was fonned to enhance such cooperation, and a New Economic Partnership for 
African Development was launched under the African Union umbrella. Only time will 
tell whether this cooperation can take place equitably, as there is some concern that 
smaller countries with low skills bases could be inundated by South Africa, the largest 
economy in the southern African region. 
669 The Namibian (23, 24 and 25 August 2002). 
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Overall, Namibia has done well on the democratic front but needs to be vigilant. I also 
hope that, as time goes by, there will be more democracy within the party's dccision-
making mechanisms. Specifically, there is a need to bring about more democracy in the 
party's process of selection of candidates for elections or for any office. Current practice 
is that candidates for regional elections put forward by SWAPO branches in the regions 
are vetted by party leaders at SWAPO headquarters. This practice is not liked by party 
structures in the regions, is not democratic, and polarizes communities, particularly if 
party leaders at the headquarters favour a person who is not a native of that region. 
Imposition of a candidate is seen by the people in the regions as the negation of their own 
wish. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This case study was undertaken to examine the process of state formation in Namibia. 
This examination was divided into two distinct phases - the pre-independence phase and 
the independence phase. For the pre-independence phase, the starting hypothesis was 
that the West's manipulation of events leading to Namibia's independence, and 
Namibians' response to this manipulation were designed as acts of self-interest in 
managing change in Namibia. 
From the western states' perspective, this self-interest included access to resources, 
preservation of the interests of the settler communities, and regional geopolitical 
advantages. Actions of the West during the pre-independence era had far-reaching impact 
on the process of evolution and the nature of the Namibian state. Since independence, 
Namibians sought to build a modern state, but the influence of events preceding 
independence continued to impact the decisions political leaders of independent Namibia 
took to respond to the new challenges. 
Chapters Two and Three provide the colonial context within which various actors had 
played their parts. Namibia was colonized to give expression to imperial Germany's 
expansionist ambitions. The West endorsed the occupation of Namibia by Germany to 
keep the West's hegemony over Africa, through the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. After 
the occupation of Namibia, Germany proceeded to confiscate lands and cattle of the 
Blacks to facilitate the settlement of immigrant Germans, who were given not only free 
land but also substantial grants. With the help of forced labour of the blacks, German 
settlers prospered. 
Even when Germany lost its colonies after World War I, Namibia continued to be 
hostage to the European states' policy of ensuring continued regional hegemony. 
Consequently, Namibia continued to be occupied - this time by the British who were 
expected to administer Namibia as the League of Nations' 'C' Mandate. The British 
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exercised this mandate through South Africa. South Africa built on the policies initiated 
by Gennany and sought to integrate the territory into South Africa. Creation of 
'homelands' in the territory, under the policy of apartheid, was partly designed to achieve 
this objective, and partly to 'solve' the 'native' problem. 
The League of Nations, dominated by the European states, did little to asccrtain the desire 
of the inhabitants of the territory. Therefore, the response of the inhabitants of the 
territory to their oppression through the contract labour system, ethnic segregation, and 
political, social and economic disenfranchisement was the emergence of the liberation 
movement, SWAPO. SWAPO's actions for gaining the country's independence included 
mobilizing international opinion, and diplomatic and armed struggles. 
Various civil society organizations within and outside Namibia played a significant role 
in mobilizing the masses in this effort under the banner of SWAPO. As a result of 
SWAPO's efforts, and the changed composition of the United Nations, new hope for the 
inhabitants of the territory was ignited. However, South Africa's machinations and the 
West's Cold War imperatives continued to undermine Namibians' efforts towards 
securing independence. In fact, the West's preoccupation with the Cold War resulted in 
various western states exercising their veto powers at critical times for over two decades 
on issues related to Namibia. 
Time and again, efforts of the international community (the United Nations General 
Assembly, OAU, NAM, Frontline States) were thwarted by the West, because of its 
economic and geopolitical interests in the region. However, when the pressure of the 
international community increased at the diplomatic front, the western nations tried to 
manage an outcome that would be favourable to them. Attempts were made to maintain 
the status quo by deferring many decisions to South Africa. When many of the buffer 
states to the north, viz., Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique, wrested control from the 
colonizing powers and became independent, little attempt was made to stop South Africa 
from destabilizing these countries in an effort to contain what it saw as 'communist 
menace'. 
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In fact, keeping South Africa in good humour was an important ingredient of some of the 
international players' policy of retaining southern Africa in their sphere of influence. 
Many attempts at the implementation of the Plan for the Independence of Namibia also 
had false starts because of threats to the West's geopolitical interests. South Africa and its 
allies saw no particular advantage in going along as long as they had upper hand in 
Angola. 
In order to accommodate South Africa's security concerns, the Reagan administration 
devised the plan to link the Namibian question to the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. 
The linkage issue was in many ways a brilliant strategy, as it addressed South Africa's 
concerns and gave the Reagan administration important geopolitical advantage. 
Significantly, the linkage issue had coincided with Mr Gorbachev's coming to power in 
the Soviet Union. 
Independence for Namibia was, however, to await deeper involvement of the Cuban 
forces in southern Angola and the entrapment of South African Defence Forces there. 
President Castro informed me during my visit to Havana on 7 September 200 I, and 
almost certainly the West sensed it, that the Cubans were willing and ready to take the 
fight for the independence of Namibia to the Orange River and beyond. This turned the 
tide in favour of a negotiated settlement. 
The independence of Namibia, through the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 435 of 1978, also shifted the focus of the West towards influencing the 
outcome of elections, and imposing on Namibians a constitution drafted by the West. 
Subsequently, a compromise was reached with SWAPO agreeing to certain 
Constitutional Principles. After the Western Contact Group got what it wanted as the 
Constitutional Principles, it sought assurances of job guarantees for the Whites in the 
civil service. This was in addition to guarantees for the protection of property rights to 
ensure that the Whites did not lose their economic privileges. In addition, in promoting 
specific electoral systems, efforts were made by the members of the WCG and South 
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Africa to ensure that SWAPO did not get two-thirds majority in Constituent Assembly 
elections, and that, minority ethnic parties would be represented in the legislature. 
In order to ensure that the Constitutional Principles were adhered to at the time of 
drafting of the constitution, the settlement of the Namibian question stipulated that the 
constitution would have to be approved by the Security Council, thus, once again, 
allowing the western powers to exercise their veto if need be. Because of these 
restrictions, many compromises had to be made in the drafting of the constitution. 
SWAPO also felt that it was better to' compromise and secure the independence of the 
country as soon as possible. Therefore, SWAPO accepted the Constitutional Principles 
prescribed by the Western Contact Group. It also agreed to assume a R800 million debt, 
that South Africa had claimed it spent in Namibia (although, this debt was written off 
after a long delay when an ANC Minister of Finance was finally appointed), and the 
postponing of the reintegration of Walvis Bay and islands in the territorial waters of 
Namibia into Namibia, until the decisive change in government took place in South 
Africa. Subsequently, Walvis Bay and offshore islands were reintegrated into Namibia. 
Thus, constructs that directed South African, western and N amibian responses to the 
West's machinations were straightforward. South Africa and the West's actions were 
driven by their desire to 'formalize' their control over the territory, to maintain control 
over the territory's economy, to engineer transition to democracy that would be 
favourable to the West, and to continue to maintain some influence in independent 
Namibia. In this effort, interests of the indigenous population of the territory were often 
negated. Namibians, on the other hand, fought at the international fora and on the ground 
for their emancipation - to be able to shape their own destiny. 
The type of state that emerged in Namibia on 21 March 1990 is a consequence of various 
actors influencing events in their own interest. In the postcolonial era, too, the West 
continues to influence the options available to the new state. An understanding of these 
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influences is important if the government of independent Namibia is to emphasize the 
self-interest of the citizens of Namibia. 
For the government of independent Namibia, the consequences of such compromises 
have been far reaching. For instance, land reform has been made increasingly expensive 
ifnot impossible. Affirmative action within the civil service, an effort to balance the civil 
service, and attempts at reducing the size of the civil service were greatly hampered. 
Members of the WCG had made the demands, but did not think it necessary to provide 
the finances to carry out land reform and civil service reform initiatives. 
This study has been particularly focussed on helping to recognise the interaction of 
various players' self-interest in Namibia's state formation. This recognition allows the 
policy makers to develop better strategies for meeting various challenges of nation 
building. 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that actors will change, but the manipulation of events 
to serve their interests will continue with significant consequences for a country like 
Namibia. However, Namibians too can play their part in ensuring that they, knowing that 
self-interest is the prime driving force in international politics and economy, are ready to 
give weight to their own self-interests to ensure social, political and economic 
development on their own terms. 
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